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Abstract 
This dissertation analyses the institutional and organisational evolution of state-business relations in 
Malawi, from the colonial period (1891-1963) to the first decade of multiparty democracy (1994-2004), 
through the period of one-party authoritarianism (1964-1993). It contributes to three areas of political 
science. 
Firstly, it adds to empirical knowledge on the politics of state formation and state-building by illuminating 
how institutions governing state-business relations have been central to the evolution, form and 
character of the Malawian state. It provides some insights for building the capacity of states, especially 
in southern Africa, to deliver coherent and credible economic policies. Secondly, it demonstrates how 
the distribution and exercise of power between state and business elites, and the relative financial and 
political importance of the private business sector to the state, shape the institutional and organisational 
forms of state-business relations. It shows that these relations are profoundly political rather than 
technocratic products and reformers need to be more aware of this. Thirdly, it contributes to historical 
institutionalism by suggesting that  the concept of critical junctures should be defined based on people‟s 
expectations for, rather than effects of, institutional change; that history should be emphasised not just 
for explaining institutional continuities as is done by most historical institutionalists but also institutional 
discontinuities; and that in explaining existing patterns of institutions researchers need to be concerned 
more with the most recent predecessor institutions rather than going too far in the past.  
The analysis is organised in seven chapters, grouped into three parts. The first part presents the 
research problem, reviews the literature and outlines the methodological approach. The second part 
provides empirical narratives of state-business relations in each of the three periods. The third part 
spells out the implications of the work for the understanding of the politics of Malawian state-business 
relations, for state-business relations generally and historical institutionalism.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Business and the State in Malawi: The Problem, Context and Argument 
Introduction 
 
In the last few decades, the analysis of state-business relations (SBRs) has returned to the research 
agenda, particularly with respect to developing countries. One sustained argument that has emerged 
from the recent empirical analyses is that although their forms may vary widely between countries, 
synergistic SBRs are a necessary condition for economic progress, especially in conditions of late 
development. Besides engendering trust between state and business elites, such relations are known 
to improve information exchange between decision-makers and enhance the credibility of governments 
in the realm of economic policy making and implementation, hence contributing to a healthy investment 
climate that enables economic growth and development. However, SBRs take different forms at 
different times in different countries and they yield different outcomes. Most of the literature on the 
subject has been concerned with the effects of these relations on economic outcomes. But how do the 
formal and informal institutional arrangements that shape relations between states and businesses form 
and evolve over time? And what insights can the analysis provide for the theories of SBRs and for the 
analysis of institutional evolution generally? These two questions are the central concerns of this thesis. 
The questions are addressed by analysing the evolution of SBRs in Malawi. The analysis compares 
three time periods: the colonial period (1891-1964), the post-independence one-party, authoritarian era 
(1964-1993), and the first decade of the era of multi-party democracy (1994-2004).This periodization is 
premised on the observation that the way in which state power was organised in each period shaped 
the institutional configuration of  state-society relations generally and SBRs in particular. However, 
scholars analyse different (though related) phenomena under the banner of SBRs. Consequently, 
discourses and research on the subject are theoretically diffuse.  Before setting out the factors that 
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motivated the analysis of Malawian SBRs and the key claims of the thesis, I provide in the following 
section a conceptualisation of SBRs that the thesis uses. 
1.1. Conceptualising state-business relations 
Although varying conceptions of what constitutes the state have informed the various definitions of 
SBRs, these relations have been defined mostly in terms of what constitutes business. For instance, 
business is variously conceived as part of an encompassing notion of capital, as in marxist analyses of 
political economy and globalisation discourses; as a sector, as in the studies of Shafer (1997), Wilks 
and Wright (1987) and  Evans (1995); as a firm, particularly with regard to large companies, as detailed 
by Lindblom (1977) and earlier by Dahl (1959); as an association or interest group, as in the works of 
Olson (1965), Cawson (1985), MacIntyre (1994), Maxfield and Schneider (1997) and many others; and 
as a network, - a conception detailed in the works of Kazenstein (1977), Atkinson and Coleman (1989) 
and Wilks and Wright (1987b). Each of these conceptions provided useful theoretical lenses for this 
study, but each was too narrow to provide a satisfactory treatment of the research questions at hand. 
This thesis is concerned with a range of interactions between the state in its multiple manifestations, on 
the one hand, and business in all its complexity, on the other. Thus, my conception of SBRs is generic 
and neutral, and business is irreducible to any one of the concepts identified above. By state-business 
relations, I mean the formal and informal institutional and organisational relations between state elites 
and their agencies, on the one hand, and business elites and their organisations, on the other. Thus, 
SBRs can be unitary in that business can interface with the state as an individual firm, or do so 
collectively, in which case business firms interface with the state through a sectoral grouping like the 
Tobacco Exporters Association of Malawi (TEAM) or through a peak association like the Malawi 
Confederation of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry (MCCCI). Further, the relations can exhibit 
multiple points of interaction, formal and informal, covering all these levels simultaneously. As chapters 
four to six will show, the rules of engagement often vary at each level of interaction and have 
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implications for the formation, maintenance or change of institutions governing SBRs. However, this 
thesis is not concerned with just any relationship between any business and any manifestation or level 
of the state. The focus is on those relationships, collective or unitary, that had the potential or actual 
ability to shape, sustain, change or simply reflect the institutional structure of SBRs at the national level.  
1.2. Background: the motivation to analyse state-business relations 
SBRs are not a new theme in political studies. They have received analytical attention in political 
economy dating back to Smith (1776) and Marx and Engels (1848), to mention only precedents of two 
approaches to the subject. In recent times, they have become topical in studies of economic growth 
and development, growing from the ambit of the state-market debate in academia and among 
development practitioners and financiers. A review of the debate shows that the role of the state in the 
economy has undergone several permutations since the end of World War II (Fritz and Menocal, 2007; 
Onis 1991; Chang, 2002) with corresponding oscillations in development policy and practice from state-
led development, predominant in the 1950s, to the market-led development propagated in the 1980s 
and beyond. Other analysts, for example, Schneider (1998:101-2) have even argued that the opposite 
of state-led development is not market-led development but business-led development. The debate 
created polar analytical positions between those who championed the hegemony of unfettered private 
business enterprise and the proponents of the leading role of the state. A middle ground, which has 
mainstreamed state-business relations and motivated research for this thesis, has come about through 
the institutional analyses of development practice, covering all regions of the developing world but with 
disproportionately little focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Some of the important works in this regard are 
Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), Evans (1995), Maxfield and Schneider (1997), Handley (2008), Taylor 
(2007), MacIntyre (1994) and Kingstone (1999).  
These analyses have concluded that one important explanation of the variations in economic 
performance among developing countries is the nature of the relations between business and the state. 
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This scholarship has shown that SBRs yield (sometimes) diametrically opposite results across space 
and time. For instance, collaborative arrangements between the state and the private sector  in South 
Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Mauritius and Botswana are widely held to have been responsible for 
unprecedented economic transformation. Such relations have been described as „growth coalitions‟ or 
„reforms coalitions‟ (Brautigam et al, 2002; Taylor, 2007). Elsewhere, for example, The Philippines, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, the nature of SBRs is held as one plausible explanation for economic 
stagnation. In such cases, the main diagnostic is the nature and extent of collusion between business 
and state elites and how they militate against growth by yielding what would pass for „distributive 
coalitions‟ (Olson, 1982). In India, from 1980 onwards, the relationship is said to have accounted for 
brisk economic growth but also rising inequalities (Kohli, 2007).  
The diversity of SBR outcomes outlined above raises a set of questions with which this thesis is 
concerned: Where do the institutions governing SBRs come from? Why and how do they persist, 
sometimes even when their economic and social outcomes are inefficient or sub-optimal? For those 
that change, when, why and how do they change? The variations in the institutional and organisational 
patterns of SBRs and the  diversity of their  outcomes imply that understanding the evolution of SBRs is 
important not only for explaining the development paths of countries but also for understanding the 
nature of the state, economy and society. The way in which state authority is organised and effected 
shapes the incentives for social and economic actors, incentives that, in turn, influence their behaviours 
and interests, and contribute directly or indirectly to patterns of institutional formation, maintenance and 
change. Furthermore, it is an established fact in studies on the fiscal sociology of states that   sources 
of state revenue shape the political and economic character of states in its relations to the economy 
and to groups of social actors such as labour unions and business associations. Similarly, the structural 
aspects of the economy, including its historical context, shapes how the business community organises 
itself in furtherance of its interests. 
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This dissertation builds on this established knowledge and shows that SBRs are themselves central in 
shaping the politics and patterns of state-society relations, depending not just on the financial but also 
the perceived political importance of the business sector to the state. The analysis demonstrates that 
attempts to understand the nature of states, economies and societies in developing countries without 
an appreciation of the politics of the institutional and organisational patterns of relations between the 
state and the private sector, between different segments of the private sector and between ministerial 
departments and other bureaucratic or political agencies within the state, are bound to be shallow and 
therefore less useful for informing reforms in political and economic governance. 
Thus, rather than attempting an explanation of the economic development trajectory of Malawi from the 
perspective of SBRs, this thesis illuminates a cognate area of institutional theory that grapples with 
explaining the provenance, resilience and change of institutions. This focus was motivated by an 
observed lack of sufficient concern in the institutionalist literature with the origins, maintenance and 
change of institutions and its disproportionate concentration on the effects of the institutions. For 
example, Kang (2002) found that the state and the business sector in South Korea were „mutual 
hostages‟ in a relationship characterised by „a balance of power‟ and that this relationship gave way to 
unintended developmental effects. Other analysts, for example, Krueger (1974), Bhagwati (1982), 
Hellman et al (2000), and other neo-liberal publications have emphasised modes of interaction and 
attendant forms of corruption, ranging from unproductive rent-seeking behaviour to outright „state 
capture‟1, that come into place when government and the business sector, or parts of it, collude rather 
than collaborate. For the African state, the literature has emphasised its huge but distortive role in the 
economy and its predatory tendencies (Bates, 2001; Cheibub, 1998; Basil, 1992; Fatton, 1992; Evans, 
1989 and 1995). However, rarely has the question been raised about the formation, resilience and 
                                                             
1
 Hellman et al (2000) define „state capture‟ as  the capacity of the business community (either at macro- or meso- level) to 
shape and affect the formation of the basic rules of the game (i.e. laws, regulations and decrees) through illicit and non-
transparent private payments to public officials and politicians. 
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change of the institutions governing SBRs. The question, for example, is how the institutions that 
yielded „mutual hostages‟ and „balanced (their) power‟ in South Korea or the predatory and collusive 
institutions in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) were formed and maintained.  
Among the few commentators that have addressed this question, there are at least two observations to 
be made. Most explanations have been formulated from a functionalist perspective, for example, North 
(1991), Williamson (1985) and Keohane (1984). While these explain the maintenance and change of 
institutions to some extent, they do not address the question of the origins of those institutions but 
deduce them from the functions the institutions appear to serve. Their predominant concern has been 
with explanations of political and economic “equilibrium within the context of a given set of institutions” 
(Kreps, 1990:530) and not necessarily the origins of those institutions. Other analysts have dealt with 
the question more directly but have not done so from the perspective of SBRs. For example, Thelen 
(2002 and 2004) was concerned with the formation of institutions of vocational skills training, Lindner 
and Rittberger (2003) focused on the constitutional arrangements of the European Union (EU), and 
Riker (1995) was concerned with the crafting of the United States Constitution. Nonetheless, there are 
only a very few detailed case studies and even fewer that include informal institutions. However, some 
analysts, for example, Taylor (2007) and Handley (2008), have provided some useful insights into this 
question and have done so from the perspective of SBRs in the African context. However, both were 
concerned less with institutional formation and change than with the politics of economic reform in the 
neo-liberal era. 
In short, most of the literature on SBRs reflects a failure to explicitly and sufficiently link political 
compulsions to the provenance of institutions. Yet this consideration is important as it has become clear 
from historical comparative analyses that economic and political institutions of any society reflect 
political settlements of one form or another among the society‟s elites (Doner et al, 2005; Khan, 1997). 
As subsequent chapters will show, at the core of the formation, maintenance and change of institutions 
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governing SBRs is the exercise of power and influence, formally or informally, of both the state and the 
business sector on each other, illustrating the claim by Soltan (1998) that institutions are products of 
politics. This historical case analysis of Malawian SBRs contributes to our understanding of how 
political interests and configurations of state and business elites shape the formation and evolution of 
the political institutional architecture that governs state-society relations, particularly SBRs.  
1.3. Case selection: Why Malawi? 
Geographical context 
Malawi consists of a narrow stretch of land in south-east Africa bordering Tanzania in the north and 
north-east, Zambia in the west and northwest and Mozambique in the south and south-east. It has a 
total area of 118,484 square kilometres, of which 94,276 is land and the remainder is water. The 
population in 2008 was estimated at 13,066,320, with an average density of 139 up from 85 in 1987 
and 105 in 1998 (National Statistics Office, NSO, 2008). The population is ethnically diverse, and the 
main groups include the Chewa, Nyanja, Tumbuka, Lomwe, Sena, Tonga, Ngoni, Ngonde, Asians and 
Europeans. The country has three regions, originally imposed by the colonial government for purposes 
of administration. These regions became implicitly politically significant during the one-party state of Dr. 
Banda and explicitly so from 1994 with the rebirth of multiparty democracy. Population distribution by 
region has consistently shown the south to be the most populated and the north to be the least 
populated. The 2008 census showed that the south has 45 per cent, the centre has 42 per cent and the 
north has 13 per cent of the population. Although the figures have varied between censuses, the 
pattern of distribution remains the same. A particularly important aspect of this pattern is its coincidence 
with the configurations of political power, especially between 1994 and 2004. During this period, each 
of the three regions was associated with a particular political party: the south with the United 
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Democratic Front (UDF), the centre with the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the north with the 
Alliance for Democracy (AFORD)2. 
Malawi was chosen for this study because of the paradoxes and contradictions that its economic and 
political trajectory presents to institutional theory. The country‟s record of economic and social 
development is far from being impressive despite efforts at development planning dating back at least 
to 19303 and policy reforms under the auspices of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Given the relevance of SBRs in explaining patterns of economic development, the dismal social 
and economic record of Malawi motivated this study. 
Economic and social context 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world and belongs to the World Bank‟s category  of „low 
income‟ countries4. By 2006, its GNI per capita was $170, with GDP pegged at $2.2 billion. UNDP 
figures suggest average annual growth rates of GDP per capita of -0.4 per cent between 1975 and 
2004 and an insignificant 0.9 per cent between 1990 and 2004. In 2006, exports stood at 28 per cent of 
GDP, against an import ratio of 52.8 per cent in a context of exchange rate volatility.5 The country is 
chronically dependent on aid, which amounted to $575.3 million in 2005 and averaged about 17 per 
cent of GDP between 1995 and 2005. Industry‟s (value added) contribution to GDP reached 19.8 per 
                                                             
2 From the build-up to the 2004 election up to the 2009 election, there were fissures and fissions within and between political 
parties, including political defections among elected members of parliament. In the 2009 general election, a new party, the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won a landslide victory. Its margin of victory was such that the close identification of 
regions with parties has weakened as party and regional loyalties have shifted. 
3 On 2nd January 1930, the colonial government published what was probably the first development plan for the country, 
Nyasaland Protectorate: Development Programme (1931-1934). This was followed by The Nyasaland Development 
Programme in 1948, developed by what was called a „Post-war Development Committee‟ that was mandated to devise a 
development strategy for the protectorate after the Second World War. These were later followed by periodic Statements 
of Development Policies (DEV POL.) during the MCP era, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) during the UDF 
decade, and currently, The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) (2006-2011). 
4 According to the World Bank‟s income-based categorisation, a country is in the low income group if its GNI per capita is 
equal to or less than $905; lower middle income if it is greater than $905 but equal to or less than $3,595; upper middle 
income if GNI per capita is greater than $3,595 but equal to or less than $11,115; and high income if GNI per capita is 
equal to or greater than $11,115. 
5 For example, The Malawi Kwacha to the US dollar decreased in value from under MK20 in 1994 to MK140 in 2005. 
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cent in 2006, with gross capital formation at 16.3 per cent of GDP after averaging 12.6 percent annually 
between 1994 and 2004 – significantly below the average for sub-Saharan Africa. Agriculture continues 
to be the mainstay of the economy. It contributes over 40 per cent of GDP, over 80 per cent of total 
employment, about 90 per cent of foreign exchange and is the main source of livelihood for the majority 
of the poor and is therefore critical to any strategy of broadly shared economic growth and poverty 
reduction. The manufacturing sector is quite small and comprises mainly agro-processing, contributing 
between 10 and 12 per cent to GDP. The Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee, MVAC (2006) 
suggests that there was no growth in this sector between 1996 and 2005. The formal private sector is 
also small, consisting of a handful of oligopolistic firms and a number of medium and small enterprises 
(Ebony, 2001; World Bank Regional Programme on Enterprise Development, 2006; MVAC, 2006).  
Poverty remains deep, severe and widespread. According to MVAC (2006) more than 52 per cent of 
the population were living below the poverty line in 2005, and about 22 per cent (one in every five 
persons) were living in „ultra poverty‟, that is  they could not afford to meet the minimum daily 
recommended food requirements. The incidence of poverty is greatest in rural areas, especially in 
southern and northern regions (Integrated Household Survey, IHS, 1998; MVAC, 2006).The distribution 
of income is heavily skewed, with an inequality index (Gini co-efficient) estimated at 0.38 in 2006, 
reflecting profound inequities in access to assets, services and opportunities across the population. The 
richest 10 per cent of the population had a median per capita income that was eight times higher than 
that of the poorest 10 per cent and three times higher than the overall median income per capita for the 
country. Corruption is thought to have been intensive and limited to a narrow elite during the one-party 
era (Chingaipe and Leftwich, 2007) but extensive from the mid-1990s. For instance, Transparency 
International‟s corruption perception indices show that between 1997 and 2004 corruption progressively 
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worsened6. A local study commissioned by the Malawi Government in 2005 found that 90 per cent of 
Malawians considered corruption to be a serious problem, with 70 per cent believing it had become 
worse between 1995 and 2005. 34 per cent of businesses who had made sales to the public sector 
reported that it was common to pay gratification to public officials. The survey further found that 
politicians were seen as having the least integrity and that gratification was commonly shared among 
public officials (Millennium Consulting Group, 2006). 
Explanations of this palpably poor record have been in terms of economic policies both at macro- and 
sectoral levels and external shocks (Harrigan, 2001; Mhone, 1987; Bwalo, 1997; Ettema, 1984; the 
World Bank, 1981a, 1981b, 1982). Where institutional explanations have been attempted, apart from a 
few (for example, Chinsinga, 2002 and 2006; Pryor and Chipeta, 1990), they have been concerned with 
government service delivery systems within what Leftwich (2007:106) calls a „technicist approach‟ to 
governance absolved of politics. No explanation has been proffered from an SBR perspective per se. 
Although Harrigan (2001), Mhone (1987) and Pryor (1990) have alluded to SBRs, they have done so 
mostly with respect to the one-party period. However, such an explanation would require establishing 
more firmly the institutional and organisational patterns of SBRs first, and that is what this thesis 
accomplishes. 
Furthermore, an earlier scoping study, Chingaipe and Leftwich (2007) showed that changes in the 
formal institutions of the Malawian state were associated with observed changes in the patterns of 
SBRs, but the formal and informal institutional mechanisms that account for that association were not 
spelled out. The patterns of SBRs associated with the last two periods appeared to run against 
conventional theory relating to the macro-political institutional contexts of the periods. For instance, Dr. 
Banda and his MCP regime were known for a capitalist ideology, often mediated by some degree of 
                                                             
6 The corruption perception index relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country 
analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and zero (highly corrupt).The first assessment for Malawi was in 1997 
when the index was 4.1 and continued to fall. By 2004, it was 2.8. These figures are culled from various annual reports 
available at www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/. 
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populism (Harrigan, 2001; Short, 1974). In theory, such a regime would be expected to be sympathetic 
to the private sector in general. But the regime turned out to be highly predatory and suffocated not only 
the development of civil society but also the private business sector. Why was this? What mechanisms 
were used by the state to dominate society, in particular the business sector? What institutional 
arrangements and what political imperatives explain this apparent unconventional mix of ideology and 
praxis? These are some of the questions that are answered in chapter five.  
Similarly, in the 1990s, democratisation promised democracy and economic progress. A new 
government, the UDF, largely composed of business tycoons and self-styled democrats, embarked on 
institutional reforms aimed at developing a liberal and democratic political economy. In design, the 
reforms would translate into collaborative, synergistic and developmental relations between the state 
and business interests. However, in practice, the UDF proved to be a highly collusive and corrupt 
regime, approximating what Hutchcroft (1993 and 1994) described as „booty capitalism‟ in the case of 
the Philippines. Anders (2005) described the Malawian phenomenon as „the democratisation of 
appropriation‟ while Muula and Chanika (2006) characterised the 1994-2004 period simply as „Malawi‟s 
lost decade‟. How did the collusive institutions, especially with respect to SBRs, evolve within a formal 
democratic institutional framework that was aimed at increasing transparency and accountability? What 
political imperatives sustained them? These are some of the empirical questions that are addressed in 
chapter six. 
There have also been claims about the continuity of colonial policies and institutions into the post-
colonial period, several of which have implications for SBRs. For example, Pachai (1973) showed the 
effect of the colonial legacy on land policies; Nzunda (1989) pointed out that the company law instituted 
in 1908 to serve the interests of British imperialism remained in force for twenty-two years after 
independence; Harrigan (2001) pointed to the continuation of a colonial agro-based development 
strategy with its attendant institutions. While historical works on Malawi have scattered allusions to 
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various aspects that are of interest to SBRs generally, no scholarly work (so far as I know) has 
attempted a systematic analysis of the evolution of the institutional and organisational patterns of 
colonial SBRs. Thus, despite citation of institutional continuities in several domains, it has not been 
clear whether the post-colonial pattern of SBRs was influenced by the colonial legacy in the same way 
as other institutions. This thesis shows that historical legacies have been important in shaping patterns 
of SBRs in subsequent periods by providing rationales more for institutional discontinuity and 
modification than continuities. 
In short, Malawi provides an excellent case study for the evolution of institutional and organisational 
patterns of SBRs in different political institutional set-ups. By addressing the questions sketched above, 
this thesis makes a substantial empirical contribution to the understanding of how state-level politics 
shaped SBRs in the country, and also provides deeper insights about the processes of institutional 
formation, maintenance and change more generally, as highlighted below. 
1.4. Overview of the analytical and methodological framework 
In analysing the evolution of the institutional and organisational patterns of Malawian SBRs, this thesis 
uses the approach of historical institutionalism. The inspiration to use this approach draws from Karl 
Marx‟s observation that the men (and women) who make history “do not make it just as they please; 
they do not make it in circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of past generations weighs like a 
nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be revolutionising themselves and 
things, creating something that did not exist before... they conjure up the spirits of the past to their 
service” (Marx,1869 online version, not paginated). Historical institutionalism provided a set of concepts 
that helped to dig beneath the institutional arrangements to enable an analytic narrative of patterns of 
SBRs in each of the political epochs to reveal the political imperatives, interests and relationships of 
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state and business elites that created and supported the institutional arrangements or resisted and 
sought to change them, and the historical context in which these processes transpired. 
Historical institutionalism has been used by scholars to analyse institutional evolution in different social 
spheres, for example, Skocpol (1979), Collier and Collier (2002) and Thelen (2004). However, one of its 
analytical tools, critical junctures, has lacked conceptual precision. It has not been clear just what 
factors determine the criticality of any juncture. Consequently, its analytical relationship with a sister 
concept, path dependence, has been nebulous, giving the impression (rightly so) that historical 
institutionalism is an inconsistent approach for exploring questions of institutional formation, continuity 
and change. This has been the case because existing definitions of critical junctures foreclose 
institutional continuity and emphasise breakdown and change, while those of path dependence 
emphasise institutional continuity even across critical junctures. Using the insights from the analysis of 
Malawian SBRs I suggest a reformulation of the concept of critical junctures in a manner that resolves 
the conceptual tension with the concept of path dependence. In doing so, this thesis contributes to 
making historical institutionalism a more consistent approach. 
The key concepts that are used in the analysis are critical junctures, power asymmetries, institutions 
and institutional architecture, and politics. This section provides an overview of the operational 
definitions of these concepts but I present the analytical and methodological approach more 
comprehensively in chapter three. 
Critical junctures 
Several scholars have defined critical junctures differently. While some definitions are loose and make 
the concept porous, others have sought to delimit its scope using arbitrary criteria (more on this in 
chapter three). Consequently, its direct empirical referents have been elusive to pin down precisely. 
Nonetheless, it is a commonly used concept in political analysis, recently illustrated in such works as 
Collier and Collier (2002), Mahoney (2000), Pierson (2004) and Hogan (2006). I define critical junctures 
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as the occasional points or periods of time when political and/or economic processes presented 
(virtually unexpected) windows of opportunity for departures from the existing institutional set-up. This 
definition focuses attention on episodes of institutional upheaval that were expected to engender a 
transformation of the core of the institutions governing state-business relations. The concept is used to 
illuminate how fundamental changes in the political institutional architecture of the state shaped the 
formation and change of SBR institutions within and across the periods of study. 
Power asymmetries between the state (and its elites) and the business sector (and its elites)  
This refers to the distribution, ownership and control of economic and political resources among elite 
clusters which become the bases of their power in contesting the formation, maintenance or change of 
institutions. Power asymmetries impose constraints on or provide opportunities to different actor-
groups. They are used in the analysis to show how they influenced actor-groups to engage in political 
activity that shaped the institutional and organisational patterns of SBRs. The use of this concept draws 
mainly on the works of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a and 2006b) and Mann (1981). The focus was 
on ongoing struggles within, and also over, prevailing institutional arrangements. The concept 
illuminates gradual forms of institutional change in the practice of SBRs within each period. 
Institutions and political institutional architecture 
I adopt the definition of institutions proposed by Douglas North. Institutions mean the man-made 
constraints or „rules of the game‟ that structure human interaction in political, economic or other social 
spheres (North, 1990). Institutional architecture refers to “the complex totality of a country‟s basic 
political institutions – the rules, usually enshrined in a constitution and other key laws that determine 
how the leadership of a state is configured and how state authority is exercised” (Macintyre, 2003:1). 
The concept is used in assessing the extent of concentration or dispersal of governmental decision-
making power in each period and how the distribution of power shaped patterns of SBRs.  
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Politics 
There are many definitions in the literature. For this study, I adopt the one provided by Leftwich (2005), 
i.e. all the activities of cooperation, negotiation and conflict, within and between societies, whereby 
people go about organising the use, production or distribution of human, natural and other resources in 
the course of the production or reproduction of their biological and social life. This definition broadens 
the scope of political activity and enables examination of a whole range of interactions between the 
state and the business community. 
Data was collected from a range of primary and secondary documents as well as in-depth interviews 
with key informants who included serving and retired politicians, businessmen and leaders of peak 
business associations, details of which are presented in chapter three. Data was interpreted using an 
integrated, empirically-based approach that drew eclectically from process tracing, discourse and 
content analysis and analytic comparison. 
1.5. Overview of key claims 
The key claims of the thesis are in three categories. The first set relates to empirical contributions to the 
understanding of Malawian SBRs and the role of politics in shaping them. The second set relates to 
new insights that the analysis brings to SBR theory. The third set relates to historical institutionalism. 
The empirical analysis demonstrates that the evolution of the institutional and organisational patterns of 
SBRs dovetailed with the politics of state formation in the colonial era, nation-building in the post-
independence period and state/polity reforms in the era of multiparty democracy. Consequently, the 
analysis of Malawian SBRs is as much about the formation of institutions governing these relations as it 
is about the nature of the relations in the evolving institutional arrangements. The analysis further 
demonstrates that studying the politics of SBRs offers a fresh perspective into the character of states 
and is a useful way for comparing governments or regimes. It shows why SBRs are at the core of both 
political science and economics and how they are crucial for understanding state-society relations. 
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This thesis claims that colonial SBRs were mostly characterised by consultations, negotiations, 
bargaining and cooperation between the British administration and the European commercial and 
agricultural interests. While there were several ways for exchanging views, public-private policy 
dialogue was consolidated through direct representation of the European commercial and agricultural 
interests in the Legislative Council (LEGCO). The Indian and African business communities were 
marginalised and had no regular or meaningful policy voice and space. I describe this pattern of SBRs 
as particularistic concertation. It was a collaborative governance pact characterised by a balance of 
power between the state and the European business sector, sometimes against the interests of Indian 
and African communities. Institution formation and policy-making, maintenance and change entailed 
processes of negotiation and hard-ball bargaining.  
A new approach to politics and the economy characterised the post-independence pattern of SBRs. 
Unlike in the colonial period, political power became concentrated in the president who enjoyed 
unimpeded executive authority across the public-private domains. Institutional formation and policy-
making were more by presidential fiat than dialogue and the state‟s business regulatory regime virtually 
substituted the discipline of the market. Through its enterprises, the state itself dominated the business 
sector. It subordinated private enterprise by creating and co-opting the African Businessmen 
Association (ABAM) into the political party while subjecting all private enterprise including those of non-
Africans to a perpetual insecurity of property rights that was sanctified by forfeiture laws. I describe this 
pattern as neo-patrimonial state hegemony.  
Throughout the first decade of multiparty democracy, the institutional arrangements and practice of 
SBRs were in a flux as much as were those governing macro-level politics and the economy. While 
there were efforts by several state agencies and the business community to institutionalise public-
private dialogue for the making of economic policy and development strategies, there also evolved a 
pattern of non transparent and collusive relations between business owners and the party elites that 
 17 
 
 
dominated government and national politics. I describe this dual pattern of SBRs as nascent 
concertation and politically embedded cronyism and collusion. 
The changing institutional configurations of SBRs, from one political epoch to another, depended, first 
on the dominant political ideas for organising state-society relations. State and business elites engage 
in the creation or re-engineering of rules and practices that align with the dominant ideas. For instance, 
imperialism in the colonial period, nationalism in the one-party period and democracy after 1994, 
provided the ideational frameworks which directly shaped patterns of SBRs. Not only did these ideas 
shape choices of development strategies which in turn affected SBRs, they also affected how the 
business sector organised itself vis-a-vis the state. In each period were business groups that opposed 
key elements of the dominant ideas and were therefore at odds with the state while other groups were 
in agreement with the dominant ideas. Within the business sector, parochial identities such as race and 
political affiliations not only fragmented the business community but also influenced state attitudes 
towards different segments of the business community. Consequently, the nature of institutional 
arrangements for SBRs depended on the balance of power between the contending groups. In each 
period, those business groups that were on the same side with the government based on these 
parochial identities enjoyed better SBRs. 
Furthermore, macro-level politics shaped the way in which the authority of the state was configured and 
exercised, which in turn directly shaped variations in SBRs. The political institutional architecture 
determined the nature of policy voice and space for the business sector.  Thus, from a colonial 
imperialist bureaucratic state that sided with European commerce and agriculture, the state turned into 
a leviathan in the one-party period emphasising its sovereign authority and the obligation of all other 
social actors to submit to its hegemonic power in the economy and politics; before degenerating into a 
soft state characterised by a lack of discipline and low levels of law observance and enforcement in the 
first decade of multiparty democracy. Decentralisation of state authority yielded organisational pluralism 
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within the state, leading to competition among agencies and departments for visibility and importance. 
Not only did this weaken the capacity of the state to deliver coherent and credible policies, it also made 
the individual agencies/departments vulnerable to narrow influences in the business community. 
The changing nature of politics and the the state resulted in business associations changing from being 
vigorous representatives of business demands  and vehicles of political representation in the colonial 
period, to mere transmitters of government policy to the business community in the one-party period, 
and to a weak and fluid combination of these roles in the democratic period. Thus, the evolution of the 
structure, power and ideology of the business sector, across the three periods, was profoundly bound 
up with political process of organising and re-organising state-economy and state-society relations. The 
differences in the institutional and organisational patterns of SBRs were rooted in the distribution and 
exercise of power between the state and the business sector. The national political institutional 
architecture shaped opportunities and incentives for state and business elites in each period to create 
and sustain the distinct institutional and organisational forms of SBRs. 
This thesis claims and demonstrates that synergistic SBRs thrive on mutual dependence between the 
state and the business sector in achieving their political and economic objectives. In particular, attitudes 
of state elites towards the business sector are shaped by their perceptions of the political and financial 
usefulness of the business sector (or parts of it) to the objectives of state elites. In the colonial period 
SBRs were characterised by acrimony when the administration was dependent almost exclusively on 
the largesse of the British South African Company (BSAC). Concertation only emerged in the context of 
an evolving relationship of dependence between the administration and the wider European community 
after financial relations with the BSAC had been severed. The administration needed to raise revenues 
and the constitutional changes of 1907 rested the political legitimacy of the administration on the 
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enduring consent of the European community. The colonial state could no longer afford a hostile 
relationship with the European business community. 
Conversely, in the one-party period the state dominated society and economy leading to the relatively 
low financial and political usefulness of the private business sector to the state. Furthermore, low levels 
of capitalist development in a context of nationalist politics compelled the state to engage in populist 
strategies to indigenise the business sector in ways that made the entire business community 
dependent on the goodwill of the president. The government generated most of its revenues, relied on 
foreign aid and preyed on private capital without fear of immediate political repercussions. After 1994, 
the UDF government depended on the business community for revenues as well as a political 
constituency. Supported by the rhetoric of neoliberal economic reforms, the UDF regime was pro-
business in its policy orientation. However, interdependence was shaped by narrow, particularistic 
interests that led to collusive relations. The analysis illustrates how politics matter for relations between 
the state and the business community, between segments of the business community and between 
state agencies. It further demonstrates the roles of agency, i.e. leaders, elites and coalitions, in the 
formation, maintenance and change of institutions for political and economic governance and how 
SBRs are central for understanding the politics of economic growth, state-building and patterns of 
social inclusion and exclusion, all of which shape the nature of states, patterns of economic governance 
and patterns of state-society relations generally. 
In terms of SBR theory, the thesis provides fresh insights on at least three aspects. Firstly, it suggests 
that regardless of whether the state is authoritarian or democratic, policy concertation in SBRs require 
that decision-making authority within the state should neither be too concentrated as was the case 
during the one-party period nor too fragmented as during the first decade of multiparty democracy. 
Either extreme presents political problems that preclude the emergence of benign institutions for public-
private policy dialogue. Secondly, current SBR theory advocates for encompassing business 
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associations capable of pursuing non particularistic policies that guarantee long term economy-wide 
efficiency. This is all good but the empirical evidence in this thesis presents a paradox in that the 
formation of such encompassing associations has been at the behest of the state. Even when the 
business sector is able on its own to develop encompassing associations, access (or lack of it) to policy 
dialogue with state elites, shapes how the business sector organises itself. Thus, unless the state is 
interested in the existence of peak, encompassing associations, the business sector is more likely to 
suffer from organisational pluralism, defined by such parochial identities as sector of business activity, 
race and political affiliations, and be unable to cultivate a pan-business front. Lastly, collusion in SBRs 
is a common phenomenon although its degree varies from one country to another or from one regime 
to another. Current SBR theory emphasises the enactment and implementation of business competition 
laws. Such legislation is obviously important in a functioning market economy. The Malawi case 
suggests that fending off collusion in SBRs is dependent on the nature of the state and the attitude of 
its elites and business leaders towards transparency and accountability. The existence of competition 
law on its own does not prevent harmful collusion in situations where elites straddle business and 
politics and political financing is unregulated. 
With respect to the analytical framework of historical institutionalism, this thesis claims that the 
dominant conceptualisation of critical junctures has led scholars down the wrong analytical path in 
explaining institutional formation, maintenance and change. Instead of defining critical junctures on the 
basis of long term effects of institutional change or as periods when an existing institutional 
arrangement breaks down or as when a significant off-path change takes place, this thesis suggests 
that a definitive element of critical junctures is the people‟s expectations for institutional change in a 
particular direction. This conceptualisation, whose analytical usefulness is supported by the institutional 
evolution of Malawian SBRs helps to explain not only institutional breakdown but also gradual 
institutional change and institutional continuity despite periods of upheaval. It reconciles the concepts of 
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critical junctures and path dependence, opens up explanatory room for the role of agency and makes 
historical institutionalism a consistent approach for explaining institutional evolution. Furthermore, most 
historical institutionalist studies have emphasised the role of history in explaining institutional continuity 
using the concept of path dependence. This thesis claims and demonstrates that history matters for 
institutional discontinuities too as in moving from one political epoch to another, actors draw insights 
from experiences with previous institutional arrangements in order to discard or modify them and design 
new ones. 
1.6. Structure of thesis 
The thesis is organised in three parts with a total of seven chapters. This first chapter has presented 
the broad questions and claims with which this thesis is concerned and has shown why they are 
important for academic and policy purposes. Chapter two reviews the literature on state-business 
relations. The main observation is that the literature provides useful empirical and theoretical material 
for a comparative study of SBRs and their policy and development outcomes, but pays very little 
attention to the theoretical question of their emergence, evolution and change. Chapter three outlines 
the analytical and methodological framework and describes how the framework was used to gather and 
analyse data.  
Part two consists of three chapters on the empirical analysis of SBRs in Malawi. Chapter four analyses 
the emergence and institutional development of SBRs in the colonial period. It shows that the politics of 
state formation and consolidation created a symbiotic relationship between the state and the European 
business community. This chapter is particularly important for a historical institutionalist analysis 
because it deals with a foundational period in which a set of institutional pathways were laid down. 
Chapter five analyses SBRs in the post-colonial, one-party authoritarian state. It highlights how the 
political objectives of the nationalist government restructured state-business relations by discarding, 
modifying and extending institutional elements inherited from the colonial period and by creating new 
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ones. Chapter six analyses the patterns of state-business relations in the emergent multi-party 
democratic state. It highlights how the politics of dismantling the one-party state led to the weakening of 
the state and broadened the scope for collusive SBRs.  
Part three has one chapter – chapter seven - which elaborates the empirical and theoretical 
contributions of the analysis of Malawian SBRs. It synthesises the evidence of how political processes 
have historically shaped the institutional and organisational patterns of SBRs in Malawi and draws out 
implications for institutional and SBR theories.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Provenance of State-Business Relations – A Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on the provenance of the institutional and organisational patterns of 
state-business relations (SBRs). It observes that academic and policy interests in SBRs have a fairly 
long history. They can be traced from Smith (1776) right up to the most recent studies of developing 
countries, including those of MacIntyre (1994), Evans (1995), Maxfield and Schneider (1997), Taylor 
(2007), and Handley (2008) among others, and ongoing research projects by various consortia and 
organisations.  It shows that the analysis of these relations is part of the wider discourses on relations 
between the state and society and the state and the economy, which are central to the social and 
political sciences. It identifies factors that shape SBRs, how the state and the business community 
influence each other and the different comparative patterns of these relations. I argue that the literature 
provides useful insights for understanding the institutional evolution of SBRs in Malawi but pays less 
analytical attention to how politics shape the formation and change of the institutional and 
organisational patterns of these relations. 
The chapter has four main sections. Section 2.1 provides an overview of the academic and policy 
context of studies on SBRs, identifies some of the recent discourses associated with these relations, 
and highlights some of the antecedents of concerns with SBRs. Section 2.2 identifies factors that shape 
the patterns of SBRs. Section 2.3 focuses on the modes of influence between the state and the 
business community. Section 2.4 surveys the comparative patterns of state-business relations that 
arise from the different combinations of factors.  
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2.1. Context and discourses on state-business relations  
2.1.1. Academic and policy context 
Dahl (1959) lamented the paucity of studies on the politics of SBRs: “For all the talk and public curiosity 
about the relations between business and politics, there is a remarkable dearth of studies on the 
subject…One would suppose that the role of business, particularly big business, would be a matter of 
central concern to political scientists” (1959:1). By the 1970s, however, SBRs had become a focus of 
analysis in comparative political economy, especially “in theories of dependent development and 
bureaucratic authoritarianism [and] in other efforts to explain highly exclusionary patterns of growth and 
politics” (Schneider, 1998:101) that favoured small groups of elites. However, this scholarship boom 
was followed by a lapse in the  late 1970s and early 80s when academic attention shifted to non-elite 
social actors whose political activism was being propelled by political and economic liberalisation 
associated with the „third wave of democratisation‟ (Huntington,1991) and structural adjustment 
programmes, respectively.  
The recent surge of interest in SBRs, particularly in developing countries, is due to at least two factors. 
First, neo-liberal policy experiments have shown that “the opposite of state-led development is not 
market-led but rather business-led development” (Schneider, 1998:102) – a theme emphasised by 
Chandler et al (1997) but one that Smith (1776) and Schumpeter (1961) alluded to (see below).The 
second has been the realisation that „institutions matter‟ for growth and development – a theme 
resurrected by Burki and Perry (1998) but building on a voluminous literature in economic history 
(North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Olson, 1965). A key conclusion has been that patterns of SBRs are crucial 
in explaining patterns of development. Others have suggested that patterns of SBRs determine not only 
the content of economic reforms but also the range of policy instruments that can be used and the pace 
at which the reforms are implemented (Schneider, 1998; Silva, 1996; MacIntyre, 1994; Maxfield and 
Schneider, 1997). These suggestions have led to research that addresses a diversified set of questions 
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relating to the origins, change, efficacy and effects of both formal and informal institutions, and the 
interactions between them, on various facets of development. This thesis is a contribution to these 
efforts. 
On the policy front, some recent studies on SBRs have been motivated by the disappointing results of 
neo-liberal reforms under Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) (World Bank, 1981) and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; Weyland, 1998; Gore, 2000; 
Ibrawoh, 1999; van de Walle, 2001). Particular policy questions relating to SBRs concern property 
rights, corruption, political credibility, governments‟ capacity to deliver essential social services, market 
regulation and, in general terms, how states influence entrepreneurial behaviour for better or worse 
(World Bank, 1997).  
Consequently, international development organisations are pushing for various policy and institutional 
reforms in the arena of SBRs. The World Bank, the United Kingdom Department for International 
Development (DFID) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are 
inspired by the conviction that “no development is possible without growth, w ithout a good investment 
climate, without a buoyant private sector”7. Private Sector Development (PSD) is regarded not only as a 
tool for non-state based development of capitalism but also as essential for economic growth and 
poverty reduction because it generates employment and is a source of innovation. The various reform 
efforts8 aim at facilitating the contribution of the private sector to national development in developing 
countries by improving  the business and investment climate, instituting or reforming public-private 
dialogues (PPD) for policy-making and implementation and developing public private partnerships 
(PPP) in the provision of public goods and essential social services. Research is also being supported 
to inform aspects of these processes through, for example, the research Programme Consortium on 
                                                             
7 Francois Bourguignon on www.ifc.org  accessed on 30th July 2008). 
8 Details can be found at www.publicprivatedialogue.org, www.ifc.org and www.oecd.org . 
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Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth (IPPG) at the Universities of Manchester and York9, the 
International Institute for Labour Studies, World Bank Research arms, and the OECD Centre for 
Development, among others. 
2.1.2. Locating state-business relations in the social sciences 
State-business relations are at the core of at least three enduring themes in the social sciences. Firstly, 
they are part of debates on the cause-effect relations between institutions and development. Some 
institutions matter for growth and development, whereas others constrain these processes (Hodgson, 
2001; Chang, 2007; Woo-Cummings, 1999)10. There is a need to identify which institutions, under what 
circumstances, work for or against growth and development and why and how they change or resist 
reform. This is particularly crucial „because development failure is now understood to represent 
institutional failure and not just policy failure‟ (Doner et al, 2005:329). Secondly, SBRs are an integral 
part of the state versus society debate, exploring issues related to strong and weak states and modes 
of interactions between the state, on the one hand, and weak or strong civil society, including the 
business sector, on the other (Leftwich, 2007a; Kohli, 1998; Migdal,1988; Evans,1995). This debate 
ordinarily merges into discussions of the interface between formal and informal institutions, hierarchies 
and interests (Schmitter, 1974; Cawson, 1986; Helmke and Levitsky, 2006). Thirdly, SBRs are at the 
centre of market versus state debates. An important theme of this debate to the present study is the 
recognition that “all states intervene in their economies for various reasons [but] the key question is 
how government intervenes and for what purposes” (Johnson, 1982:17-18). Thus, the key question is 
no longer whether the state should intervene in the economy but what kind of intervention is necessary 
for growth and development (Evans, 1995; Chang, 1999; Woo-Cummings, 1999; Kohli, 2004; Wade, 
                                                             
9 See www.ippg.org.uk  
10 There is a growing body of scholarly work on this theme by the IPPG. Research papers are available at 
www.ipppg.org.uk. 
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1992). Placed within these huge debates, academic interest in SBRs goes back several centuries. The 
following section highlights some of the earliest ideas. 
2.1.3. Antecedents to the analysis of state-business relations 
Early concerns focused on the linkages between patterns of SBRs and economic development and 
social stratification. Three strands can be identified: state-centred, business-centred and those that took 
a middle view. 
The business-centred tradition 
This tradition has its origins in Smith (1776), especially in the argument that “the different progress of 
opulence in different ages and nations” resulted from “two different systems of political economy”11 – 
the system of commerce and manufactures and that of agriculture (Smith, 1776/1976, Book IV:428). He 
demonstrated that the state‟s instruments of economic policy, especially import restrictions and export 
encouragement through „bounties‟ (i.e. subsidies), „drawbacks‟ (i.e. tax rebates) and commercial 
treaties with other states shape SBRs, but such state interventions would be “disadvantageous to the 
country in whose favour [they are] meant to be established” (Book IV.ix:489). He advocated a pattern of 
SBRs in which the state would be discharged from “the duty of superintending the industry of private 
people and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interests of the society” (ibid: 
Book IV.ix:51). 
However, such optimism has not been borne out in most of the developing world, where mostly fragile 
states dominate weak economies such that the economic survival of the territories and political survival 
of the regimes hinge on some form of state activism in the economies. Neither has the optimism 
materialised in strong states such as those in East Asia, where „developmental states‟ have been 
                                                             
11 Smith conceived „political economy‟ as a “branch of the science of a statesman or legislator” (in short, government or the 
state) aimed at “providing plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly, to enable them to provide such 
a revenue or subsistence for themselves and to provide the state with a revenue sufficient for [the provision] of public 
services” (Smith, 1776/1976, Book IV: 428).  
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central in directing private capital and investments using „bounties‟ and „drawbacks‟ within „plan-rational‟ 
frameworks, giving rise to different patterns of SBRs (Woo-Cumings, 1999; Onis, 1991, Wade, 1992). 
Schumpeter (1961, 1950)12 reinforced the business-centred view in his notion of development13. He 
argued that “it is the producer who, as a rule, initiates economic change” (1961:65). Although less 
explicitly concerned with SBRs, his analysis had fundamental implications for them. The propositions 
that  the development of a nation comes from „entrepreneurs or wild spirits‟ and that those who really 
move the innovation and the economy are the big companies that have resources and capital to invest 
in research and development, imply that realising development requires some positive engagement 
between the state and (big) business. Thus, rather than a „hands-off‟ pattern of SBRs as implied by 
Smith and championed by the World Bank and the IMF since the 1980s, the Schumpeterian formulation 
suggests that states that need to ascend the economic ladder must forge synergistic, or hand-in-hand, 
relations with private capital. This is borne out in emerging market economies in Asia and Latin America 
(Amsden, 1989; Moore and Schmidtz, 2008; Johnston, 1982; Doner and Schneider, 2000; Evans, 
1995). However, private „big companies‟ as contemplated by Schumpeter have been rare in most of the 
developing world, where states have tended to substitute public enterprises for them, leading to varied 
patterns of SBRs. A key point that emerges from this tradition is that the nature of state involvement in 
the economy shapes the patterns of SBRs. 
The state-centred tradition 
                                                             
12 His ideas were developed by 1909 and published for the first time, in German, in 1911. 
13 In the Schumpeterian framework, development is defined by new ways of combining materials and forces of production, 
covering five cases: 1.The new combination must introduce a new good or new quality of good, 2.It must introduce a new 
method of production that is based on new scientific discovery, 3.It must open a new market (either for old or new 
products), 4.It may require conquest of  a new source of supply of raw materials or intermediate goods, and 5.It may 
require carrying out new organisation of any industry (e.g. creating or breaking the monopoly position (Schumpeter, 
1961:66). 
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A key antecedent in this tradition is to be found in the work of Marx and Engels on political economy14, 
especially in two notions of the role of the state in society. A predominant argument is that in the 
process of capitalist development, SBRs are such that the state is constrained by businessmen15 and 
performs acts that aim at protecting and furthering their interests:  
...the bourgeoisie has ... since the establishment of modern Industry and of the world market, 
conquered for itself, in the modern representative state, exclusive political sway. The executive of 
the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie…It 
has drowned [all virtue] in the icy water of egotistical calculation… [and] resolved personal wealth 
into exchange value…In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has 
substituted naked, shameless, direct brutal exploitation (Marx and Engels,1848/1998:5). 
This view indicates the potential vices of a cosy relationship between businessmen and those who 
control political power through the state, and the role of ideologies in sustaining the institutional pattern. 
This fear is borne out in some developing countries but more in the interest of political regime survival 
than furtherance of bourgeoisie interests. For example, it has been shown that business in the 
Philippines was born and flourished or failed not so much in the marketplace as in the halls of the 
legislature or in the administrative offices of the government (McHale, 1959 as cited by Hutchcroft, 
1994:217). Similar patterns have been observed in Egypt and have been described as politically-
embedded cronyism (Adly, 2009).  
Marxism also conceived the state as a factor of cohesion endowed with relative autonomy from social 
forces (Hay, 2006; Poulantzas, 1973). In SBRs, this notion is vindicated in works that have highlighted 
various forms of relative autonomy of the state from powerful business interests. For example, Evans 
(1995) has demonstrated that in developmental states, SBRs took the form of embedded autonomy. 
More directly related to the role of the state in promoting „social cohesion‟ have been the corporatist 
                                                             
14 Contrary to Smithian conception, „political economy‟ in Marxism refers to antagonistic relations of production and 
exchange between those who control the means of production and those who provide labour, mediated by the state.  It is 
about relations between „the economic base‟ and the „political superstructure‟ (Hay, 2006; Poulantzas, 1973). 
15They call them the „bourgeoisie‟ and are defined as „the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social 
production and employers of wage labour‟ (Marx and Engels, 1848/1988: 55, footnote No.7). 
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arrangements in Latin America and East Asia, which have explicitly sought to attain social peace and 
harmony among antagonistic classes – business and labour - through social pacts (Lucas, 1997; 
Schneider, 1997; MacIntyre, 1994). This tradition suggests that patterns of SBRs are partly shaped by 
the degree of autonomy that the state enjoys over the business community. The more autonomy the 
state has, the less likely the possibility of becoming an „executive committee‟ for capitalists and the 
better the position to act as a factor of social cohesion. Yet there is nothing to preclude the suggestion 
that a more autonomous state may become predatory on private enterprise. 
The middle view 
The core argument is that patterns of SBRs are not to be explained in exclusive terms on the lines of 
perfect markets and imperfect states or imperfect states and perfect markets. Rather, the explanations 
ought to be balanced between economic factors and politics (World Bank, 1997; Amsden, 1989; 
Johnson, 1982; Deyo, 1987; Chang, 2002 and 2007). A key antecedent of the middle view is found in 
the observation that economic and political phenomena are connected through the role of „the 
corporation‟ so that  “certain questions about the governmental-market relation are at the core of 
political science and economics no less for planned economies than for market systems” 
(Lindblom,1977:ix-x). As suggested in his analysis of the privileged position of busineses in a market 
system and the politics of business enterprise in communist systems, Lindblom‟s work alludes to the 
possibility of a variety of patterns of SBRs, shaped by the type of political regime. Thus, “[a]side from 
the difference between despotic and libertarian governments, the greatest distinction between one 
government and another is the degree to which market replaces government or government replaces 
market” (ibid: ix). The middle view suggests that patterns of SBRs represent forms of adjustment 
between states and business rather than approximations to unilateral control of one by the other, as the 
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cases of Taiwan and South Africa exemplify16. These antecedents underscore the view that patterns of 
SBRs influence development trajectories and outcomes.  
Especially from the 1980s, scholarly interest in SBRs extended to developing societies, motivated 
mostly by the need to counter neoclassical homilies on the primacy of markets in the growth miracles of 
East Asian countries. A flagship publication is Johnson (1982) which showed that SBRs that took the 
form of purely state-dominated command economies or unproductive market laissez-faire were inferior 
when judged from their development outcomes. The distinctive feature of developmental SBRs, as 
evidenced by Japan, was one in which “the state‟s role in the economy is shared with the private sector 
and both the state and private sectors [improve] the market to make it work for developmental goals” 
(ibid:viii). The provenance of the Japanese pattern of SBRs was attributed to the bureaucratic aspects 
of the state. Evans (1995) has emphasised the potency of networks between state and business elites. 
Maxfield and Schneider (1997) extend the analytical reach of this approach to the organisational 
properties of both states and business and the institutional aspects for their interaction. These 
developments are insightful for the present study because, like in other developing countries, neither 
the state nor the market in Malawi is fundamentally consolidated around agreed rules.  
The various perspectives on SBRs have precluded a standardisation of approaches to the study of 
these relations. For present purposes, three approaches are identified in the following section. 
2.1.4. Recent approaches to the study of state-business relations 
As the study of the development of capitalism 
                                                             
16 In Taiwan, the authoritarian KMT state dominated the business sector via large-scale public enterprises and control of the 
financial sector. This yielded clientelistic SBRs between the native Taiwanese business elites and the mainland Chinese 
political elites. However, regime transition and the economic and governance reforms of the 1980s resulted in a power 
surge for business, and politicians became more reliant on businesses for political financing – yielding a realigned pattern 
of SBRs (Chu, 1994). Similarly, in South Africa, the predominantly white business owners‟ fears of nationalisation by the 
ANC compelled them to engage with the black political elites, even before the latter took power, and they pledged to 
support the political cause of a multi-racial country in exchange for a repudiation of the ANC socialist charter. The result 
has been a pattern of SBRs that was hitherto generally not expected under the ANC government (Taylor, 2007). 
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In this approach, the main concerns have been the formation of capitalist classes and their 
organisational expression. The focus has mostly been on business associations and the role of the 
state in enabling or constraining their growth (Becker, 1990; Hawes and Liu, 1993; Leys, 1994; 
Kennedy, 1994; Heilman and Lucas, 1997). Some of this scholarship has conceptualised the 
provenance and activities of business associations as an integral component of a social movement 
aimed at minimising the power and roles of the state in society. For example, Becker (1990) saw a 
„bourgeoisie social movement‟ in the anti-statist activities and ideologies of the FEDECAMARAS in 
Venezuela. Similarly, Heilman and Lucas (1997) conceived business associations as „social 
movements for African capitalism‟. At the core of this orientation is the realisation that the development 
of capitalism involves “human agency in such forms as associational activity, trends of thought, 
passage of laws and shaping the government – in sum, in the form of social movements and politics” 
(Sklar,1987:11). Others, however, have sounded caution on the ongoing competition and conflicts 
between business associations in a context of „pervasive organisational surplus‟ (Moore and Hamalai, 
1993), which often confound efforts at collective action in relation to the state. One implication is that a 
capitalist class that may be internally divided on the basis of parochial identities such as ethnicity, race, 
religion or other cleavages may be less likely to mobilise into coherent and widely representative 
business associations and may be vulnerable to penetration and divide-and-rule tactics by the state. 
The case of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (FICCI) illustrates this point (Sinha, 2005). 
As the study of governance 
Some scholars have approached SBRs as part of the governance problem, that is, “the exercise of 
political power to manage a nation‟s affairs” (World Bank, 1989:60). Thus, SBRs are seen by some as 
part of the process of deepening democracy – a view that is expressed in several qualified concepts, 
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such as „good governance‟ (World Bank, 1992 and 1994)17, „good enough governance‟ (Grindle, 2007); 
„collaborative governance‟ (Rhodes, 1995 and 1997; Ansell and Gash, 2007; Donahue, 2004), and 
„nodal governance‟ (Burris et al, 2005). Studies in this approach have focused on how to manage the 
“pluralisation of the institutional environment” (Lucas, 1997:71) in which political and economic 
decisions are made. Inevitably, most attention has been paid to Public-Private Dialogue (PPD) 
mechanisms i.e. forums and other arrangements for consultation and cooperation between actors from 
government and business18. Besides engendering transparency, reciprocity, credibility and trust 
between the state and organised business interests (Schneider and Maxifield, 1997; te Velde, 2006, 
Herzberg and Wright, 2006), these arrangements are seen as important for the consolidation of 
democracy (Hart, 2001). 
These recent notions of governance resonate with an older discourse of corporatism. For SBRs, two 
versions of corporatism can be identified, namely, corporatism as post-capitalism and corporatism as 
interest mediation. Post-capitalism corporatism differs from both capitalism and socialism and 
represents a system of political economy in which private ownership of capital is combined with public 
control, and the state directs business towards specific goals (Winkler, 1976:103, Hutchful, 1989:21) on 
the basis of four principles: “Unity, order, nationalism and success” (Winkler, 1976:103). It differs from 
capitalism in that the market system is constrained, and rights over private capital are somehow 
abrogated by the state. It is different from socialism because it does not include nationalisation of 
private capital. The state is sufficiently autonomous from economic interests and can impose its will 
without being captured by any economic group. This version of corporatism is in evidence in several 
accounts of the nature of the economic system that was central to the rise of „developmental states‟ in 
South Korea and Japan (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989). 
                                                             
17 This qualification aimed at absolving politics from governance and development and suggested only technical, 
administrative and managerial solutions to the problems of growth and development (Leftwich, 2007a:107). 
18  Case studies from 2006 from various countries are available at www.publicprivatedialogue.org  
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Corporatism as interest mediation is concerned with the organisation and structure of political and 
economic interests in society and the relationships of those interests with the state. For Schmitter, it is a 
“system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognised or „licensed‟ (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational role in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
supports” (Schimitter, 1974:93-94). For Cawson (1986:38), “Corporatism is a specific socio-political 
process in which organisations representing monopolistic functional interests engage in political 
exchange with state agencies over public policy outputs which involves those organisations in a role 
which combines interest representation and policy implementation through delegated self-
enforcement”. Thus, starting from a pluralism where interest groups are many and have influence but 
lack formal roles in both policy-making and implementation, Schmitter‟s conception represents an 
intermediate case in which interest groups are organised into „peak groups‟, that have formal roles in 
policy-making but not in its implementation. Cawson‟s interpretation represents a situation in which 
interest groups form representative peak associations and have formal roles in policy making and 
implementation. These conceptions imply different patterns of SBRs and demand that particular 
attention be paid to processes of political exchange between states, business and labour as well as 
aspects of collective action within the sectors. 
The functioning of corporatist arrangements, however, depends on whether the aim of the state is to 
organise and dominate society or to create a platform through which societal groups can influence the 
state. For the former, the state is “not to be the subject of effective challenge from popular or 
particularistic demands” (Williamson, 1985:8). The state organises social groups in order to establish 
and maintain a certain socio-economic order and to directly regulate the behaviour of individual actors 
in the economy so that it is compatible with the desired social order. Examples of such arrangements 
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include Brazil under Getulio (Lucas, 1997), South Korea under Park (Moon, 1994) and Indonesia 
(Lucas, 1997). For the latter objective, corporatist arrangements may combine centralised and 
decentralised patterns of engagement (Cawson, 1985; Grant, 1985). It implies „pluralisation of the 
institutional environment‟ (Bratton, 1989; Lucas, 1997), which may give rise to „pressure‟ patterns of 
relations, making collusion and patrimonialism common while limiting policy coordination. For example, 
South Africa‟s National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) is institutionalised by 
statute to bring government, labour and capital together but does not restrict formation of other groups 
outside it. In fact, sometimes even the government avoids NEDLAC on some issues and deals directly 
and exclusively with an association of leading corporate executives, the South African Foundation 
(SAF) (Taylor, 2007). Similarly, in Egypt, besides the state-controlled Egyptian Federation of Industries 
(EFI), many business associations sprang up in the 1990s, leading to considerable fragmentation in the 
representation of big business and creating confusion for government officials (Adly, 2009:21). 
As the study of coalitions for the delivery of public services and development 
Recent concerns in this regard revolve around the notion of public-private partnerships (PPPs). These 
are contractual arrangements between public and private sector entities to deliver policies, services and 
infrastructure (Burgiene et al, 2006). Scholars and policy practitioners are concerned mostly with the 
extent and institutional forms of involvement of private enterprise in the delivery of public goods and 
services as well as success factors, especially administrative, managerial, financial or other technical 
competences (UNECE, 2008; Compagnon, 2008; Vian, 2007; and Jacobson and Choi, 2008). A few 
have been concerned with the politics of these arrangements, focusing on issues such as the capacity 
and structure of the state, the democratic legitimation of these partnerships and their unintended 
consequences (Flinders, 2005; Friend, 2006). In a much older tradition, and in the context of the 
centrality of SBRs in shaping development trajectories, there is considerable literature on growth 
coalitions and collusive or predatory coalitions (Brautigam et al, 2002; Mackie, 1988; Taylor, 2007). The 
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main concerns have revolved around the politics and forms of collective action and the formal and 
informal rules that yield the different types of coalitions (Moore and Schmidtz, 2008; Wang, 2000).  
Other studies have been concerned with the changing patterns of SBRs in the neo-liberal era. Areas of 
focus have included changing balances of power between the state and the business sector and the 
opening up and utilisation of policy spaces (Moore and Hamalai, 1993; Kleinberg, 1999; Heilbrun, 1997, 
Taylor, 2007; Handley, 2008; Adly, 2009). For example, despite liberalisation of both politics and the 
economy, personalistic and collusive relations between state elites and businesses continued in 
Zambia, Indonesia and Egypt (Taylor, 2007; MacIntyre, 1994a; Adly, 2009), while in Nigeria (Lucas, 
1997), Taiwan (Chu, 1994) and South Africa (Taylor, 2007), states sought to position themselves 
strategically and relied on the business sector and its associations to increase their global 
competitiveness. The liberalisation of economies has also given way to more pronounced ambivalence 
of interests within the business sectors. In many African countries, this has reinforced the state‟s 
perception that the business sector is disorganised, and it is consequently ignored or marginalised in 
policy processes (Taylor, 2007; Handley, 2008). By contrast, states in Latin America have responded 
by organising the business sector and attempting to co-opt it (Taylor, 2007; Lucas, 1997). 
2.2. Factors shaping state-business relations 
2.2.1. Factors related to the state 
Political institutional architecture 
Political institutional architecture is defined as “the complex totality of a country‟s basic political 
institutions – the rules, usually enshrined in a constitution and other key laws, that determine how the 
leadership of a state is configured and how state authority is exercised” (Macintyre,2003:1). The focus 
is on the extent to which the political institutional architecture concentrates or disperses governmental 
decision-making power and how the functioning of the distribution of power within it shapes SBRs. 
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Political architecture determines whether the government will be stable or unstable, whether it will be a 
dictatorship or based on democratic principles, or whether it will be the rule of men or the rule of men 
under the law (Fessler, 1949:1). 
The distribution of political power varies between unitary and federal states, presidential and 
parliamentary systems (Bagehot, 1867/1993; Althusius, 1610/1964; Ersson, 2000 and Elazar, 1997; 
Riker, 1964 and 1975; Ostrom, 1974). The structure of the state and the distribution of power within it 
yield a corresponding pattern of business organisation. In a federal state, the dispersal of power gives 
rise to a similarly fragmented business sector. For instance, in the US, “there is no peak organisation 
capable of presenting the views and interests of American business as a whole” because “the federal 
structure ...fragments the business community” (Vogel, 1987:111). Schneider (1997:200-201) also 
shows that in Brazil, SBRs were „disintermediated‟, and there was no peak association and meetings 
were issue driven. In such cases, SBRs take place at meso- and micro-levels where sectoral 
associations and large firms, respectively, engage with the state, often in an ad hoc manner. In unitary 
states, the tendency is for business to organise into peak associations like the Federation of Economic 
Organisations (FEO) in Japan (Boyd, 1987) and the Federation of Korea Industries (FKI) in South 
Korea (Moon, 1994). The motivation is to match the concentrated power of the state. Nonetheless, 
there are examples of fragmented business sectors in unitary states such as Britain (Wilson, 1990) just 
as there are peak business associations in some federal states like India (Sinha, 2005)19 and Mexico 
(Schneider 1997:200-201). Thus, the argument that state form determines SBRs is less plausible and 
much depends on conjunctural factors and the actual practice by states. 
                                                             
19 Gangal(1962), however, argues that Indian federalism is better described as „unitarism with a high degree of 
decentralisation‟ because in his analysis a holistic interpretation of the Indian constitution and the actual behaviour of 
states runs counter to the definitive feature of federal states, which is dispersal of state authority. 
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Similarly, presidential and parliamentary systems are distinguished on the basis of the concentration of 
executive power in the president in presidential systems and in the cabinet in parliamentary systems20. 
There are subtle distinctions between these systems of government, but what matters most is their 
actual practice, which often „deviates from constitutional theory‟ such that „the borderline between 
parliamentarism and presidentialism lies in muddy waters‟ (Lane and Ersson, 2000:121). Systems of 
government „shape the whole political process and the way of ruling‟ (Linz, 1994:18) and affect SBRs 
through their effects on state bureaucracies and, therefore, state performance and attitudes towards 
business. Presidential systems are associated with „appointive bureaucracies‟ in which every incumbent 
appoints a large contingent of his own personnel into the top echelons of the bureaucracy. Such 
bureaucracies consist of the president‟s „personal retainers‟, and state power and authority are 
identified with „personal rulership‟ (Weber, 1964). In other words, “the political administration…is treated 
purely as a personal affair of the [president] and political power is considered part of his personal 
property” (Weber, 1968 Vol.3:1028-1029). For example, in Brazil and Mexico, about 50,000 positions in 
the top three or four levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy were distributed by direct personal political 
appointment, mostly as pure patronage pay-offs with little positive impact on policy, and were all subject 
to immediate dismissal (Schneider, 1999:291-2). SBRs in such situations are more likely to be 
influenced by the idiosyncrasies of the president and the propensity for the state to be predatory, as in 
Zaire (Evans, 1995; Bates, 2001), or cronyist, as in the Philippines (MacIntyre, 1994) and Egypt (Adly, 
2009), is likely to be high. 
Parliamentary systems on the other hand, are associated with coherent bureaucratic apparatuses of 
the Weberian type21. Consequently, the bureaucracy has relative operational autonomy from both top 
                                                             
20 There are various versions of presidentialism as well as parliamentarism. See Lane and Ersson (2000), Horowtz (1990), 
Lipset (1990), and Linz (1990a, 1990b) for discussions on the variants. 
21 According to Weber (1968), such bureaucracies are not generally subjected to interference from political elites and  are 
often insulated from them; recruitment is meritocratic, promotion is gained following a career path and is performance-
based rather than being based on personal loyalty; formulation of policies is professional and objective, not influenced by 
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politicians and societal groups, and policy has a higher chance of being made on the basis of sound 
analysis of evidence. In these conditions, SBRs are likely to be consultative in policy making and 
developmental in outcomes. Frequently cited examples in developing countries are South Korea and 
Japan (Amsden, 1989; Johnson, 1982).  
Bureaucratic capacity and autonomy 
Variations in bureaucratic capacity have been used to explain differences between developmental 
SBRs and rent-seeking, distributive coalitions. State strength, capacity and autonomy are understood 
as the ability to enforce political decisions and goals arising from institutions governing domestic 
linkages between bureaucratic agencies and social actors (Weiss, 1998; Atkinson and Coleman, 
1989)22. The most analytically useful statement of how state bureaucratic capacity affects SBRs is 
provided by Evans (1995) in the concept of embedded autonomy. Embeddedness refers to the ability of 
the state bureaucracy to enmesh itself in a „concrete set of social ties [i.e. network] that binds the state 
to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of 
goals and policies‟ (Evans, 1995:12).  State autonomy means the ability of the state bureaucracy to be 
insulated from the particularistic demands of both politicians and societal groups in the formulation as 
well as implementation of policy. Embeddedness alone is likely to result in a weakening of the state and 
a pattern of SBRs characterised by organised rent-seeking practices, that is, „embedded particularism‟ 
(Herring, 1999). With autonomy alone, the state is more likely to become predatory. 
It is generally agreed that a bureaucracy with such capacity as projected by Evans must be coherent, 
sufficiently centralised, endowed with professional ethos, well trained and staffed on the basis of merit 
(Evans, 1995; Doner, 1992; Fields, 1997; Maxifield and Schneider, 1997). Such a bureaucracy 
enhances coordination, aggregates interests, improves transparency and minimises particularistic 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
narrow, myopic interests; and implementation is informed by principles of bureaucratic impartiality, not personal 
connections and favours. 
22 For comprehensive discussions on state strengths and weaknesses see Migdal (1988), Haberer (2003), Atkinson and 
Coleman (1989) and Leftwich (2007), especially chapters 4 and 9. 
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pressures. Bureaucracies that lack these attributes tend to have multiple points of interface with the 
private sector, policy coherence and coordination can be quite problematic, and they encourage 
personalism that easily becomes collusive (Taylor, 2007; Lucas, 1997; MacIntyre, 1994; te Velde, 2006, 
Herzberg and Wright, 2006; Evans and Rauch, 1999). However, such internally coherent bureaucracies 
are rare in developing countries. The key questions, therefore, for many developing countries are why, 
how and when such bureaucracies come into being. 
Type of political regime 
Of the many classifications of political regimes, three stand out as relevant to the study of SBRs. Evans 
(1995) offers an outcome-based classification in which regimes are either predatory, developmental or 
somewhere between these two. In another, regimes are classified according to their behaviour and 
economic outcomes. Thus, a political economy is either a command, developmental or market 
economy (Johnson, 1982). In the third, the concern is with the political character of regimes, which may 
be totalitarian, authoritarian or democratic (Linz, 1964)23. The central organising question for the 
classifications is whether there is more or less central state control of the economy and the political 
system. The important question for this thesis is whether being an authoritarian or democratic, 
command or market-based; predatory or developmental regime affects patterns of SBRs. 
Civil liberties associated with democratic regimes are deemed to provide opportunities for political and 
policy spaces for engagement between the state and civil society, especially the business community. 
“The involvement of civil society... in the process of policy making addresses the need of the state and 
the government to broaden their legitimacy by enhancing the transparency, the quality and the 
efficiency of their policies. In the specific case of economic policies, corporations and the business 
community...have full authority to be associated to the policy-making process” (Pinaud, 2008:1). 
                                                             
23 Also see Block (1994) for a five-part classification. There are many other classifications in both economics and political 
science, but they are essentially permutations of these. 
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Conversely, authoritarian regimes are associated with repression and predation. Unlike democracies, 
where lobbies and cartels accumulate and eventually rob states of their dynamism (Olson, 1982; 2000), 
dictatorships often curtail freedom of association, meaning that business associations may not exist, 
and if they do, they cannot challenge state policies. Examples include Mobutu‟s Zaire (Evans, 1995) 
and Rawlings‟ Ghana before 1993 (Kraus, 2002). However, other military and authoritarian regimes, for 
example, South Korea under Chung Hee Park and Doo-Hwan Chun, Taiwan under Chiang Kai-Shek 
and his son, Japan before 1945, Brazil and Mexico are credited for synergistic and developmental 
SBRs in a context of political centralisation, repression and exclusion (Schneider, 1997 and 1999; 
Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1999 and 1982; Amsden, 1989; Olson, 2000; Vu, 2007; Moon, 1994). This 
suggests that explanations of the outcomes of SBRs must go beyond simplistic association between 
regime types and outcomes. 
The nature of state intervention 
The purposive intervention of the state in the economy or activities of private enterprise is based on the 
reality that a nation‟s welfare and interests cannot be optimised through the working of the market 
alone. This is because the logic of the market, that is, profitable allocation of values for a society, does 
not correspond to the political logic of states, that is, the authoritative allocation of values for a society 
(Johnston, 1984; Wilks and Wright, 1987a; Easton, 1965). Thus, governments intervene in the 
economy for a range of reasons, including promoting the nation‟s economic development and growth, 
accelerating the structural transformation of domestic industry in a desired direction, improving the 
international competitiveness of designated products, encouraging the development of new 
technologies, smoothing the phasing out of chronically depressed industries, assisting the 
rationalisation of weak industries judged to have potential to recover, protecting domestic employment 
and ensuring the welfare of people (Johnson, 1984; Ozaki, 1984). 
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State intervention differs in content and form depending on the stage of development of an economy, 
its natural and historical circumstances, international conditions and its political and economic situation 
(Ueno, 1982; Ozaki, 1984). Different forms of state intervention structure incentives for private 
enterprise differently and directly affect patterns of SBRs. For analytical purposes, Evans (1995) has 
identified four types of state intervention in the economy. The government performs roles as a 
custodian, a demiurge, a midwife or a husband. In summary, as custodian, the state engages in 
regulatory efforts that either polices and restricts initiatives of the business sector or formulates and 
enforces rules aimed at providing stimuli and incentives. As demiurge, the state takes direct 
responsibility for delivering certain types of goods and services, often through public enterprises, based 
on the assumption of the limitations of private capital. As midwife, instead of substituting itself for 
private producers, the state assists with the emergence of new entrepreneurial groups or induces 
existing groups to venture into more challenging kinds of production. As husband, the state cajoles and 
assists private entrepreneurial groups in meeting global business challenges, including taking over risky 
complementary tasks like research and development24. The nature of state intervention determines 
what activities and strategies will dominate the agenda of business associations, and each structure 
SBRs differently (Bell, 1995; Johnson, 1982; Chang, 1994 and 1999; Wilks and Wright, 1987; Amsden, 
1989). 
2.2.2. Factors related to business structures and the nature of the economy 
Structure of the economy 
The contributions of various productive economic sectors of a country to foreign exchange earnings, 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), domestic employment, and other macro-economic indicators condition 
SBRs in different ways. It informs the role the state should play and what kind of industrial policy it 
                                                             
24 For a full discussion, see Evans (1995 ch.4). 
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should institute since new sectors are not built by individual firms but complementary combinations of 
several firms and the state. It also shapes the organisation of business associations vis-à-vis the state, 
as reflected in many sectoral business associations in many countries. Economies that rely on a few 
sectors for revenue also tend to craft synergistic SBRs in those sectors (Hirschman, 1977). 
Economic and political importance of the business sector 
Current or potential economic contributions of the sector (i.e. economic utility) and the capacity for 
sustained and politically significant collective action of the sector (i.e. political utility/political threat) 
feeds into the state‟s  political calculation of whether the sector is expendable or not. Fiscal sociology 
has taught us that sources of state revenue have an impact on political processes, especially state 
formation and patterns of state-society relations (Moore, 2004; Bates, 2001). For example, in Mauritius, 
the government could not afford to adopt a wholly hostile attitude towards the few sugar barons of 
French descent as doing so would bring the economy to its knees (Meisenhelder, 1997). When the 
South African government was asked to explain why it had been very slow in pushing the 
transformation of the mining sector in terms of the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme, 
the Minister of Energy and Minerals responded, “It‟s shades of grey: business, government and others 
are deciding in terms of negotiation and partnership...we call the shots together... rather than 
„exercising power over‟ its „power with‟ – it is an inclusive approach to governance” (Hamann et al, 
2008:21-22). On the other hand, SBRs may be insignificant in sectors that the state perceives to be of 
low economic and/or political utility (Taylor, 2007). For instance, the Chiluba government in Zambia was 
able to ignore the organised business sector (mostly merchants and manufacturers of consumer goods) 
because of its low economic utility: the state still employed the largest proportion of the formal 
workforce and controlled the mining sector, which provided revenue for government services as well as 
rents for patronage (Taylor, 2007; Brautigam et al, 2002). However, the case of Zimbabwe‟s agricultural 
sector shows that neither economic nor political utility alone is enough to engender congenial SBRs. It 
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must be both. The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) enjoyed access to the government and protection 
of land rights until continued protection became a political liability for the regime. It turned out that 
regime interests outweighed economic importance of the farmers and the CFU was expendable (Taylor, 
2007). 
Strength and autonomy of capitalist classes and institutions 
This is often understood in terms of the „structural power of capital‟, i.e. a situation in which government 
is dependent on the economic and investment decisions of the private sector to realise its economic 
goals, which in turn compels government to consider the interests of business even in the absence of 
formal lobbying (Heilman and Lucas, 1997:145). Otherwise, governments have to contend with the 
„footloose‟ nature of capital (Hirschman, 1978). The effectiveness of structural power is such that 
business associations can be considered irrelevant because “...[the corporation] is at hand, ready to be 
used by its executives, for political activity ranging from discussions with civil servants  to financial 
support of political parties” (Lindblom, 1977: 196). However, in many developing countries, capital is too 
diffuse to automatically excite specific policies and is dependent on the state in many ways. 
Consequently, its structural power is limited. Even where capital is concentrated and mobility is not 
unduly restrained, capitalist interests still organise into associations so as to concentrate power and 
influence in order to get the ear of government. Examples include the Consenjo Mexicano de Hombres 
de Negocios (CMHN) in Mexico (Schneider, 1997) and the South African Foundation (SAF) in South 
Africa (Taylor, 2007). 
The key issue is whether the private business sector commands a large constituency or is a political 
threat to the regime. This affects the political calculus of the government as to how to engage with the 
business community (Taylor, 2007). For example, in Brazil in the 1980s, the efficiency of government 
was so dependent on the cooperation of the landed oligarchy that rather than being able to focus on its 
relationship with industrial capital, the state had to simultaneously contend with traditional elites 
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threatened by the conflictual transformation of rural class relations (Evans, 1989 and 1997). The 
autonomy of the capitalist class resides in the strength of capitalist institutions, especially property 
rights, and in the organisation of the business sector for the purpose of exerting influence. However, 
this is mediated by dominant ideologies, especially those of state elites, as shown below. 
Strength of capitalist ideology vis-à-vis other ideologies 
The relative strength of capitalist ideology appears to influence patterns of SBRs. These are in part 
conditioned by factors such as the structure of the economy, the interface between the local and 
international economy, and historically, the impact of imperialism and colonialism. For example, in 
Africa, low levels of capitalism are associated with imperialism and settler communities whose practices 
held back the rise of and marginalised an indigenous bourgeoisie. Small populations of white and 
Indian settlers dominated African business sectors (Taylor, 2007; Lucas, 1997; Dotson and Dotson, 
1968). Spaniards and the Portuguese dominated in Latin America (Schneider and Maxifield, 1997), and 
minorities of Chinese descent dominated in Southeast Asia and Taiwan (MacIntyre, 1994). This legacy  
affects SBRs in several ways, especially when the „indigenes‟ pressure governments for preferential 
treatment or governments victimise the non-indigenous private sector25  in order to address historical 
imbalances. 
Furthermore, parochial identities such as ethnicity and regionalism shape politics and affect patterns of 
SBRs when the state and the business sector are each dominated by ethnically separate groups or 
both are dominated by a single group. In a context where access to the state is a more important 
means of class formation than relations of production (Sandbrook, 1985; Kennedy, 1994), ethnic 
groups tend to constitute cleavages in economic and political life, and class formation is facilitated by 
government repression of some groups and selective provision of benefits to others.  In such situations, 
                                                             
25 Examples include Senegal, Kenya (Lucas 1997, Footnote No. 74), Taiwan (Chu, 1994) and most recently the black 
empowerment programme in South Africa (Hamman et al, 2008). 
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classes do not represent historical actors that are grounded in the structures of antagonistic socio-
economic interests and their transformation (Rueschemeyer et al, 1985:51-63). Rather, they are 
politically created according to the interests of those who wield power. Relations between states and 
the business classes they create often cement patrimonial relations of dependency. African examples 
include Nigeria, Kenya, and Senegal (Lucas, 1997; Dinwiddy, 1974). In Asia, the point is best 
exemplified by the Philippines, where “the state apparatus [was] continually choked by an anarchy of 
particularistic demands from, and particularistic actions on behalf of, those oligarchs and cronies who 
[were] most favoured by its top officials” (Hutchcroft, 1994:218). In some instances, the state replaced 
the private sector through state-owned enterprises, as was common in Taiwan (Chu, 1994) and most of 
post-colonial Africa (Dinwiddy, 1974). 
The strength of capitalist ideology, especially among state elites, vis-à-vis statist or socialist ideologies 
determines the position of business in SBRs. Where a capitalist ideology is entrenched, the state tends 
to be pro-business and intervenes in the economy to enable rather than to hinder private enterprise. 
The resulting patterns of SBRs are the growth coalitions associated with developmental states in South 
Korea and Japan and industrial transformation in Brazil (Evans, 1995). If the dominant ideology is 
statism, the attitudes and engagement between state and private business can be hostile and may give 
rise to patterns of SBRs based on particularism. Statism not only crowds out the private sector through 
public enterprises but also reduces the political and economic utility of private businesses, leading to 
intransigence on the part of the state and to the marginalisation of the business sector from policy-
making processes (Taylor, 2007; Brautigam et al, 2002). For example in Taiwan, the Kuo Mitang (KMT) 
government‟s public enterprises dominated the business sector, and the entire banking sector was 
under the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Consequently, the native Taiwanese business community had 
very low political and economic utility to the state, which was dominated by the Chinese (Fields, 1997; 
Chu, 1994). Similarly, in Ghana, SBRs were conditioned by the fact that the PNDC government did not 
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require private sector investment apart from gold mining in order to generate its high rates of economic 
growth and reconstruction (Kraus, 2002). 
If the dominant ideology is socialist, the private business sector is often antagonised and preyed upon, 
capitalist institutions, especially private property rights, are undermined, and the political risk of private 
investment is high. Examples include Tanzania after the Arusha declaration in 1967 (Heilman and 
Lucas, 1997; Nyang‟oro 1989) and Zimbabwe from the late 1990s, where populist anti-imperialist 
rhetoric brought the economy to its knees (Taylor, 2007). A particularly instructive example is Rawlings‟ 
Ghana, where the PNDC government came to power obsessed with socialist notions. It subjected 
successful entrepreneurs to extra-judicial proceedings on charges of sabotaging the economy. Many 
businesses were closed down or confiscated, profit was deemed morally questionable (Tangri, 1992; 
Kraus, 2002), and the government “saw wealth as something undesirable, especially in a society where 
the mass of people were very poor, and deprived sections of the community needed to be protected 
from exploitative capital. Business [had] to improve its concerns for labour and managers [did not have] 
to live too affluent a life-style in an environment of hardship” (Tangri, 1992:104). 
The organisation of business interests in relation to the state 
The literature suggests that how the business sector is organised contributes to the shaping of patterns 
of SBRs. The organisational form of the business sector affects the political calculus of the government 
as to whether to grant business associations access to policy dialogue, and how exactly to engage with 
the business community. For some scholars, membership density of the associations, effective internal 
mediation of members‟ interests, quality of policy inputs and financial autonomy are some of the 
important factors that enhance the capacity of business associations to engage with the state (Doner 
and Scheneider, 2000; Taylor, 2007; Bell, 1995; and Sinha, 2005). 
High membership density, which reflects the degree of representativeness, illuminates the political 
importance of the association in terms of a political constituency, the ability of the association or its 
 48 
 
 
members to make campaign contributions, the proportion of the sector output produced by its members 
and its overall capacity to be an asset to the government (Dunleavy and O‟Leary, 1987:34; Doner and 
Schneider, 2000:271).The extent to which business is mobilised in a particular sector, or indeed at a 
macro-level, determines whether it will be able to assume a role in the making and implementing of 
policy (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989:53). Thus, encompassing business associations create the 
perception of political and economic utility to the state and are more likely to be concerned with broader 
economic strategies than narrow interests. For example, in Zambia, manufacturers represented by the 
Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM) had “little political clout; they were ignored [by the Chiluba 
government] in favour of importers, informal economy traders and mostly urban consumers who 
provided a more valuable political constituency” (Taylor, 2007:71). In India, the Rajiv Gandhi 
government did not find the FICCI a useful partner in the implementation of reforms aimed at 
technological modernisation, external opening and a reduction of state regulation26. The government 
ignored the FICCI and instead propped up a rival association, the CII (Sinha, 2005:9-10).  
Thus, an important question for the theoretical objective of this dissertation is how can membership of 
business associations be increased? The literature suggests that „selective incentives‟ or „club goods‟ 
(Olson, 1982) are critical because they make membership of an association valuable while making exit 
or non-membership costly. Such incentives vary between countries, but the critical ones include access 
to state actors, management of import and export quotas and licenses and other similar documents, 
and several other services or benefits specific to the associations (Doner and Schneider, 2000; Taylor, 
2007)27. What appears paradoxical is the fact that the selective incentives that are primarily responsible 
for increasing and maintaining the membership density of business associations have to be sanctioned 
or delegated by the state (Handley, 2008; Sinha, 2005). This suggests that whether a business 
                                                             
26 The reforms were seriously opposed by his own party which had dense connections with the FICCI. The FICCI was 
protectionist, weak, politically fragmented and had acquired vested interests in the continuation of the regulatory system. 
27 Doner and Schneider (2000:72) provide a table indicating a range of selective incentives offered by different associations 
mostly in Latin America and East Asia. 
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association will become a political force will partly depend on the interests of state elites in providing 
exclusive state-related incentives that sustain the association. 
An inability to effectively mediate member interests often results in fragmentation and membership 
attrition that erodes the political utility of the association, especially where association membership is 
not compulsory. For instance, in Thailand, the Thai Auto Parts Manufacturers Association has had to 
contend with another assembler-backed association, several large textile firms do not participate in the 
Spinners Association, and many other large firms operate outside the government-sanctioned peak 
association, the Federation of Thai Industries (Doner and Schneider, 2000:271). The result of this 
pluralisation has been a lack of coordination of policy inputs to the government and unwillingness by 
the government to engage in policy consultations with many players. Similarly, in Zambia, merchants 
and manufacturers pushed contradictory demands on the state. According to Taylor, “state officials 
charged that business associations were confused and inconsistent because [they did not know] what 
they [wanted] and [government] saw no need to credibly respond to business concerns” (Taylor, 
2007:71). 
At the core of the organisational strength of business associations and their role in SBRs is the quality 
and quantity of their professional staff as well as their ability to meet the financial outlays necessary for 
acquiring and processing information and implementing associational and government-sanctioned 
activities. Examples of strong business associations include those in Japan, which are often staffed by 
retired economic bureaucrats, and South Korea, where government has had a hand in the appointment 
of key personnel (Boyd, 1987; Fields, 1997). Furthermore, competition between rival associations, as 
was the case in India, compelled each competitor to develop human resource capacity in order to 
develop competitive advantages. Inadequately staffed associations or those in which staffs are less 
competent in processing information and developing proposals and strategies not only will they be 
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unable to match the competence of state bureaucrats but they will also contribute to the downgrading of 
the association.  
2.3. Modes of influence between state and business 
SBRs have two basic dimensions: the nature of government intervention in the private sector and the 
nature of business involvement in political life. Patterns and outcomes depend on how the involvement 
of one influences the other. 
2.3.1. Control of business finance by government versus political financing by business 
Where private capital is scarce, government control over banking institutions provides the state with 
leverage over business. Governments use such instruments as credit rationing and disbursement of 
loans „to reward the friendly, exclude the hostile and disorganise the dangerous‟ (Moon, 1994:145). For 
example, in South Korea, the government of Chu Doon Hwan used credit allocation and threats of tax 
investigations to enforce compliance with the administrative guidance on business restructuring. It 
further required commercial banks to set aside 35-55 per cent of their available lendable funds for small 
and medium sized firms in order to compel big firms to deconcentrate due to financial suffocation 
(Ibid:148). In Taiwan, the Ministry of Economic Affairs exercised such control over the banking sector 
that „the fortunes of large firms depended on the good will of government‟ (Chu, 1994). However, 
finance control can degenerate into political patronage, which often results in macro-economic 
disequilibria and financial crises like that of East Asia in 1997 (Chang, 1999). A particularly good 
example is the Philippines, where favoured cronies accessed massive bank credits but never repaid 
them, creating a financial crisis aptly described as „selective squander‟ (Hutchcroft, 1993). Similarly, in 
Egypt, huge loans from public banks were given to cronies, often without sufficient collateral and 
sometimes on the basis of a telephone conversation (Adly, 2009). 
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On the other hand, business‟ financing of political parties and candidates creates pockets of business 
support among politicians that can be vital in diffusing populist and statist elements of regimes. While 
this happens in both developed and developing countries, it can be quite useful in the latter because 
the indigenous „capitalist classes‟ are mostly at formative stages of development. In South Korea, for 
example, Roh Tae Woo came to power on a populist platform that promised to curtail big business in 
the interest of ordinary people. When the regime resuscitated industrial restructuring and rationalisation 
measures, the chairman of the FKI admonished both opposition and ruling politicians and warned of 
potential retaliation through the discretionary use of political contributions. He declared that the FKI 
would henceforth provide donations to politicians willing to support and protect business freedom. This 
led to political and bureaucratic realignments and a pro-business economic regime (Moon, 1994). 
Similarly, for South Africa, Taylor (2007) has shown that business people met the ANC in exile in 1985 
and later, in 1988, fifty white business executives and progressive organisations formed a consultative 
business movement aimed at promoting a fair and just society and a successful economy in a united 
non-racial democracy. Taylor has argued that in exchange, but also due to the changing global 
economic context, the ANC repudiated its 1955 freedom charter, which had called for social democracy 
and nationalisation as means for addressing inequalities in the distribution of resources. Likewise, in 
Egypt, private capital holders who benefited from cheap loans from public banks provided up to one 
billion US dollars to the regime for the 2005 election campaign (Adly, 2009:17). 
The reciprocity, that is, the control of business finance by governments and political financing by 
business, can also generate widespread rent-seeking and rent-taking especially when ownership of 
business coincides with holding a political position in government, as it transpired in Zambia in the 
1990s (Taylor, 2007; Daloz, 2003). It yields widespread resentment and cynicism about SBRs as it 
suggests the existence of „distributive coalitions‟ and trading influence. This is particularly a problem 
where the state is not consolidated, dominates the economy, and political funding is largely unregulated 
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(Fisher and Eisenstaedt, 2004). However, the political influence of the business community lies in the 
state‟s or regime‟s perception of its chances of survival with or without the support of the business 
sector. In Brazil, business association leaders mobilised resources for a coup in 1964. Ten years later 
they launched an anti-state campaign against the military regime for failing to institutionalise private 
sector participation in the policy process, and the state responded positively (Lucas, 1997). The PNDC 
government in Ghana had similar fears and subjected prominent businessmen to trials in specially 
designed tribunals and confiscated their property (Tangri, 1992; Kraus, 2002). In Taiwan, the KMT 
established businesses to avoid dependency on the native Taiwanese for funding (Chu, 1994). 
2.3.2. Government policy, regulations and discipline enforcement –v- lobbying by business 
Formulating policy and enforcing regulations are basic functions that even anti-statists assign the state 
in the process of capitalist development. However, where neither states nor markets have consolidated 
around agreed rules, enforcement of regulations and discipline becomes selective and discretionary. 
State incumbents require political supporters to survive and these in turn must be provided with 
incentives sufficient to retain their support (Evans, 1989: 564). In the context of weak states, this 
exchange relationship affects the formation of goals and the enforcement of rules. The uneven 
enforcement of rules owing to political considerations penalises those not favoured by the regime while 
its cronies escape censure for indiscipline, as has been the case in Egypt (Adly, 2009). But not all 
aspects of state action are inclined towards the „vested interests‟ of its supporters. Economic policies 
and regulations are rarely chosen or enforced for public or private interests but “chiefly for regime 
interests such as consolidating power, expanding political support and assuring political survival” 
(Moon, 1994:145; also Taylor, 2007). 
On the other hand, the business sector engages in persuasive attempts to influence state decision 
making, through provision of policy-relevant information and advocacy rather than explicit pressure. For 
example, groups of Chinese entrepreneurs for many years engaged in strategic persuasive 
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representations to the Communist Party to accept the „private sector‟ not as „the second‟ and 
illegitimate economy but as central to market socialism and to accept them into the party membership 
(Haberer, 2003). Lobbying can take the form of formal macro- and sectoral lobbies in PPD forums, such 
as the JEC in Mauritius or NEDLAC in South Africa, but it can also occur informally through networks. 
At the micro-level, lobbying can be an opaque and informal activity, difficult to monitor and presenting 
real dangers of collusion. At the collective level, its efficacy depends on many organisational and 
attitudinal factors on both sides of the relationship as discussed above. In countries like the US, 
lobbying has increasingly come to include strategies of „constituency-building‟ in which business firms 
seek to build support for their interests among consumers, stockholders, employees, and so on in order 
to create enough political pressure to be heard (Baysinger,1984).  
2.3.3. State predation on business versus state capture by business 
Predation has been variously defined. Some definitions confine it to the more generic conception of the 
state, while others attribute it directly to the individual or group of individuals who run the state. 
According to Pareto (1966:114-115), predation refers to “the appropriation of the goods of others by 
legal or illegal means”. In some of its guises, it is perpetrated by a small number of individuals who 
compel the majority to pay tribute to the minority. In such scenarios, “the minority preys on the majority 
using the state as its engine of predation” (Leftwich, 2007a:100). Levi (1981) grounds her definition on 
the self-interest and self-maximising assumptions of the public choice analytical framework. For her, 
predation occurs when the ruler, that is, the actor or set of actors who promulgate and enforce the law 
of a society, of which the most important are those governing property rights, attempts to formulate 
policies that maximise their personal objectives and they succeed because their bargaining power 
relative to that of those external to the political establishment, is disproportionately higher (Levi 
1981:438). Such power often comes from the rulers‟ access to and control of instruments of force and 
coercion and state resources.  
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Evans (1995:44, see also 1989:562) defines predatory states in terms of their ability to extract “ large 
amounts of otherwise investable surplus while providing so little in the way of collective goods in return 
that they do indeed impede economic transformation”. This, however, appears to delimit predation to 
lawful (not necessarily just) but heavy tax burdens and alleges that state elites squander the resources 
without providing the necessary public goods that tax revenue is supposed to finance28. It further 
implies that heavy taxation and other forms of extraction that are matched with provision of public 
goods may not necessarily amount to predation29. Olson (1993) argues that while an autocratic ruler 
may extract the maximum possible surplus from society and use it for his own purposes, to call this 
predation is misleading. He prefers to call it stationary banditry which takes diverse forms but “the 
essence of the matter is that the stationary bandit provides a minimum amount of public goods to 
ensure increased income through expropriation/extraction” (1993:569). Besides the pursuit of outright 
expropriation, political elites and administrative personnel also solicit donations from businessmen and 
poor citizens, who are either coerced by the regime to contribute or volunteer bribes in return for 
favours. Such states thrive where the business sector is weak and the state takes advantage of its 
dispersion. In short, predation is „the state as organised [and legalised] crime‟ (Tilly, 1985:165). 
Predation implies the insecurity of property rights. Besides dissipating surpluses, when predation 
destabilises property rights, investors withhold their investment (Bates, 2001). Gordon Tullock (1974) is 
clear on this point when he argues that “with random seizure of property, it is irrational on the part of 
citizens [more specifically, businessmen] to produce very much to be seized” (as quoted  by Levi, 
1981:435). 
 
                                                             
28 However, in his analysis of Zaire, it is clear that he uses the term „predation‟ to cover illicit acquisitions of money and o ther 
goods by those who hold „any slice of public power‟(Evans, 1989: 570). 
29 Evans (1989:562 footnote No.3) claims that his definition is different from those who define „revenue maximising states‟ as 
predatory. 
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On the other hand, a powerful business sector can „capture‟ the state and use it in favour of business 
interests. State capture is achieved when the business community is able to shape and affect the 
formation of the basic rules of the game to its advantage through massive illicit and non-transparent 
provision of private benefits to officials and politicians. It echoes other concepts such as crony 
capitalism, booty capitalism and pirate capitalism and includes cases where high-level corruption is 
pervasive (Adly, 2009; Hellman et al, 2000; Kang 2002b; Hutchcroft, 1994; Shatz, 1984; Frye, 2002). In 
state capture, the business sector colonises the state and turns it into its executive committee, stifling 
growth in the process (Kang, 2002a)30. This mode of business influence is associated with strong 
business sectors and weak states and is characterised with policy incoherence or indecision (Kang, 
2002b; Hellman et al, 2000; Frye, 2002). With weak states and weak market institutions, a typical 
problem for states in developing countries is to resist society‟s demands (Migdal, 1998). Examples of 
state capture include the Philippines (Hutchcroft, 1994), Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and Croatia (Hellman et 
al, 2000:10).  
2.4. Comparative patterns of state-business relations 
What patterns of SBRs can be expected from the different combinations of factors and modes of 
influence between the state and the business sector? Kang (2002b) proposes that the interaction of two 
factors – the degree of coherence (coherent/fractured) of the state apparatus and the degree of 
concentration (strong/dispersed) of the business sector – give rise to the following patterns of SBRs. 
Mutual hostages:  where the state is coherent and business is strong/concentrated. Each is too 
powerful to be taken advantage of by the other. SBRs are collusive but yield unintended developmental 
benefits, as exemplified by South Korea (Kang, 2002b) and Germany (Sinha, 2005). 
                                                             
30 Kruger (1974) shows the extent of economic dissipation that arises from such intensive rent-seeking and, Bwagwati 
(1982) even specifies the type of „rents‟ that are directly unproductive and which thrive in such scenarios. 
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Predation:  where a coherent state (centralised) takes advantage of a dispersed and weak business 
sector with political elites pursuing outright expropriation. The result is massive top-down corruption and 
economic plunder, as was the case in Zaire (Evans, 1989).  
 Rent-seeking:  where a fractured state is colonised by a strong business sector, i.e. state capture. The 
result is massive bottom-up corruption, as was the case in the Philippines (Hutchcroft, 1993 and 1994).  
Laissez-faire:  where the state is fractured and the business sector is dispersed. No rents are created. 
An example is the US (Wilson, 1990). 
Kang‟s model recognises the reality of collusion in any pattern of SBRs. It therefore achieves its major 
purpose of modelling corruption and its effects on relations between state and business elites. 
However, the model is insensitive to the fact that in development states like Japan and South Korea, 
the developmental effects of SBRs were not unintended. Additionally, a combination of coherent states 
and weak business sectors does not always result in predation. In Japan and South Korea, the states 
did not prey on the weak private sectors but nurtured them through various industrial policy instruments 
and created large conglomerates. Furthermore, where there is a combination of fractured states and 
dispersed business, the states tend to be authoritarian but lack capacity. Rather than residual 
corruption, one gets a pattern of politically-embedded cronyism, as in post-liberalisation Egypt (Adly, 
2009).  
Sinha (2005:5-6) develops a model of state-interest group interaction similar to that of Kang except that 
the key variables are state-centred, i.e. state autonomy and state weakness. While some of her 
descriptions of patterns of SBRs are useful, others are not, as they describe the environment within 
which SBRs take place or the nature of the state. For instance, embedded autonomy/corporatism 
justifiably describes patterns of SBRs where the state is autonomous and business is coherent, and 
embedded particularism characterises SBRs in which the state is autonomous and the business sector 
is fragmented. However, terms such as state pluralism or liberal pluralism are too crude to describe any 
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particular pattern of SBRs, just as pluralist state, over-developed state or disorganised business do not 
at all describe patterns of SBRs. If anything, these are best regarded as factors that give rise to 
patterns of SBRs. 
Atkinson and Coleman (1985, 1989) provide a comprehensive description of patterns of SBRs. Building 
on Katzenstein (1977), SBRs are conceived as „policy networks‟ in which state elites and private sector 
actors come together for purposes of economic policy making. Based on variations of „state autonomy‟ 
and „concentration and/or dispersal of decision-making power in government‟ and „business 
mobilisation‟, they identify at least five possible patterns of SBRs, depicted in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of patterns of state-business relations 
 Clientele 
pluralism 
Parentella pluralism State-directed Corporatism concertation 
State variables Low autonomy  
 
High 
centralisation 
Low autonomy 
 
Low centralisation 
High autonomy 
 
High centralisation 
High autonomy 
Low 
concentration 
High autonomy 
 
High 
concentration 
Business 
variables 
High  
mobilisation 
Low  mobilisation Low mobilisation High mobilisation High mobilisation 
characteristics State off-loads 
some 
responsibility 
to private 
sector actors. 
Close connections 
between firm 
owners/managers and 
the dominant political 
party; Government 
members eager and 
willing to intervene in 
administrative 
processes with 
partisan calculus; 
Dispersed 
bureaucratic authority, 
weak technical 
expertise, 
undeveloped 
professionalism. 
 
Business considered 
untrustworthy by state 
elites; State embarks 
on economic projects 
which affect 
investment decisions 
of business; state 
elites often self-
righteous and 
manipulative; No 
consultations, but 
more directives –
SBRs barely cordial.  
 
An autonomous 
but divided state 
seeks to place 
the burden of 
decision making 
in the hands of 
conflicting socio-
economic groups. 
Business shares 
in policy-making 
through direct 
negotiations but 
the state leads the 
way; The state 
avoids capture, 
pushes through a 
broader agenda. 
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The different patterns of SBRs entail different formats of PPDs. The literature suggests that these 
mechanisms can be classified broadly as formal and informal. Formal PPDs are institutionalised in the 
form of advisory investment councils, discussion forums between government officials and 
representatives of the business community (Pinaud, 2008:1) Examples include the Joint Public-Private 
Consultative Committee (JPPC) in Thailand, The Malaysian Business Council in Malaysia (Lucas, 
1997), NEDLAC in South Africa (Taylor,2007) and the Joint Economic Council (JEC) in Mauritius. 
Ideally, a PPD would take the form of concertation, but in the context of weak states and weak private 
sectors there exists a disjuncture between the local institutional and economic situation and the 
conditions for an optimal PPD. In such situations, “merely assembling government representatives, 
high-level civil servants and private sector [organisations] around a table will not suffice to create an 
atmosphere of trust in which the broad direction of economic policy can be jointly expounded”(Pinaud, 
2008:3). 
Although the current policy drive is to formalise SBRs‟ institutions in an orthodox way31, evidence 
abounds that some regions in the world have experienced high levels of investment and economic 
growth without having the desirable formal institutions. In the developing world (as in the developed 
world), exchanges between state and business elites are often „hand-in hand, informal, shaped by 
personal or small group relationships rather than general rules or principles...they are particularistic‟ 
(Moore and Schmidtz 2008:40). For example, the personal networks of professional elites in the public 
and private sectors in France are known to have been central to the success of industrial policy 
(Loriaux, 1999). In China, where the private sector was adjudged illegitimate for ideological reasons, 
security of property as well as increased private investment resulted from informal but strategic 
pressures by entrepreneurial groups connected to the central committee of the communist party 
(Haberer, 2003; Moore and Schmidtz, 2008). The informal institution of guanxi – based on personal 
                                                             
31 For example, World Development Report (2005) and www.publicprivatedialogue.org . 
 60 
 
 
connections, reciprocity and mutual trust - complemented and compensated for the weak formal 
institutions and played a major role in facilitating foreign direct investment (Wang, 2000). Similarly, the 
old boy network (amakudari) in Japan (Schaede, 1995) gave the state bureaucracy an internal 
coherence and corporate identity while institutionalising policy dialogue with the private sector. It gave 
rise to a pattern of SBRs commonly described as embedded autonomy and led to phenomenal growth. 
Furthermore, Skinner (1958) and Mackie (1992)32 have shown that businesses in Hong Kong, Taiwan 
and Southeast Asia have long operated in political and economic systems that have lacked the rule of 
law and have learned to protect their interests through networks of mutual support and political co-
optation. 
These examples reinforce the observation that the functioning of an institution is not to be inferred from 
its [apparent] form (Wiggins and Davis, 2006) as much depends on the administrative requirements, 
efficacy of implementation and actual outcomes.  But not all informal relations between state and 
business actors work for wider developmental purposes. Evans (1989:579) has condemned 
bureaucratic rings in Brazil33 as ad hoc, personalised and undependable for industrialists, and arbitrary 
in outcomes. Similarly, exceedingly close SBRs involving an economically powerful oligarchy and weak 
formal institutions blurred the distinction between the public and private spheres and led to cronyism in 
the Philippines (Hutchcroft, 1994; Haggard, 1994). For Africa, descriptions have been overwhelmingly 
pessimistic, best summarised by Chabal and Daloz (1999) when they argue that SBRs capable of 
becoming growth or reform coalitions are anathema to African states, where political elites are more 
preoccupied with rent-seeking and fomenting disorder than with development34. 
 
                                                             
32 As cited by Wang (2000:543). 
33 Described as individualised connections between the local bourgeoisie and the state: “small sets of individual industrialists 
connected to an equally small set of individual bureaucrats, usually through some pivotal office holder”. 
34 Other key works on this theme are Bratton and de Walle (1997), Jackson and Rosberg (1984), Le Vine (1980), Clapham 
(1982). 
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Focusing almost exclusively on venal bureaucrats and rent-seeking capitalists and believing in 
Mueller‟s iron law of rent-seeking35, some analysts have called for arms-length relations between 
governments and business sectors. They have pushed for neo-liberal reforms aimed at minimising the 
roles of the state in the economy. However, the reforms have yielded three paradoxes: first, they have 
not removed contact between government and business although some facilities for potential collusion 
have been removed (Schneider and Maxfield,1997); second, the reform process itself has created new 
rents, especially the privatisation programmes (ibid.; Taylor, 2007; Mwenda and Tangri, 1992; 
Debardeleben, 1999); third,  evidence, from Mexico and Chile for instance,  has shown that „the road to 
markets is easier if business cooperates‟ (Schneider and Maxfield, 1997:4). In short, the neoliberal 
policy prescription for SBRs in the guise of investment climate reforms “causes collateral intellectual 
damage: denial of the possibility that [business people] might actually need and want politicians [and 
bureaucrats] to have discretion to help them in times of trouble or to encourage coordination among 
private sector enterprises” (Moore and Schmidtz, 2008:27). 
The nature of the state in state-business relations 
The comparative patterns suggest that the state in SBRs will conform to the weathervane model, the 
neutral view or the broker model (Dunleavy and O‟Leary, 1987:43). In the weathervane model, the state 
“is a coding machine, a passive vehicle through which inputs are processed. The state resembles a 
weathervane [in that] it simply mirrors or responds to the balance of pressure group forces in civil 
society” (ibid). State elites and their bureaucratic agencies “are responsive to, biased towards and 
indeed colonised by the strongest pressure groups in their domains” (ibid). The effects of such SBRs 
will depend on contextual factors, but clearly in this model, government potentially becomes “the steady 
appeasement of relatively small groups” (Dahl, 1956:145) while policy-making is reduced to the 
“legitimation of victories in pressure group contests” (Dunleavy and O‟Leary, 1987:43). 
                                                             
35 The law states: “wherever a rent is to be found, a rent seeker will be there trying to get it” (Mueller, 1989:241). 
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In the neutral view, the state is either a bystander or a referee presiding over the existing rules or an 
interventionist that promotes substantive fairness (Dunleavy and O‟Leary, 1987:45). Unlike in the 
weathervane model, a neutral state does not simply allow pressure groups to formulate public policy 
after having competed among themselves but rather tilts the balance of public policy towards the 
interests of the unorganised party. Their motivation for doing this may be the need for political stability 
and consolidation of political power and legitimacy. For SBRs, the model suggests the existence of 
patterns in which the state has a modicum of autonomy from societal groups such as business 
associations and plays the role of mediator, balancer and harmoniser of interests. Institutionally, this 
may require „societal corporatist arrangements‟ in which governments do not restrict „freedom of 
association‟ but encourage the rise of peak associations that assume a privileged role in discussions 
(Schneider and Maxfield, 1997; Hutchful, 1989; Schmitter, 1974; Bianchi, 1986). 
In the broker model, the state does not mirror its society, as in the weathervane model, nor does it 
neutrally tip the balance of public policy towards the „public interest‟. Rather, state elites have and 
pursue their own policy preferences, which may be far from altruistic. Consequently, “policy [reflects] 
the outcome of self-interested contests within the state apparatuses …” (Dunleavy and O‟Leary, 
1987:47), and the outcome may also be favourable to other societal groups. This view resonates with 
that of Pempel (1999), who argues that rather than purely focusing on policies and state structures in 
the search for explanations of development outcomes, one must also concentrate on regime interests. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that concerns with SBRs are not new and that they straddle the disciplines of 
Politics, Sociology and Economics. The institutional and organisational patterns of SBRs are shaped by 
many factors, ranging from dominant economic and political ideologies in any given country to how the 
state and the business sector are organised vis-à-vis each other and the technical capacities within 
them. In addition, the political and economic importance of the business sector in relation to the 
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objectives of state elites and the modes of influence between the state and the business sector all feed 
into the calculus of state elites and help structure SBRs. The literature further suggests that the 
character of political regimes affects the scope and methods of interaction between governments and 
businesses, but their relationship with developmental outcomes is inconclusive. The variations in 
patterns of SBRs suggest that historical legacies, situational imperatives and regime interests give rise 
to different patterns. Thus, in contexts of relatively low capitalist development, weak states and 
fragmented markets, SBRs will take different patterns depending on the political courses of action. 
However, the literature does not systematically and directly deal with the interests and constraints that 
motivate state elites to take particular courses of action vis-à-vis the business sector and engender the 
different patterns of SBRs. Neither do the models illuminate how SBR patterns tend to persist once they 
stabilise and how they change or can be changed. The models further presume a separation between 
the state and the business sector, but states in developing countries straddle political governance and 
doing business, and state elites are often also businessmen (Daloz, 2003). We therefore need to 
understand what patterns of SBRs emerge when state companies are a significant part of the business 
sector. 
The literature on SBRs is largely concerned with the relationship between forms of these relations and 
developmental outcomes, often from different theoretical perspectives. But there is little analytical 
attention paid to the politics of how the institutions come into being, how they are sustained and how 
they change. In the next chapter, I present the analytical and methodological approach that was used to 
trace the evolution of SBRs in Malawi. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Analytical and Methodological Framework 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the analytical and methodological approach of historical institutionalism that was 
used to gather and analyse data in order to trace and explain the evolution of state-business relations 
in Malawi. I argue that historical institutionalism was an appropriate approach because it provided a 
framework that was institutional in focus, historical in time and actor-centred. This was particularly 
important as it has become clear from the extensive literature on SBRs that understanding SBR 
institutional processes amounts to understanding the particularities of contests, negotiations and 
cooperation between state elites and their agencies, on the one hand,  and business elites and their 
organisational forms, on the other, and the rule structure within which these relations take place. 
Historical institutionalism provided a set of concepts that were sensitive to inter-temporal aspects rather 
than snapshot views of political processes and institutional outcomes. These concepts are inherently 
comparative and were therefore useful for discerning continuities and discontinuities in the practice of 
SBRs from one era to another. Its explicit focus on the distribution and exercise of power by actors 
effectively made it a useful political approach for examining the formation, maintenance and change of 
SBR institutions as they unfolded over time. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 presents the key methodological premises and ideas 
of historical institutionalism and indicates why the approach was appropriate for this study. Section 3.2 
discusses the key analytical elements of the approach. Section 3.3 describes how the approach was 
operationalised and the methods that were used to collect data. Section 3.4 discusses ethical issues 
encountered during the data collection phase and provides a conclusion. 
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3.1. Historical institutionalism 
3.1.1.  Origins of historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism is an approach to the analysis of the evolution (i.e. origins, maintenance and 
change) and outcomes of formal and informal rules that shape the behaviour of actors (i.e. people 
and/or organisations) in political, economic or social spheres of life. Its antecedents lie in historical 
sociology and political economy, especially in the works of Karl Marx on „historical materialism‟, Max 
Weber on the „methods of social science‟ and Emile Durkheim on „the rules of sociological methods‟. As 
a variant of the „new institutionalism‟1, its re-incarnation in political analysis began in the early 1980s as 
a reaction to the behavioural revolution and to the increasing use of rational choice approaches. These 
two approaches were deemed unsatisfactory because of their society-centred overemphasis that 
effectively pushed the state onto the margins and the tendency to abstract political behaviour from its 
historical and institutional context2. Early works to mainstream the approach include Skocpol‟s (1979) 
study on the state and social revolutions, which sought to explain the causes and patterns of great 
revolutions; Skocpol (1984) on vision and method in historical sociology; and Evans, Rueschmeyer and 
Skocpol (1985), who were explicitly concerned with bringing  the „state‟  back to the centre of political 
analysis. While Theda Skocpol (1992) gave the approach its name, it is Steinmo, Thelen and 
Longstreth (1992) who first produced a coherent statement of the approach  and who provided  further 
improvements and conceptual clarity in their later works alongside that of others including Thelen (1999 
and 2003), Mahoney (2000), Pierson (2000) and Hogan (2005). 
3.1.2.  Key methodological premises of historical institutionalism 
 
                                                             
1 Following Hay (2002:7) it is conventional to regard the political science mainstream today as characterised by three 
distinctive perspectives: rational choice theory, behaviouralism and the new institutionalism, each with several approaches 
within its fold. Each adopts a different approach to political analysis. 
2 Useful surveys of the development of „Institutionalism‟ as an approach are provided in Hay (2002), Sanders (2006), and 
March and Olsen (2006). 
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The aim of historical institutionalism is to produce a nuanced and detailed empirical description of the  
causal chains or „pathways‟ of the long-term development  of interactions among goal-oriented actors, 
that is, the evolution of institutions and their outcomes. The approach is based on at least four 
methodological premises3. 
First, the analysis of political interactions, like those characteristic of SBRs, is realistic and more 
illuminating if it is sensitive to the rule-structure within which the interactions take place, such a 
structure being a creation of current or previous actors. The rationale for this premise is to be found in 
numerous studies that have shown that „institutions matter‟ in that all social, political and economic 
behaviours of people and organisations are profoundly shaped by, and only acquire their importance 
within, the institutional context in which they occur. Thus, at the core of the logic of historical 
institutionalism is the argument that empirical institutional analysis must concern itself fully with the 
historical development of institutions. 
Second, empirical study must be sequential, following the trajectory of life itself rather than a discrete 
approach that takes „snapshot‟ views of the phenomenon under study. The assumption of historical 
institutionalism in this regard is that human beings (and their agencies) are norm-abiding, rule-following 
and self-interested actors. Thus, how they behave in any activity (for instance, SBRs) depends on the 
nature of the organisation, on the wider context in which they function and on the specific set of rules 
they have to comply with or seek to resist. Thus, in seeking to explain institutional formation, 
maintenance and change, narratives constructed using this framework will necessarily be longer and 
must inevitably be based on history. 
Third, empirical study must be driven by a hypothesis (or several) that arises from an empirical puzzle. 
Unlike other approaches, notably rational choice and behaviouralism, which select their cases on the 
bases of how they deviate from a prediction of some general theory, historical institutionalism begins 
                                                             
3 I have drawn these premises mainly from Sanders (2006), Thelen (1999), Thelen (2003), Steinmo (2007), Levi (1999). 
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with real-world observations. For example, Evans‟ observations led him to ask why some states foster 
industrial transformation, while others do not or do not do it well (Evans, 1995).  Similarly, Handley 
(2008) was concerned with why and how the business sector in some countries develops the capacity 
to constructively contest the formulation of economic policy, while in other countries it struggles to 
develop an independent political capacity? Such questions are then used to formulate hypotheses to 
explain the observed paradoxes or differences.4 
Fourth, historical institutionalism works at the level of mid-range theory building in which groups and 
organisations, not necessarily atomised individuals (as in rational choice), are the main units of analysis 
and employs inductive reasoning to transcend the particular stories and generate theoretical claims. 
This premise contrasts significantly with the other main approaches to political analysis, which aspire to 
universal theoretical claims and use deductive reasoning to falsify or validate a theory.  
3.1.3.  Key ideas of historical institutionalism 
The main ideas of historical institutionalism have not remained static, because new theoretical insights 
have emerged to refine and recast them. Nonetheless, there are at least four core ideas that constitute 
the approach although some of their fine details continue to be areas of theoretical contestation and 
intellectual debate. 
First, and particularly important to this study, is the idea that institutions are products of politics, so  in 
order  to understand their provenance, resilience and change, there is a need to go beyond the 
institutional arrangements themselves  so as to discover the political imperatives and relationships that 
were responsible for their creation, those that resisted them and sought alternative arrangements, and 
the structural context in which these processes took place. This idea necessitates a broader 
                                                             
4 The other approaches, notably rational choice institutionalism, begin with an observation of deviance from the predictions 
of a general theory. For example, in view of the problem of free-riding, why do communities cooperate in the exploitation of 
natural resources? (Wade,1992). Or given that „capital is privileged‟, why do corporations come together to form business 
associations? (Lindblom,1977). 
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understanding of what constitutes „politics‟ (as defined below) and implies that “institutional [evolution] 
is a contest among actors to establish rules which structure outcomes [in a manner] most favourable for 
them” (Knight, 1992:15) in the immediate future or in the long run. Thus, a society‟s institutions, 
including those governing SBRs, are viewed as creations of political conflict and strategic bargaining 
among social actors and reflect power asymmetries among the actors. Although this idea still has high 
explanatory power, some of its assumptions are problematic in that the constituencies responsible for 
the genesis of an institution may not be the same as those that sustain it over time. For example, 
Thelen‟s study of Germany‟s political economy of vocational skills found that the 1897 Handcraft 
Protection Law aimed to galvanise a reactionary artisanal class as a countervailing force against a 
growing and radical labour movement. But further down the line, industry that was bypassed by the law 
developed interests around it and became its main defender (Thelen, 2003). 
The second idea is that „history matters.‟ The legacy of the past influences the present and the future in 
that initial policy and institutional choices and the commitments that grow out of them determine 
subsequent decisions/choices (Krasner, 1984; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002) such that there develops 
inertia for the initial choices to persist. Consequently, implementing the reform, transformation, and 
replacement of institutions becomes difficult. Furthermore, history matters because political events take 
place in a historical context that directly shapes them. Classic examples of the importance of history‟s 
centrality to industrial policy come from studies on late development, particularly the work of 
Gershenkron (1962), whose historical analysis led him to two important conclusions:  the time when a 
country industrialises affects its strategy for industrialisation, and late industrialisers will necessary 
require the interposition of the state. History also matters to the extent that people‟s ideas at the time of 
designing institutions are shaped by a combination of their past experience and intended future 
outcomes. In short, for historical institutionalism, “history is not a chain of independent events” 
(Steinmo, 2007:12) but a sequence shaped by sets of inter-dependent variables. 
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The third idea relates more directly to the question of institutional emergence and change and has been 
a subject of theoretical contestation and refinement. Initial formulations were influenced by the 
„punctuated equilibrium‟ approach to policy formation and change (True et al, 2007)5. This postulated a 
theory of institutional development characterised by long periods of institutional stability and 
reproduction that are punctuated occasionally by brief phases of institutional flux during which more 
dramatic change occurs (Cappocia and Kelemen,2007; collier and collier, 2002). Thus, once created, 
institutions either persist or break down in the face of an external force (True et al, 2007; Hay, 2002; 
Peters, 2005). However, this „zero-sum‟ view of institutional evolution is not entirely supported by 
empirical evidence. Recent formulations go beyond the influence of external shocks and incorporate 
endogenous processes and variables for institutional evolution. Further, unlike the initial formulation 
that implied that institutional formation always occurs via a revolution-like process, current formulations 
point to different modes of institutional change, including layering, drifting and conversion (Thelen, 1999 
and 2003, Redmond, 2005a; Steinmo, 2007; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), all of which show that 
existing institutions rarely break down, and change often takes place in a manner that cannot be said to 
be revolutionary. 
The fourth idea relates to the role of ideas/ideologies in shaping the evolution and change of 
institutions. The rationale is that ideas have „framing effects‟ on choices and become the mobilising 
forces for societal groups like business associations and political parties that often seek to create or 
change institutions. For the actors interested in the perpetuation of existing institutional arrangements, 
ideas provide a rallying point. As Mkandawire (2001:291) noted with respect to developmental states, 
ideologies provide the rationale and legitimacy for policies and institutions and “serve as the „opium‟ for 
masses” while “knitting together the ruling class”. Studies that have reinforced this tenet include Hall 
                                                             
5 Eldredge and Gould (1972), in their evolutionary studies in biology, were the first to introduce the phrase „punctuated 
equilibrium‟ before social scientists began to apply it to the study of change of social phenomena (see also Somit and 
Peterson, 1992). 
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(1989), in which he explored how economic ideas shape political power over time, and Blyth (2002 and 
2003) in which he analysed the role of ideas in shaping the interests of actors and inducing institutional 
change. 
The approach provided four key concepts for the analysis of SBRs, namely, a conception of institutions 
that distinguishes them analytically from organisations, critical junctures, power asymmetries, and a 
broader understanding of what constitutes politics. Some of these concepts (for example, critical 
junctures) still lack consensus on the specifics of their meaning, and I hope that the findings of this 
study will have contributed to clarifying some of the issues. 
3.2.  Concepts in historical institutionalism for the analysis of state-business relations 
3.2.1.  Institutions and organisations 
Historical institutionalism distinguishes between institutions and organisations. Institutions are 
understood as constraints devised by people to govern regular political, economic and social 
interactions (North, 1990). Often described as „rules of the game‟, they are embedded in structures of 
meaning and resources and tend to be relatively resilient to the preferences and expectations of 
individuals and, sometimes, to changing external circumstances. They structure incentives in political, 
social or economic exchange (March and Olsen, 2006). Institutions can be formal and explicit, that is, 
rules and procedures that are created, communicated and enforced through channels that are widely 
accepted as official, or they can be informal and implicit, that is, rules that are socially shared, usually 
unwritten, and are created, communicated and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels. They 
include traditions and customs, values, cultural practices and other norms of behaviour that are treated 
as accepted ways of doing things6. Thus, the statutory rules governing the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) in South Africa (Handley, 2008), the administrative edicts 
governing the Zambia Business Forum (ZBF) (Taylor, 2007), or the High Level Consultative Committee 
                                                             
6 This distinction between formal and informal institutions is based on the works of Helmky and Levitisky (2006), North (1990 
and 1995), Leftwich (2007b), O‟Donnel (1996), Carey (2000), Lauth (2000), Bratton (2007), Hyden (2006). 
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in Botswana (Land, 2002) exemplify formal institutions, while the „old boy network‟ in Japan (Schaede, 
1995) or the quanxi in China (Wang, 2000) exemplify informal institutions.  
Informal institutions embody private forms of power and influence and “may operate behind, between 
and within the formal institutions, hence substantially influencing how public power is used to make or 
prevent decisions that benefit some and disadvantage others” (Leftwich, 2006:2). Their effect on formal 
institutions can be any one or combinations of the following: complementary, substitutive, 
accommodating and competing7. Formal and informal institutions go together, not least in SBRs, and 
especially in Africa, where a particular social logic of exchange, „the economy of affection‟8, 
predominates. The patterns of SBRs depend, in part, on the exercise of power and influence, formally 
or informally, of the actors. 
Organisations, on the other hand, are “purposive entities designed by their creators to maximise wealth, 
income or other objectives defined by the opportunities afforded by the institutional structure of society” 
(North, 1990:73, emphasis added). Thus, the nature of organisations and how they develop depends 
on existing political and social institutions at the macro-level. But organisations themselves comprise 
rules that seek to govern and direct the behaviour of their members towards the attainment of 
organisational goals. Organisations are therefore subsets of institutions (Hodgson, 2001). However, 
once established, organisations interact with the macro-level institutional framework and, in turn, 
influence how the framework evolves. Organisations are therefore central to the processes of 
                                                             
7 I follow Helmky and Levitisky (2006) here, who provide the following descriptive definitions: Complementary informal 
institutions shape behaviour in ways that neither violate the overarching formal rules nor produce substantively different 
outcomes. Often, they enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of formal institutions. Accommodating informal 
institutions create incentives in ways that alter the substantive effects of formal rules but without directly violating them. 
Often, they are created by actors who do not like outcomes generated by the formal rules but are unable to change or 
openly violate those rules. Competing informal institutions structure incentives in ways that are incompatible with the 
formal rules. To follow one rule, actors must violate another, e.g. in systemic corruption. Substitutive informal institutions 
seek outcomes compatible with formal rules and procedures and exist where the formal rules are not routinely enforced. 
They achieve what formal institutions were designed for but have failed to achieve, and they often emerge where state 
structures are weak or ineffective. 
8 An „economy of affection‟ is constituted by personal investments in reciprocal relations with other individuals as a means of 
achieving goals that are seen as otherwise impossible to attain. Such goals may aim at material goods or symbolic goods 
such as prestige and status (Hyden, 2006:73). 
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institutional creation, maintenance and change. If we conceive SBRs as a game, organisations are 
players within the game whose rules are specified formally and/ or informally. As players, their objective 
is to win the game “by a combination of skills, strategy and coordination; by fair means and sometimes 
by foul means” (North 1990:4-5). Examples of organisations in SBRs include government departments 
or agencies like the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Private Sector Development (MITPSD) or the 
Malawi Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA) and business associations like the Malawi Confederation 
of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (MCCCI) or the Indigenous Business Association of Malawi 
(IBAM) as well as individual firms. 
3.2.2.  Critical junctures 
A predominant conception of „critical junctures‟ has been based on the notion of „punctuated 
equilibrium‟. They have been taken to mean occasional points in time when confluences of political 
factors and social pressures culminate in a window of opportunity for institutional and policy departures 
from the existing forms. Some analysts have metaphorically described them as „watersheds‟ (Abbot, 
1997), „turning points‟ (Sewell,1996), or „unsettled times‟ (Swindler, 1986; Katznelson, 2003) and have  
conceived them as periods when agency produces decisions that have long term consequences such 
that it is generally agreed afterwards that „nothing was ever the same again‟ (Collier and Collier,2002; 
Mahoney, 2000). Although useful, this conception has serious analytical limitations in that it ignores 
endogenous processes of change and narrowly conceives institutional innovation and change as 
functions of exogenous shocks, or as Steinmo (2007) puts it, „products of fate‟; it presents institutional 
changes only  as „big bang‟ events  and sidelines the less dramatic but significant incremental 
institutional changes; it assumes a complete breakdown of existing institutions and their replacement by 
new ones, an assumption that is contradicted by reality;  and it is less clear on the factors that make a 
juncture critical and  is quite ambiguous on the causes and duration of the juncture. 
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I suggest that a more analytically useful conception ought to be less deterministic in its claims about 
institutional processes, and the criticality of the juncture should not be primarily decided by the 
resilience of an institutional path. Rather, the criticality of such junctures should be determined by what 
can be shown to have been the general expectations, primarily of the actors, in relation to the change 
of the institutions in question. For example, the onset of democratisation in 1994 in Malawi was a 
critical juncture in which actors consciously tried to rearrange political structures in order to address the 
institutional excesses of the past and redirect incentives for future political actors9. There were high 
expectations for institutional change in a particular direction. Whether the intended direction was 
sustained is an empirical question and should be marginal to the definition of a critical juncture. 
Thus, critical junctures should be understood as occasional points or periods of time when a confluence 
of political and socio-economic processes present virtually unexpected windows of opportunity for 
actors to consciously try to change the way existing institutions work  insomuch that departures from 
the existing institutional set-up are generally expected. The criticality of a juncture, then, depends on 
the extent of possibilities for institutional change. This formulation contrasts significantly with those 
provided by Mahoney (2000 and 2001) and Hogan (2005 and 2006). For them, junctures are „critical‟ if 
once new institutions are chosen or created, it becomes almost impossible to return to the original 
position and choice set to execute a new choice and an institutional pattern that is significantly different 
from the pre-existing one is set for the long term. While my interpretation has points of tangency with 
that suggested by Leftwich (2008), it differs in that the bases of my formulation are expectations for 
institutional change, while Leftwich‟s formulation is premised on the degree of discretion available to 
actors to institute change. My view is that, even in cases of high discretion and apparently major 
                                                             
9 The popular slogan that reflected the intentions and expectations for change was „zinthu zisinthe‟ (literally: Things must 
change),which after the multiparty general election in 1994 changed to „Zinthu zasintha‟ (literally: Things have changed). 
Useful accounts that capture the expectations regarding institutional changes associated with the transition period are 
provided in Phiri and Ross (1998). 
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changes, over time, old institutions may be found to have persisted. In that case, more room for 
manoeuvre is reduced to much ado about nothing. 
The definition accepts that some junctures, such as situations of regime change (for example, the 
attainment of political independence), provide more room for manoeuvre, while others may be 
embedded in antecedent conditions and therefore limit room for change,  as is evident in the framing of 
the US Constitution (Riker, 1995)10. Furthermore, regardless of whether there is more or less room for 
change, institutional choices at critical junctures are not predetermined, but contingent (i.e. choices are 
made from among various alternatives and arise from the „rough-and-tumble‟ of elite conflicts and 
negotiations vis-a-vis the existing and the proposed institutions). The duration of a critical juncture may 
be a brief period in which a particular institutional direction is taken, as was the case in the creation of 
the NEDLAC in South Africa and the JEC in Mauritius (Taylor, 2007), or it may constitute an extended 
period of reorientation of old institutional set-ups as has been the case in China (Haberer, 2003). In this 
regard, Roland (2004) has rightly argued that some institutions, especially cultural ones, are slow 
moving, while others, especially formal political institutions, are fast moving. The interaction of 
institutions in these two categories influences why, how and when institutional change occurs. Thus, 
the length of time associated with a critical juncture can neither be fixed beforehand nor can it be 
indefinite. Rather than imposing an arbitrary time span on the lines suggested by Mahoney (2000), I 
suggest that the nature of the expectations in relation to the institutional changes agreed to at the 
juncture should be the basis for deciding the duration of a critical juncture. 
This concept was used, firstly, to identify periods of time that may have acted as or were generally 
expected to be, openings for the formation and change of SBR institutions and secondly, to identify the 
factors that shaped institutional choices by exploring the nature of contests or negotiations, including 
                                                             
10 Riker has shown that some critical propositions of the Virginia Plan which essentially became the US Constitution, were 
replaced after heated contestation and  that the counter-propositions were informed by the workings of antecedent 
institutions. 
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such factors as identities of players and how they were organised, their sources of power and other 
contextual and temporal factors that influenced their positions in the contests. 
3.2.3.  Power asymmetries 
The literature reviewed in the previous chapter has made the point that the nature of SBRs is shaped 
by the distribution of power within and between the state and the business sector so that institutional 
evolution entails a contest among actors to establish rules that structure outcomes to their advantage. 
The exercise of power is critical to the nature of the contests, negotiations and cooperation that 
determine the institutional and organisational forms of SBRs. Thus, institutional changes may reflect 
changes in the balance of power between those interested in maintaining the institution and those 
seeking to change it, or they may reflect changes in the interests and ideas of the most powerful. 
However, given that institutions often come to serve functions remote from those originally intended by 
their designers and come to be supported by constituents that may not have been part of creating them 
(Thelen, 2003), the origins of an institution cannot be simply attributed to an existing distribution of 
power. It requires going back in time to the moments of institutional changes and understanding the 
configurations of power that shaped institutional choices or the mode of adaptive change. 
Of the many forms that power takes, there are two main ones that are critical to the institutional 
processes of SBRs. These are „political (ideological) power‟ and „economic power‟. Political power 
emanates from having a disproportionate influence on the norms, values and principles that underpin a 
certain institutional pattern governing social, political and economic life, that is, it establishes a 
dominant ideology or a discourse that may be hard to shift and may deliver disproportionate power to 
those who dominate or benefit from the institutional arrangements that flow from this dominant 
discourse. This form of power is associated with and often accrues to those who control the state. 
Changing such a dominant ideology often requires a complex politics that changes both the institutional 
arrangements and the group of political elites that control them. Economic power derives from 
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ownership and control of major economic resources and activities and can be directly used for political 
purposes. This form of power is associated with landowning elites or their organisations, business 
associations, large corporations and trade unions (Mann, 1986; Leftwich, 2007b; Lukes, 1974; Young 
2001). What is crucial to the analysis of SBRs is the nature of interaction and influence between those 
who exercise the formal political powers of the state and those who wield significant power because of 
the resources they control.  
Operationally, assessing the role of power asymmetries in the processes of institutional formation and 
change for SBRs involved two main levels of analysis. The first was to identify and understand which 
groups of actors pushed what kind of opinions regarding which institutions? From what kind of view and 
interest were their opinions formed and with what kind of authority?  This informed the understanding of 
the bases of power of the state and the business sector and the institutional and organisation 
infrastructure that they used to broadcast and exercise that power over each other. The second level 
involved assessing the state‟s perceptions of the political and economic values of the business sector 
and how these perceptions influenced the attitudes of the state towards the business sector or parts of 
it. 
3.2.4.  Politics 
The subject matter of this thesis is the „politics‟ of state-business relations. However, what constitutes 
„politics‟ is not straightforward, and each definition raises further and more difficult questions (Leftwich, 
2004). There is not much space to attempt to catalogue all definitions. However, it has been suggested, 
and is generally agreed,  that “ the political should be defined in such a way as to encompass the entire 
sphere of the social…[E]vents, processes and practices should not be labelled „non-political‟ or „extra-
political‟ simply by virtue of the specific setting or context in which they occur. All events, processes and 
practices which occur in the social sphere have the potential to be political…” (Hay, 2002:3). I agree 
with this assertion for two reasons. First, it makes the point that arena- or site-specific definitions of 
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politics are inadequate as the activity of politics runs through the entire range of human interaction, 
including in SBRs. Second, it underscores the point that definitions that limit the activity of politics to 
conventional politicians are restrictively narrow and confine politics only to certain institutional and 
organisational sites such as political parties, parliaments or government offices. 
A political analysis of SBRs therefore needs a definition of politics that provides sufficient insights at a 
sufficiently high level of abstraction. I adopt a definition proffered by Leftwich that in my view meets 
these criteria: “Politics comprises of all the activities of cooperation, negotiation and conflict, within and 
between societies, whereby people go about organising the use, production or distribution of human, 
natural and other resources in the course of the production or reproduction of their biological and social 
life” (Leftwich, 2004:103). Thus, what is political concerns “the distribution, exercise and consequences 
of power” (Hay, 2002:3), which is at the core of cooperation, negotiation and conflict-making or conflict 
resolution processes.  
SBRs are „political‟ in at least two main ways: First, they entail processes concerned with or that reflect 
(uneven) distribution and exercise of power and influence using different means, including coercion 
between the state and the business community or some segments of it. As Hay (2002) observes, power 
is about context-shaping, or in other words, the capacity of actors, in this case state and business 
elites, to redefine the parameters of what is socially, politically and economically possible or desirable 
for the other. Second, patterns of SBRs shape the subsequent formation of institutions governing 
economic activities, including the ownership, distribution and use of resources. They essentially entail a 
„mobilisation of biases‟ in favour of particular economic ideologies, institutions and policies over others. 
Thus, contestation, negotiation, power and influence between the state and (some) economic agents, 
are endemic to SBRs.  
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However, it must be noted that historical institutionalism has been criticised on several counts, largely 
because of the theoretical implications flowing from its earlier view on institutional evolution that was 
informed by the „punctuated equilibrium‟ approach. Recent works have addressed most of the criticisms 
but have themselves raised new issues for institutional theory11. Nonetheless, the approach provided 
the tools for studying the human political interactions between the state and the business sector in a 
context of rule structures, and for a sequential study of the evolution of SBR institutions. In particular, 
the approach was appropriate for the analysis for two main reasons. Firstly, it provided an 
epistemological framework that enabled an understanding of how history itself shaped SBR institutions. 
The emphasis on extended time frames across periods of different political institutional contexts made 
the approach inherently comparative by expanding the number of observations. Consequently, it 
enabled a long-term view of SBRs in Malawi that provided a basis for an assessment of existing 
propositions about institutional formation, resilience and change while generating new theoretical 
insights. Process tracing allowed the establishment of „pathways‟ in a way that was sensitive to „period 
effects‟, i.e. historical institutionalism required placing events „in time‟ without losing sight of the overall 
pattern of the institutional and organisational patterns of SBRs. 
Secondly, with new theoretical insights from recent works (for example, Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), 
historical institutionalism provided the necessary tools for an analysis of SBRs that sought to identify 
what aspects of the institutional configuration were renegotiable, under what circumstances, and what 
modes of change ensued, or in other words, a search for the mechanisms through which institutions 
remain the same or change in some dimensions while persisting in others, or completely break down 
and get replaced. 
                                                             
11 I return to these issues in the last chapter, where I assess how a political analysis of SBRs in Malawi sheds light on the 
processes of institutional evolution. 
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 3.3. Operationalising the analytical framework and data collection methods 
The analytical framework was used to develop questions that guided data collection and analysis as 
detailed below. 
3.3.1.  Data collection methods: document analysis and key informant interviews 
Document analysis 
This involved a systematic perusal of primary documents, official documents, published sources and 
secondary literature. The bulk of the primary records were consulted at the British Public Records 
Office (PRO) in Kew, London, and the Malawi National Archives (MNA) in Zomba, Malawi. Other 
records and documents were accessed at resource centres and libraries of various government 
agencies, business associations and individuals. Data was culled from the following broad categories of 
sources for all three periods of the study:  
 Original correspondence within and between the government departments and personnel, on 
the one hand, and business associations and businessmen, on the other. For the colonial 
period, this included correspondence between the Nyasaland Government and the Foreign 
Office and the Secretary of State for Colonies in London, correspondence between business 
associations and business people in Nyasaland and Britain with the Colonial Secretary of state 
and other correspondence. 
 Sessional papers, including  the minutes of meetings of the Legislative Council (LEGCO) and 
the Executive Council (EXCO) during the colonial period, later replaced by the Hansard and  
the minutes of cabinet meetings in the post independence period;  annual and other reports of 
both government and business associations; minutes of meetings and other records of 
business associations. 
 Statutes, including ordinances and orders-in-council during the colonial period, later replaced 
by Acts of Parliament and Regulations as subsidiary legislation, and records of proceedings of 
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the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) conferences. 
 Various policy documents, including development blueprints and political party manifestoes. 
 Various newspapers, magazines and newsletters. 
 Transcriptions and audio speeches made by state and business elites at various occasions. 
 Miscellaneous reports from different organisations and private correspondence. 
Document analysis was complemented by key informant interviews which sought to elicit deeper 
insights into the relevant issues. 
Key informant interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with selected „key informants‟. These were purposively 
sampled from both the state and business sectors. For a close follow-up on some issues, „snowballing‟ 
was used12. These sampling methods were preferred because the respondents were deemed to be 
people with specialised knowledge or critical information on matters related to SBRs in different 
institutional contexts. They could not, therefore, be randomly selected.  A key characteristic of this 
method was that some respondents, for example, chairmen of business associations, counted more in 
terms of their roles in SBRs than others. Formal interviews were held with 21 respondents (see 
Appendix I for a list of names) spread across five categories as follows:  
 Retired and serving public servants in departments and ministries or government agencies that 
discharged duties impacting on SBRs. 
 Retired and serving politicians selected on the basis of their roles in or connection to instances 
or events incidental to SBRs at any point in their careers. 
 Businessmen or representatives of firms selected on different grounds, including known or 
perceived roles of their firms in the economy and involvement in significant incidents relevant to 
                                                             
12 Purposive sampling is a non-random technique in which respondents belong to predefined groups and have particular 
attributes or characteristics that enable detailed exploration of the research objectives. The number of people 
interviewed is less important than the criteria used to select them (Silverman, 2006). Snowball sampling is a non-random 
and potentially very biased technique in which a starting sample of respondents provides the researcher with the names 
of others who might participate in the study (Northey and Tepperman, 1986). 
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SBRs. 
 Leaders of selected business associations and of peak associations. 
Open-ended questions were asked to enable conversational interviews in order to elicit deeper insights 
into the issues being researched. Questions were based on several themes as outlined in Appendix 
3.2. The themes were derived from the literature on SBRs, institutional theory and the history of politics 
and economics of Malawi. The questions were designed to allow wide variations in the answers of the 
different respondents and therefore offered greater likelihood of a better explanation of SBRs. For each 
respondent, an interview schedule in the form of a fairly detailed list of questions was prepared based 
on the profile of the respondent and his or her role in matters relevant to state-business relations. An 
audio record of the interview was made if the respondent allowed it. Fairly comprehensive notes were 
also taken. Each interview was then transcribed and analysed. 
Key informant interviews were useful in several ways. First, they enabled an understanding of events, 
actions, values, and so on related to the practice of SBRs from the perspective of the actors 
themselves or those close enough to the process to be pertinent in their observations. Secondly, they 
enabled a detailed description of the practices and processes of SBRs in the post-colonial period by 
paying attention to mundane details and the processual aspects of politics and in situating the findings 
in their wider social and historical context 
3.3.2.  Data analysis – Integrated empirical approach 
The analysis of data was a systematic search for institutional and organisational patterns of SBRs in 
the data. The analysis sought to establish recurrent behaviours, rules, actors and dominant ideologies 
that underpinned the practice of SBRs in each period. These were identified or inferred from the actual 
words spoken or written down. The focus was on understanding what was said in relation to SBRs, who 
said it, to whom it was directed, how it was said, and the context in which it was said. Beyond a focus 
on the actual words spoken or recoded in texts, further analytical focus was on the manner in which 
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activities or events that shaped SBRs were implemented. In this aspect, the analysis sought to uncover 
the underlying assumptions and motivations of actors related to the activities, events, rules and 
structures affecting SBRs. The focus was on identifying who did what, why and how they did it13. Once 
an empirical pattern of SBRs was established for each period, process tracing was used to explain the 
patterns. Process tracing is a procedure of causal analysis that first establishes some association 
between explanatory variables and the outcome variable and identifies the causal mechanisms that link 
the two14. Causal mechanisms refer to “the processes and intervening variables through which an 
explanatory variable exerts a causal effect on an outcome variable” (Mahoney, 2003:363). For all the 
three periods, the analysis found that politics was the main explanatory variable for the different 
patterns of SBRs but in each period politics was played out through different processes and intervening 
variables. Process tracing helped in identifying factors for the emergence, maintenance and change of 
the institutional and organisational patterns of SBRs in each period. Thus, the technique was useful in 
tracing pathways of causation.  
The patterns of SBRs in each period were then juxtaposed with one another to assess similarities and 
differences and continuities and discontinuities across the time periods. To do this I drew insights from 
analytic comparison which is a set of procedures in which a researcher uses the method of 
agreement15 and/or the method of difference16 to discover factors that affect outcomes in a number of 
cases (Neumann, 2006; Lijphart, 1975; Meckstroth, 1975). Each period of analysis was treated as a 
case. The procedure consisted of identifying similarities in the conduct of SBRs among the three cases 
and  the variables that accounted for the  similarities, identifying instances of difference across the 
                                                             
13 In doing this interpretive process I drew on techniques that are associated with discourse and content analysis which 
involve a range of methods for analysing data collected from interviews or other recorded talk and texts (Silverman, 2006; 
Rugg and Petre, 2007; Gerring,2006). 
14  A comprehensive statement of this technique is provided by George and McKeon (1985) and Bennet (2008). 
15  In using the method of agreement, the analysis seeks to establish that cases which share a common outcome also share 
common hypothesised causal factors, despite varying in other significant ways (see Mahoney, 2003: 341). 
16 With the method of difference, the analysis contrasts cases in which an outcome under investigation is absent in other 
cases which have the same hypothesised causal factors (see Mahoney, 2003:341). 
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three cases, i.e. where different institutional and organisational forms of SBRs were associated with 
different causal variables, and those instances where similar causal variables could be associated with 
different SBR forms or similar SBR forms could be associated with a different set of causal variables 
across the cases.  
Using this method enabled the identification of combinations of factors that shaped the evolution of 
SBRs in the different periods.17 This allowed a shift from mere descriptions of historical events or social 
and political settings to a more general and theoretical interpretation of the narratives which is 
condensed in chapter 7. 
3.4. Methodological limitations of the study 
Three important limitations of this study arise from the conceptual framework and the study design. 
Generalisability: A case study approach enabled in-depth understanding of patterns of SBRs, but its 
results provide only limited scope for generalisation. Similarly, the main concern behind the sampling 
techniques used was not the „representativeness‟ of the sample but targeting respondents who were 
deemed to have vital information on aspects of the research problem. 
Causation: This study sought to explore the evolution of patterns of SBRs. Given a multitude of 
variables that impact on SBRs, it did not establish causality between the independent and dependent 
variables as the methods used did not control for the effects of other variables in order to isolate the 
effect of a single variable.  
Perceptions of bias: The themes deployed in the study were developed by me and were derived from 
the literature and made consistent with the research assumptions spelled out in chapter one. Since 
conventional case study approaches identify themes from findings and endeavour to employ categories 
or descriptions established by respondents, this study might be criticised for potential bias. However, 
the design retained sufficient flexibility to revise and refine categories and themes in the course of data 
                                                             
17 This was possible because in this method, a researcher “identifies many factors for a set of cases, sorts through logical 
combinations of factors and compares them across cases” (Neuman, 2006:471-2). 
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collection. Further, a within-case comparative study required some level of methodological consistency 
and focus in order to enable comparison. The initial imposition of themes and categories was therefore 
crucial to effective execution of the study. 
3.5. Ethical considerations  
The conduct of this study, like most empirical research, had ethical dimensions. Ethical problems are 
“those that arise [when a researcher tries] to decide between one course of action and another, not in 
terms of expediency and  efficiency but by reference to standards of what is morally right or wrong” 
(Barnes, 1999:16). The University of York research committee defines ethical issues more generally as 
those that arise from the basic principle that academic activities should neither include practices which 
directly impose a risk of serious harm nor be indirectly dependent upon such practice. Such issues 
relate to the methodology used, the subjects or respondents used, and the application of the project 
findings18. Thus, ethics define what  conduct is or is not legitimate in a particular research exercise, and 
ethical issues require the researcher to balance between the pursuit of scientific knowledge and the 
rights of those being studied, those  participating in the study, or of others in society. Three ethical 
issues that concerned the data collection for this study were consent of the participants, confidentiality 
of information and disclosure of the research objective. 
Consent: Permission to access materials pertinent to the study was sought from the relevant 
authorities at the national archives in London and Zomba, in ministries and other government agencies, 
and business associations. Each respondent‟s permission was sought prior to their taking part in the 
study. 
Research objective: At each and every instance of interface with respondents or other custodians of 
information, it was disclosed in clear terms that the research was purely academic although its results 
                                                             
18 See the University of York Code Of Good Practice for Research, available at 
www.york.ac.uk/research/policy/Cop_Ethics.htm. 
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could have some institutional and policy relevance. A one-page research synopsis was prepared and 
delivered to each respondent at the time of requesting an interview. 
Confidentiality of information: Respondents were informed and assured that all information was 
collected on the basis of strict confidentiality and would not be used for any purposes other than 
academic research. Consequently, statements that are direct quotes from respondents have been 
acknowledged as such, but no direct attribution to the sources by name occurs except where the 
respondent expressed no reservation for such attribution. Similarly, audio records of interviews were 
taken only when respondents permitted and were destroyed after use. 
Scientific misconduct: The conduct of the research and the development of the thesis have adhered 
to all legal and ethical standards required of academic researchers. Particular attention has been paid 
to matters of scientific misconduct especially plagiarism and research fraud19. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the analytical and empirical approach that was deployed in the collection 
and analysis of data to produce analytic narratives of SBRs in Malawi in three different political 
institutional contexts. Historical institutionalism provided a political approach to SBRs that was useful for 
interrogating the formation, maintenance and change of institutions governing these relations. The next 
three chapters in PART II present narratives arising from the use of this approach. In the spirit of 
historical institutionalism, the chapters follow the sequence of political periods. In the next chapter, 
therefore, we begin with a narrative of SBRs in the colonial era. 
                                                             
19 Research fraud involves tampering with data to make results appear more convincing or even creating fictitious interview 
results. Plagiarism is the act of stealing or presenting as one‟s own, the ideas or work of someone else (Burnham et al, 
2004:263-264). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Particularistic Concertation: Colonial State-Business Relations and the Politics of State 
Formation 
“Mr Chairman, we [members of the Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture] were here before the 
Administration and possession, as we are frequently told, is nine-tenths of the law.”1 
  
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the pattern of colonial state-business relations from 1891 when the „modern‟ 
state in Malawi was founded at the insistence of the commercial, agricultural and missionary interests 
who had begun to settle about a decade and a half earlier. Throughout the colonial period (1891-1964), 
the evolution of the institutional and organisational patterns of SBRs dovetailed with the formation and 
consolidation of state institutions. It was, therefore, intertwined with political processes. In the first six 
years, SBRs were characterised by the state‟s apathy towards the broader business community and 
preferential treatment for an imperialist chartered company – the British South Africa Company (BSAC). 
The result was the business community‟s general acrimony towards the state. However, after 1896, 
SBRs developed into a collaborative governance pact characterised by a balance of power between the 
state and the business sector. The relationship took the form of concertation, i.e. a pattern of regular, 
free speech meetings and other forms of exchange between representatives of peak business 
associations and the government. Its key characteristics were consultations, negotiations, bargaining 
and cooperation. Consequently, the state sometimes behaved as an obedient servant of private capital 
in providing a policy environment for furthering private commercial interests. At other times, the quest 
                                                             
1 R.S. Hynde at a public meeting of the Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture,  British Central African Times, 2 May 1903 
(MNA). 
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for hegemony and legitimacy made the state pursue policies that pitted it against the business 
community. 
However, the business sector was fragmented on racial and sectoral lines. Formal commerce and 
plantation agriculture were dominated by Europeans and by Indians. African entrepreneurs were very 
few and mostly plied their trade on the margins of the formal sector. The practice of SBRs was 
particularistic in that it was segmented on racial lines. Concertation was exclusive to Europeans, often 
through their peak associations founded in the 1890s. The Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce 
(henceforth, the Chamber) enjoyed virtually unbridled access to the state and often received a 
sympathetic hearing on a range of issues. However, there were glaring sectoral divisions within the 
European business community between planters and other commercial interests. Despite these 
divisions, they were able to transcend occasional differences, cultivate pan-business interests and 
engage with the state. Indians were not organised in any meaningful way for SBRs until the Nyasaland 
Indian Traders‟ Association (NITA) was formed in 19232. In August 1936, it became the Nyasaland 
Indian Chamber of Commerce (NICC)3. However, since it was denied regular access to the 
government, SBRs for the Indian community were ad hoc, mostly taking place through written 
correspondence. The earliest business association for Africans, The Nyasaland African Industrial Union 
(NAIU), was founded in 1907 but was short-lived, largely because of its low membership density4. 
Except for a few instances where the Blantyre Native Association (BNA) asked for government 
intervention on specific business issues, Africans were excluded from formal SBRs until after the first 
general election in 1961.  
The chapter makes three main arguments. Firstly, particularistic concertation evolved from the mutual 
dependence between government and the European business community. Secondly, the formal 
                                                             
2 The Nyasaland Indian Traders‟, NITA/2444/1923, MNA. 
3 NICC Secretary to Provincial Commissioner, Blantyre, 28 June 1939. 
4 Its second meeting was held on 15 May 1909 at Nyambadwe and total recorded membership was eleven (Pachai, 1973). 
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political institutional architecture of the period, especially the position and role of the Legislative Council 
(LEGCO), sustained the Chamber not only as a peak business association but also as a legitimate 
political representative of the European settlers. Thirdly, the establishment of business interests before 
the advent of the state and the role of business interests in the processes of founding the state 
endowed the European business community with an early advantage in accumulating an initial and 
disproportionate amount of power and capacity to organise politically vis-a-vis the state. As a result, the 
business community was able to compete for, and preserve, „spaces‟ where they genuinely engaged 
with the state in policy dialogue. The analysis shows how history and politics matter for the processes 
of institutional formation, maintenance and change. 
The analysis is sequenced as follows: Section 4.1 traces the role of the business sector in the process 
of state formation and highlights the evolution of particularistic concertation. Section 4.2 discusses the 
dynamics of particularistic concertation, showing how the European business community was favoured 
and how the Indian and African business communities were marginalised. Section 4.3 is concerned 
with institutional and organisational change in SBRs. It shows how nationalist political agency in the 
context of the Central African Federation (CAF) and the idea of „colonial trusteeship‟ led to the opening 
up of the political system to African elites, thereby weakening institutions that had sustained 
particularistic concertation and giving rise to a new pattern of SBRs. The conclusion highlights 
preliminary theoretical observations for SBR and institutional evolution. 
4.1. State formation and the origins of concertation 
The colonial pattern of SBRs - particularistic concertation - evolved largely from the mutuality of 
interests and dependence between the government and the European business community: the state 
sought to establish political control and authority over the Africans, while the business sector was 
principally interested in using African labour and appropriating other natural resources, especially land. 
To pursue its objective, the state needed the settler community, on whose consent its legitimacy 
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depended. Similarly, the economic interests of the business sector required the cooperation of the 
government in regulating economic relations between European and Indian commercial interests and 
between both foreign groups, on the one hand, and the Africans, on the other. The result of this 
dependence was that the evolution of state-business relations was intimately bound up with efforts at 
state formation. The earliest role of the business sector in this process was in the acquisition of land 
that later comprised the territory of the state. 
4.1.1. Acquisition of territory and establishment of British sovereignty  
The genesis of the colonial state in Malawi lay in the activities of the expatriate business interests, 
supported by missionaries, who sought the establishment of civil authority for the furtherance of their 
own interests. They began to arrive in the 1870s in response to a call for lawful commerce and 
Christianity made by David Livingstone in 1859 as a means to curb the slave trade and „civilise‟ 
Africans (Pachai, 1973:71; Pike, 1968:62, 70-71). In 1878, the first company, African Lakes Corporation 
(ALC)5, arrived from Glasgow as a commercial and development arm of the Free Church of Scotland. 
More companies and planters followed so that by the early 1880s their increasing presence and 
influence led to an imperial contest between Portugal and Britain for the control, occupation and 
development of the territory (Pachai, 1973; Tindall, 1968). From the late 1870s, the business and 
missionary communities continually petitioned the British government to take a more active role in the 
administration of the territory. They asked for a government officer and even requested that one of their 
number be entrusted with a consular role (Smith, 1975:49). The British government, however, 
appointed its own man, Captain Foot, as Consul in 1883 but with little material support for discharging 
his duties (Thurston, 1995; Smith 1975).  
The Portuguese occupied part of the lower Shire Lowlands in southern Malawi on 12 May 1882, but the 
occupied Kololo villagers revolted violently in 1884. The ALC moved in, primarily to safeguard its 
                                                             
5 Established as Livingstonia Central Africa Company in 1878 in Glasgow, it changed to ALC in 1894.See MacMillan (1970). 
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business interests as the area provided trade routes for its merchandise from the ports on the Indian 
Ocean. The company negotiated treaties with chiefs in the rebellious villages, promising British 
protection – a commitment that the Foreign Office disavowed in 1885, abolishing its responsibilities in 
the territory because of lack of financial resources (Pachai, 1973; Mc Millan, 1975). Nonetheless, the 
ALC, supported by other traders and planters, continued initiatives to bring the Shire Highlands6 under 
British protection. It signed treaties with chiefs that stipulated that they were to accept the protection of 
either the British government or the company (Smith, 1975:49). Although the Consul refused to 
recognise the treaties and wanted them abrogated, the ALC applied for a Royal Charter in 1887 to 
administer the territory. The Foreign Office refused, partly because the company did not have adequate 
administrative capacity and partly, and more importantly, because “it was not Great Britain‟s duty to 
defend missionaries and traders in remote regions from „native enterprise‟”7. The British South African 
Company (BSAC) offered in 1889 to administer the territory under its charter, but missionaries, 
businessmen and planters,  who had earlier  supported the ALC application, strongly opposed this 
because they “did not want another Rhodesia” in Nyasaland (Tindall, 1968:179). Thus, by the end of 
1889, company rule over Nyasaland had been forestalled, and the British government was unwilling to 
extend its authority to the new territory. 
In 1889, Harry Johnston, British Consul in Mozambique, concluded negotiations with the Portuguese 
government whereby southern Malawi was conceded to Portugal (Smith, 1975; Pachai, 1973). Cecil 
Rhodes of the BSAC – “never one to allow financial considerations to inhibit expansion of the British 
Empire” (Smith, 1975:59) – offered to finance the signing of treaties with chiefs and the administration 
of the protectorate. On the basis of this financial guarantee, the Foreign Office discontinued 
negotiations with Portugal and despatched Harry Johnston to conclude treaties with chiefs but 
                                                             
6 The Shire Highlands was the part of Southern Nyasaland that had the most British settlements. 
7 Foreign Office Undersecretary, 2 March 1888, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, V.323:20. 
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instructed him “not to declare a protectorate until there was a Portuguese aggression” (Smith, 1975:60, 
Pike, 1968). Thus, Johnston became first Commissioner and Consul-General for the territories under 
British influence north of the Zambezi, where he was to administer Nyasaland for the British 
government and exercise similar administrative powers on behalf of the BSAC over the territories west 
of Nyasaland (now part of Zambia). Thus, in addition to being an official of the British government, the 
Commissioner was also an agent of the BSAC and responsible to its board. According to Tindall (1968) 
and Baker (1972), Johnston had the approval of the British government for his dual role. As will be 
shown below, the interlocking of roles had significant consequences for SBRs during his period. To 
expedite the conclusion of treaties with African chiefs in the Shire Highlands, Johnston engaged John 
Buchanan - a successful planter who arrived in Nyasaland in 1876 and was serving as manager of the 
ALC - as acting British Consul specifically for this purpose. 
In August 1889, while Johnston was on a tour of duty, an armed Portuguese expedition advanced, 
aiming to take control of the southern part of Malawi (Smith, 1975:60, Pike, 1968). John Buchanan, 
using the powers of his new role to advance an old agenda, advised the Portuguese general that the 
territory that they had targeted was under British protection and asked him to halt the expedition. This 
effectively declared a protectorate over the Shire Highlands. On 21 September 1889, Buchanan further 
advised the Portuguese general that more areas were to come under British protection (Pachai 
1973:78-80). Even more areas were added in a third declaration on 14 May 1891 that created the 
British Central Africa Protectorate8. On 11 June 1891, the Anglo-Portuguese treaty was signed, which 
marked the beginning of the British protectorate that lasted 73 years. 
The leading role of the business community in establishing the territory and the authority of the state 
over the acquired territory is evident in the account above. Besides mobilising European commercial 
and agricultural interests to present a unified front to the British government, the ALC took practical 
                                                             
8 London Gazette,15th May 1891, PRO FO 881/6292. 
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steps and invested in acquiring territory from African chiefs. Although the British government had 
refused to recognise the treaties between the company and chiefs, the company continued to invoke 
the legitimacy of the British government in its treaties. For example, in 1890, Alfred Sharpe settled a 
treaty for what was then called „Chikuse territory‟ (now Ntcheu). Although this was done on behalf of the 
ALC, whose representative, a Mr Tom Taylor Nash, accompanied Sharpe, the treaty was signed off by 
Sharpe as “Acting for and on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland”9. It was the 
private alienation of land from African chiefs by British elements and the offering of protection to the 
African populations on the alienated lands that created the territory of the protectorate state.  
Furthermore, with the support of local British interests, the ALC lobbied the Foreign Office for consular 
representation, requested a Royal Charter to administer the territory on behalf of the British 
government, and used one of its employees at an opportune time to declare British authority over the 
territory. While the ALC led in the acquisition of territory and in extending the sovereignty of the British 
state over it, another corporation, the BSAC, was influential in setting up the protectorate‟s 
administration in the first five years. 
4.1.2. British South African Company and the setting up of the colonial administration 
The first administration was set up under the provisions of The African Order in Council (1889), which 
allowed the Commissioner prerogative powers “to introduce ordinances, proclamations, rules and 
regulations subject to approval of Foreign Office” (Pachai, 1973:236). With this surfeit of authority, 
Johnston‟s terms of reference required him to „strengthen the protectorate; advise chiefs on their 
relations with each other as well as with foreigners; secure peace and good order; and check the slave 
trade‟ (Pachai,1973:82; Pike, 1968). However, the British government did not provide any grant-in-aid 
for the administration and the Commissioner had to rely solely on the cooperation of the BSAC, which 
had guaranteed an annual subsidy for the administration. In 1889, Rhodes had undertaken to provide 
                                                             
9 Africa (Central) Treaty of Chikuse Territory, 17 February 1890, PRO FO 93/4/1. 
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£9000 per annum, through the ALC, for the administration of the protectorate. This was because in that 
year, the BSAC acquired £20,000 worthy of shares in the ALC (Baker, 1972:33-34; Pachai, 1973:83). 
The Foreign Office advised that money for the administration of the protectorate could not be disbursed  
through the ALC because the company was unchartered and that  the money had to be paid to “the real 
administering body, the Government” (Baker, 1972:33-34). In early 1891, the BSAC revised the subsidy 
to £10,000 per annum for five years, which was to be spent according to the discretion of the 
commissioner10. The administration began with only four European officers including the commissioner, 
seventy volunteers from the Indian Army to keep peace and order and twenty Africans providing 
support services (Pachai, 1973:81). The British Treasury only provided salaries for the British officials. 
Consequently, there was heavy reliance on the largesse provided by the BSAC. This dependence 
afforded the company great influence, which in turn put the administration at odds with settlers, traders 
and missionaries on the way in which they thought the protectorate should be run. 
The relationship between the BSAC and Commissioner Johnston generated perceptions of the 
existence of a clientelist principal-agent relationship in which the commissioner, and hence the 
government, often acted as a virtual stooge of the company. This, however, was not surprising because 
unlike other colonial states that maintained themselves by extracting resources from the domestic 
economy (Clapham, 1985), Johnston‟s administration was heavily reliant on the largesse of the BSAC. 
For example, by December 1891, the administration was costing £22,500, of which £20,000 was 
provided by the BSAC11.  In 1892, the commissioner disclosed that he was compelled to use resources 
earmarked for the BSAC‟s territory for the development of Nyasaland especially the Shire Highlands12.  
Between 1892 and 1893, the BSAC claimed land on the basis of the treaties made between chiefs and 
the ALC between 1885-6. Johnston refused to endorse these claims because the Foreign Office had 
                                                             
10 Memorandum of Agreement between Foreign Office and BSAC, PRO FO 93/4/4.  
11 Johnston to Salisbury, 10th December, 1891, PRO FO 84/174.  
12 Johnston to Salisbury, 11th May 1892, PRO FO 403/174. 
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indicated that the treaties were not enforceable after 189113. In May 1893, the BSAC offered to 
increase the annual administration subsidy to £17,500 for 5 years but on two conditions: if the 
protectorate government conveyed all crown rights in land to the company14, and if Johnston gave 80 
per cent of the protectorate‟s territory to the company15. The company‟s intention was to acquire 
leverage in land matters: “For the future, it must be understood that the chartered company alone has 
the right to acquire, subject to approval of her majesty‟s government, concessions of land and minerals 
within and without the protectorate”16. At that time, 60 per cent of the land was controlled by the 
European community and the government as depicted in Table 4.1 below: 
Table 4.1. Distribution of land ownership in 1893 
Owners/Occupiers Proportion of land 
(%) 
Planters, traders and missionaries 20 
British South Africa Co17 20 
British Crown 20 
Africans 40 
Source: Pachai (1973):83. 
Effectively, the BSAC‟s demand meant that the Crown‟s and Africans‟ shares of land would pass to it, 
turning Africans into tenants on their own land - a phenomenon missionaries described as a „frightening 
prospect‟ (Pachai, 1973:83). While Johnston agreed to these conditions, the Foreign Office unilaterally 
changed the proposed duration of the subsidy from 5 to 10 years18 but refused to endorse the proposed 
alienation of land to the company on the basis that the protectorate was not included in the charter of 
                                                             
13 Johnston to Foreign Office, 5 December 1891, No.22, CA Confidential, FO/842114 PRO. 
14 Rhodes to Johnston, 30 April 1893, PRO FO403/185. 
15 Johnston to Rhodes, 3rd May 1893 enclosed in Johnston to Foreign Office, PRO FO403/185. 
16 Rhodes to Johnston, 30th April 1893, PRO FO403/185. 
17  In 1893, BSAC took over ALC and so held the largest proportion of land. 
18  Johnston to Rhodes, 8 October 1893, PRO FO403/185. 
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the company19. In response to pressures from missionaries and planters, who loathed rule by the 
chartered company, Johnston pursued a land policy with safeguards that apparently worked against the 
interests of the BSAC20. Nonetheless, he granted the company enormous tracts of land in central and 
northern parts of the protectorate based on the ALC treaties that the Foreign Office had refused to 
recognise (Ross, 1975:91).  
4.1.3. Perceptions of government capture and the rise of business associations 
The prerogatives that the Commissioner enjoyed under The African Order in Council effectively granted 
him authoritarian rule. He established a highly centralised political order, which represented a typical 
colonial state in that there was “from the [commissioner] a sense of superiority over those whom [he] 
ruled, a sense of power emanating from above rather than growing from below; for the ruled a sense of 
the state as an alien imposition, to be accepted, ... to be feared, to be cajoled and where possible 
exploited, but existing on a plane above the people whom it governed and beyond any chance of 
control” (Clapham,1985:19). While in many colonial territories this was true from the perspective of 
colonised peoples, it was equally true for the settler community in Johnston‟s Nyasaland. This pattern 
of governance had been discerned as early as 1892 by Rev. Hetherwick, who wrote in a private letter: 
“In some way or another, I hope a change may be effected in the means and methods of this 
administration. It can only be done by [the Foreign Office]. We have no appeal here, nor room for 
appeal; the author of the mischief is the court of appeal, and there, of course, no appeal can be 
heard”21. 
 
                                                             
19  Foreign Office to Emmanuel and Simmons, 7th June 1893,PRO FO 403/185. 
20 Four safeguards were 1.That the administration should have enough land for expansion, 2.Africans should be paid a fair 
price for their land, 3.African land should not be sold to the BSAC without the consent of the African inhabitants, 4.That all 
disputes would be settled by Johnston himself (Pachai, 1973:82). 
21  From Rev.Hetherwick to Rev. Dr Scott, 13 June 1892, PRO, FO 6337/211. 
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The apparently easy access to external financial resources encouraged the administration to ignore the 
emerging commercial community. The authoritarian tendencies of the administration meant that 
opportunities for public-private dialogue were limited, especially as the state appeared to have had no 
reason to engage with the business community. Following the argument by Bates (2001) and Doner et 
al (2005), it can be said that access to easy money from the BSAC meant that Johnston‟s 
administration did not experience an acute „resource imperative‟ that would compel him to forge a 
coalition with the business community. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that the relationship 
between Johnston‟s government and the BSAC was collusive and aimed at introducing company rule 
by the backdoor. For instance, in 1893 Johnston refused to sanction land agreements between other 
companies and chiefs. Although the refusal was justified in terms of the ongoing land reforms, other 
correspondence suggests otherwise. For example, the Central Africa Company‟s agreements were 
refused because “it would be very hard if this greedy company were to worm its way in and try  to oust 
the [the BSAC] from its rights”22.When the Foreign Office intervened on behalf of the Central Africa 
Company, Johnston circumvented the instructions by endorsing leases to worthless and inaccessible 
land. He, further, refused title deeds to planters, which affected their opportunities to secure loans and 
did not allow them to sell any of their land, to prevent trouble for the BSAC when it assumed company 
rule (Woods, 1991:40). Furthermore, Johnston borrowed heavily from the BSAC and taxed planters and 
traders heavily in order to repay the loans so that “their collapse would leave [the BSAC] as the only 
enterprise that could pay for the administration and thus make charter rule more acceptable to 
Whitehall” (Woods, 1991:26). Missionaries were particularly in the suspicion that Johnston manipulated 
local administration to advance the interests of the BSAC: “If he can lift ivory and taxes when and 
where he pleases in the interest of the [BSAC], we demand, on behalf of the natives some independent 
power to watch their interest” (Ross, 1975).  
                                                             
22 Johnston to Foreign Office, 21 January 1893 enclosed in Bowler to Roseberry, 9th June 1893, PRO FO 403/185. 
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Under these circumstances of neglect and acrimony, agricultural and commercial interests began to 
coalesce in order to form something of a countervailing force to the state23. In September 1892, the 
Shire Highlands Planters Association was formed, but its geographical coverage was too limited for its 
purposes vis-a-vis the government. Consequently, some planters led by John Buchanan – the 
promulgator of the protectorate – formed the Nyasaland Planters Association (NPA) in December 
189224. However, the mobilisation of the commercial and agricultural interests evolved in ways that 
“created deep schisms within the European community and contradictions among commodity 
producers” (Woods, 1991:21). By 1894, both associations were moribund. By 1895, the government 
and the missions had established The British Central Africa Gazette and Work and Society as their print 
media outlets, respectively, and both were generally hostile to the agricultural community (Woods, 
1989:364). Buchanan observed the need for planters and commercialists to form a united and strong 
association in order to pursue their common interests. It led to the formation of the Chamber, which 
evolved into the articulator of European business interests to the government for many years. In the 
same year, The Central African Planter (CAP) (which changed to Central African Times (CAT) and to 
Nyasaland Times in later years) began to be published with a devotion to “the planting interests of the 
community – the interest  ... on which the commercial prosperity of the [protectorate] depends”25. 
Nonetheless, the business community continued to be internally deeply divided, as will become clear 
below. Their intermittent unity was motivated by either common antipathy towards the government on 
certain issues or by government directives for the business community to provide a single front for 
policy consultations. 
Johnston‟s failure to deliver on his commitments to the BSAC irked the company, which  consequently 
withdrew the offer to increase its subsidy (Pike, 1968; Pachai, 1973). Planters and missionaries also 
                                                             
23 Chamber Minutes, 25 November 1941 (50th Anniversary of the Chamber), MNA 27/NCC/2/19. 
24 Historical Manuscripts Inventories, p.1 of ACC. 27, MNA. 
25 Editorial, CAP, Sept 1895, MNA. 
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resented his authority, especially on land policy. Consequently, the Foreign Office agreed with the 
BSAC that the Commissioner would cease administering the company‟s territory and that the company 
would stop subsidising the administration of the protectorate by 30 th June 189526. In 1894, the BSAC 
undertook direct administration of its area, and the resource vacuum for administering the protectorate 
compelled Johnston had to find alternatives. He turned to the larger business community and sought to 
provide planters with legal tenure, something that he had earlier refused27. 
However, his turn to the wider business community was too little too late. Its organisational capacity, 
especially the membership density of the Chamber, increased as it became a representative of 
commercial, agricultural and general settler interests to the government28. Johnston‟s health began to 
fail. In May 1896, he left for treatment of black water fever (Tindall, 1968:185) and never returned. 
Despite several achievements related to state formation, Johnston “did not leave on a flood of grateful 
eulogies” (Hanna, 1965:122). This was particularly true for the business community, which in late 
September 1897 welcomed the appointment of a new Commissioner by expressing gratitude that 
Johnston was not going to return29. The views of the business community on Johnston‟s administration 
were perhaps most clearly stated in the following excerpt: 
The Administration so far as promoting the welfare and advancement of [the protectorate] has 
been, we regret to say, a failure. This is in no small degree due to the rule of autocracy inaugurated 
by Commissioner Johnston...that is a disease that kills every effort and every attempt of private 
enterprise30. 
Thus, between 1891 and 1896 SBRs were bifurcated. On one hand, the particularistic relationship with 
the BSAC virtually amounted to government capture31 due to the increasing dependency of the 
                                                             
26 Memo from Percy Anderson to BSAC, 6th November 1893, PRO FO 403/185. 
27 Johnston to Roseberry, October 1893, PRO FO 403/185. 
28 The Nyasaland Chamber of Commerce, Historical Manuscripts Inventory, Acc. No.27, p.1 (MNA). 
29 „Annual Meeting of the Chamber, CAP, 1 October, 1897, MNA. 
30 CAP, Editorial 15 June 1897, MNA. 
31 To be understood in the same way as „state capture‟ as defined by Hellman et al (2000) except that the exchange of 
money was not illicit or clandestine. 
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administration on the financial resources of the company. On the other hand, relations with the larger 
business community were characterised by suspicion, mutual mistrust, antagonism and marginalisation. 
Johnston acknowledged this when he wrote that “the difficulties raised up against my work by 
Europeans have infinitely exceeded the trouble given me by the Negroes or Arabs” (as cited by Jones, 
1964: 55). However, from 1897, the attitudes between the government and the European business 
sector improved, largely due to two factors. Firstly, the European business community organised into a 
peak association with increased membership density and began seeking policy dialogue with the 
government. The business community thus became a political constituency that the government could 
not easily ignore. Secondly, the withdrawal of the BSAC‟s financial subsidy increased the government‟s 
dependency on the local business sector as a source of revenue for administering the protectorate. The 
combination of these factors compelled the government to accept the Chamber as legitimate and 
granted it regular access to the Commissioner and his officials. It marked the beginning of a new 
pattern of SBRs i.e. concertation. 
4.1.4. Creating and deepening concertation 
The replacement of Johnston by Alfred Sharpe in 1897 was obviously a critical juncture as it raised 
expectations for improvements in SBRs. When the Chamber entertained the new Commissioner at a 
complimentary dinner32, he acknowledged that it was a great satisfaction to him to know that he had the 
sympathy of the settlers, the possession of which would greatly assist him in discharging his duties33. 
Unlike Johnston, who had been catapulted into authority without intimate knowledge of the country and 
without social ties, Commissioner Sharpe had lived in the country since the late 1880s and socialised 
with missionaries, settlers and government officials, especially through the Shire Highlands shooting 
and sports clubs. These clubs had interlocking memberships and provided opportunities for informal 
                                                             
32 „Complimentary Dinner to HM Commissioner‟, CAT, 10 October 1897. 
33 From Sharpe to the Chamber, 12th September 1897, reproduced in CAT, 8 October 1897.  
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interaction between leaders of business associations and the government. For instance, the Chamber‟s 
President in 1897, Duncan Beaton, was also president of the shooting club where the Commissioner 
had been a member before becoming its patron. Captain Daly, Messrs Israel and Lindsay were on the 
Executive Committee of the Chamber while also serving with Commissioner Sharpe and his deputy as 
patrons of   the shooting club34. This social network enabled informal discussion of issues that were 
core to structuring SBRs, especially as there was not yet an institutionalised PPD forum. For example, 
when a member asked that the Chamber be affiliated to the London Chamber of Commerce and that it 
participate in showcasing at the Imperial Institute, its president explained that the matter had been 
discussed and that the government was willing to pay 33 per cent of the cost of affiliation, that the 
BSAC would bear a large part of the cost and that the ALC would transport exhibits for showcasing free 
of charge35. 
Besides the informal interaction, ad hoc formal interface between business and government elites 
became frequent, especially on sticky issues such as the construction of railways36. However, it is the 
question of African labour that effectively laid the foundation for concertation. After the meeting 
between the committee of the Chamber and the commissioner, the Chamber released  a statement with 
the following excerpt: 
 In the matter of the labour question, [the commissioner] had...proposals which are free from 
obnoxious red tapism and which...commend themselves to the employers of labour in this country. 
[His] suggestion...amounts to an invitation to the employers...to cooperate with government in 
formulating a workable scheme for the recruiting of labour and the only condition... is that the 
employers should be prepared to act in concert, and that the government has the right to veto 
anything which would not be consistent with the queen‟s regulations on the subject.37 
 
                                                             
34 „Season 1897 The Shire Highlands Shooting club BCA‟, CAT 10 October 1897; „Blantyre Sports Club‟, CAT, 1 October 
1897. 
35  Annual Meeting of the Chamber, CAT, 1 October 1897. 
36  Sharpe to Chamber, 29th March 1897, reproduced in CAT, 1 October 1897. 
37 „HM Commissioner‟s Views‟, CAT 18 December 1897 p.1; see also „The Chamber and HM Commissioner‟, CAT 18 
December, 1897 p.3. 
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This „liberal and broad-minded offer‟38 from the Commissioner set a precedent for collaboration between 
the government and the business community and was the earliest step towards institutionalisation of 
PPD. In 1898, a law was introduced to regulate emigration of African labour to the mines of South Africa 
and Rhodesia. However, by 1903, the outflow had become too much for planters. On 18 th March, the 
Chamber asked the Commissioner to transmit a petition to the Foreign Office on the matter, but the 
Commissioner refused on the grounds that, as he had received letters from individual planters and 
others with views that were at variance to those of the Chamber, the views of the Chamber were not 
representative of the whole community39. The Commissioner wished “a plebiscite had been taken of all 
the members of the Chamber and if the mind of the public had been ascertained.”40 It must be noted 
that the exportation of labour was being carried out under a scheme that involved the British, Nyasaland 
and Transvaal governments. The need to raise revenue for the administration forced the government to 
export 1000 labourers to the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA). In return, WNLA made 
upfront tax payments for the labourers and recovered it from their wages (Pachai, 1973; Chirwa, 1993). 
A public meeting of the Chamber voted for the abolition of the scheme, and their view was best 
expressed by R.S. Hynde when he argued, “The dominant feelings among Europeans...are that we...are 
not wanted in this country. But, Mr. Chairman, we were here before the Administration and possession, 
as we are frequently told, is nine-tenths of the law”41. Similar pressure was exerted on the Foreign 
Office by London-based corporate directors who had interests in the protectorate42. However, the 
government displayed its autonomy and continued with the WNLA scheme until 1907. 
                                                             
38  Ibid. 
39  „Export of Labour‟, CAT, 21 March 1903, p.2. 
40  Ibid. 
41  „Should BCA be a Recruiting ground for Labour for the Mines? Opinion of the Residents‟, CAT, 2 May 1903, p.4.(MNA) 
42  Mr Roe, representative of the BCAC, informed the public meeting that his directors in London were involved in the 
lobbying (ibid, p.7). 
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4.1.5. Private sector fragmentation – planters and commercialists in uneasy partnership 
1903 was an eventful year for the Chamber, especially because of the issue of African labour. The 
executive committee met 23 times, its chairman resigned amid allegations of a conflict of interest as his 
company owned the agency that was recruiting labour for the WNLA, and amendments to the 
constitution of the Chamber were proposed43. While the breadth and depth of concertation increased, it 
was apparent that planters wanted to break away from the Chamber and to form their own association. 
This created the fear of business associations working at cross-purposes and presented the potential for 
concertation to weaken. It was then proposed that the Chamber should have two sections dealing with 
planting and commercial interests respectively, each section with five committee members, with the 
committees operating independently on exclusive matters, and the presidency and vice-presidency of 
the chamber alternating between the sections and rotating annually44. Despite these attempts, the 
Nyasaland Planters‟ Association (NPA) was constituted and held its first general meeting in November 
1903. In December, the Commissioner congratulated planters on the formation of their association and 
observed that the Chamber “had undoubtedly done much good work but in all planting countries it was 
found that the best interests of purely agricultural matters could be much better dealt with by... a 
planters association... [He] would endeavour to support the [association] in every possible way”45. The 
reformation of the NPA reduced the political significance of the Chamber by reducing its membership 
density until 1907, when the two merged to form the Nyasaland Associated Chamber with “membership 
open to all European residents of Nyasaland who [were] engaged in the development of the country”46. 
In 1907, the protectorate received a typical Crown Colony constitution, which replaced commissioners 
with governors and shared governmental power between an Executive Council (EXCO) and a 
                                                             
43  BCA Chamber of Agriculture and commerce Annual General Meeting, CAT, 10th October 1903, p11-14.  
44  Ibid.  
45  CAT, 12 December, 1903, p.10. 
46  Nyasaland Associated Chamber, Minutes of Proceedings 2 Nov-27 June 1911, 27/NCC/2/1, MNA. 
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Legislative Council (LEGCO), both councils being chaired by the Governor47. The new constitution 
provided opportunities for reconfiguring state power, institutionalising PPD and deepening concertation. 
Hitherto, PPD had been ad hoc, often initiated by the business community in reaction to government 
policies. Nonetheless, SBRs were “most friendly” as the Chamber found the Commissioner and his 
officials “willing to listen to and consider the various proposals submitted to them”48 despite the fact that 
questions often arose where state and business interests were at variance, as shown on the labour 
question. 
4.1.6. Institutionalising Public-Private Dialogue – the primacy of the architecture of political 
institutions 
Public-private dialogue (PPD) in the colonial period found its sustenance in the formal political 
institutional architecture of the state. The constitutional framework laid down in the Nyasaland Order in 
Council of 1907 provided opportunities for the development of the institutional mechanisms for PPD 
that formalised and deepened concertation. It also sustained the Chamber as a peak business 
association and for many years as a legitimate political representative of the European settlers despite 
the diversity of interests and the frequent lack of harmony between them. By negotiating the details for 
operationalising some constitutional principles, the Chamber was able to sufficiently tilt the rules for 
selecting „unofficial‟ members of the Legislative Council (LEGCO) in its favour. Thus, from 1908 until 
1956, the LEGCO had seats for the business community, and the Chamber developed an elaborate 
procedure for the selection of representatives. This section traces the evolution of this institutional 
framework and shows that the process was defined by elite politics. 
The LEGCO as a forum for government-business dialogue 
Unlike the 1889 African Order in Council, which concentrated all government decision-making power in 
the commissioner, the 1907 Nyasaland Order in Council dispersed the power between an EXCO and a 
                                                             
47 Nyasaland Order in Council, 1907, MNA. For reasons for this form of a Constitution, see Hailey (1956: 261). 
48  Mr Beaton, Chamber President, Annual General Meeting, CAT, 10 October 1903, p.10. 
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LEGCO with the latter acquiring the power to make ordinances and to exercise all powers that had 
previously been exercised by the commissioner. The LEGCO was to consist of the Governor and 
persons that would be appointed by the British government on recommendation of the Governor49. It 
has been argued that the introduction of the LEGCO did not reduce the power of the Governor as he 
had “final word on all governmental matters [and] had complete control over the legislature since its 
members were practically hand-picked by him” (Kadzamira, 1971:83). However, this view is largely a 
logical derivative from the law and is not entirely supported by empirical data on how elites engaged 
with the legal framework. In fact, the provision of a LEGCO attenuated the powers of the Governor and 
was the most important single rule that enabled the formal institutionalisation of concertation. Because 
of the provision, the Chamber, and later the Nyasaland Convention of Associations (see below), 
practically became something of an „electoral college‟ for the nomination of members to LEGCO, where 
some unofficial members were designated as representatives of agricultural and commercial interests. 
As early as 17 December 1907, the Chamber asked the Governor, in order to secure adequate 
representation of commercial and other interests in the LEGCO, that agriculture be represented by a 
member who was solely engaged in the industry50. On 6th May 1908, the Chamber urged the Governor 
to take due notice of its resolution on representation of agricultural interests. The Governor, however, 
argued that granting the request would amount to unlawful delegation of authority, and he unilaterally 
appointed three Europeans to the LEGCO, including the president of the Chamber. Upon considering 
this response, the Chamber passed a motion requesting the Governor to take their wishes into account 
when making future nominations to the LEGCO51. On 1 June 1909, the Chamber resolved to approach 
the Governor to allow it to nominate one member for LEGCO citing the practice in the Straits 
Settlements and Ceylon as precedent. The Governor replied that he had no power to allow the chamber 
                                                             
49  Article 3, Nyasaland Order in Council 1907. 
50  Chamber Minutes, 17 December,1908, 27/NCC/2/1, MNA. 
51  Chamber minutes 2 June 1908, 27/NCC/2/1, MNA. 
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that right52. In August 1909 the Chamber petitioned the Secretary of State for Colonies (SSC) and 
requested the privilege of nominating one or more members for the LEGCO53. In January 1910, the 
SSC indicated that he “did not see his way to alter the present mode of nominations”54. The contestation 
went on until 1922. In the meantime, on the request of the Governor, the Chamber continued to suggest 
(and gave in alphabetical order) twice the number of names as there were vacant unofficial seats on the 
council55. The Governor would then choose from the list and recommend that they be appointed by the 
King. In 1921, the Chamber observed that the Governor had repeatedly refused it the right to make 
nominations to the LEGCO. Dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of the unofficial representatives on 
export and income taxes “made it necessary for some definite action to be taken”56. It was then 
proposed that “no member of the chamber or of the affiliated associations should accept appointment to 
LEGCO on the nomination of ...the Governor”57. The Chamber resolved, however, to allow the 
government to reconsider its position and called for at least consultation “as to whom we wish to 
represent the public on the Council”58. They further warned that if this right was refused, they would 
press further by asking their members to reject nominations from the Governor, adding that if “the latter 
step is necessary, it will not be taken with the idea of disassociating ourselves from cooperation, but 
with the object of getting into closer touch with Government”59. 
Rejecting nominations to the LEGCO would seriously jeopardise the legitimacy of the government. 
Thus, in February 1922, the government indicated that although the decision of the SCC precluded the 
Governor from accepting nominations, the Governor was “prepared to give the fullest consideration to 
                                                             
52  Chamber minutes, 1 June 1909, 30 June 1909, 27/NCC/2/1 MNA. 
53  The Foreign Office was responsible for Nyasaland until 1904, when the responsibility was transferred to the Colonial 
Office. 
54  Chamber minutes, 28 July 1909, 25 August 1909, 27 January 1910, MNA. 
55  Chief Secretary to Governor Hall, 28 March 1940, S1/625II/19 folio 234, MNA. 
56  Chamber minutes,1921, 27/NCC/2/3, MNA. 
57  Ibid. 
58  Ibid. 
59  Ibid. 
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any suggestions the Chamber may desire”60. However, conflicts of interest between agriculture and 
commerce within the chamber intensified. In 1925, the Cholo (Thyolo) and the South Nyasa Planters 
Associations withdrew from the Chamber, revived the NPA and asked the government to recognise the 
NPA and grant it access61. Membership of the NPA was confined to planters or farmers “resident and 
personally engaged in agriculture on an estate or farm”62. While its general aim was to further and 
protect the interests of agriculture generally, the association‟s specific interests revolved around 
cooperative production and marketing of farm products; the organisation, supply and conditions of 
labour; and ventilation on legislation directly concerned with agriculture63. Although the government had 
indicated that it would give due consideration to the opinions of the association64, it refused to accord 
the association full recognition because it was “considered desirable... to look to one body as 
representing...the views of the planting community and that the Chamber... has hitherto been regarded 
as an institution with which government should communicate in such matters”65. The government was 
weary of a pluralised institutional environment for public-private dialogue but nonetheless undertook to 
furnish the NPA with copies of communications on agricultural matters that it would address to the 
Chamber. The government further suggested that, alternatively, the Chamber and the NPA should 
constitute a standing joint committee that would authoritatively interact with the government66. 
Virtually at the same time as the formation of the NPA, the Chamber was further weakened by the 
formation of the Nyasaland Merchants Association (NMA) from within its ranks to protect European 
trading interests. The primary objective was to manage what they perceived to be unfair trading 
practices perpetrated by the Indian community. The association laid down terms of credit for the 
                                                             
60  Chamber Minutes, 28th February 1922, 27/NCC/2/3, MNA.  
61  Cholo Planters Association to Chief Secretary, 18 February, 1925, File No.441/25, MNA. 
62  Article 3, NPA Constitution, NPA/441/25, MNA. 
63  Article 2, NPA Constitution, op.cit. 
64  Chief Secretary to Cholo Planters Association 25 February and 22 October 1925, File No.441/25,MNA. 
65  Acting Chief Secretary to NPA, 25 June 1926, MNA 441/25. 
66  Ibid. 
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wholesale and retail businesses and provided credit reference services to its members. It was 
suggested, as a containment strategy, to make the NMA a subcommittee of the Chamber. This was 
initially rejected by the traders on the grounds that the NMA was interested in trade only, while the 
Chamber was interested in a broader pan-business agenda67. In 1926, the government strongly 
criticised the formation of separate business associations, arguing that it was impossible to ascertain 
with confidence the real wishes or opinions of the non-official community and that doing so with many 
public bodies would be a time-consuming process68. The NPA, however, felt that the government was 
reneging on its promise to place it on an equal footing with the Chamber and that it was being relegated 
to a secondary position69. Thus, rather than being subordinated to the Chamber, the NPA preferred the 
formation of a joint standing committee in which the Chamber would be an equal partner. The joint 
committee resolved to form a central body modelled on the Kenyan Convention of Associations. The 
NPA approved the resolution, but the Chamber insisted on further negotiations, which lasted another 
two years. In 1928, the Governor summoned representatives of all unofficial bodies to a meeting, at 
which he expressed his earnest hope “that an organisation would be formed with a central executive 
which would possess the goodwill of the entire European community and ... speak with authority and 
confidence on matters affecting common interests”70. The outcome of the meeting was the formation of 
the Nyasaland Convention of Associations (NCA). Upon the formation of the NCA, the NPA dissolved, 
and the NMA rejoined the Chamber. 
The NCA became a premier political organisation and subsumed business associations. Commercial 
interests other than transport were represented by the Chamber, and agriculture was represented by 
                                                             
67 Historical Note in Historical Manuscripts, Acc. No.30, MNA. Note that the only archival file for the NMA, containing records 
from January 1925-February 1928 , File No. 30/NMA/1  has been missing since 2003. 
68  Chief Secretary to NPA, 4th August 1926, Nyasaland Times, 20th July 1926. 
69  NPA to Chief Secretary 17 August 1926, MNA 441/125/1. 
70  „Nyasaland Associations: Are they of Any Value? Nyasaland Times, 10 January 1933,MNA. 
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various district Settlers and Planters Associations71. Transport interests were represented by the 
Nyasaland Motor Transport Association (NMTA). In addition to these, there were other associations 
affiliated to the NCA whose objectives were confined to specific purposes and who did not take part in 
the general politics of the organisation. These included the Nyasaland Tobacco Association (NTA), 
Nyasaland Tea Research Association (NTRA) and the Nyasaland Tobacco Exporters Association 
(NTEA), all of which were formed at the initiative or encouragement of the government. Planting and 
commercial interests continued to have direct representation in the LEGCO. Following the formation of 
the NCA, concertation deepened as the business community was able to present a unified front. For 
instance, between 1928 and 1932, from a random selection of 50 questions of importance on which 
business associations submitted written opinions to the government, the government‟s final decision 
was either wholly, mainly or partly in accord with that of business in thirty-eight cases. In eight cases, 
final decisions were pending and only in four cases were the government‟s final decisions contrary and 
adverse to the inputs and interests of the business community72. 
The business community had considerable policy voice and the government often openly appreciated 
“the straightforward advice...even though it was not always possible to accept it”73. By 1939, Governor 
Kennedy had observed that the interests of Europeans were not directly represented in EXCO, where 
the views of officials went unchallenged and often took precedence over the unofficial views 
represented in letters or other documents. He proposed the appointment of unofficial members to EXCO 
in an advisory capacity74. Although the SSC found it unnecessary to alter the composition of the EXCO, 
he approved the proposal75 so that from 1939 business had direct representation in the EXCO, albeit 
without voting powers, but had voting rights in the LEGCO. However, SBRs soured in the 1940s. This 
                                                             
71 These included Cholo Settlers, Ntcheu Settlers, Dedza Settlers, Mlanje Planters, South Nyasa Planters and Zomba 
Planters. 
72  Nyasaland Associations: Are they of Any Value? Nyasaland Times, 10 January 1933, MNA. 
73  Acting Governor Hall to William Bowie, 20 April 1934, S1/625II19 folio 20. 
74  Governor Kennedy to SSC, 26 July 1939, S1/625II/19 Folio 188, MNA. 
75  SSC telegram No.217, S1/625II/19, MNA. 
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was mainly because of a cumulative effect of the numerical advantage that government had in the 
LEGCO. There were more official than unofficial members and they often out-voted the unofficial 
members on questions where the government and the business community had divergent views. This 
mechanism had been used previously to subdue the representations of the business community on the 
following issues: 
 Decision to grant the British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) a monopoly to purchase 
cotton grown by Africans in 192376. 
 Continuation, after the war had ended, of taxation measures that had been meant to raise 
revenue for the First World War77. 
 Introduction of a Native Tobacco Board in 192678 
 Introduction of a Trade Union Law in 193479. 
In 1944, the unofficial vote in the LEGCO was once again swamped by the official vote on tax 
measures. It was observed that “year after year...the unofficial members suffered defeat... with such 
nonchalance and light heartedness” that the Chamber was inclined to regard them as “semi-official 
government agents used as a buffer between the Colonial Office and the British Community in 
Nyasaland”80. It was then resolved that unofficial members should withdraw from the LEGCO “until such 
time as the Chamber [was] satisfied that British subjects...have such representation...as [would] 
safeguard their interests adequately”81. However, the unofficial members refused to comply with this 
resolution because they had been nominated to the LEGCO by the NCA, not the Chamber82. The Acting 
Governor felt that the Chamber‟s resolutions were not “the general opinion of responsible Europeans...” 
                                                             
76  Chamber Minutes, 27 February 1923, MNA 27/NCC/2/4. 
77  Chamber to SSC, 22 January 1921, MNA 27/NCC/2/4. 
78  LEGCO Minutes, 8 February 1926, PRO CO626/21. 
79  LEGCO Minutes,4-6 June 1932, PRO CO 626/21. 
80  Chamber Minutes, 9 May, 1944, MNA. 
81  Ibid. 
82  Chamber Minutes,   13 June 1944, MNA 27/NCC/2/19. 
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and that “this small Chamber committee” could not speak for all European settlers, who totalled 1,80083. 
The Governor later claimed that the Chamber‟s president had discredited the meeting as having been 
attended by certain members who rarely attended the Chamber‟s meetings and that “the President 
himself opposed the resolution”84. At a subsequent general meeting of the NCA, Chamber delegates felt 
that they were treated like naughty school children and that the attitude of the NCA chairman towards 
the chamber was that of a schoolmaster85. In 1945, the Chamber withdrew from the NCA and asked the 
government to reserve a seat for commerce in the LEGCO, but this was not to be. 
4.1.7. Inclusive politics and the weakening of particularistic concertation 
The spectre of nationalism began to gather momentum in 1944 with the formation of the Nyasaland 
African Congress (NAC). This was coupled with the demand for popular electoral representation of the 
European community by the NCA. Consequently, constitutional changes between 1945-46 reconfigured 
the LEGCO, and in 1949, five elected Europeans, three Africans nominated by an African Protectorate 
Council, and one Indian from the Indian Chamber of Commerce (ICC) comprised the unofficial members 
of the LEGCO. Thus, LEGCO seats were no longer identified by the social or economic interests of the 
European community but by colour. These changes remained in place until 1956 – three years into the 
Central African Federation (CAF) – when further constitutional changes saw the withdrawal of the Indian 
seat and an increase in African seats, which were  filled by indirect elections (Kadzamira, 1971:84-85). 
The reconfiguration of the LEGCO weakened concertation as it embodied diverse and often antagonistic 
interests. Thus, in 1951, the Chamber began to consider rejoining the NCA in order “to have one 
undivided power and avoid being played off by the government”86. However, this was overtaken by the 
introduction of the CAF, which transferred many common services from the protectorate to the Federal 
Assembly in Salisbury (Kadzamira, 1971; Walker, 1965; Hanna, 1965). Especially important to SBRs 
                                                             
83  Acting Governor to SSC, 12th May 1944, PRO CO 525/195. 
84  Governor Richard to SSC, 15 May, 1944, PRO 525/195. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Chamber Minutes, 27 November 1951, MNA 27/NCC/2/24. 
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was that such matters as trade, industry, commerce, income tax and customs became federal 
responsibilities. The Nyasaland LEGCO was left with the responsibility for matters directly concerned 
with the welfare of the African population (Kadzamira, 1971; Walker, 1965; Hanna, 1965). 
Consequently, European business interests looked to Salisbury, while the Nyasaland Government 
began to respond to demands to boost African commerce. In 1954, the Chamber became a member of 
the Federal Council of Industry (FCI) and the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland (ACCORN)87. The NCA became a „Nyasaland Forum‟ where European opinion on any 
issues could be expressed88.  
Thus, political changes from the 1940s through to the late 50s, especially the introduction of the 
federation and the increase in the number of Africans in the LEGCO and later in the EXCO, undermined 
the institutions that had undergirded colonial SBRs between 1907 and the late 1950s. As will be seen 
later in the chapter, the early 1960s witnessed political processes that virtually wiped out the 
concertation in SBRs and laid down the foundations of yet another pattern that characterised the post-
colonial era (see chapter 5). 
Having traced the institutional evolution of particularistic concertation, I turn, in the following section to 
an overview of the dynamics of this pattern of SBRs.  
4.2. Europeandom: dynamics of particularistic concertation 
Colonialism meant ensuring the political and economic dominance of whites over any other subjugated 
races. In this project, the colonial state allied with European private capital in some respects but did not 
always respond positively to business demands. Whenever it had its own interests to pursue, it often 
steered its policy proposals and legislation through the opposition in the Chamber, unofficial members 
of the LEGCO or any big corporation. This autonomy of the colonial government accounted in part for 
the sustainment of concertation while preventing government capture by narrow business interests. 
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Consequently, what passed as policy on many economic matters depended on the distribution and 
exercise of power of either the state or the business community. This section highlights the dynamics of 
the pattern of SBRs that ensued. 
4.2.1. Exclusion of non-Europeans from public-private dialogue 
Colonial state-society relations were shaped by a racial thinking that categorised society into a hierarchy 
of European, Indian and African. The private sector also developed along racial lines, and business 
associations became advocates of political agendas besides economic concerns. This stratification of 
society reflected Johnston‟s vision of Central Africa as a region to be “ruled by Whites, developed by 
Indians and worked by blacks”89. Consequently, formal SBRs were particularistic as only European 
business associations had preferential access to the government. Indians were excluded because “the 
class of Indians in Nyasaland was not such as to justify their being treated on the same lines as 
Europeans...”90 Their inputs to government policies were reactive and only in writing91. Africans were 
excluded because “[their] understanding was too immature to justify...extending to [them] the same full 
freedom...enjoyed by the settlers”92. The government took it upon itself to be the custodian of African 
interests93. Nonetheless, the BNA – a group of elite Africans – occasionally voiced African commercial 
concerns to the government but only in writing94. The European business community often used their 
access to the government to carve out narrow benefits, sometimes by turning the government into an 
ally to subjugate the Indian and African communities. It is therefore not surprising that one independent 
African of the time described this configuration of political and economic power as a „Europeandom‟ in 
                                                             
89  Johnston to Foreign Office, PRO FO Confidential, item 6337, No.145. 
90  EXCO Minutes, 8 December 1908, PRO CO 626/6; Governor Manning to Colonial Office, 13 April 1912, PRO 525/42. 
Restrictive rules on Indian immigration to South Africa and Rhodesia from 1904 onwards saw less-educated and 
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government bureaucrats. 
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which the European missionaries, government and companies were altogether “too cheaty, too thefty, 
too mockery [of Africans and Indians]”95. However, while the European business sector had both policy 
voice and policy spaces, the government was relatively autonomous, sometimes in defence of the 
Indian and African communities and at other times for the sake of its own interests.  
4.2.2.  Business as a reliable policy partner  
Recent literature on SBRs in developing countries portrays the state as an unwilling partner that has to 
be coaxed by the business community96. However, in this early phase, the Nyasaland government was 
enthusiastic about a policy partnership with the European business community. In 1908, the Governor 
described the appointment of the unofficial members to LEGCO as “the most important step” for policy 
making that would enable the Governor to consult “members with such large experience of local trading 
and planting industries and with so ample a knowledge of [Africans] and [African] questions...”97 So 
reliable were business representatives in providing policy and legislative advice that by 1940, 
government co-opted them into the EXCO too.  Records of proceedings in LEGCO, EXCO, Chamber 
and NCA meetings and correspondence among business associations, firms, the Colonial Office and 
the Nyasaland government show that concertation took  the following forms: 
 Government referral of policy questions to business associations: The government often 
solicited inputs from the private sector on all sorts of policy questions. In addition to written 
submissions that were considered by the EXCO, there were often face-to- face consultations 
between government and deputations of business associations98. 
 Unsolicited inputs including legislative petitions: Business associations were always eager 
to express themselves on matters affecting their members even when the government did not 
                                                             
95  Charles Domingo, cited in Shepperson and Price (1956:163); also cited in Davidson (1964:137). 
96 For example, Taylor (2007), Pinaud (2008), Maxfield and Scheneider (1997) and numerous country cases available at 
www.publicprivatedialogue.org  
97  LEGCO Minutes, 7 May 1908, PRO CO 626/6. 
98 Examples include: renewal of the monopoly granted to the British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) to purchase cotton 
grown by Africans, and the introduction of an auction system for disposing of tobacco (Nyasaland Times, Monday 
August 2, 1937). 
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ask for their inputs. Such inputs included petitions that were considered by the LEGCO and 
EXCO or sent to the SSC on appeal99. 
 Shared membership on commissions and boards: Chapter 18 of the Laws of Nyasaland 
provided for the formation of commissions on different matters as deemed fit by the Governor. 
This facility was used to deepen collaboration between the government and the business 
community on policy issues. A practice evolved in which members of the business community, 
often nominated by their associations, were appointed to commissions whose recommendations 
often entailed new policy100. Similarly, there were advisory boards for many policy areas, and the 
business associations were often invited to nominate their representatives to those boards101. 
 Private sector initiation of policy and legislation: The 1907 Constitutional Order in Council 
stipulated that ordinances were to be enacted by the Governor with the advice and consent of 
the LEGCO. In practice, however, and especially on legislation that had potential to transgress 
European commercial and agricultural interests, the business associations went beyond the 
provision of advice to the introduction of legislation through unofficial members of the LEGCO102, 
sometimes at the invitation of the government as was the case with the amendment of the Trade 
Licensing Ordinance103 and the Tobacco Marketing Bill, which took two years of negotiation104. 
4.2.3. The government as regulator and particularistic ally of European capital 
Some scholarship on political economy (for example, Lindblom (1977), Evans (1995), Chang (1999 and 
2007)) has suggested that the roles that the state plays in the economy help shape the patterns of 
SBRs. While all governments play roles in the economy, the key factor affecting the form of SBRs is the 
                                                             
99  Examples include: petitions and memoranda on nomination of members to LEGCO, op.cit; exportation of African labour, 
op.cit and restrictions on the granting of trading licences (Power, 1993:597). 
100  Examples: Land Commission in 1920, Inquiry on Natives on Private Estates, Inquiry  into the Revenue and Expenditure 
of the Protectorate 1922,  Inquiry into the Chilembwe Uprising, 1915 (Terms of reference for this commission were set 
by the Chamber and agreed to by Government (EXCO Minutes, 15 October, 1919, PRO CO 626/6)). 
101 Examples: Boards on Communications, Motor Vehicle Licensing, Agricultural policy, Education, Labour, and Native 
Tobacco. 
102 Examples include: Tea Ordinance No.31 of 1934 (LEGCO Minutes, 20 October 1934, PRO); Flue-Cured Tobacco 
Ordinance No.10 of 1936 (LEGCO Minutes, 21 April 1935, PRO); Tung Ordinance No.11 of 1946 (LEGCO Minutes 19 
February 1946, PRO). 
103 When the government requested suggestions for amending the Ordinance, the Chamber submitted a draft proposal in 
1931 that the government found to be unduly biased in favour of European trading interests and intended to legislate 
away competition from Indian traders. The draft was rebutted article by article by the Attorney General. A new bill drafted 
by the government was introduced and passed in the LEGCO in 1932 (Power, 1993). 
104 The bill was drafted by the tobacco association in 1936 and adopted by the government. Consultations and negotiations 
on the bill with the Chamber and the Tobacco Association substantially changed the government version of the bill. The 
government disowned it but advised on its introduction in the LEGCO as a private member‟s bill (EXCO Minutes, 20 
February 1936 – 29 October, 1937, PRO). 
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extent to which government takes on the roles that are conventionally deemed to be for the private 
sector and the extent to which the organised private sector takes on the roles that are conventionally 
expected to be performed by the government. The role of the colonial government in the economy was 
mostly regulatory105. In performing this role, the government often behaved as an ally to the European 
commercial interests, as the following three cases illustrate. 
Firstly, labour and tax regulations were conflated to provide government with revenue while providing 
conditions under which European enterprises could maximise the use of cheap African labour. Under 
the 1894 tax rules, the government and the European business community worked out a mutually 
beneficial arrangement in which African tax offenders were handed over to the European planters and 
company managers to work for a specified period, and the European would pay the required amount of 
tax to the government. In 1901, the Chamber asked the government to help raise the supply of labour 
by increasing the tax payable by Africans who did not work for Europeans for at least one month a year 
or introduce a 50 per cent tax rebate if the African worked for a European for at least one month a year. 
The government obliged, and in 1903, the Chamber successfully negotiated for the rebate to increase to 
100 per cent (Ng‟ong‟ola, 1986; Pachai, 1973). 
Secondly, although the colonial government was conscious of the rights of Africans to land, the best 
arable lands were alienated by concession to settlers, especially large companies. Hailey (1942:1) 
observed that 70 per cent of these parcels of land was in the hands of 11 large estate holders. Under 
labour tenancies called thangata, Africans resident on these alienated lands were reduced to a servile 
status106. Furthermore, laws and regulations on production and marketing of cash crops favoured 
                                                             
105 The government sometimes took active roles in the economy. For example, it provided European tobacco farmers with 
loans until 1931(Governor Thomas to SSC, 13 August 1931 PRO CO525/140/3); it financed the formation and operations 
of the Nyasaland Tobacco Association (Governor Green to SSC, 17 July 1931 PRO CO525/140; Nyasaland Times 31 
March and 3 April 1931); upon the demand of  the Chamber, it took up shares in the Shire Highlands Railway Company 
(Ross to Chief Secretary, 3 November 1926 PRO CO525/115/3); and in the 1950s, it established the Agricultural 
Produce Marketing Board (APMB), which began to invest directly in the economy (Ng‟ong‟ola,1986). 
106  On „thangata‟ see Kandawire (1977), Newbury (1980) and Khrishnamurthy (1964). 
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Europeans. Africans were prohibited from growing premier cash crops such as coffee, tea and flue-
cured tobacco. This exclusion aimed to avoid creating African competitors and to ensure the availability 
of labour supplies for European plantations. This tack of particularism was best expressed by 
Commissioner Johnston when he observed that “from time to time a planter [rose] to object to the 
[Africans] being allowed to plant coffee, in case they should come into competition with him or [urged] 
the administration to use its power despotically to compel a black man to work for wages whether he will 
or not” (Johnston, 1897:183). For the cash crops that Africans were allowed, mostly dark -fired tobacco 
and cotton, producer prices were suppressed (Ng‟ong‟ola, 1986; Nyasaland Protectorate, 1909). In 
1911, a law was introduced whereby an African could pay a lower rate of tax if he sold certain cash 
crops to a European who then resold at a higher price (Pachai, 1973:114). In short, agrarian regulations 
and policies furthered agricultural and commercial interests of settlers at the expense of Africans, who 
had limited access to means of economic production and were effectively regarded as a rural peasantry. 
Thirdly, regulations governing commerce and trading were less particularistic in favour of Europeans 
than in other areas of economic activity. This was because this sector of business was dominated by 
Indians, who were able to coalesce into the NITA and later the NICC and effectively counterpoised 
particularistic proposals from NMA and the Chamber107. However, one particularistic regulation that 
affected SBRs in the post-colonial era (see chapter 5) was enacted in 1914. It prohibited Indians and 
Africans from acquiring property and pursuing trade in the Blantyre Townships except in areas that were 
designated as Asian or Native wards108. This regulation was a sequel to one of 1913 in which the EXCO 
approved the principle that it was “highly undesirable that Indians should be permitted to reside in the 
vicinity of European areas”109. Consequently, Indians spread to rural areas so that by 1961, 50 per cent 
of Indians were living outside the main towns of Blantyre, Zomba and Lilongwe (Power, 1993:581). Their 
                                                             
107  See Power (1993) for an overview of the Anglo-Indian trade rivalries in Nyasaland. 
108  EXCO Minutes, 4 December 1913; 9 March 1914, PRO CO 626/6. 
109  EXCO Minutes, 16 September 1913, PRO CO 626/6. 
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trading activities also increased significantly, as shown by increases in the number of licences given to 
new entrants and the number of additional licences given to established traders who were opening up 
more branches of their businesses. For instance between 1911 and 1928, the distribution of retail 
licences was as depicted in Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2.: Distribution of retail licences between Europeans and Indians, 1911 and 1928110. 
Year Race Licences for new entrants Additional licences to 
established firms 
1911 Europeans 29 38 
Indians 40 117 
1928 Europeans 45 154 
Indians 172 446 
 Source: Power (1993: 589). 
Despite their close relationship, the government was able to resist some demands from the European 
business community. For example, when the Chamber pushed for the abrogation of the WNLA scheme 
in 1903 in order to keep African labour within the protectorate for plantations and railway construction, 
the Governor refused and advised the local employers to provide fair wages and humane working 
conditions to Africans. In 1923, the government went ahead with granting the British Cotton Growing 
Association (BCGA) a monopoly to purchase cotton grown by Africans amid opposition from the 
Chamber and unofficial members of the LEGCO111. In both cases, the government had revenue 
interests112. Similarly, when the NMA proposed stringent measures on credit transactions, trading 
activities and bankruptcy laws - all aimed at disadvantaging Indian traders - the government did not 
oblige113. In short, government went along with business policy proposals only to the extent that the 
                                                             
110  Note that under the 1910 Licensing Ordinance Africans did not need a licence to trade. 
111 Disposal of Native Cotton Crop – Agreement with BCGA, PRO CO 525/120/9; LEGCO Minutes, 16-17 April,1923 PRO 
CO626/6. 
112  According to Pachai (1973:122) WNLA paid the 6d tax to the government for each labourer and recovered it from wages. 
Further, WNLA was paying African labour a higher wage of £2, 5s 0d per month while local employers were paying 3s 
6d per month. Following the Governor‟s response local wages for African labour rose to 7s per month. With regard to 
BCGA government was entitled to 50 per cent of the profits from the sale of cotton. 
113  Petition from European Wholesale Importers against Banyan Trading, LEGCO Minutes, 4-6 May, 1909, PRO CO 626/6. 
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proposals yielded political and financial benefits or, at the very least, did not present a significant 
political or economic cost to it. 
 4.2.4. Big business and the state – on the margins of collusion? 
Besides the pattern of concertation described above, there were closer relations between the 
government and some big corporations. Two important features of these relations were that they were 
largely informal and were tripartite owing to the division of governmental power between the Colonial 
Office in London and the Nyasaland government in Zomba. SBRs at firm level appear to have been 
influenced by the potential or real stakes of the companies in the protectorate and hence their political 
and economic significance to the government. Although the official records suggest that these relations 
were developmentally synergistic, there is room to suspect some collusion. For present purposes, only 
two examples are given, covering relations with the BSAC on land and mineral rights and with the 
Zambezi Mining Development Company (ZMDC) on the rights to prospect for coal114. These two 
examples are chosen only to show the features of informal SBRs and how the deconcentration of 
governmental power could sometimes safeguard the autonomy of the state and prevent capture by 
business interests. The latter point is particularly important as there is quite a considerable amount of 
literature that advocates centralisation of governmental decision-making power for effective SBRs. 
Relations with the BSAC 
The BSAC enjoyed a special relationship with the colonial state partly because of its role as benefactor 
in the formation of the Nyasaland Protectorate. However, after the financing arrangement was severed, 
the relationship continued but evolved from the one of near state capture that had characterised 
Johnston‟s period to an narrower kind of particularistic concertation in which the BSAC interfaced with 
                                                             
114 There are indications of similar state-firm relations with British Central Africa on railways (Vail, 1975); Blantyre Supply 
Company on labour (Chirwa, 1993). 
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the Colonial Office mainly on land and mineral rights. The following case illustrates the general pattern 
of this relationship. 
In the 1930s, the Colonial Office referred a draft bill of the Nyasaland Mining Ordinance to the BSAC for 
consideration and comments. The company made detailed proposals regarding their 2,730,000 acres in 
Nyasaland and suggested amendments to the Ordinance, including a particularistic application of the 
law where government could apply the mining law to the company‟s land “by agreement”115. The 
company further proposed that the “government should receive all purely administrative payments 
made under the law but other revenue, including royalties, should be divided equally between 
government and the company”116. The Colonial Office considered these proposals to be fair but advised 
that they could not act until they heard from the Nyasaland government. The company drafted a 
complete chapter of the Mining Ordinance so as to regulate all matters of land and mining rights on its 
land and asked the Colonial Office to adopt it. After a series of consultations, referrals and 
amendments117, the Deputy Governor of Nyasaland observed “... that the company has made some 
effort to adopt our suggestion that [its] special mining chapter should be cut down so far as the 
provision therein may be said to be of general application,....they are now prepared to agree that the 
general Mining Ordinance should apply to the company‟s areas [with a few exceptions]”118. On 3rd 
September, 1935, the Colonial Office forwarded to the BSAC the Nyasaland Protectorate (Native Trust 
Land) Order in Council and the revised Mining Ordinance with an informal note that said: “Provided 
Nyasaland agree, we are proposing to enact the order in council as soon as may be conveniently 
possible, in the meantime perhaps you will be so good as to look through the draft bill and let us know 
                                                             
115  From secretary of BSAC to SSC, PRO CO 525/120/10. 
116  Ibid. 
117 The depth of concertation is reflected in „Notes of a discussion on the Mining Legislation of Nyasaland held in the 
Colonial Office Conference Room on Thursday, 21st of June 1935 at 3:30pm‟ and in the „Notes of a discussion with 
Representatives of the British South Africa Company regarding the Mining law of Nyasaland held on 25 th June 1935 in 
Mr Calder‟s Room at 3:30pm‟ PRO CO 525/120/10 PRO CO 525/152/13 Folio No.16.  
118  A confidential despatch from Governor of Nyasaland, 11th December 1935, PRO CO 525/159/3, folio no.4. 
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whether you have any further comments. If you now think that it, and the Mineral Rights Order in 
Council are satisfactory, we will write officially to the company and soon, I hope, bring these somewhat 
long outstanding matters to a satisfactory conclusion”119 . 
This example suggests that relations between government and „big business‟ tended to be informal. 
Companies appeared to wield too much power over the state in pushing through their particularistic 
proposals. It is clear from the informal correspondence that decisions were strenuously negotiated, 
which reflects the existence of a technical capacity to negotiate the relevant issues in both the 
government and the companies. It is further clear that division of governmental authority between the 
Colonial Office and the Nyasaland government was critical to the preservation of state autonomy, 
otherwise it is probable that if power were centralised, the company would have been able to somewhat 
easily push through its narrow agendas.  
Relations with ZMDC 
When Sir Alfred Sharpe retired as Governor of Nyasaland, he became the managing director of ZMDC, 
which was based in Mozambique. In October 1923, relying on his status and informal connections 
within the colonial administration, he wrote to the Colonial Office asking them to confirm “whether coal 
had been discovered in Nyasaland” and whether “the Colonial Office and the Nyasaland Government 
were willing to negotiate with the ZMDC” on the development and exploitation of the coalfields. He was 
simply advised to follow the Nyasaland Mining Ordinance of 1906120. In the meantime, another 
corporation based in Nyasaland, the British Central Africa Company (BCAC), applied for rights in the 
coalfields on a royalty basis, and the Nyasaland government “had reason to believe that the BCAC was 
very anxious to obtain the rights”121.  
                                                             
119  From Calder (Colonial Office) to  Hutchinson (BSAC), enclosure in PRO CO 525/151. 
120  Applications for Prospecting and Working Rights for Nyasaland Coalfields, PRO CO525/115/4. 
121 Despatch of 8/01/1924 from Governor of Nyasaland to SSC, PRO CO 525/115/4. 
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 In January 1924, Sir Alfred Sharpe visited Nyasaland to discuss the matter with the Governor. In 1926, 
he met Sir C. Strachey at the Colonial Office to discuss the possibility of a joint application between the 
BCAC and ZMDC. On 29th March 1926, Sir Sharpe wrote a letter to the Governor of Nyasaland that 
indicates what kind of state-firm relations existed. Reference was made to “my interview with you at 
Zomba in April 1924” and “unofficial correspondence which has taken place between yourself and 
myself”.  He went on to say that he had “heard a rumour that a British syndicate  has applied, or has the 
intention of applying for the concession for the investigation and eventually development of the 
Nyasaland Coalfield. If there should be any truth in this report...., if a concession is given, it should be 
to us [i.e. ZMDC and BCAC]”122 . In concluding his letter, Sir Alfred Sharpe exerted pressure on the 
Governor to decide in favour of ZMDC by suggesting that he had already cleared the deal with the SSC 
when he wrote the following: “I am addressing your Excellency direct on this matter in accordance with 
the instructions given by the Colonial Office in their letter to me of the 19 th November, 1923”. Although 
there is no evidence of corrupt exchanges, the informality of the relations reflected in the language 
provides room to suspect that collusive relations existed in which private companies appeared to 
exercise an inordinate amount of power and influence on both the Nyasaland government and the 
Colonial Office. In the case of ZMDC, this pattern of relations can be explained by Alfred Sharpe‟s role 
from being a respected colonial officer and later to a director of a private company with interests in his 
former protectorate. This case shows that the dispersion of power between the Colonial Office and the 
Nyasaland government, each with its own elaborate processes of decision making, was critical for the 
preservation of the autonomy of the state from powerful capitalist interests.  
                                                             
122 From Sharpe to Governor Bowring of Nyasaland, enclosed in Despatch of 8/01/1924 from Governor Nyasaland to 
Colonial Secretary, PRO CO 525/115/4). 
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4.3. Institutional change in SBRs, 1955 to 1963 – the primacy of the reconfiguration of political 
power  
The nationalist political process, especially from the 1940s, and the introduction of the Central African 
Federation (CAF) in 1953 opened up political and economic spaces for Africans and began to affect the 
configuration of power in SBRs. The introduction of the CAF diminished the policy-making importance of 
the protectorate government on commercial and industrial matters, which were lost to the federal 
government. Thus, the European commercial and agricultural interests repositioned themselves to 
interface with the federal government. Secondly, reforms in political representation further weakened the 
position of the business community. Of particular importance was the introduction of direct popular 
elections of European LEGCO representatives, which reduced the political relevance of business 
associations since they lost the status of being electoral colleges, and government looked elsewhere for 
its legitimacy. Furthermore, the withdrawal of European concerns from wholesale and retail trade, 
especially between 1948 and 1958, further weakened the political and economic importance of the 
Chamber123. The inclusion of Africans and Indians in the LEGCO meant that it was no longer a forum for 
sanctioning European particularism in the economy. The five Africans that joined the LEGCO in 1956 
“took upon themselves the role of a fully fledged opposition and immediately began to harass the 
government with hostile questions, criticism and denunciation of federal arrangements” (Pike, 
1968:138). Thus, both agency and structural elements that had consolidated particularistic concertation 
began to weaken. 
Besides weakening SBR institutions, the CAF further “created a hot-house in which African nationalist 
aspirations flourished” (Pike, 1968:122). In 1960, a new constitution sanctioned the imperial policy of 
cooperation with African nationalists, abandoned the identification of LEGCO seats as „African‟ and 
„non-African‟ and  provided for a LEGCO with 28 elected unofficial representatives,  three ex-officios and 
                                                             
123 An economic survey conducted in 1958-59 found that European withdrawal was because of two reasons: intense 
competition from Indian traders and unreliable and costly employment of African storekeepers (Nyasaland Protectorate, 
1960: 45). On the growth of the Indian trading community, see Power (1993). 
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two nominated members of the EXCO (Pike, 1968; Kadzamira, 1973; Pachai, 1973). Essentially, the 
constitutional changes resuscitated and reaffirmed the principle of „colonial trusteeship‟, which espoused 
that political power would eventually be devolved to the indigenous peoples of colonised territories when 
they were politically ready to take over and that where conflict occurred between settler and native 
interests, the latter would prevail124.  
The electoral results of 1961 augmented the power of nationalists in the LEGCO and EXCO and 
significantly changed the political landscape of the country. Of the 28 seats in the LEGCO, the 
nationalist party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), won 25 (Mair, 1962). A ministerial system of 
government was introduced, and between 1961 and 1962, the number of MCP ministers in an EXCO of 
10 increased from five to seven125. This reconfiguration of political power resulted in African nationalists 
displacing white colonists in the LEGCO and EXCO and provided an opportunity to pursue African 
political objectives. In fact, the period between 1961 and the attainment of political independence in 
1964 was a period of transition in which political processes remoulded the patterns of state-society 
relations and policy-making processes. SBRs, having been core components of both aspects, could not 
escape change. By 1964, a new pattern of SBRs had evolved to such a degree that the attainment of 
political independence was less, if anything, of a critical juncture in the institutional development of 
SBRs. Although the period 1961-64 was formally part of the colonial era, the African political elites, led 
by Kamuzu Banda, were effectively in charge of the government. They wasted no time in using their 
newly found political power to begin redressing the racially inspired political, social and economic 
                                                             
124 The principle has a long history, but its clearest statements are to be found in Lugard (1926/1966), The Hilton Young 
Commission Report (1929), and The Passifield Memorandum (1930). 
125 One of them, Cameron, was white and an independent member of the LEGCO. The United Federal Party, which 
represented settler interests, gave up its claim for EXCO seats. See Baker (2001,ch.3) for an appreciation of the 
negotiations that led to this configuration. 
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wrongs perpetrated by colonial particularism and to laying a foundation for long-term economic 
development126. The following institutional and policy changes were crucial in restructuring SBRs. 
Firstly, policy making became centralised in Kamuzu Banda despite a nominal dispersion of power 
through the ministerial organisation of government. He became “personally and solely responsible for 
MCP policy and the policy to be adopted by his ministers in government” (Baker, 2001:39). He is on 
record to have said, “If they [i.e. ministers and the party] do not like it, they can either lump it or sack me 
but I have made it quite plain right from the start that I impose my own policy...” (ibid). This was further 
bolstered by a preference for informal ways of formulating policy. Banda admitted “in writing and 
verbally that he will do as much business as possible by means of informal discussions... leaving the 
minimum of essential stuff to formal meetings of the Executive Council”127. This pattern of informal, 
largely private and personalised policy-making increased the influence of Banda, reduced the 
importance of legitimate state institutions responsible for policy formulation and had a significant effect 
in shaping SBRs in the post-independence period, as will be seen in the next chapter. 
Secondly, Banda and the MCP did not like the fact that commerce and business “was a monopoly for 
people of other races, Europeans, Asians...”128, and it was their intention that “Africans should enter 
commerce ... but our people have no means of entering commerce easily because they have no money, 
they have no capital to start business and the banks will not easily give them credit”129. This diagnosis 
led to interventions that introduced a pattern of particularism in favour of African businessmen. The 
earliest change came in October 1961, three months after the election. At an informal meeting in 
Lilongwe, Banda told African businessmen that he would allow them to enter the transport business and 
share in the business of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Board (APMB) as transporters. His 
condition was that the businessmen should come together to form an organisation with which the APMB 
                                                             
126   See Nyasaland Government, Development Plan 1962-65. 
127  Governor Jones to SSC Macleod, 4 October 1961, CO 1050 2491 (cited in Baker, 2001:40). 
128  Kamuzu Banda, speech to businessmen, 4th September, 1971(MNA). 
129  Ibid. 
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and the government could deal. Consequently, the Malawi Road Transporters Association (MARTA) 
was formed130. On Banda‟s orders, the APMB apportioned 45 per cent of its transporting business to 
MARTA in its first year and 60 per cent in the second year. By 1964, the APMB had stopped doing 
business with European and Indian transporters, and the entire business was given to MARTA131. In the 
same period, Banda ordered a review of the Business Licensing Ordinance and assigned his economic 
lieutenant, Dunduzu Chisiza, to lead the process132. The object was to open up spaces for Africans to 
enter the commercial life of the country. Similarly, opening up the farming of estate crops that had been 
exclusive to Europeans, especially tea and flue-cured tobacco, was top on the policy agenda. After the 
elections, an African delegation was sent to study the smallholders‟ tea scheme in Kenya. Banda used 
their report to negotiate with the exclusively white Nyasaland Tea Association “to let our Africans grow 
their tea near established factories so that they can take their leaf to the factories already built and 
functioning...our smallholders will be your juniors... and [as such] we expect you to give them 
encouragement”133. The Tea Association began supporting the smallholder scheme from 1962134. In 
1963, Banda pushed through the Special Crops legislation, which opened up the growing of cash crops 
to Africans135. 
Thirdly, the paucity of credit for African entrepreneurs and the need to mobilise resources for economic 
development increased the role of the government in the economy. The APMB, founded in 1952 by 
combining several crop-specific marketing and regulatory boards, provided the only viable vehicle that 
could be used to mobilise capital. In 1962, African representatives in the LEGCO pushed the Farmers 
Marketing Ordinance to reform the APMB and address the grievances of the colonial agricultural 
                                                             
130  Originally established as Nyasaland African Transporters Association, it became MARTA in 1964. 
131  Ibid., Interview with Mr Sindo, Mapanga Blantyre, 27 July 2009.  
132 Chisiza was a champion of Africanisation, but he died in 1962 in a car accident (See Power,1993; Baker,2001). For the 
activities of the Licensing committee see „Working Party on business Licensing‟ File No. BL 44 Folio 10, MNA. 
133  Kamuzu Banda, speech to the Tea Association, 11th February 1967. 
134  See Pachai (1973) and Palmer (1985) for the development of the Tea Industry in Malawi. 
135  Special Crops Act No.27 of 1963; Government Notices 212 and 213 of 1963. 
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economy. The APMB became the Famers Marketing Board (FMB), acquired African Board members, 
with a chairman exercising executive powers, and its activities included participation in business 
ventures (Ng‟ong‟ola, 1986:256). By 1964, the government had adopted a policy of creating big state 
companies to assist any public or private organisation with capital, credit or other resources in the 
execution of any projects, schemes or enterprises relating to the development or improvement of the 
economy of the country136. At the same time, the government adopted a policy of “surfeiting the 
executive arm of government with unbounded discretion in the management of the agricultural economy 
and encouraged the sole crop marketing authority, [the FMB], to participate in business ventures and 
other developmental activities” (Ng‟ong‟ola, 1986:256). 
It is important to note that these changes were politically inspired and were only possible because of the 
changes in the institutional configuration of political power. The politics of transition to independence 
caused institutional changes in the structure and practice of colonial SBRs. By July 1964, when colonial 
rule formally ended, a path of state hegemony in the economy had been set. In the post-independence 
period, this factor and the political hegemony of the MCP characterised state-society relations and 
profoundly shaped SBRs. 
Conclusion  
The analysis of colonial SBRs generates insights that are of interest to the broader theoretical objectives 
of the thesis. For institutional theory, these relate to how history and politics matter for the processes of 
institutional formation, maintenance and change; the role of politics in shaping institutional paths; and 
how the notion of critical junctures relates to institutional change. With regard to SBR theory, the 
analysis suggests the primacy of national political architecture in moulding how the business sector 
organises itself vis-a-vis the state, the primacy of the political and financial significance of the business 
                                                             
136  Kamuzu Banda, speech to businessmen, 4th September, 1971 (MNA). 
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community to the objectives of the government, and how political processes and patterns of elite 
configuration shape the dynamics of PPD. 
The primacy of politics 
The provenance and institutional development of SBRs in colonial Malawi illustrates the primacy of 
inter-elite politics in shaping the patterns and content of these relations. Colonial SBRs were so at the 
core of state-society relations that the formation and evolution of SBR institutions was intertwined with 
the formation and consolidation of state institutions. The conflation of these processes created a 
scenario in which state and business elites made implicit and explicit political demands on each other in 
order to further their respective interests. Consequently, the institutional and organisational patterns of 
SBRs were products of negotiations and bargaining and could be described as evolving and repeated 
„political settlements‟ between government and business elites. For instance, business demands for 
direct political representation shaped the LEGCO into a forum for SBRs while the demand of the 
government to deal with one „public body‟ in policy dialogue helped to create and sustain a peak 
business association despite the diversity of interests within the European business community. 
However, the politics of concertation thrived on the mutual dependence of the parties in order to 
address their political needs. The state elites needed the support and cooperation of the business 
community to legitimise the government and its policies. The Governor‟s speech in the first LEGCO 
session in 1908 signalled this need, which continued to manifest itself in the different ways through 
which concertation took place. On the other hand, the business community needed the state to provide 
civil authority to stave off European competitors for territory and regulate economic relations within the 
territory. The politics of nominating business representatives to the LEGCO and the asymmetry of voting 
power in the LEGCO illustrate how elites sought to acquire and preserve political power that they could 
use in furtherance of their interests.  
Economic (Financial) dependence of the state on the business sector 
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The foregoing narrative of colonial SBRs suggests that the extent to which the government depends on 
the business sector determines whether the government has political and economic reasons 
(incentives) to regard the business sector as a policy partner. During Johnston‟s period, the government 
relied on an external source of funding and regarded the European commercial and agricultural 
community with a considerable level of hostility. Neither did Johnston seek to create legitimacy for the 
state, as he solely relied on the legal powers provided in the 1889 Order in Council. The government 
was, however, faced with a „resource imperative‟ after external funding was withdrawn. This increased 
government‟s recognition of the local business community as a source of revenue for the administration. 
Consequently, the business community was accorded a greater role in economic policy making, and a 
relationship based on reciprocity developed. For example, the conflation of labour and taxation policies 
from the early 1900s signifies that the state increasingly relied on the business community to help raise 
revenue. Thus the analysis provides further evidence for the proposition from fiscal sociology that the 
social, economic and political evolution of societies is, in part, driven by the ways in which states tackle 
the challenges of raising revenues and managing spending (Schumpeter, 1918/1991; Campbell, 1993; 
Moore, 2004). Sources of revenue for the colonial state precluded the rise of synergistic SBRs in 
Johnston‟s time and later shaped the depth and breadth of concertation and impacted on the patterns of 
state formation. It further illustrates that synergistic SBRs are likely to endure when they deliver valuable 
benefits to the contracting parties, especially the state. 
Organisation of the business sector in relation to the state 
According to theories of collective action (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; Axelrod, 1984), the kind of 
concertation that characterised colonial SBRs is possible only with a highly mobilised business 
community that can present itself as a united political constituency. Indeed, this was the optimistic 
intention expressed in the 1890s by planters and commercialists when they founded the Chamber of 
Commerce and Agriculture. But the diversity of interests within the colonial business community was 
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deep-seated, and finding unity among themselves was difficult. While such fragmented private sectors 
have been cited by governments as an excuse for avoiding policy dialogue with the business community 
(Handley, 2008; Taylor, 2007), the protectorate government persuaded the business community to find 
unity in diversity by requiring that access to policy dialogue would be through a peak association. The 
government‟s need to avoid a pluralised institutional environment for policy dialogue pulled the different 
factions of the European business community together into peak associations, namely, the Associated 
Chamber in 1907 and  the NCA in 1928.  
The cases of the NPA and the NMA illustrate that access to the government for policy dialogue may be 
the single most important selective benefit that voluntary business associations can offer their members. 
Between 1903 and 1907, the NPA survived because it received support from, and access to, the 
government. When planters withdrew their affiliation from the Chamber in 1925, their revived NPA was 
denied policy space until 1928, when the NCA was founded at the insistence of government. Similarly, 
the NMA struggled to find an independent foothold between 1925 and 1928 largely because 
government denied it access to policy dialogue until it rejoined the Chamber in 1928. The Chamber itself 
was refused access to the state when it pulled out of the NCA in the early 1950s and was about to rejoin 
the NCA when the CAF was introduced and changed the incentives for rejoining the NCA. This 
suggests that the organisational patterns of the business community for the purpose of policy dialogue 
with the government may be dependent on the government‟s tolerance for a plurality of voices from the 
sector. It further suggests that the state can sometimes compel internally fragmented business elites to 
transcend their sectoral divisions and develop a pan-business consciousness and political competence 
necessary for providing policy inputs. At other times, it suits the state to maintain a fragmented business 
sector, as did the colonial government when Governor Sharpe sanctioned the reformation of the NPA in 
1903 and granted it access to policy dialogue until 1907. 
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Besides the quest for a non-pluralised institutional environment, the government‟s attitude to business 
associations further illustrates that the representativeness of the associations was an important 
consideration in granting space for policy dialogue to their representatives and for the form that the 
engagement would take. The main considerations were the number of subsectors of the economy that 
the association represented and the number of eligible members that actually subscribed to the 
association.  For instance, the NMA was deemed less representative. In 1925 it had only eleven signed-
up members137, its cause was championed mostly by seven wholesale importers138, and the market 
share of its members was decreasing due to competition from Indians (Power, 1993). For the NPA, the 
government was torn between its need for a single united front for the business community and the 
importance of the planting community to the economy. Thus, it allowed an exchange of correspondence 
with the NPA and considered its written representations but refused it the right of representation to the 
LEGCO and regular face-to- face policy dialogue, which was reserved for the Chamber until the 
formation of the NCA. 
The formation of sectoral business associations at the request of the government provides further 
evidence of the ability of the government to shape the organisation of the business sector, especially in 
sectors that it deems economically important to the economy. This is exemplified by the formation of the 
Nyasaland Tobacco Association and the Nyasaland Tea Association. This fact reinforces a recent 
proposition made in the context of India that „developmental‟ business associations emerge and acquire 
their capacity as a result of active state support (Sinha,2005), often in „hand-in- hand‟ rather than „arms-
length‟ relations (Moore and Schmidtz,2008).  
Political architecture and the autonomy of the State vis-a-vis business 
                                                             
137  NMA Minutes, 12 January 1925, MNA NY 6/1/1. 
138  Petition of Principal European Wholesale Importers of Nyasaland, PRO CO 625/6. 
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The formal political institutional architecture of the state shapes institutional trajectories of SBRs by 
defining how the political process should work. For instance, the centralisation of legislative and other 
governmental power in the Commissioner under the 1889 Order in Council was partly responsible for 
the lack of synergy between Johnston‟s government and the business community. Institutionalised 
SBRs only evolved when the 1907 Order in Council came into force and deconcentrated the power of 
the Governor. The creation of the LEGCO and the principle that legislation would be legitimate only if 
enacted with the advice and consent of the LEGCO opened up spaces for business representation. 
Although subsequent SBRs were close and the business community had considerable influence over 
policies, the government preserved its autonomy. This was possible because the dispersion of decision-
making authority between the Colonial Office and the protectorate government and the use of the 
LEGCO and EXCO provided a set of checks and balances that effectively protected the state from 
capture by powerful capitalist interests. While multiple points of contact between the state and business 
are known to engender collusion (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989; Kang, 2002), they appear here to have 
been responsible for the preservation of state autonomy and avoidance of collusion. This was 
particularly true of state-firm relations with the BSAC and ZMDC, which tended to be quite informal and 
provided more room for particularism. This finding suggests that decentralisation of decision-making 
authority over economic policy does not precipitate state capture or other forms of collusion so long as 
there exists a functioning mechanism for coordinating the decisions that are made and for achieving 
policy coherence and consistency without inhibiting the enterprise of private capital. 
Social cleavages in the reconfiguration of power 
Colonial social cleavages were defined primarily by racial thinking. Particularistic orientations in SBRs 
(e.g. marginalisation of Indians and Africans from PPD) stemmed from a concentration of both political 
and economic power in the European community. It is apparent that the politics of racial identities had a 
significant influence on the perpetuation of Europeandom in SBRs. However, the reconfiguration of 
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political power in the early 1960s meant that racial identities became a means of separating economic 
and political elites in that while economic power lay with Europeans and Indians, Africans wielded 
political power. This incongruity resulted in differences in the logic and mode of social organisation and 
in the understanding of each other‟s economic and political interests. The institutional changes 
introduced by Kamuzu Banda during the transition to independence exemplify this point. Of particular 
importance were the rolling back of policy space for the business sector and the creation of MARTA for 
the purpose of beginning to Africanise the sector. These changes illustrate the proposition that “how 
business looks and behaves depends in large part on the state” (Handley, 2008:3). It provides additional 
evidence that where parochial identities such as race or ethnicity are pronounced in identifying political 
and economic elites, reconfiguration of political power may be a stimulus for institutional change in 
SBRs139. This is the case because such reconfiguration often accompanies changes in the ideology and 
politico-economic objectives of the political elites that affect the purposes of SBRs. 
The role of history and timing 
The analysis of colonial SBRs demonstrates the importance of a historical institutionalist approach in 
several ways but also casts doubt on the validity of some of its concepts, especially the notion of critical 
junctures. Firstly, it is clear that power asymmetries between the business and the state are central to 
explaining the pattern and the outcomes of SBRs. However, the narrative suggests that the distribution 
of power between elite clusters is rooted in the historical context of inter-elite engagements. For our 
case, these date back to the processes of state formation. 
Secondly, the analysis demonstrates that it matters whether it is business or the state that emerges and 
develops political capacity first. In this case, not only did the business sector acquire that capacity 
earlier, it also led the early processes of state formation. In later years, being „the oldest public body in 
                                                             
139  Studies that have made similar observations in African SBRs include Lucas (1994) and Meisenhelder (1997). 
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Nyasaland‟140 afforded the Chamber political clout that enabled it to sustain concertation with the 
government. This finding provides further evidence for the proposition that synergetic state-business 
coalitions emerge when the organisational strength of the business sector is high and the state lacks 
useful policy information and technical capacity (Taylor, 2007). 
Thirdly, the narrative shows that history matters in explaining institutional change because of the 
relevance of predecessor institutions in informing the design of new ones. This is reflected in the 
negotiations on changing the rules for selecting members of the LEGCO. Furthermore, to explain fully 
the institutional and organisational patterns of SBRs instituted after 1897 and those introduced between 
1961 and 1964, one needs an empathetic historical understanding of the nature and functioning of the 
institutions that had hitherto existed, especially how they shaped the political and economic objectives of 
elites. The African political consciousness and activism that ultimately caused institutional changes in 
SBRs arose from the historically embedded particularism of state-society relations that elevated 
Europeans and oppressed Africans. 
Finally, the institutional development of colonial SBRs shows that the notion of critical junctures has an 
intuitive appeal for thinking about institutional formation and change. However, it raises questions about 
precisely what factors are necessary to designate any moment of institutional change as a juncture and 
what would determine the criticality of the juncture? Institutionalist literature has emphasised the 
contingency of events that create a moment of change and installation of institutions that are new in 
outlook and effects as definitive features of junctures. The junctures are deemed to be critical only at a 
later point in time when the effects of the new institutions confirm that things are no longer the same 
(Hogan, 2006; Abbot, 1983; Collier and Collier, 2002). However, the narrative above shows that old 
institutions rarely break down; neither do new ones emerge spontaneously. Institutional development 
was a negotiated incremental process in which the interests of government and business elites were 
                                                             
140  The Chamber often described itself in these words when making a representation to the government. 
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often compromised into political settlements so that the new rule of the game was only a slight 
modification of the old one. There were no complete departures from the past as is suggested in some 
conceptions of critical junctures based on the notion of „punctuated equilibrium‟. The analysis suggests 
that rather than determining the criticality of such moments by the effects of the new institution, it is 
stakeholders‟ expectations of real institutional change that should be of prime importance in determining 
the criticality of the moment. For instance, 1907 was a critical juncture for SBRs because the Order in 
Council prescribed a political institutional architecture that generated expectations about how the 
business community and the government would formally engage with each other. Similarly, the 1961 
election represented a critical juncture in that the reconfiguration of political power resulted in 
expectations of change in some rules governing the business sector. For instance, it was expected that 
Africans would be allowed to take part in what had been prohibited business activities such as haulage. 
The expectations may or may not be fulfilled. 
The foregoing theoretical observations are true for the colonial epoch and are only preliminary in so far 
as the theoretical objectives of this thesis are concerned – I will take them up further in the final chapter. 
The next chapter analyses the development of post colonial SBRs to identify continuities and 
discontinuities and to discern what they suggest for SBR and institutional theories. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Neo-Patrimonial State Hegemony: Post-colonial State-Business Relations and the Politics of 
Building the Nation and the Party 
“To me, two passengers – one by the name of „Business‟ and the other by the name of „Politics‟ 
[may be allowed] to travel by the same train when I can‟t help it...but I see to it that they do not 
travel in the same compartment...”1  
“This [country] is not a hunting ground for crooks. I am going to see to it [that] honest 
businessmen...have nothing to fear from me. But sharks, crooks, I will make this country 
Gehenna for them.”2 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses state-business relations in the one-party era (1964-1993).  It shows that  the 
analysis of SBRs for this period, like that of the colonial era, is  as much about the formation of 
institutions governing these relations as it is about the nature of the relations within the evolving 
institutional arrangements. The shift of power from the British to African nationalists, and the attendant 
political processes, consolidated a new approach to politics and the economy that Dr. Banda had 
begun forming in 1962. The result was a pattern of SBRs that was markedly distinct from particularistic 
concertation that had characterised the colonial epoch. I describe the new pattern as neo-patrimonial 
state hegemony. This was a system of governance in which political power was concentrated in the 
president, who wielded sweeping executive authority across public and private  domains and was 
revered as infallible; the bureaucracy was deprived of policy autonomy, and  business associations 
were politically weakened and subordinated to the party; the policy and institution-making processes 
were more by presidential directives than consultation; the state, through its companies, dominated the 
business sector and, in relative terms, reduced the economic and political significance of non-state 
private enterprise; and the state‟s strictly enforced business regulatory regime  virtually replaced the 
                                                             
1 Kamuzu Banda, 11th February 1967, speech to the Tea Association, MNA 1967 pam 1,27. 
2 Kamuzu Banda, 8 October, 1968, speech - State Opening of Parliament, MNA 1968 pam 1,127. Gehenna is a biblical term 
which in Malawi is understood to mean „hell‟. 
 136 
 
 
discipline of  the market. All these features were essentially binary opposites of the SBR institutional 
matrix of the colonial era.  
The analysis shows how a confluence of history, the role of the state in the economy, politics and 
political institutional architecture shaped the institutional evolution of SBRs. The argument has three 
main strands. Firstly, the institutional and organisational pattern of SBRs during this period was shaped 
by a political institutional architecture that concentrated power in the president. Secondly, the role of the 
state in the economy, in a context of low levels of capitalist development, led to a mingling of business 
and politics in which business was subordinated to politics. Thirdly, the private business sector had so 
low economic/financial and political utility to the state that the state did not have much incentive to 
deepen policy dialogue with it. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 provides the contextual background that underpinned 
the rise of neo-patrimonial state hegemony.  Section 5.2 traces the institutionalisation of neo-
patrimonial state hegemony vis-a-vis SBRs. Section 5.3 discusses the dynamics and effects of neo-
patrimonial state hegemony on SBRs, focusing on the business activities of the state and the regulatory 
framework for business enterprises. Section 5.4 focuses on the politics of indigenising commerce and 
industry, and section 5.4 shows how democratisation processes in the 1990s opened up the way for 
some elements in the business community to champion macro-level political change that ultimately 
undermined the economic and political hegemony of the state. The conclusion makes a preliminary 
case of what insights the narrative of post-colonial SBRs generates for institutional and SBR theories. 
5.1. Background:  socio-economic profile and business fragmentation at independence  
Nationalist political activities culminated in the attainment of independence on 6th July 1964. The 
country was renamed Malawi. Kamuzu Banda, the Prime Minister since 1963, became the President in 
1966 when Malawi became a republic. In the same year, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) became 
the only lawful political party, and the country became a one-party state with Banda as Life President of 
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the party and later of the Republic too3. Banda‟s regime created a political system that was anything but 
democratic and has been aptly described as „a hard state‟ (Mhone, 1987), a „hortatory regime‟ (Joffe, 
1973), despotism (Short, 1974; Ihonvbere, 1997) and a dictatorship (Baker, 2001; Phiri and Ross, 
1998). The overarching goal of the regime was „to build the nation and the party‟. Under this theme, a 
set of guiding principles for the politics and the economics of the country were formulated and pursued 
in ways that fundamentally impacted on the institutional evolution of SBRs. 
At independence, the Malawi economy was dominated by subsistence agriculture and exportation of 
labour to South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). 
Plantation agriculture, mainly tea and tobacco, on European-owned estates formed the mainstay of the 
export sector, providing about 40 per cent of export merchandise. Agriculture accounted for 55 per cent 
of GDP and 90 per cent of employment4. There was no significant mining industry. GNP per capita was 
about $60, half of which was attributed to smallholder agriculture and the other half to about 100,000 
people in wage employment, mainly on estates and in government service. The 5,000 estimated 
hospital beds were enough for less than 12 per cent of the population. The seven-year primary 
education catered for less than half of the relevant age group. Total secondary school enrolment was 
estimated at 4,000, which represented only one per cent of the eligible population, while tertiary 
education was available for fewer than 1000 students. Only 33 Malawians had some level of university 
education5. In the business sector, manufacturing and transport were dominated by Europeans while 
commerce, except banking, was dominated by Indians. For example, Joffe (1973:135) has shown that 
Asian establishments accounted for 90 per cent of retail trade but represented only 15 per cent of 
licensed retail outlets while African retailers owned 82 per cent of licensed retail establishments. 
                                                             
3 See Williams (1978) chapter 7, Short (1974) chapter 12 and Baker (2001) on the emergence of a one-party state. 
4 Figures are from Harrigan (2001:12).  
5 Figures from GoM (Government of Malawi) (1987) and National Statistics Office (NSO) (1984). 
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Overall, however, according to Short (1974:276), 90 per cent of small scale commerce was Asian 
owned. 
Against this background, and very much in line with the prescriptive analysis by Gerschenkron (1962) 
on the role of the state in late development, the government believed that its main task was to promote 
and control development. A common observation was that “the colonial government neglected to 
develop our country... now that we the Africans are in power, we have to develop the country 
ourselves”6. A war against economic unviability, poverty, ignorance and disease was declared. Four 
fronts for prosecuting the war were identified, including the „business front‟7. Thus, in contrast to the 
colonial state, the new government took a „hands-on‟ approach in the business sector by creating its 
own companies in order to spur economic development and achieve financial independence from the 
British government. A restrictive business regulatory framework evolved and aimed at cushioning the 
masses against the excesses of capitalist entrepreneurship and constraining the emergence of 
alternative centres of political power. The regime further believed that social and economic progress 
could be induced by exhortation of the people to take up economic roles that were politically 
determined by the leadership. Particular emphasis was on strategies for the indigenisation of commerce 
and industry. These dirigiste principles aimed at launching a developmental path that would 
simultaneously correct the economic and political wrongs perpetrated by colonialism.  
In 1964, the business sector was fragmented in its organisation vis-a-vis the state. In addition to the 
Associated Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Indian Chamber of Commerce that persisted 
from the period before 1961, there were the Asian Chamber of Commerce and the African Chamber of 
                                                             
6 Kamuzu Banda, State Opening of Parliament, 8 October 1968 p.3.; speech at the opening of Malawi Distilleries, 24  
February 1967, p. 8. 
7 The other fronts were agriculture, labour measures and tourism. See Banda‟s speeches to the MCP Convention, 1967, and 
to Parliament on 9th March, 1971. 
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Commerce and Industry8. Despite attempts by the Chairman of the „European‟ Chamber (J.V. Raines) 
to form a nationwide non-racial chamber in 19659, the African and the Asian chambers continued to 
exist as independent entities until about 1968. However, the political desire to Africanise the business 
sector, especially commerce, led the government to support the creation of a peak business 
association for Africans in 1969 – the African Businessmen Association of Malawi (ABAM)10. ABAM 
existed alongside the Chamber and had some shared African membership although the majority of 
African businessmen belonged to ABAM only. But unlike the Chamber, whose role in policy became 
derivative, peripheral and manipulated, ABAM enjoyed considerable access to government bureaucrats 
and politicians, including the president. Like several other African associations permitted during this 
period, ABAM was an affiliated member of the MCP, and its executive committee members were 
delegates to the MCP convention, which was designated as the highest policy-making body of the 
country. The political relationship between ABAM and the party (hence, the government) enhanced the 
legitimacy of the party among Africans by yielding policies for promoting African commercial enterprise, 
sometimes by using political power to discriminate against Indian and European commerce. There was 
a strong belief that it was politically necessary to develop an indigenous business class.  
5.2.  Nation building and the institutionalisation of neo-patrimonial state hegemony 
5.2.1.  The meaning of national building and Kamuzu Banda‟s monopoly of policy voice  
In the context of the deep and widespread poverty that was prevalent at the time of independence, and 
in the aftermath of the infamous cabinet crisis,11 the MCP government adopted „building the nation and 
                                                             
8  Secretary for Trade and Commerce to the various Chambers, 22 February, 1964, File No. JLI, folio No. 30 (MNA). Folio 
26 shows that there also existed briefly The Nyasaland Central Province Chamber of Commerce, which was dissolved in 
1963. Except for the Asian Chamber which was based in Lilongwe, the rest were based in Blantyre.  
9  „The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Malawi – A Thriving Organisation‟, Daily Times, 13 September 1978, p.1. 
10 Except for Joffe (1973) and Dinwiddy (1974), who mention ABAM in passing, I have come across no any other published 
scholarly work on the political economy of Malawi that mentions ABAM. For this reason, I devote some space in this 
chapter to show its relationship with the state establishment.  
11  Hansard ,September, 1964, but for an account of the crisis, see Baker (2001). 
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the party‟ as its overarching goal12. It meant “building the nation and the party politically, economically, 
morally and spiritually”13. It was argued that “no people [could] call themselves a nation or an 
independent nation, when they [had] no political stability in their country; ... no economic viability...; no 
moral principles and [did] not observe the spiritual side of their life”.14 To achieve and maintain political 
stability, the „four cornerstones‟ of the MCP, namely Unity, Loyalty, Obedience and Discipline, were 
emphasised15 and enforced in ways that consolidated the personal power of Kamuzu Banda in 
everything and undermined any need for policy dialogue with any other stakeholders. The MCP 
projected itself as the „supreme‟ political body in the country and declared that no member, high or low, 
was above it16. In effect, the power of the MCP transcended its membership and subordinated every 
person and organisation. This was a direct result of the institutional fusion between the party and the 
government. 
In a scheme typical of patrimonialism (Weber, 1968) or personal rule (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984; 
Sandbrook, 1985), Kamuzu Banda was designated as “the supreme leader and symbol of the 
supremacy of the party” who had to be “respected, honoured and revered by every member of the party 
... [and the members were] expected to conduct themselves in a courteous and respectful manner in 
his presence”17. By 1965, some overzealous politicians began deifying Kamuzu. It was argued that 
there was no need for any kind of opposition to Kamuzu on any matter by anyone: “There is no 
opposition in heaven. God himself does not want opposition – that is why he chased Satan away. Why 
should Kamuzu have opposition?”18 A behavioural pattern of hero-worship began to evolve in which 
                                                             
12  From 1965 until the early 1990s, this was the theme of the MCP annual conventions. 
13  Kamuzu Banda, opening speech to the MCP Convention, 1st September 1969:2. My concern here is with the political and 
economic aspects of this agenda.  
14  Ibid. 
15  Provided in section 2 of the MCP Constitution. 
16  Preamble to MCP Regulations (1965). 
17  MCP (1965) Regulation No.15. 
18  A.W. Chipungu, Deputy Minister for Health, Malawi News, 20th December 1964 – cited by Short (1974:258). 
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Kamuzu was presented as an all-knowing and benevolent leader. John Tembo, the one-party state‟s 
henchman, reinforced the development of Banda‟s personality cult when he said in 1965,  
There is no question that we have the best leadership we can ever expect to get ... What must we 
do? ... We must be dedicated to duty, we must be loyal and we must be obedient, because all the 
plans which [Kamuzu Banda] has for us... cannot come true if we the followers and our people do 
not help him to realise [them]. There is no [any other] way for us; we cannot offer money, we 
cannot offer our brains. All we can do is offer our dedication...”19 
 
Banda was therefore designated as „father of the nation‟.  All development plans and successes were 
seen as his acts of selfless benevolence. He was depicted as being in charge of all the financial and 
intellectual resources necessary for development. In this formulation, state-led development was itself 
political patronage. By the end of 1965, the MCP convention had “whole heartedly and willingly” 
endorsed “the proposal to establish...a strong and stable government under a one-party state and to 
have a President who shall be both Head of State and Head of Government and shall have no vice 
President or Prime Minister”20. Thus, straddling the positions of head of state, government and party, 
Kamuzu Banda enjoyed a “highly centralised and overpowering presidency” (Diamond, 2008:138) in 
which virtually every aspect of national policy depended on his personality and ideology. Delegates to 
the 1965 MCP Convention pledged (on behalf of all Malawians) “to abide by the ideals and principles of 
Kamuzu Banda”21.  
However, the foregoing resolutions were only formal endorsements of a personal monopoly of power 
that began soon after the 1961 elections. Kamuzu was unambiguously clear about his policy-making 
position before 1965. As early as 1963, he boasted about it to potential investors: “Anything I say is law. 
Literally law. It is a fact in this country”22. Thus, the personalisation of the policy terrain that he had 
initiated in 1962 (see chapter 4) found its full legitimate expression in the resolutions of the 1965 MCP 
                                                             
19  Hansard, 15th July, Third Session, First Meeting 1965, p.81. 
20  Resolution No.9, MCP Convention 1965 (MCP 1980:2). 
21  Resolution No.7, MCP Convention 1965 (MCP,1980:2). 
22  Kamuzu Banda, speech at a dinner hosted for Lonrho Executives, 8 November, 1963. 
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Convention and the provisions of the 1966 one-party republican constitution. It was common practice for 
Banda to make spontaneous policy announcements at political rallies throughout his presidency. 
Because of this, ministers and senior government officials were of necessity required to attend most 
public meetings addressed by the President in case there were policy announcements for their 
respective portfolios.23 His personal rule, anchored by the political institutional architecture (see below), 
came close to Weber‟s (1968) sultanism as paraphrased by Sandbrook (1985:89-90): a strongman who 
occupied the centre of political life – the centrifugal force around which all else revolved. He ruled on the 
basis of material incentives and personal control of the state machinery and demanded veneration and 
obedience. But how did this cult of personality, which fundamentally impacted on SBRs, evolve? 
5.2.2. Political institutional architecture and policy dialogue with the business community 
The political institutional architecture of the one-party state, i.e. the totality of the basic political rules 
that determined how political power was configured and how state authority was discharged, removed 
any policy spaces for Non-State Actors (NSA) where they could engage with government in a genuine 
contestation of policy. Formal and transparent Public-Private Dialogue (PPD), which had characterised 
most of the colonial era, was deinstitutionalised as policy-making became the personal terrain of 
Kamuzu Banda. This practice was sustained by a framework of four cornerstones – unity, loyalty, 
obedience and discipline – that constituted the operating philosophy of the party and the state. Within 
this framework, a policy opinion different from that contemplated and announced by the President was 
regarded as a manifestation of conflict or dissent and a threat to the political stability that was extolled 
as necessary for economic development. Nominally, the annual party convention was the forum for 
policy formulation. In effect, it was nothing less than tokenistic as participants merely provided 
affirmative comments and endorsed policy announcements. Except for the voices of a few European 
                                                             
23  Interview, Dr.Justin Malewezi, Permanent Secretary and later SPC during the MCP era. 
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settlers who Kamuzu Banda nominated to Parliament as a „responsible opposition‟, freedom of thought 
and speech on policy matters was severely curtailed.  
Quest for unity and stability 
In the project of building the nation and the party, the predominant intentions were to preserve a climate 
of political unity and stability and a peaceful and orderly administration of the country so that the regime 
could concentrate the energies of the government and the people on the development of the country24. 
The need for political stability was further justified in terms of creating a conducive environment for 
business, especially for foreign investors. For example, in 1965, the Minister of Finance observed, 
[stability] is what businessmen like. They are not missionaries. When they come over, they expect 
to make profits, to pay dividends to shareholders and apart from helping us by investing money to 
develop this country, they must get their returns too. They must be assured that whatever they do 
here will stand for a long time. If somebody comes over here to build up a shop and there is a 
possibility that the shop will be stoned in two days‟ time, he can‟t bring his money.25 
 
The quest for political unity and stability was a predominant organising factor within the political 
institutional architecture that was put in place. The President was prepared to engage in preventive 
detention, even of tens of thousands of people if that was required to maintain political stability26. He 
further observed that “when a country is building its political institutions, it is likely to do many nasty 
things” and left the implication of the observation open to interpretation when he concluded, “Well,  we 
are building our political institutions here now”27. The following institutional and organisational elements 
were of particular importance in determining the parameters that shaped the organisation and practice 
of SBRs: the legal supremacy of the party over any organisation, the designation of the party 
convention as the primary public forum for policy dialogue, the creation of a European parliamentary 
opposition and the security forces of the party. 
                                                             
24  Kamuzu Banda, speech during State Opening of Parliament, 8 October 1968, p. 5. 
25  Hansard, 15th July,Third Session, First Meeting 1965,p.83. 
26  Kamuzu Banda, speech during commemoration of release from Gweru prison, cited in Short (1974:256). 
27  Ibid. 
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The supremacy and autonomy of the MCP in relation to business 
The supremacy of the MCP and Kamuzu Banda was enshrined in the enacting words of the party 
constitution28  as follows:   
WHEREAS it has been universally accepted that in Malawi the Party is supreme and that no-one is 
above the party; 
WHEREAS it has been unanimously agreed that Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, Life President of 
the mighty Malawi Congress Party, as a symbol of the party, is the Supreme Leader; ...29 
 
This position of the party was conveyed to the business community in a series of speeches, the most 
telling ones being those made by the President himself. As early as December 1963, he warned the 
non-African business community that after the attainment of independence, they would be deported if 
they financed African opposition parties30. In 1964, at the opening of the trade fair organised by the 
“European” Chamber of Commerce, he projected the supremacy of the party in the following terms:  
The Government of this country is in the hands of the people of this country. In my hands, in the 
hands of these boys behind me31, in the hands of my people of this country who control the Malawi 
Congress Party because the government of this country means the Malawi Congress Party. Any 
businessman, Industrialist and investor who fully understands this, will be given all opportunity, all 
possible protection for his business here32. 
The practical effect of these statements was to cajole business enterprises into supporting the MCP 
financially and materially while subduing them politically. His attitude towards expatriate capital was 
welcoming but only if it obliged the regime and did not seek to influence politics: 
Here under the new government, businessmen and Industrialists from all over the world are 
welcome...as long as they come here fully realising, fully accepting the fact that this is Malawi and 
not England, France, Germany or the United States of America. Yes, I want to be quite blunt about 
that. This is Malawi and we are in the majority and that being the case, the political show must run 
                                                             
28 In enforcement, the party and republican constitutions were so conflated that distinguishing between them was only 
necessary for academic purposes. See Williams (1978), especially chapter 7. 
29   Preamble, The Constitution of the MCP 
30  Hansard, 12 December, 1963,p.1010. He specifically mentioned the Mbadwa and Christian Liberation parties. 
31  As a father figure, Kamuzu referred to his ministers and party stalwarts as his „boys‟. 
32  Prime Minister‟s speech at the opening of the Trade Fair, 4July 1964, MNA 1963/64, pam 1,127. 
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by us – the Malawians. As long as they understand and accept this, businessmen from all over the 
world are welcome here and government will give them the necessary protection”33. 
The proscription of expatriate business elites from involvement in policy-making and politics in general 
was emphasised: 
But no businessman, no industrialist, no matter how great he may be, how great his business 
organisation or company is, must come here with the idea of making this country a banana 
republic. We will not allow it. I will not allow any country, any businessman to come here and think 
that because he controls millions [of pounds] he can come here and control the government of this 
country. I am not going to allow my government to be a puppet of any business company here. I 
want that clearly understood. This is not South America or Central America. This is Central Africa 
and this particular country is Malawi. No one can think because he controls millions [of pounds], he 
can come here and control the government in Zomba34. 
Thus, unlike Johnston‟s protectorate government, Banda‟s stance showed that he was keen on staving 
off any form of state capture by business interests. It also showed that the state was ready and willing to 
tower over the business sector and dispense with any of its elements if it was politically desirable to do 
so. This attitude was, however, not unique to Banda but was prevalent in many newly independent 
African states. For example, the nationalist slogan of Ghana‟s Nkrumah for this purpose was couched 
as a pseudo–biblical commandment: „seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto 
you‟35. The primacy of politics over business in Nyerere‟s socialist Tanzania was conveyed in the 
Arusha declaration: “The mistake we are making is to think that development begins with industries 
...The policy of inviting a chain of capitalists to establish industries in our country might succeed in giving 
us all the industries we need but it would also succeed in preventing the establishment of socialism 
unless we believe that without first building capitalism, we cannot build socialism”36. The call was for a 
                                                             
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Kwame Nkrumah, 12th June 1949 at the launch of the Convention People‟s Party (CCP) (Thanks to Daniel Appiah for the 
details). 
36  Julius Nyerere, Arusha Declaration 1967. 
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strategy of self-reliance in which the African state would take charge of both political and economic 
affairs but where politics would lead economics. 
The Party convention as forum for Policy dialogue: particularistic co-optation of the business 
sector 
 
The pursuit of stability was in essence an exercise in the creation of a politically united elite cluster. For 
this reason, the MCP constitution aimed at co-opting strategic African groups into the party structures. 
Section 6 provided that the Trade Union Congress of Malawi (TUCM) and other movements or 
organisations would be affiliated to the party, provided that they were not proscribed by the party 
convention or the party National Executive Committee, their constitutions, principles, programmes and 
rules were not in conflict with those of the party and that names of the national officers of the 
organisations were approved annually by the party National Executive Committee. Of particular 
significance to the practice of SBRs was the fact that under this rule, ABAM was so intertwined with the 
party that even its organisational structure mirrored that of the party at national, regional, district and 
sub-district levels. Members of the National Executive Committee of ABAM were approved by the party 
based on the recommendation of the Inspector General of Police (IG), who collated intelligence on the 
individual members through the police Special Branch37. Following the 1991 ABAM elections, one 
executive member was deemed politically unreliable and was subsequently not cleared to assume 
office.38 The amalgamated Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which included non-Africans, was not 
an affiliate of the party. Although it was under constant political surveillance, its executive committee 
members did not have to be vetted for political reliability. 
Section 25(k) of the party constitution designated members of the national committees of affiliated 
organisations as delegates to the MCP Convention. Under this rule, ABAM was accorded a policy voice, 
while the Chamber was denied the same but was expected to comply with the resolutions of the party 
                                                             
37  IG to ABAM administration Manager, FSO/19/c/17/20/vol.vii/170, 22 January 1986 [private archives]. 
38  IG to ABAM Acting Administration Secretary, FAO/IG/c/7/20/vol. Viii, 20th February 1992. 
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convention. Albeit nominally, the convention was a forum that heard, discussed and decided national 
policies, including those that impacted on the practice of SBRs. It was so important that in 1971 the 
President described it as “the primary Parliament of Malawi”39, whose inclusiveness reflected “our kind 
of democracy, whatever others may think”40. However, the convention was an annual event that lasted 
only four days and spent most of its time hero-worshipping Kamuzu Banda. There was no genuine 
contestation of policy because Kamuzu had forewarned that if anybody voted against the government, 
in the convention or in parliament, he or she would lose favour and would be expelled41. It is therefore 
not surprising that party resolutions were merely endorsements of Banda‟s views, which he always 
outlined in the opening address to the conventions. 
This arrangement deinstitutionalised concertation with the business community but consolidated 
informal, non-transparent consultations with whichever business interests Kamuzu deemed important 
for any other strategic issue. This observation recurred in interviews with the former Executive Chairman 
of ABAM, a long serving cabinet minister in Banda‟s government and the Secretary to the President and 
Cabinet (SPC). However, the Chamber was accorded an indirect form of ventilation on policy between 
1964 and 1973 through a nominated European parliamentary opposition. 
The nominated European parliamentary opposition 
Although political power was concentrated in the President and the MCP, Banda found it necessary to 
provide some political accommodation to Europeans. He therefore created a „nominated (parliamentary) 
opposition‟, initially comprising three Europeans. In 1965, he proposed to the MCP Convention and 
Parliament to increase the number to five. To allay the fears of other nationalists, Banda indicated that 
only those Europeans who agreed with the regime and did not intend to cause trouble would be 
                                                             
39  Kamuzu Banda, closing speech, MCP Convention (Lilongwe), 11 September, 1971. 
40  Kamuzu Banda, opening speech, MCP Convention (Mzuzu) 6 September 1970, MNA, pam 1,127. 
41 Hansard, 17 May 1966:550. Note that Kamuzu had absolute control over who could be Members of Parliament and would 
dismiss them as he saw fit. See Williams (1978). 
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appointed42. Consequently, section 20 of  the republican constitution provided  that the President could 
“appoint as nominated members of the National Assembly such persons, not exceeding five in number 
as he considers desirable so to do, in order to enhance the representative character of the assembly, or 
to represent particular minority or other special interests in the Republic”43. The rationale for this 
arrangement was communicated to Parliament in 1968: “I wanted ... to have a measure, a degree of 
true European representation by having here not necessarily those Europeans that we know openly are 
our friends or ...  pretend on the surface to be our friends...But even those Europeans whom we know 
do not agree with us, I wanted some of them here. And the only way to do that was the way I decided - 
nomination”44. Thus, while the prospect of an organised African opposition was abhorred, a legitimate 
place for European “opposition” was provided. 
Although the MCP regime thrived on the principle of avoiding any form of political conflict, the nominated 
opposition was the only group that was accorded the privilege of expressing openly alternative policy 
options, but then only in Parliament. As Joffe (1973) has observed, this passed for lawful and legitimate 
conflict. Although the selection of the opposition members was not institutionally connected to the 
Chamber, there was an implicit understanding that the Leader of the Opposition acted as a conduit for 
expatriate agricultural and commercial interests. For example, in 1965, the Minister of Finance asked 
the Leader of the Opposition to “help [government] ...  by impressing upon people in the Chamber of 
Commerce, particularly merchants, to start thinking seriously about improving their premises”. Similarly, 
Kamuzu Banda referred to the two additional oppositional members appointed in 1966 as one 
representing the tea interests, and the other, the tobacco interests. When he wanted to address 
„contractors‟, who were all European, he also asked the Leader of the Opposition to convene the 
                                                             
42  Hansard, Third Session, Second Meeting,7 October 1965 p.198. 
43  Republic of Malawi (Constitution) Act, 1966 (Act No.23 of 1966). 
44 Kamuzu Banda, 14 October 1968, closing speech of parliamentary session,p.12. 
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meeting45. Thus, policy dialogue with the non-African business community was indirect and occurred 
through the nominated opposition until 1973. At best, they could put their views opposing government 
policy on record but could not influence any changes in policy or rules. 
However, in the early 1970s, the continued existence of a nominated opposition lost favour with Kamuzu 
Banda. The official reason was that only 23 Europeans out of 7,046 and 294 Indians out of 10,880 had 
registered for citizenship by 197246. Consequently, the MCP Convention in 1973 found it „undemocratic‟ 
to have five members representing such a small number of people. It recommended “to the Government 
to stop European sectional representation in Parliament forthwith” (MCP, 1980: 18). It is probable that 
this was the most politically convenient justification for dealing with what had increasingly become a 
disloyal opposition and a political nuisance for the regime. Two instances are worth pointing out. 
Firstly, in 1968, at the height of the preparations for the large-scale project of constructing a new capital 
city in Lilongwe, Banda began to focus on business integrity, efficiency and reasonable profit, especially 
in the construction industry47. Later that year, legislation governing consultants and contractors was 
proposed. Banda announced that “First class consultants and contractors who meet requirements of 
competence, experience and integrity have nothing to fear from the new legislation. Its only victims will 
be those firms who have no business to be here. We cannot afford either in the Government or in the 
private sector to carry the burden of incompetence, inexperience, dishonesty or idleness”. The Leader of 
the Opposition spoke strongly against some stringent provisions of the bill that had caused 
“considerable concern ... and intense lobbying...”48 But Banda observed that consultants and 
contractors were in the habit of inflating costs in various ways and of compromising on the standards of 
work. While accepting some observations by the Leader of the Opposition as valid, he angrily retorted: 
                                                             
45  Kamuzu Banda, speech to contractors, 8 May 1968, MNA 1968pam 1127. 
46 The numbers for those who registered are taken from (MCP,1980). The totals are 1966 figures taken from Dotson and 
Dotson (1968). 
47  Kamuzu Banda, speech to contractors, 8 May, 1968. 
48  Hansard, Sixth Session, First Meeting, 11 October, 1968. 
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It is my intention to make this country a paradise for honest, serious and efficient businessmen...But 
while I am determined to do this...I am also determined to make it Gehena for dishonest and 
inefficient businessmen. This is not a hunting ground for crooks. I am going to see to it [that] honest 
businessmen...have nothing to fear from me. But sharks, crooks, I‟ll make this country Gehenna for 
them49.  
For the first time since 1964, Banda wondered whether the Leader of the Opposition was being 
responsible50. 
Secondly, in 1971, the government announced legislative proposals to expropriate European estate 
holdings in the central region that were not being cultivated by the owners. These proposals attracted a 
spirited defence from the nominated opposition. The Leader of the Opposition pointed out the following:  
European land holdings were less than one  per cent of the total landmass of the country so that the 
proposed legislation was trivial from an economic point of view;  the colonial government had already 
confiscated about 75 per cent of the uncultivated land between 1959 and 1961; since 1961 there had 
been progress to cultivate the undeveloped land holdings; the tenant system that  the President disliked 
existed in the central region because it was impossible to grow tobacco profitably with hired labour; 
government proposals in the bill would merely continue the tenant system but under the aegis of 
parastatal companies; and the proposed law amounted to a breach of the government‟s assurances to 
European estate owners given in October 1969 that they would have five years within which to phase 
out the tenant system51. This direct attack on the credibility of the government irked Banda and his 
lieutenants. In his response, Banda indicated that he did not want to „strike a discordant note‟ or „inject a 
drop of acid in the discussion‟ but pointed out that land in the central region had been unlawfully 
appropriated by Europeans under the colonial government through informal discussions at the 
Gymkhana club in Zomba and that money being made from these estates was being spent outside the 
                                                             
49  Kamuzu Banda, 14 October 1968, closing speech of parliamentary session, p.22-23. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Hansard, March, 1971 (cited in Joffe (1973). 
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country52. The opposition had become a political nuisance and its views were contrary to the 
development agenda of the government. Two years later, the MCP convention formally passed the 
necessary resolution.  
The abolition of the nominated parliamentary opposition in October 1973 was the ultimate removal of 
the independent and transparent business voice in policy making. 
Politics and accommodation of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
The Chamber lacked policy visibility partly because it was seen to be an organisation for Europeans. Its 
role in the rapidly changing political environment became derivative. Government officials, including 
ministers, interacted often with the Chamber largely to project the power of the African government and 
to press its members to help government achieve its policies in the business sector, especially on 
Africanisation of the sector, curbing profiteering, and exploration of new external markets and attraction 
of foreign investment53. However, a change of government attitude to the Chamber is discernible in the 
1970s. This followed a 1968 nationwide recruitment drive by the Chamber to increase its African 
membership, which stood at 10 out of 305 members. The drive was justified as one way of contributing 
to the government‟s goal of increasing African participation in business54. The initiative  gained the 
support of the government when Aleke Banda, then Minister of Economic Affairs, addressed a meeting 
of African businessmen and „a sprinkle of European businessmen organised by the Chamber‟  and 
encouraged the former to join the Chamber while pleading with the latter to „persuade their counterparts 
overseas to come and invest in Malawi by opening new industries‟55. The Chamber‟s strategy to realign 
its policies with those of government was perhaps a response to persistent outbursts by the regime that 
Malawi was no longer an occupied territory and all companies and organisations had to do things 
                                                             
52  Kamuzu Banda, closing speech to Parliament, March 1971, MNA, pam 1127. 
53  Kumanda, B., „Urge them to invest in Malawi – Says Aleke‟, The Times, 19 August, 1968, p.1. 
54  „Chamber Plans Big Boost to Business‟, The Times, 29 February 1968, p.1. 
55  Kumanda, B „Urge them to invest in Malawi – Says Aleke‟, The Times, 19 August, 1968, p.1. 
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according to the government‟s wishes. Kamuzu Banda never missed an opportunity to remind the 
business community that while he allowed business freedom, the government had to make policy56. 
Political recognition of the Chamber increased in 1974 when Mr. Aubrey Kachingwe was elected its first 
Malawian chairman and gave the Chamber the African face that government craved. The Minister of 
Trade and Industry then advised that the Chamber 
  should not take pride for living in isolation [and] its members must be always responsive to 
the changing circumstances. The principal role of the chamber is to be an avenue for 
constructive thinking. It must also play its vital advisory role to the government so that the 
private sector too can exert its impact in the whole process of the country‟s economic 
development57.  
The Chamber then capitulated to politics and began to play a politically visible and appeasing role. 
Among other activities, it raised funds for various projects, especially those run by the Kamuzu 
Foundation Trust, „Youth Week‟ activities and MCP conventions. It also began running seminars for 
rural businessmen, covering such areas as management, marketing, financial control and bookkeeping 
as a contribution to the government policy of developing commerce and industry58. In 1975, for the first 
time, the Chairman of the Chamber was part of a government delegation to the Mozambique 
International trade fair59. By 1980, relations between the Chamber and the government had improved so 
much that the 93rd Annual General Meeting of the Chamber attracted patrons from “government, civic 
institutions as well as the Malawi Congress Party”60. By December 1982, total membership had 
increased to 550. The following year, the Chamber was accorded permanent representation on the 
National Transport Committee of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
 
                                                             
56  „Malawi not a „Banana‟ republic‟, Daily Times, 14 October, 1974, p.2. 
57  Address to 83rd Annual General Meeting of the Chamber in 1975; „Commentary‟, Daily Times, 13 September 1978, p.7 
58  „Businessmen attend one-day seminar‟, Daily times 19 September, 1977, p.11. 
59  „The Chamber of Commerce – A Thriving Organisation‟, Daily Times, 13 September 1978, p.7. 
60  „Chamber of Commerce aims for higher economic prospects‟, Daily Times, 19 May 1986, p.1. 
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The political acceptability of the Chamber increased its membership density as more African 
businessmen and Indians joined it without fear of being accused of associating with a dissident 
organisation. It is clear in the change of the government‟s attitudes and subsequent accommodation of 
the Chamber in some aspects of policy processes that political considerations, especially localising the 
leadership of the Chamber, were critical. The compatibility of objectives between state elites and 
leaders of business associations is known to be a factor in shaping the kind of synergy that develops 
between them (Sinha, 2005). The foregoing discussion shows that so long as Europeans remained in 
leading positions, the Chamber would have continued to be ignored by the political elite. Although its 
involvement in policy formulation was as limited as everyone else‟s, the Chamber‟s political manoeuvre 
of seriously attempting to operationalise the policy intentions of the regime won it increased legitimacy 
and government confidence. 
By 1986, the government had delegated some responsibilities to the Chamber. Besides being 
increasingly recognised as the private business community‟s voice to government, it became 
responsible for the issuance of certificates of origin, the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), 
Preferential Trade Area (PTA) certificates of origin and road transit coupons to transporters in order to 
facilitate movement of goods through Mozambique61. This set of selective incentives augmented the 
Chamber‟s stature as a partner to government. In 1988, its chairman, Harry Thomson, observed that the 
Chamber existed “to help the government improve the economy and it was imperative that members... 
should be conversant with the government‟s economic policies in order to negotiate with the 
government...effectively”62. A few months later, amid government concern about inflation, the Chamber 
constituted an inflation committee to assist government in combating inflation63. 
 
                                                             
61  „Chamber of Commerce and Industry – Its Functions‟, Daily Times, 3 July 1986, p.17 
62  „Chamber needs stronger Committee in centre‟, Daily Times, 3 May 1988, p.2. 
63  Chamber forms inflation committee‟, Daily Times 13 April 1989, p.1. 
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The party machinery of control 
The one-party state developed control structures and institutional arrangements of domination and 
subjugation of all other societal actors64. The Youth League of the MCP was instrumental in the quest 
for political stability and enforcement of the four cornerstones. The Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) – an 
elite wing of the Youth League – was established in 1963 as a means for mobilising the youth for 
national development, but it soon took up the task of political indoctrination and became an exemplary 
projector of Kamuzu as father and founder of the Malawi nation and a fountain of wisdom who always 
knew what was best for the nation (Phiri, 2000)65. The MYP evolved into a Paramilitary wing of the 
MCP, with bases in all districts, and gathered intelligence and persecuted those who did not comply with 
the demands of the regime. Together with the ordinary Youth League, it constituted a third security arm 
for the state that complemented the conventional police and the army66. The party machinery was 
particularly effective in enforcing Regulation No. 16: “Any [person] guilty of disloyalty, rumour 
mongering, deliberate manufacture of destructive stories, invidious whisper campaigns, loose talk and 
character assassination against any member of the party or the party itself or contravenes any of these 
rules, shall be guilty of a breach of party discipline...and shall be dealt with in such a manner as the 
President in his absolute discretion may think fit” (MCP,1980:22). The youth leaguers and the young 
pioneers were particularly zealous in policing bus stations and markets in towns and semi-urban 
centres. They were key in the enforcement of price regulations in local markets and shops (see below). 
They were also instrumental in collecting political intelligence in highly sophisticated ways. In 1968, 
Banda boasted to expatriate businessmen about the efficacy of his intelligence agents: 
                                                             
64  For an informative model of the framework see Mhone (1992). 
65 The MYP was modelled after and trained by the Young Pioneers of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and the National Service 
Brigade of Israel. 
66  It is estimated that by 1992, government expenditure on the MYP amounted to 150 per cent of the country‟s entire health 
budget (Phiri, 2000:3). 
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Some of you think that you can talk all sorts of things and it will never get to me. But you are fooling 
yourselves....Most of the things you say even in your own pubs when you think you are among 
yourselves reach me.... How? I am not going to tell you. All I want you to know is that you are 
deceiving yourselves if you think you can engage in any kind of childish, foolish, careless talk...67 
In short, the control machinery of the party was responsible for a culture of political silence within the 
country and for penetrating the business sector to ensure that contrary views were not aired and that 
state directives regarding any aspect of doing business were complied with in full. The political 
institutional architecture of the one-party state concentrated political power in the President. It 
engendered and sustained authoritarianism, paternalism and repression. It revolved around the 
personality of Kamuzu Banda, so much so that his idiosyncrasies towards „business‟ and policy making 
were critical in shaping the patterns of SBRs. The following section provides an overview of the pattern 
of state hegemony in SBRs during this era. 
5.3. Dynamics of neo-patrimonial state hegemony in state-business relations 
When other African countries were going down the socialist path of development in the second half of 
the 1960s, Banda attempted to explain the economic ideology of his regime at several public meetings 
and official forums. The most important of these were an inaugural lecture at the MCP political 
educational conference in 1968 and an opening speech to the MCP Convention that year. 
Consequently, the Convention resolved that “in Malawi‟s own interest, capitalism is the only feasible 
system”68. However, he declared that it would not be liberal capitalism in which the wild spirits of 
entrepreneurs would be left to run amok. Banda observed that  
even in America, rigid capitalism is no longer permitted. The Government has certain control. In 
Britain, it has even more control. So here, too, we will not let capitalism run wild and get away with 
murder in this country. Capitalism under control and regulated, but capitalism just the same, not 
communism or socialism69.  
                                                             
67  Kamuzu Banda, speech to contractors, 8 May 1968:8-9, MNA, 1968 pam 1127. 
68  Resolution No.5, MCP(1980:6) 
69  Closing speech, MCP Convention (Lilongwe) September 1968: 5. 
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The resolution sanctioned a brand of capitalism in which the state, singularly or in partnership with 
private capital, played a bigger role in the economy and in which private enterprise of whatever scale 
was strictly regulated and policed because Kamuzu claimed to believe “in honest and fair capitalism”70. 
5.3.1.  The state in business – minimising political and economic dependence on private 
enterprise 
Neo-patrimonial state hegemony in SBRs evolved from a genuine need to spur economic development. 
The widespread view before 1964 was that granting independence to Nyasaland was not reasonable 
as the country was an „imperial slum‟ (Vail, 1975), a „sleepy backwater‟ and a „Cinderella of the 
protectorates‟ (Pachai, 1973) that was economically unviable71. A confluence of three factors – the 
political need to prove that proponents of the Central African Federation (CAF) were wrong on the 
economics of the country; the reality of the paucity and risk aversion of private capital in the country; 
and the hype of development economics, which peaked in the 1960s and 70s – provided the political 
and economic rationale for massive state involvement in the economy. 
State participation in business had begun in the colonial period, as seen in arrangements between the 
British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) and the protectorate government, and the establishment of 
the Agricultural Production and Marketing Board (AP&MB) in 1955. At independence, the need to 
accelerate the pace of economic development through the business sector was emphasised and found 
its first formal expression in the first five-year development plan (1965-69)72. Private enterprise was 
seen as the primary driving force for development throughout the economy, with the public sector 
playing supportive and stimulative roles akin to those that Evans (1995) has described as the midwifery 
roles of the state in the industrial transformation that is associated with the emergence of 
                                                             
70  Speech, Political Education Conference, 15 May, 1968, p.9. 
71  See counter-arguments by Banda in his speech on Republic Celebrations, 6 July, 1971, MNA, pam 1,227.  
72  Jones, Sir Glyn, speech from the Throne, 7th July 1965, MNA. 
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developmental states in East Asia73. The reality, however, is that the state performed more of the 
„custodial‟ and „demiurge‟ roles (Evans, 1995) than the midwifery ones. However, this should not be a 
surprise as Banda himself had indicated this leaning in 1967 and 1968 when he told the Tea 
Association and Parliament, respectively, that, 
To me, two passengers – one by the name of „Business‟ and the other by the name of „Politics‟ 
[may be allowed] to travel by the same train when I can‟t help it...but I see to it that they do not 
travel in the same compartment...”74 
Private enterprise had its chance here, in fact it missed its opportunity ... [because] it didn‟t want to 
spend pennies. Therefore, the government must go into business ... We are not going to close 
private enterprise ... We are going to compete ... Where private enterprise is willing to risk its 
capital, it is alright with us. But where it is afraid, shy, unwilling, then the government will have to do 
something about it, and it must do something about it75. 
The urgency for economic development and the lack of private indigenous capital provided the rationale 
for the state‟s role in business. Indeed, politics and business were conflated as the state domina ted 
both activities. State dominance in the economy was accomplished mainly through the activities of two 
parastatal companies, namely, the Malawi Development Corporation (MDC), founded in 1964, and the 
Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC)76. Using these two corporations, the 
government went into business singularly or through joint ventures with foreign and local capital. The 
government also nationalised some companies, notably the Malawi Railways in 1965, and established 
other state-owned enterprises in utilities, hospitality and services. Besides the MDC and ADMARC, 
Banda augmented his personal business empire, which he had begun building in 1959. In 1969, he 
consolidated his enterprises into Press Holdings Ltd (Press) which grew into a conglomerate that van 
Donge (2002) has dubbed as the „African Chaebol‟. Although Press was a privately owned company, its 
                                                             
73  See GoM (1987:5) for a summary of the roles the Malawian state aimed to perform; see Woo-Cummings (1999) on 
theories of developmental states. 
74  Speech to the Tea Association,11th February 1967, MNA 1967 pam. 1,127. 
75  Closing speech of parliamentary session,14 October 1968, MNA pam. 1127. Also speech to contractors, op.cit., p.4. 
76 The APMB was reorganised in 1962 and renamed as the Farmers Marketing Board (FMB). The FMB was further 
reorganised in 1971 and renamed ADMARC. 
 158 
 
 
activities were not dissimilar to those of the MDC and ADMARC77. While he personally owned Press, 
Banda was Minister for the MDC and ADMARC78. He therefore had ultimate authority for all three 
companies, whose institutional relations gave Press the appearance of a parastatal company (see 
below). The activities of these companies resulted in the building up of a range of public and quasi-
public bodies that invested in, managed or supported a broad spectrum of economic activities in 
agriculture, industry, commerce and finance. Together they dominated the business sector and virtually 
eclipsed the non-state business sector. 
The economic dominance of the triumvirate: The MDC, ADMARC and Press Corporation Ltd 
The corporate triumvirate engaged in all sectors of the economy. In many ventures, this was done 
through partnerships with foreign firms in the forms of management contracts and shareholding. The 
three were the only local companies that for a long time were allowed to partner foreign capital. Banda 
boasted about this approach as „Malawi‟s way of doing things‟, a veiled reference to the contrasting 
nationalisation programmes that were taking place in neighbouring Tanzania and Zambia: “I do not 
believe in confiscation and nationalisation of private property or capital, [but] I am a stronger believer in 
local participation in any business and Industrial enterprise”79. The rationale for joint ventures between 
local and foreign capital was two-fold - to reduce remittances to foreign countries and to develop an 
African business class. In the financial sector, state participation was particularly important to the 
regime‟s resource mobilisation. On the establishment of the National Bank, Banda observed that banks 
and insurance companies were of greatest importance because they mobilised capital for investment in 
commercial and industrial undertakings. It was therefore “not prudent...to leave banking and insurance 
                                                             
77 See Van Donge (2002); Malawi Congress Party (and others) – v -The Attorney General, and The Speaker of the National 
Assembly, HC, CC No.2074 of 1996; Attorney General –v- Malawi Congress Party (and others), SC, CA No.22 of 1996 
[1997] MWSC 1 (31 January, 1997). 
78  Positions established in the Acts of Parliament for MDC (1964), ADMARC (1971). 
79  Opening speech to Parliament, March 1971, p.11. 
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business entirely in the hands of expatriate companies... or outside governments”80. For the 
Commercial Bank of Malawi (CBM) and the National Insurance Company (NICO), Malawians and 
government departments were particularly urged to do business with them. 
ADMARC played a minimal role until 1971, when it was reorganised on instructions from the President. 
Its mandate was widened and its management was asked to understand that “the organisation is no 
longer just another government board, where or in which the questions of development and profit are 
minor ones, but a business concern, where and in which the question of development and profit are 
paramount and the question of stabilising farm prices, secondary”81. The corporate triumvirate 
developed a diversified portfolio of enterprises in virtually every sector of the economy (Appendix III 
provides lists of business interests for each of these three „public‟ corporations at the end of the MCP 
era). By 1974, the government‟s business strategy had resulted in the establishment of 320 new 
factories (GoM, 1974). By 1977, Press and its subsidiaries had a gross turnover of about 33 per cent of 
GDP and the parastatal sector was contributing 25 per cent of GDP by 1985 (Lwanda, 1995:58). By 
1994, Press and the parastatal sector combined were controlling 75 per cent of the economy. 
Politics and elite configurations in state-business relations 
Given the configuration of power and the application of the four cornerstones, there existed cohesion 
and unity of purpose among corporate, bureaucratic and political elites. At the apex was Kamuzu 
Banda, who straddled the three sectors to the extent that the elites below him saw in him their „common 
parentage‟. The result was a form of elite cousinhood across the different sectors based on common 
adherence to the rules of a political game in which loyalty to the leadership took precedence over 
independent initiative and policy debate. Not only was Banda the supreme political leader, but also he 
was the supreme businessman (Van Donge, 2002:651). 
                                                             
80  Ibid, p.7. 
81 Ibid,p.13. 
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Elite cousinhood was enhanced by institutional arrangements, especially interlocking directorships, 
among the three major corporations and a pattern of elite interchangeability in which senior executives 
were moved from one corporate body to another. Some bureaucrats were, by virtue of office or 
personal appointment, were members of corporate boards. Similarly, party elites, including several 
members of Parliament, were appointed to serve on corporate boards. The result of these practices 
was a blurring of the public-private divide. The phenomenon meant that there was only a small elite that 
straddled both business and politics. While Banda capped the structure, political control of this 
configuration rested with his henchman, John Tembo.  For example, in the early 1990s, he was not only 
the Minister of State in the President‟s Office but also Treasurer-General of the MCP and Chairman of 
11 companies. The dominance of the state in business provided those who manned it with patronage 
resources that helped them augment their power. Thus, unlike the South Korean regimes that relied on 
private businesses for political financing (Kang, 2002; Moon, 1994), Banda‟s regime was largely self-
reliant.  
By 1994, Press had a total of 28 subsidiaries and 8 minority holdings (PCL, 1994). ADMARC had 
holdings in at least 18 companies, some of which had their own subsidiaries. The MDC too had at least 
18 companies with some of them having subsidiaries of their own (Privatisation Commission, 1994). 
This number reflected a significant reduction in MDC enterprises as the corporation had 32 subsidiary 
and associated companies in 1983. However, the portfolio performed poorly due to weak management, 
pervasive government controls and regulations and a lack of strategic focus. By 1987 government 
divested some of the enterprises and reduced the portfolio to 1882. However, rationalisation of the MDC 
took the form of swapping with Press and ADMARC rather than selling to other parties, allegedly 
because of a lack of Malawian buyers (Guhalti, 1989). The interconnectedness of the three 
corporations was most crucial in the financial sector (Mhone, 1987; Harrigan, 2001; Kydd, 1985) where 
                                                             
82  MDC Board Paper, No.35/99, 18 October, 1999, (MNA). 
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they owned about 70 percent of the assets and the two dominant banks controlled 90 per cent of all 
banking assets83. Not only did dominance afford the small elite easy access to resources for their 
business activities but was also effectively used as a „carrot and stick‟ to reward the loyal and punish 
the incompliant elements in business by refusing them credit.  
The concentration of political and economic power in small elite yielded an oligarchy that prevailed 
throughout this period. While the economy appeared to be improving in macro-economic terms, its 
benefits were not widely enjoyed. For example, by 1984/85 only about 10,718 families had annual 
incomes exceeding MK5, 00084. There were fewer than 20,000 privately owned cars. Only 5,808 civil 
servants were in the grades above that of a clerical officer. The largest estate owners were also the 
barons of the regime: of the 8,660 tobacco estates in 1987, only 362 had production quotas in excess 
of 25,000kgs. By 1991, the political, corporate and bureaucratic elite is estimated to have numbered 
fewer than 50,000 households, with a majority of them comprising a sub-elite that gravitated around the 
big men of the regime85. In short, the concentration of economic and political power sustained the 
regime by affording its leaders the requisite patronage and control machinery but also significantly 
reduced the economic significance of non-political private enterprise and its associations. 
5.3.2. The regulatory framework - policing private enterprise  
The need to improve the living conditions of the masses and the need for political elites to consolidate 
power saw the enactment of statutes that suffocated the business sector in several ways. Licensing 
regulations passed as part of the legislation on the control of goods and services enacted in 1968, 
severely distorted market operations, especially pricing and distribution. They also restricted entry to 
some business activities, especially imports, commercial agriculture and the formation of joint ventures 
with foreign capital, which was exclusive to the corporate triumvirate discussed above. In a context of 
                                                             
83 IMF, Malawi Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Policy Framework Paper, 1998/99–2000/01, 
www.imf.org/external/np/pfp/malawi/malawi.htm, 10/06/2010. 
84  The exchange rate to the American dollar was MK1.72. 
85  Figures from Frausum (1991:12). For an account of the estate-led development strategy, see Harrigan (2001). 
 162 
 
 
widespread poverty, pricing controls were populist, and their enforcement increasingly became 
contaminated with the politics of regime maintenance. In addition, a forfeiture law enacted in 1966 
effectively sanctioned state predation on private capital even though it was primarily designed to 
penalise political dissidents or those suspect to the regime. While the various legislations may have had 
some legitimate business, developmental or welfare intentions, it was largely applied in a manner that 
afforded state elites opportunities to consolidate power and maintain the institutional arrangements of 
control. Necessity required businessmen to maintain the good will of the President and his associates. 
Licensing regulations 
The rule structure provided by the Business Licensing Act (1970) accorded the Minister of Trade and 
Industry absolute discretion and did not even provide for a right of appeal against  his decisions or,  at 
the very least, oblige him to provide reasons if he refused or cancelled a licence. The Minister of Trade 
argued that there was no need for an appeal procedure because he always considered carefully each 
and every point for cancellation of licences86. However, whenever expatriate capital was involved, the 
President was personally responsible for the decisions regarding business licensing: 
I am not going to allow any stupid businessman to come in just because he has money and think 
he can twist my people around ... That is why I am very, very strict with licensing of businesses. No 
matter who the Minister of Trade and Industry is, he will not be allowed to issue a license until I 
approve it – I am the real Minister of Trade and Industry in this country87. 
Besides commerce and industry, commercial agriculture, especially the production of burley tobacco, 
was also subjected to licensing by the Ministry of Agriculture88. Within the licensing requirements, 
government „quota‟ allocation committees periodically decided the maximum import values that firms 
were allowed as well as the maximum quantities of specific types of tobacco any grower could 
                                                             
86  Hansard, 2 December, 1970, p.796, as cited  by Williams (1978:241). 
87  Kamuzu Banda, Prime Minister‟s Speech at the opening of the Trade Fair, 4 July 1964, MNA, 1963/64 pam 1,127. 
88  „Warning on Tobacco, The Times, 23 July 1970, p.3. 
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produce89. Business licensing was an effective institutional weapon for forcing businesses to comply 
with the demands of the regime as licences could be cancelled on the flimsiest of grounds as illustrated 
in the following two cases. 
Firstly, in December 1970, an amendment to the Insurance Act transferred the power to refuse or 
revoke an insurance licence from the Registrar of Insurance to a minister. All companies were required 
to re-register and were warned that each application would be looked at on its merits, and registration 
could be refused for various reasons or on the grounds of national interest. The purpose of the 
amendment was “for the protection of our people and for the survival of the [newly established state 
company –The National Insurance Company of Malawi (NICO)]90. Thus, licensing regulations were used 
to provide a competitive edge to a state-owned company. Even before the amendment was passed, 
Kamuzu Banda indicated that “all ministries, government departments and statutory bodies [would] have 
to show cause why they [were] not insuring, with the new insurance company”91. 
Secondly, in 1972, the MCP Convention condemned certain fanatical religious sects, especially the 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses, as hindering the political and economic development of the country. This was 
against the backdrop of the sect having been banned in 1967 for being “dangerous to the good 
government of the state”92. The convention resolved that all members of the sect “employed in 
commerce and Industry should be dismissed forthwith and that any commercial or industrial concern 
that does not comply with this resolution should have its license cancelled”93. It was further resolved that 
members of the sect “employed by the government should be dismissed forthwith” and that those who 
were “self-employed, either in business or farming must have [their] activities discouraged”94. A wave of 
                                                             
89  From Secretary for Trade and Industry to various chambers of commerce,22 Februar, 1964, MNA, Division of Trade and 
Industry, File No.JLI. 
90  Hansard, 2 December, 1970. 
91  Speech to Parliament,1970, p.4. 
92  Gazette, 20 October 1967. See also resolutions of the MCP Convention 1967. 
93  MCP Convention Resolution of 1972 (MCP,1980:16). 
94  ibid. 
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business forfeitures followed, as did deportations of expatriate managers who were unable to dismiss 
employees because they did not know their religious affiliation95. 
In short, while business licensing is a legitimate activity undertaken by governments everywhere, it was 
used  in the one-party era as an instrument for restricting the entry of some entrepreneurs into certain 
lucrative ventures in a manner that was ostensibly contradictory to a capitalist system of free enterprise, 
where market competition determines entry and exit from business sectors. As the case of the 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses shows, licensing regulations were also used to settle political scores with 
individual businessmen or companies. It was „political correctness‟ rather than economic criteria that 
took precedence in making decisions on various aspects about business licences. 
Price controls and enforcement by the MCP machinery 
The MCP government instituted a price control regime through The Control of Goods Act (1968). Since 
the President insisted on businesses making profits by increasing the turnover rate rather than by 
increasing profit margins96, its aim was to curb profiteering. An entrenched perception was that 
businessmen were dishonest in their pricing. Thus, Banda often reiterated that Malawi was “not a 
hunting ground for crooks”97. He was keen to ensure that honest businessmen had nothing to fear, but 
“sharks, crooks” would find Malawi to be “Gehenna for them”98. The political undertones in the pricing 
instructions to businessmen were as clear as their business sense was elusive: 
You must not cheat my people in the village. You must not charge higher prices for what you 
bought cheaply yourselves. Anyone who does that, I will cancel his licence. I do not want my 
people to be cheated by either Asians or Africans99. 
 
                                                             
95  Interview, Mr. Mark Katsonga, businessman and politician. 
96  Speech to the MCP Convention (Lilongwe), 1968, p.13. 
97 Closing speech of parliamentary Session, 14 October, 1968, p.23. 
98  Ibid. 
99  Closing speech, MCP Convention (Lilongwe), September, 1968, p.13. 
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Consequently, a Price Monitoring and Control Committee (PMCC) was formed in the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry. Subsidiary committees were constituted in the districts and were chaired by district 
commissioners (DCs). Their mandate was to check on prices and monitor that traders were displaying 
prices of their merchandise. The PMCC reviewed prices and set a mark-up of between 12 and 18 per 
cent, depending on whether the producing firm faced competition100. For those commodities specifically 
mentioned in the law, firms needed permission from the Ministry to effect price changes. For the other 
commodities that were informally added to the list of controlled goods, firms needed a „letter of no 
objection‟ before raising prices101. 
However, unnecessary political infiltration into the price control regime began to occur in 1973 in the 
context of the oil crisis, which resulted in an inflationary trend. The Ministry issued a warning to all 
businesses that selling any item above prescribed prices would result in severe penalties. The general 
public was asked to report any overpricing to police or the Ministry102. Consequently, many shops, 
mostly owned by Asians, were closed down for overcharging, owners‟ bank accounts were frozen and 
some of them were deported and their properties forfeited103. However, the Ministry found itself 
overwhelmed and unable to control prices, especially in rural markets and trading centres: 
This situation cannot be controlled through the normal machinery available in the Ministry. Not only 
is this machinery inadequate due to inadequate staff but also will not make the necessary impact. I 
am sure the only way to deal with the spiralling market prices is through the Malawi Congress Party 
machinery104. 
 
                                                             
100 Kaluwa (1989); Interview with Mr. Mandindi, Director of Trade , 21 July 2009; „Price Monitoring and Control committee 
formed‟, Daily Times, 19 March, 1982, p.7. 
101  Ministry of Trade and Industry Z/Q Individual Firms, 43 Portland Cement Company (Mw) Ltd, File No. IND/109 (MNA). 
102 „Ministry Issues Warning on Prices‟, Daily Times, 23 January, 1973, p.1. 
103 DC(Mangochi) to Secretary of Trade and Industry, 29 November 1973; DC (Mchinji) to Secretary of Trade and Industry,2 
October 1973; Secretary of Trade and Industry to Office of President and Cabinet, 30 th April 1973; Secretary (OPC) to 
Deputy Chief Immigration Officer, 3 May 1973 (MNA) File No. 45/01/02/vol.v. 
104 Secretary for Trade and Industry to MCP Administrative Secretary, 6 December 1973 (MNA), Ministry of Trade and 
Industry General Correspondence File No. 45/01/02/vol.v. 
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Thus, the youth leaguers and MYP began to police markets and shops and reported offenders to police, 
district commissioners and Ministry officials. In 1978, Kamuzu Banda extended the responsibility to the 
Women‟s League of the MCP and instructed them to “report anyone overcharging to the Secretary -
General of the Malawi Congress Party”105. Thus, a parallel structure with its own rules for price control 
emerged within the party and complemented the bureaucratic one in the Ministry. At the 1980 MCP 
Convention, on the motion of the President, delegates described overcharging as “criminal and inhuman 
practice” and resolved “to help His Excellency the Life President check prices in all business enterprises 
in their respective areas and report all those charging high prices to appropriate authorities and the 
Secretary General of the party who in turn will cause cancellation of licences of all such 
businessmen”106. In the aftermath of this resolution, ABAM embarked on a campaign to cajole its 
members to desist from overcharging107. Between 1979 and 1980, 63 businessmen had been 
prosecuted for contravening price control regulations108. After 1980, however, the number of businesses 
that suffered due to party activities related to price control increased, and some cases were based on 
petty jealousies. Price control turned out to be a populist measure that struck a chord with the poor 
majority and pitted the state against private entrepreneurs and traders. For instance, in 1983, the 
Ministry announced that it would do “everything possible to serve the interests of the public by 
restraining traders and manufacturers from [increasing prices] despite the rising cost of raw materials109. 
The price control framework, however, began to crumble between 1986 and 1987 under the auspices of 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Prices for many commodities were deregulated. Foreign 
exchange, import and agricultural production quotas were removed. Government justified these 
                                                             
105  „Ngwazi Warns Market Vendors‟, Daily Times, 14 September,1978, p.1. 
106  Resolution No.10, MCP (1980:37). 
107  Interview with Mr. Chikhawo; „ABA committee official for Chikwawa elected, Daily Times, 4 February ,1981, p.3; „ABA 
asked to help check overcharging‟, Daily Times, 21 June 1983, p.2.; „Warning on unfair prices‟, Daily Times, 4 February, 
1981, p.7. 
108  „63 Businessmen Prosecuted‟, Daily Times, 20 March, 1981, p.7. 
109  „Traders Restrained from Overcharging‟, Daily Times 11 March 1983 p.2; „Fines for Seven Trading Cheats‟, Daily Times, 
27 October, 1983, p.1. 
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changes as being consistent with its statement of development policies for 1987-1996110. By 1992, 
when the wind of political change blew across the country, price controls remained only on sugar and 
cement (Kaluwa, 1989). 
Business forfeitures and security of property rights 
The Business Licensing Act complemented the Forfeiture Act (1966) in institutionalising insecurity of 
property rights for private businessmen. In particular, the Forfeiture Act vested unfettered discretion in 
the political and bureaucratic elites to confiscate private property. This law aimed to consolidate political 
power by occasioning economic injustice on those who were real or imaginary foes of the regime.111 
The provision that was critical in shaping SBRs was in section 2 of the Act: 
If the Minister is satisfied that any person is, or has been, acting in a manner prejudicial to the 
safety or the economy of the state or subversive to the authority of the lawfully established 
government, irrespective of whether that person be within or without Malawi, he may by order, 
which shall be published in the gazette, declare such person to be subject to forfeiture. 
The generality of terms such as „acts prejudicial to the safety of the economy‟ effectively allowed any 
perceived business offence to qualify an enterprise for forfeiture. Such practices as selling above the 
government‟s prescribed prices and violations of foreign currency quotas not only resulted in 
cancellation of business licences, freezing of bank accounts and deportations but also forfeiture of all 
real and personal property of the person involved. Forfeited property was to be vested absolutely in the 
government and used or applied for purposes that would be directed by the Registrar General112, who 
was “at all times subject to such general and specific directions of a forfeiture committee”113 that was 
personally appointed by the President. The Act carried a wide indemnity clause under which no suit, 
prosecution or other legal proceeding would lie or be instituted against any person or the government in 
                                                             
110  „Government Promotes Private Sector‟, Daily Times, 7 May 1990, p.1. 
111  For a concise legal analysis of the Forfeiture Act, see Roberts (1966). 
112  Section 5(d) of the Act. 
113  Section 6(1) of the Act. 
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respect of anything done or purported to be done under the provisions of the Act114. This allowed the 
seizure of property belonging to persons mistakenly believed to be subject to forfeiture (Roberts, 
1966:133) and protected party activists who abused the Act for their own intentions. 
Many Asian and African businessmen fell victim to the Forfeiture Act. One account estimates that there 
were 300 forfeiture deportations of Asian businessmen between 1966 and 1981 (Kotecha, 1981). While 
forfeited aliens could be deported, Africans were detained indefinitely, often without trial115. Government 
and party leaders often appropriated forfeited assets among themselves, either by distributing it directly 
or through a pre-empted auction system116. Only one case (as far as I know) of such forfeitures was 
brought before the courts after the fall of the MCP regime and was successfully concluded in 2001. A 
businessman who was also a Member of Parliament had his business licences cancelled arbitrarily and 
declared a subject to forfeiture. The forfeited portfolio of assets, which included shops, farms and 
equipment, warehouses, maize mills, livestock, lorries, a petroleum filling station, 11 houses, crops, 
bricks, wood and furniture, was taken over by Press under the President‟s instructions117. In 1998, the 
High Court estimated the assets to have a replacement value of MK92, 525,975 (for other details, see 
Appendix IV)118. This case illustrates how the regulatory framework was predatory and that the MCP‟s 
brand of capitalism was one that allowed only the chosen few to participate, and only in so far as they 
submitted to the political demands of the regime. As some respondents observed, very few local long-
term investments were made, except by the very top elites, because no independent local entrepreneur 
                                                             
114  Section 7 of the Act. 
115  During the field research, I tried to make a count of business forfeitures but source documents (Forfeiture Files) could 
not be located. The MNA referred me to the Administrator General, who in turn referred me to the Ministry of Justice and 
the defunct National Compensation Tribunal, but to no avail. 
116  According to three respondents – a former Minister in the MCP government, a senior bureaucrat in the MCP government 
and a business tycoon whose father suffered forfeiture of some of his businesses. 
117 Press took over several other forfeited businesses, including bakeries and farms. Other privately owned wholesale shops 
were forfeited and taken over by the MDC and rebranded as Chipiku Stores by the Import & Export Company (Interview, 
Mr. Mark katsonga, July, 2009). 
118 Many other cases are reported to have been dealt with by the National Compensation Tribunal, which was 
established after the change of government. Its records, however, were not available for examination. The 
Tribunal was dissolved in 2006 amid allegations of abuse of funds. 
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could be sure of anything long enough to reap the benefits of his investments119.The government‟s own 
Statement of Development Policies of 1987 observed that “ownership of all but the smallest [business] 
ventures is highly concentrated among a small number of parastatal organisations and private 
companies” (GoM 1987:62). But without any reference whatsoever to the restrictive nature of the 
business regulatory institutional framework, the policy document simply observed that this was because 
“the number of Malawian entrepreneurs willing and able to undertake industrial ventures of any size has 
been very limited” (ibid). 
In short, the business regulatory regime empowered the President and his cohorts to dispossess, 
without warning or negotiation, any business proprietor perceived to be contravening the regime‟s view 
of the „national interest‟ or who potentially threatened the interests of the political elites. Politics, not 
good economics, determined the survival and success of business enterprises. It is certainly no 
exaggeration to suggest that the greatest single constraint on African entrepreneurship was the 
institutionalised uncertainty of the business environment. The one-party state was nothing less than a 
predator on private enterprise despite an outlook of stability. Although it claimed “to support a liberal 
system of private enterprise as the basis for commercial and industrial activity”(GoM, 1987:55), the 
evidence shows that rather than being „liberal‟, the system subjected the miniscule private enterprise 
sector to heavy policing and arbitrary deprivation so that the epicentre for commercial and industrial 
activity was the state itself through its corporations. Although the state tried to promote African 
enterprise, it was very much as a reward for those African businessmen who helped to prop up the 
regime and cultivate its legitimacy.  
                                                             
119  Interviews with Mr. Mark Katsonga Phiri  and Mr. Humphrey Mvula. 
 170 
 
 
5.4 The African Businessmen Association and the politics of indigenising commerce and 
industry. 
Under the hegemony of the party, the non-co-opted business community did not have any independent 
policy voice but merely complied with the announced policy or resolutions of a party convention. 
However, the political importance of ABAM increased and so too did its policy leverage, especially in 
attempts to indigenise commerce and industry. Nonetheless, ABAM‟s influence did not in any way eat 
into the autonomy of the state because the association was itself the creation of the state, and the 
„selective incentives‟ accorded to it by the government were elements of political patronage for which 
members were perpetually grateful to Kamuzu and the party. The rationale for the efforts to indigenise 
the business sector lay in the disproportionately small share of Africans in the business life of the 
country. 
5.4.1.  African private enterprise at independence 
Like other African countries, Malawi‟s business sector was dominated by foreigners at independence. 
Indians were the most successful in commerce. They dominated wholesale trade and enjoyed a virtual 
monopoly on rural retail trade. Joffe (1973) and Dinwiddy (1974) peg the Indian share of small-scale 
commerce at 90 per cent, which was carried out through only 15 per cent of licensed retail 
establishments. Europeans participated in wholesale and retail trade, but their overall share was small 
and was attributable to a few big companies (Power, 1993).They nonetheless occupied strategic 
positions, including plantation agriculture, transport and finance. There were no African wholesalers, 
and the African share of retail trade was less than 10 per cent but Africans had a disproportionate share 
of 82 per cent of licensed retail establishments (Joffe, 1973; Nyasaland Government, 1962)120. This 
reliance on external actors was regarded as potentially unreliable, economically risky, but most 
importantly for the present purpose, politically unacceptable. 
                                                             
120  A Government report of 1959 indicated that by 1957 there were 9,300 African retail shops and 4 wholesalers. 
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Against this background, the new African government deemed it expedient to minimise dependence on 
the entrepreneurship of non-indigenes. This was particularly the case since Indians and Europeans 
showed little, if any, enthusiasm to adopt Malawian citizenship. African participation in commerce, 
however, became a policy focus in 1962 when Kamuzu Banda ordered the formation of MARTA121 for 
the purpose of opening up provision of transport services to Africans. But in 1964, Africanisation of the 
business sector had two clear dimensions. The first was to Africanise the ownership of large-scale 
enterprises. This dimension received most attention from the President and led to the state establishing 
multi-sectoral corporations and dominating the business sector as discussed above. The second 
dimension aimed at Africanising small-scale commerce122. It moved up the government agenda in the 
late 1960s when the domination of non-Africans in rural commerce was deemed to be “inimical to the 
economic development and viability of the country”123. Besides the need to develop an indigenous 
commercial class, Kamuzu wanted to enhance the political legitimacy of the party among African 
entrepreneurs. Thus, in 1968, he convened a meeting of African businessmen, where he complained 
about mismanagement of MARTA and effectively asked them to form a more encompassing 
association124. Consequently, in 1969, the Association of African Businessmen of Malawi (ABAM) was 
formed and became an appendage of the party. In 1970, Kamuzu directed the dissolution of MARTA 
and directed the formation of a government body – the Malawi Road Transporters Authority125 – which 
worked in collaboration with ABAM. 
Africanising the business sector was part of a development strategy in which the state played an 
entrepreneurial role while catalysing the emergence of indigenous capitalists in the private sector. One 
                                                             
121 In fact, the colonial government began to take positive steps in 1958, when it set up the African Loans Board, which 
aimed at providing working capital to already established traders to expand the range of merchandise.  
122  These dimensions were not unique to Malawi. Kenya had similar experiences. 
123  Kamuzu Banda, Hansard, 29 January, 1968: 242-3. 
124  Kamuzu Banda, speech to African businessmen, October, 1968. 
125  Kamuzu dissolves MARTA, Malawi news, 17 February 1970, p.1. 
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aim was to control the externalisation of resources through remittances of profits by expatriate 
businesses: 
One of the things that now irritates me – I have to send the Minister of Finance to London every 
year...to discuss monetary management questions with the British Government. Why? Because 
there are no African businessmen here. All the trade, commerce, Industry are in the hands of other 
people: Europeans and Asians....The fact [is that] the shareholders of these private companies 
here are in London. And when the dividends are paid, the greatest portion...goes to London and 
what is even worse, to Bombay, Calcutta...and Pakistan...we have to go to London begging for 
money when money is being made in this country by these private enterprises and goes out of the 
country. And then when we go there, those people, some of the officials in certain ministries talk as 
if we are begging them126.  
Kamuzu saw ABAM as a vehicle for promoting African involvement in business activities and for 
mobilising the energies of Malawian businessmen to contribute to the overall development of the 
country. In the words of its last Executive Chairman, ABAM was “a weapon on the trading front in the 
war against poverty, disease and ignorance”127. Thus, the association identified with the party in many 
respects and enhanced the mingling of business and politics. 
5.4.2.  ABAM, the MCP and the government – Institutional relations based on mutual 
dependence 
ABAM was formally commissioned by the President in 1975 and registered under the Trustee 
Incorporation Act in 1978128, but its institutional relations with the MCP and the government began at its 
inception in 1969. Its National Executive Committee members were approved by the National Executive 
Committee of the Party and were, under the MCP Constitution, delegates to the party‟s convention. Its 
membership ranged from petty traders to medium enterprises. Its organisational structure mirrored that 
of the party down to the district level. Although the ABAM constitution required the election of a National 
                                                             
126  Kamuzu Banda, October 1968, closing speech of parliamentary session, p.10. 
127  Interview, Mr. D.J. Chikhawo, July 2009. 
128  D.J. Chikhawo, Inaugural speech to ABAM Executive Committee (Shire Highlands Hotel), 16 February 1992, p.1. 
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Executive Committee every two years, elections were not regularly held129. At all levels, the association 
worked with the party structures to promote the activities of the party and disseminate propaganda 
messages tailored for the African business community130. 
The long-term political objective of ABAM was to help Kamuzu Banda in his efforts to achieve the 
economic independence of the country131. In the process, the relationship between ABAM and the party 
became reciprocal. While the party introduced particularistic policies and business schemes that 
favoured African businessmen (see below), the association was expected to help and promote the 
activities of the party. Politicians in high-ranking positions often reminded ABAM members that they 
owed their success to Kamuzu Banda‟s efforts to develop the country through the party. Consequently, 
ABAM mobilised financial resources in support of political activities such as national and regional 
conferences132. Occasionally, ABAM executive committees met with the President and would present 
cash donations. For example, in 1984 a ten-member delegation presented MK5, 000 to Kamuzu Banda 
“as a token of appreciation for the business opportunities offered to them” and thanked him for 
establishing several organisations (see below) to help the development of African commerce and 
industry133. At a subsequent meeting of the ABAM Executive Committee, the Vice Chairman and other 
members observed that the amount donated to the President was too insufficient  because “many and 
great are the good things which members of ABAM are now enjoying as a result of the direct interest 
which [the President] has in the association”134.  ABAM‟s most conspicuous role was the provision of 
free transport to party activists, especially the Women‟s League – Kamuzu‟s Mbumba – because “the 
                                                             
129 For instance, D.J. Chikhawo was first elected in 1980 and served as Executive Chairman until 1994 but was re-elected 
only twice, in 1985 and 1991. 
130  D.J.Chikhawo to D.S. Katopola, MP, MCP Regional Chairman (S), 29 January 1992, ABA/EXCHRMAN/DJC/cen. 
131  „Help Ngwazi to achieve Economic independence of the country‟, The Times, 2 July, 1970, p.8. 
132 „ABA donates MK1000 to MCP Convention‟, Daily Times, 20 August 1981 p.5; „Businessmen urged to contribute towards 
party activities‟, Daily Times, 11 September, 1980, p.8. 
133 „Businessmen say “Thank You Ngwazi”, Daily Times,21 February, 1984,p.1. 
134 Minutes of Extraordinary Board Meeting of ABA Executive Committee, held at Shire Highlands Hotel on 25 th February 
1984. 
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women entertained the [President] whenever they went to these places and providing transport was a 
gesture of appreciation for what Kamuzu had done for African businessmen”135. 
The association was expected to adhere to the MCP code of practice, especially in so far as the four 
cornerstones were concerned. For example, it was expected that those who lost political favour should 
either be prohibited from being members of the association or not hold any positions in the association. 
For example, when Bakili Muluzi was dismissed from the post of Secretary General of the MCP in 1978, 
ABAM appointed him chairman of its Transport Sub-committee. The Executive Chairman of the 
association was then asked by senior party officials and government bureaucrats why he had appointed 
a person who had fallen out of political favour136. Similarly, in 1987, a group of party activists observed 
that at district meetings of ABAM in the southern region, it was emphasised that the association is a 
„baby of the MCP and follows the MCP system and whatever the MCP does‟. They therefore wanted to 
know from the MCP Administrative Secretary why a man who had been detained twice for being 
against MCP policy was holding a senior position in ABAM137.  
The political loyalty of individual businessmen took precedence over their business interests in 
legitimising their membership of the association. Even as late as 1992, the chairman emphasised 
political loyalty as an important criterion in the following terms: 
What we should always remember is that we all belong to the MCP and without the MCP ABAM 
would not be formed and be where it is today ... We must contribute business services to the 
national development programmes loyally and diligently. It is also our duty to rally, support the 
MCP, government and above all, the Ngwazi, financially and materially138. 
 
                                                             
135 „Businessmen called upon to assist with transport‟, Daily Times, 1 September 1978 p.11; „Minister Commends ABAM‟s 
efforts, Daily Times 28 February 1978 p.1; „ABA Members urged to unite‟, Daily Times, 9 April 1981 p.7; „ABA Members 
get a pat on the back‟, Daily Times, 26 May, 1982, p.3. 
136  Interview, Mr. D.J Chikhawo, July 2009, former executive chairman of ABAM. 
137  C.Njabina to MCP Administrative Secretary, 15th June 1987 [private archives]. 
138  D.J. Chikhawo, speech to new ABAM Executive Committee, 16 February 1992, p.3 [private archives] 
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ABAM‟s legitimacy with the party earned it a policy voice through different mechanisms. Occasionally, 
the Executive Committee had private audiences with the President where policies such as the eviction 
of Asian traders from rural areas were discussed139. The ABAM chairman gained the President‟s 
confidence to such an extent that in 1992 when the wind for democratic change blew across the 
country, he was privately commissioned by the President to travel around the country to gauge the 
popular mood and assess whether the continuation of a one-party state under the MCP had a real 
chance of survival. In contrast, the Chamber did not enjoy such exclusive access to the President and 
at best was involved in policy consultations at an operational level. 
In addition to access to the political authorities, ABAM had direct representation on boards of 
organisations that made policy affecting local businesses. Of particular importance were the Small 
Enterprise Development Organisation of Malawi (SEDOM), Development of Malawian Traders Trust 
(DEMATT), Malawi Entrepreneurs Development Institute (MEDI), and The Import & Export Company of 
Malawi140. The government saw ABAM, which encompassed the Exporters Association of Malawi 
(EAM), Transporters Association of Malawi (TAM) and Private Traders (Small Produce) Marketing 
Association, as a peak business association for Africans141. The Ministry of Trade, which was 
designated as a „parent ministry‟ for ABAM, granted the association a lucrative sugar distributorship of 
up to 1000 metric tonnes per week in order to boost its revenue base142 . ABAM was also regularly 
invited as a participant in policy dialogues organised by the donor community on private sector issues, 
often alongside the Chamber143. 
                                                             
 139  Interview, Mr.D.J. Chikhawo, July 2009. 
140  Interview, Mr. D.J Chikhawo and his personal papers. 
141 Secretary of Agriculture to ABAM, 10th January 1991, Ref. No. 43/1/45/vol.III/63; Secretary for Economic Planning to 
ABAM, Ref No. EPD/2/3/4 [private archives]. 
142 ABAM Chairman‟s Report, Annual General Meeting, 17 November, 1991; D.J. Chikhawo to Secretary for Trade and 
Industry, 16th January, 1992, ABA/EXCHRMAN/DJC/cen.[private archives]. 
143 „UNDP Initiative in the Development of the Private Sector–Third In-Country Private Sector Meeting‟, UNDP RAF /88/025/-
G (private archives]. 
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5.4.3.  Strategies for promoting African enterprise 
Foreign dominance in commerce was recognised as a sensitive question but was obviously detested by 
the regime: 
It is a very sensitive question, ... if I do not face it now, no one else will face it ... In this country, 
trade and commerce ... [are] in the hands of people other than our own ... The vast majority of 
businessmen in this country dealing either in consumer goods or capital goods, is not African. It is 
either European or Asian. As a result most of the money, if not all of the money, made in trade and 
commerce in this country goes ... into the pockets of Europeans and Asians; Most of this money ... 
goes out of this country ... We must do everything possible to change the situation...which has 
been going on far too long144. 
The small African share in commerce was attributed to lack of capital and lack of access to credit, 
unfavourable terms for African traders in the wholesale market and stifling competition from Indian 
entrepreneurs who were already entrenched145. Consequently, the MCP government, like other African 
governments that were facing similar situations (Dinwiddy, 1974; World Bank, 1971), devised a plethora 
of measures with the explicit objective of assisting African businessmen. These took three different 
forms: discrimination against non-African businesses in favour of Africans, provision of business finance 
and basic training.  
Formation of trading corporations 
The National Trading Corporation (NTC) was formed by a partnership between the MDC and Bookers 
Malawi, in which the MDC acquired a 51 per cent stake. The NTC, like RUCOM Industries in Zambia, 
the Ghana National Trading Company (GNTC) and the Kenyan National Trading Corporation (KNTC) 
(Dinwiddy, 1974:6), was mandated to provide special services, including trade credit, to African 
traders146.  
                                                             
144  Kamuzu Banda, Hansard, 5th Session, Third Meeting, 29 January, 1968. pp 240-241. 
145  Ibid. 
146  Hansard , 6th session, First Meeting  8 October, 1968 p.5. 
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However, the partnership between the MDC and Bookers Malawi fell through in 1970 when the NTC 
failed to lower prices in the rural areas. The President suspected that Bookers was using its relationship 
with the MDC as a shield so that it could keep prices high without suffering repercussions under the 
Control of Goods Act.147 The President unilaterally announced the dissolution of the partnership and 
directed that the NTC would revert to Bookers Malawi and its rural assets would be acquired by the 
MDC, which would turn them over to a new government company (Hooker, 1971).  At the time of the 
dissolution, wholesale services had improved somewhat through the establishment of 26 depots, and 
trade credit had been granted to up to 200 traders (Dinwiddy, 1974:88).  The Import and Export (I&E) 
Company was subsequently formed as an MDC subsidiary to run wholesale and retail shops 
throughout the country. Its mandate included lowering prices for consumers, using its „managerial 
positions‟ as apprenticeship positions for African businessmen, and selling successful shops to African 
businessmen148. The government then announced that it was going to limit the issuing of import and 
export licences to a few firms. This measure was designed to punish Bookers and aide the newly 
formed company. The NTC and its successor helped an emergent commercial class to venture into the 
wholesale and retail sectors. Combined with the activities of Press, they provided opportunity for 
entrepreneurs with political connections to negotiate the rights to lucrative distributorships of consumer 
goods. In addition, the government procurement policy changed so that some contracts, for example 
food supplies, were restricted to Africans149. Similarly, Asian businessmen were warned not to compete 
with Africans in rural areas by buying maize mills and farm produce150. By 1968, Asians were restricted 
                                                             
147  Kamuzu Banda, speech to Parliament, 1971. 
148  The Times, 1 May, 1972, p.11 as cited by Joffe (1973:138). 
149  Kamuzu Banda, opening speech, MCP Convention (Lilongwe) September, 1968, pp 14-15. 
150  „Asian Traders Advised to help Africans‟, Malawi News, 26 August 1969. 
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from doing business in rural areas. All these policy measures were hailed and endorsed by the MCP 
Convention of 1968151. 
Eviction of Asians from rural areas 
In 1968, Kamuzu observed that the country was „flooded‟ with traders of other races, who had built 
shops “in the villages where the African should be trading among his own people...This robs our people 
the opportunity to go into business”152. The MCP Convention endorsed the position that business in 
rural areas should be left to Africans only. Consequently, Asians were ordered to relocate to the urban 
centres of Blantyre, Zomba and Lilongwe within two years and licences to trade in rural areas thereafter 
would be refused. The Business Licensing Act was accordingly amended. This measure became a 
trump card for the party and ABAM until its demise in 1994153. For example, the Conventions of 1970 
and 1975 carried resolutions of gratitude to Kamuzu for this policy. Senior politicians also often made 
reference to this measure when soliciting donations to the party from businessmen. In the early 1990s, 
the measure was highlighted in order to retain the loyalty of businessmen at a time when the political 
landscape was changing. 
However, this was an ill-conceived policy which was announced before operational plans had been 
worked out. Consequently, the deadline for its implementation was pushed back to 1973 and later to 
March 1978. During most of this period the bureaucracy groped in the dark for an operational 
interpretation of the presidential directive154. ABAM too complained of slow progress in implementing 
the policy155. Consequently, a committee comprising bureaucrats, bankers, ABAM, The Chamber, 
                                                             
151  Resolutions No.2 (iv), and No.8, MCP (1980:6-7); „Help for Africans entering businesses‟, Malawi News, 26 August 
1969. 
152  Kamuzu Banda, speech to MCP Convention, 1968; „African Businessmen to get a New Deal‟, The Times, 29 January, 
1968, p.1. 
153  The Conventions of 1970 and 1975 for example carried resolution of gratitude to Kamuzu for this policy. In the early 
1990s, the measure was emphasised in order to keep the loyalty of businessmen at a time when the political landscape 
was changing. 
154  See, for example, Secretary for Trade, Industry and Tourism to Secretary to President and Cabinet and others, 15 th July 
1975, BL/110/042/01/165; BL/110/042/02/2 of 16th February, 1976. 
155  Interview, Mr. D.J. Chikhawo. 
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Press and the I&E company was constituted to deal with the technical issues in the implementation of 
the directive. It must be noted that there are claims that this policy measure was „Dr. Banda‟s baby‟, 
and he overrode policy advice to the contrary by some of his ministers156. The operational challenges 
were enormous, especially as deadlines had been set by the President before consultations. It is not 
the purpose of this study to evaluate this policy measure, but suffice to say, it was driven by political 
considerations. 
In the main, it was seen as part of the nationalist struggle to reclaim the commercial sector for 
Malawians. However, the policy was not unparalleled in independent Africa. In Kenya, the Trade 
Licensing Act (1967) and The Import, Export and Essential supplies Act (1967) were enacted to restrict 
non-citizens from trading in all rural areas and all non-central parts of major cities and towns. Non-
citizens doing business in such areas were issued with „quit notices‟ and had to sell or rent their 
businesses to citizen traders (Himbara, 1994: 472). In Malawi, however, there was no option to rent to 
citizens. According to the President, any Asians opposed to the idea were “digging their own financial 
and economic graves”157 as any unsold foreign business by 31 March 1978 was forfeited. Africans were 
repeatedly warned „not to be Indian stooges‟158, and those Africans suspected of colluding with the 
departing Asians had their business licences cancelled and assets forfeited. Most Asians left the 
country for India or the United Kingdom. Those who remained became politically and socially invisible 
but quickly re-established themselves in commerce. While a good number of them became victims of 
forfeiture, they were, as a community, generous donors to the party and especially to Kamuzu 
personally. For example, in 1992 up to 250 of them from Blantyre alone met the Pres ident to “thank him 
for the peace and calm, law and order” that had prevailed in the country for 28 years and had enabled 
them to do good business. They presented a 6 tonne truck and a cash donation of up to MK1, 034, 
                                                             
156  Interview, Mr. Aleke Banda. 
157  „President Warns Asian Traders to move by a certain date‟, Malawi News, 5 May, 1970, p.1. 
158  „Businessmen Warned: Dont be Indians‟ stooges‟, Daily Times, 6 April, 1981, p.1. 
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255159. Contrast this with the MK7,820 donated by the African business community from nine districts of 
the central region in the same year160. 
Provision of business finance and training 
After Asians were expelled from the countryside, it was expected that Africans would quickly take over. 
The reality, though, was that many Africans had neither the capital to acquire assets owned by Asians 
nor the business acumen to run similar enterprises. The scarcity of private domestic savings, 
management and entrepreneurial skills compelled the government to form organisations that would 
provide the necessary financing and training as follows: 
 The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism proposed the formation of The Development of 
Malawian Traders Trust (DEMATT)161 in 1976. The aim was to provide a combined package of 
assistance comprising training, finance, and business advisory services initially to traders 
taking over from Asians. The trust offered „learn-on-site‟ programmes by holding classes on 
cash control, credit, stock management, business analysis and sometimes shelving162. 
 In 1981, The Small Enterprise Development of Malawi (SEDOM) was established as a non-
profit organisation by the government through a grant from the European Development Fund. 
The aim was to provide financial assistance, technical advice and development of business 
premises for African businessmen163. 
 The Investment and Development Fund (Inde Fund) was established in 1981 by Inde Bank (a 
subsidiary of ADMARC) and The Netherlands Finance Company for Developing Countries. The 
aim was to provide finance and advisory services for set-up, expansion and modernisation of 
enterprises owned and controlled by indigenous Malawians. 
 The Malawi Entrepreneurs Development Institute (MEDI) was set up to provide long-term 
vocational training to African entrepreneurs and to provide them with start-up capital. 
                                                             
159  „Blantyre Asians assure Ngwazi of support‟, Daily Times, 24 November, 1992. 
160  „Government wants partnership with the Private sector‟, Daily Times, 22 October, 1992, pp 1-3. 
161  Secretary of Trade, Industry and Tourism to Secretary to Treasury and others, 10 November, 1976, BL/110/042/02, 
MNA. 
162  „Trust for benefit of local traders,‟ Daily Times, 17 April, 1980, p.1. 
163 „Grant from European Development Fund‟, Daily Times, 9 February 1981 p.1; „Small Business body is viable‟, Daily 
Times, 28 June,1985 p.1. 
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ABAM had representation on the board of SEDOM, MEDI and DEMATT and was active in organising 
workshops and seminars for businessmen. In this latter task, the Chamber was tasked by the political 
authorities with helping in the training of African businessmen in rural areas. However, these facilities 
were often under so much political influence that the allocation of finances was based not just on the 
viability of business proposals but also on the political acceptability of the applicants164. Thus, the one-
party state devised strategies for promoting African enterprise, but it required the individual 
entrepreneurs to remain unquestionably loyal to the party, and if they were not, the regime was not 
hesitant in using its legal instruments to dispossess them. Although ABAM was not a huge financial 
donor to the party (except for transportation), its political significance was quite high, especially in 
providing impetus for the implementation of  politically inspired measures for the Africanisation of the 
commercial sector and in contributing to the enforcement of price controls. 
However, ABAM had a whole range of management problems, as reflected in the failure to hold the 
periodic elections required by its own constitution. By the time the political environment began to 
change in the early 1990s, many members had become disillusioned, and there were numerous 
allegations of favouritism and nepotism in allocating sugar distribution quotas and transport services. 
There were also allegations that the ABAM leadership were Indian stooges. An audit commissioned by 
the government established gross mismanagement of finances. Thus, in 1991, the Road Transporters 
Association, an affiliate of ABAM by government directive, financed a general assembly of the 
association. Elections were held, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry pledged its support in 
restructuring the association165.  Even insiders observed that ABAM had lost direction and needed 
reform166. But the tide for macro-level political change was gathering momentum. By 1993, the political 
                                                             
164  Interview, Mr. D.J. Chikhawo. 
165  Minutes of meeting between Ministry Officials and ABAM Executive Committee, ABA/ADMINSEC/JDC/cen, 25 October 
1991; Secretary of Trade to Chikhawo, 2 December, 1991, Ref No.BL/110/029 [private archives]. 
166  Bakili Muluzi to Chikhawo, 21 November,1991 Ref. Atupele Transport, EEB sfh [private archives]. 
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landscape had changed so dramatically that many of ABAM‟s executive members at national, regional 
and district levels were activists in emerging opposition groups. 
5.5.  Political change and the beginning of the end of neo-patrimonial one-party state 
hegemony in SBRs 
Upon the attainment of self-government in 1963, Kamuzu Banda was clear about what kind of political 
system he intended to set-up: 
I am not opposed to the existence of opposition parties; [but] I do not myself propose to take the 
initiative in building up an effective opposition to my party. [And] If opposition parties should appeal 
[to the people], then....my party will.... seek to minimise their influence... should the people as a 
whole tire of me and my party, then they will remove and replace us. Until that time comes, we 
propose to govern167. 
The MCP regime pursued this objective with zeal. Although formally a one-party state, the analysis 
above agrees with Venter‟s (1995:155) observation that, to all intents and purposes, Malawi was a one-
man state in which the entire state machinery was answerable to Kamuzu Banda. For the business 
community, the result was a climate of fear, insecurity of property rights and a culture of si lence. It was 
a period of „living dangerously‟ (O‟ Maille, 1999) in which public and private domains were fused by 
politics. However, „the people as a whole‟ grew tired of the party and began pressing for the overhaul of 
the one-party state. The movement for political change in the 1990s and the rise of neo-liberalism as a 
framework for national politics and the economy shook the foundations of the neo-patrimonial state 
hegemony. The historic referendum held in 1993, which favoured multiparty democracy over the 
continuation of a one-party state, marked the beginning of the end of a pattern of SBRs, and state-
society relations generally, in which the state lorded over the business sector.  
Certainly, a number of reforms aimed at opening up economic activities to the market, as opposed to 
political rationality, began in the early 1980s with the adoption of structural adjustment programmes 
(Kydd, 1989; Harrigan, 1991). They included deregulating foreign exchange, domestic prices and the 
                                                             
167  Kamuzu Banda, Malawi News, 1 March 1963 as cited by Short (1974:253).  
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removal of barriers to the entry of private enterprise in sectors that were exclusive to the corporate 
triumvirate. These policy changes, however, did not produce any significant changes in the pattern of 
SBRs, within which neo-patrimonial state hegemony based on an entrenched pattern of elite interlock 
and an embedded political culture based on fear and submission, continued unabated. The beginning of 
the end for Banda‟s predatory, intimidatory and at times violent practices towards private enterprise lay 
in changing the fundamentals of politics, i.e. the nature of the state, the political system and attendant 
power configurations.  
Following the 1993 referendum‟s result in favour of the reintroduction of multiparty politics, the Forfeiture 
Act and the one-party constitution were repealed. In 1994, the United Democratic Front (UDF) swept to 
power with Bakili Muluzi as President.The demise of the one-party state, and especially the loss of 
power by the MCP, saw ABAM shrink, entering terminal political decline. The rise to power of the UDF, 
which was led by business tycoons several of whom had suffered at the hands of the MCP, represented 
yet another critical juncture in the institutional patterns of SBRs and is analysed in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
The structure and practice of SBRs during the one-party era was fundamentally different from that of 
the colonial era. The foregoing narrative shows that just like in the preceding epoch, the analysis of 
SBRs is essentially about the formation and evolution of institutions for organising these relations. 
Consequently, it provides further insights about factors that shape both SBRs and the processes of 
institutional formation, maintenance and change. Just like in the colonial era, the praxis of SBRs in the 
post-colonial era illustrates the primacy of political considerations for the state and business elites in 
structuring their relations. In concluding the chapter, I highlight below some theoretical points that the 
narrative illustrates or suggests. 
The primacy of politics 
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Whereas colonial business associations were fairly autonomous and enjoyed political power to the 
extent of virtual veto, the post-colonial period was characteristically different. Business associations 
were subordinated to the MCP, which thrived on a ruthless enforcement of its four cornerstones. Thus, 
Kamuzu Banda ordered the creation of ABAM more to enhance the legitimacy of the party among 
African businessmen than to broaden the sphere of African business enterprise. African businessmen 
were effectively turned into the president‟s retainers by granting them particularistic privileges, including 
reserved trading areas. These „benefices‟ (Weber, 1968:235) obliged African businessmen to proclaim 
the personal power and benevolence of the President. While ABAM was appended to the party from 
inception, the Chamber was compelled by the logic of appropriateness i.e. its continued survival was 
dependent on its willingness to go along with the political whims of the party. Similarly, the regulatory 
framework, especially its price controls, was imbued with a degree of populism that enjoyed a warm 
reception from the poor majority. While this strategy produced political gains, it repressed private 
enterprise. The arbitrary cancellations of business licences and subsequent forfeitures yielded a docile 
and overly cautious business community. Unlike the colonial government, which relied on a thinly 
spread police force for law enforcement, the post-colonial state relied on an omnipresent party 
machinery that was effective at enforcing laws or party resolutions and punishing any perceived 
deviance from the four cornerstones. The MYP, youth leaguers and the conventional police constituted 
nothing less than „patrimonial troops‟ (Weber, 1968:235) in unleashing state-controlled violence against 
politically undesirable elements in the business community. 
Political architecture and the autonomy of the state vis-a-vis the business community 
Unlike the colonial era, where institutional formation was based on inter-elite politics in the form of 
negotiations and bargaining, during the one-party era, institutions governing SBRs were not in any 
sense „political settlements‟ (Khan, 1997).  Due to the asymmetrical distribution of power in favour of 
the President, rules and codes of practices in SBRs were products of presidential fiat in which 
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economic considerations played second fiddle to political ones. While the Chamber was effectively 
sidelined for failing to Africanise its leadership, Banda created a nominated parliamentary European 
opposition to placate the expatriate business community but did not allow them any meaningful power 
to influence decisions. While the MCP Convention was officially a policy forum, the Chamber of 
Commerce was left out because its membership included Europeans, who were not allowed any active 
part in national politics. ABAM, however, like all other participants at the conventions, was merely 
sycophantic and was cajoled into building a presidential personality cult. The personalisation of the 
state in Kamuzu Banda meant that in so far as the making of policy was concerned, there was no 
benign collaboration (Scheneider and Maxfield, 1997; Harris, 2006; te Velde, 2006) between the state 
and the business community. Collaboration was only at the level of implementation of policy directives. 
The analysis suggests that transparent and benign collaboration for policy dialogue in SBRs depends in 
part on the degree of dispersal of political power in the institutional architecture of the state. While state 
power in the colonial period was shared between the Governor, EXCO and LEGCO, in the post-colonial 
period, it was centralised in the President, who was difficult to access. This removed any meaningful 
policy spaces for the business community. 
Financial independence of the state from the business sector 
When compared to the colonial period, the analysis of post-colonial SBRs provides evidence for the 
proposition that one important distinction between one government and another is the degree to which 
market replaces government or government replaces market (Lindblom, 1977:ix). It illustrates that when 
the state becomes the larger part of the business sector, the private business community loses much of 
its economic and political significance and is highly unlikely to be accorded a regular and significant 
policy voice. It further shows that a pattern of elite interlock in which political elites straddle government 
and business results in an accumulation and concentration of power by a few who use it to create 
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institutions that protect their interests at the expense of broader access to political and economic 
opportunities. 
The analysis bolsters the suggestions made in the previous chapter that state dependence on the 
private sector for revenues and the provision of employment shapes SBRs. In contrast to most of the 
colonial period, where the state relied on the domestic business sector to provide taxable employment 
and other forms of revenues, the one-party state dominated the economy itself. The role of parastatal 
companies and the President‟s conglomerate (Press) virtually eclipsed private entrepreneurs. The 
state, through its corporations and other enterprises, provided the largest proportion of jobs and 
generated the revenue that the political elites needed for patronage and other purposes. There was 
effectively little need to „sweet-talk‟ the business community or regard it as a policy partner. Johnston‟s 
colonial state disregarded the domestic business sector because the state accessed revenues with 
relative ease from the BSAC. Subsequent Governors initiated and sustained concertation with the 
business community because of their „resource imperative‟ and need to sustain political legitimacy with 
the European community. The one-party state, however, was largely self-reliant. It was itself the largest 
part of the business sector, the biggest employer and contributor to GDP. In any case, its rule structure 
was predatory, and it could therefore extract money and other materials from private enterprise through 
different mechanisms. Thus, contrary to the thesis of the „privileged position of capital‟ (Lindblom, 
1977), it is the state that was privileged in post-colonial Malawi, and capital was subservient to it. This 
insight not only endorses the hypothesis in fiscal sociology about the social, economic and political 
evolution of societies (Campbell, 1993; Moore, 2004) but also shows that the political and economic 
objectives of state elites determine how much and what kind of policy space, if any, will be accorded to 
the business community. In contrast to the miniscule role of the state in the economy during 
colonialism, the overarching economic role of the post-colonial state and Banda‟s personal engagement 
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in big business diminished the relative financial and political significance of private enterprise and 
meant that government had little reason for engaging with it directly and regularly in policy dialogue. 
The narrative also shows that the low level of capitalist development at the time of independence 
enabled the state to dominate the economy and engage in populist strategies to indigenise the 
business sector. The political and economic dominance of the state meant that the business community 
lost the autonomy it had developed over decades in the colonial era. The African businessmen did not 
even have a chance to begin to develop even the semblance of autonomy. The entire business 
community was dependent on the goodwill of the President and his lieutenants. While the state viewed 
private enterprise with mistrust for fear of it developing politically autonomous capitalists and for fear of 
it undermining the state by cheating a peasant citizenry, the business community viewed the state with 
suspicion because of the ever imminent possibility of forfeitures. Thus, the dominance of the state 
made it autonomous, but its predatory tendencies made it unable to become embedded along the lines 
suggested by Evans (1995). The state was neither an organ of a domestic bourgeoisie that it sought to 
create through indigenisation policies nor was it an „executive committee‟ for international capital 
although it partnered with it in subsidiary and associated companies. Any element of the business 
community was dispensable. SBRs, therefore, were a skewed relationship. 
Organisation of the business sector vis-a-vis the state 
Unlike the colonial government, which intervened in the organisation of the business sector to avoid a 
pluralised institutional environment for policy dialogue, the one-party state thrived on „divide-and-rule‟ 
tactics, initially by creating a sectional business association for Africans, the MARTA, and later ABAM to 
operate alongside the Chamber. This difference owes to the politics of policy making. Unlike in the 
colonial era, where business associations had a policy voice, they had no significant role in policy 
making during the one-party state. There was therefore no need for a single collective voice. Secondly, 
the pluralised organisation of the business sector served to legitimise the party among African 
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businessmen by granting their association political access and prestige while effectively designating the 
Chamber and its alien membership as  „outsiders‟ to mainstream politics. 
The analysis, like that of the colonial era, shows that access to the state is the most important incentive 
for peak business associations. The Chamber lost its visibility in policy processes until the early 1970s. 
Despite attempts to woo African businessmen to sign up for membership, there were only 10 African 
members in 1969. There was probably less pressure to increase African membership as the nominated 
parliamentary opposition was made up by members of the Chamber even though they were not 
selected by it. It is apparent that the dissolution of the parliamentary opposition in 1973 contributed to 
the election of an African chairman of the Chamber, and this act alone earned the Chamber political 
recognition and the invitation to engage in dialogue with government on policy implementation. By 
1987, the Chamber was described in the Government‟s Statement of Development Policies as a 
partner offering a forum for policy discussion. This illustrates the validity of the proposition by Leys 
(1994:30) made in the context of Kenya that it is „less important that the domestic bourgeoisie should 
be efficient – technically, financially or otherwise - ... than they should be competent politically ...”. The 
compliance of the Chamber, although mechanical, to the demands of the regime ensured its survival in 
a period when any semblance of autonomy would have resulted in it being proscribed.  It is remarkable 
that, in the long run it became something of a cradle for political change. 
Elites and their configuration 
The narrative shows that the configuration of state and business elites contributes to structuring the 
practice of SBRs. While the two clusters of elites were differentiated in the colonial era, they were fused 
in the one-party state. The dispersal of governmental power in the colonial era therefore enabled inter-
elite politics of negotiation and contestation in making institutions and policies. In contrast, the political 
institutional architecture of the one-party state yielded only one elite cluster straddling business and 
politics with decision-making powers concentrated at the top. The result was simply levels of elites that 
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gravitated around the apex, which was manned by the President himself.  Furthermore, it is evident that 
when elites straddle business and politics, the state turns into a means of boosting personal 
businesses. This is illustrated by the acquisition of forfeited businesses by the President‟s own 
company. It shows that the economic interests of key elites can exert a powerful influence on the kinds 
of choices they make with respect to political arrangements (VonDoepp, 2005; Boone, 1998). Given 
that Kamuzu Banda personally dictated the wording of the Forfeiture Act168, and that his company 
benefited massively from it, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the political power of the state 
was used to augment economic interests, which in turn augmented the political power of the President. 
Furthermore, elite interlock, firstly, between political roles and private ownership and secondly between 
various directorships of state corporations (including Press) and their subsidiaries, yielded a type of 
authoritarian patrimonialism that blurred the public-private divide and endangered the politically 
indifferent private enterprise. 
Historical institutionalism and critical junctures 
It is argued in historical institutionalism that institutions are persistent features of the historical 
landscape and are the central factors that push historical development along a set of paths (Hall, 1996; 
Hoff, 2003). While this claim has been evidenced by different studies elsewhere (Pierson, 2004; 
Thelen, 2003), the foregoing analysis does not entirely support this view when the praxis of colonial 
SBRs is juxtaposed with that of the one-party state. On the contrary, it shows that the attainment of 
independence was a critical juncture in which popular expectations for institutional change among the 
African population, especially the political elite, unleashed political energies towards that goal and 
produced marked institutional discontinuities in the practice of colonial SBRs. New institutions were 
                                                             
168  He told parliament, “I dictated this law, so if there is anyone to blame it is me” (14 October, 1968, closing speech of 
parliamentary session, p.5). 
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enacted and new practices for the conduct of SBRs evolved. The colonial institutional edifice for SBRs 
did not persist. It succumbed to political processes and power reconfiguration. 
The analysis shows that while some colonial institutions are known to have continued into the post-
colonial period, for example, the peasant land tenure system on tobacco estates (Harrigan, 2001; 
Ng‟ong‟ola, 1986), there was a complete institutional break in SBRs. This suggests that the conception 
of critical junctures based on the effects of institutional change, when applied to the attainment of 
political independence, explains institutional discontinuities and the emergence of new institutions in 
SBRs but does not help to explain institutional continuities in other spheres. This, in turn, suggests that 
institutional continuity across a macro-level critical juncture can be explained if the definitive factor in 
the notion of critical junctures is not the effects of the resultant institutional changes but people‟s 
expectations for change at the time of the event that designates a critical juncture. The expectations 
may or may not come to pass subject to elite interests.  
History and institutional change 
The narrative shows that the historical effects of the institutions and politics of the colonial era shaped 
the institutional evolution of SBRs in the post-colonial period by providing a basis for the political and 
economic objectives of state elites. In breaking with the past, political processes and the national 
political institutional architecture was designed in a manner that produced a skewed power distribution  
between the state and the business sector that the state used effectively to determine policy spaces for 
the business sector and the format of policy dialogue. Historical power asymmetries informed by 
parochial identities (especially race) were at the centre of institutional change when political power 
shifted from Europeans to Africans. The discarding of colonial institutions and the creation of new ones 
by a new cadre of political elites was consistent with nationalist expectations deeply rooted in the 
historical experiences of the Africans. The narrative shows that history matters not just for explaining 
institutional continuities  across critical junctures  as is often emphasised in most historical 
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institutionalist literature (Mahoney, 2000), but also because historical lessons derived  from the effects 
and dynamics of the previous institutional paths shape elite ideas and objectives, which lead to 
institutional discontinuities and feed into the design of subsequent institutions. Thus, the attainment of 
political independence was a critical juncture, not just for the praxis of SBRs but for state-society 
relations in general. Therefore, both institutional change at critical junctures and institutional continuity 
through path dependence are only explicable by looking to the history of institutional formation, 
maintenance and their outcomes on different groups of actors. 
The analysis illustrates the proposition that institutional change is dependent on the interaction of 
existing institutional structure and the actors who work within it. In other words, behaviours shape the 
institutions while the institutions shape the incentives for the actors (North, 1995). It therefore suggests 
that the structure-agency dichotomy, while useful for explaining some political outcomes, is not helpful 
for explaining institutional change. Like that of the colonial period, the analysis of post-colonial SBRs 
provides empirical evidence for „theories of intentional design‟ (Sinead and North, 1995) in so far as the 
emergence of political institutions is concerned. The difference between the two epochs, however, is 
that while in the colonial era the institutions were generally products of free and voluntary exchange 
between business and the state, they were products of governmental orders in the post-colonial era 
owing to asymmetrical power distribution. 
These theoretical observations, however, are only preliminary at this stage. I will return to them more 
systematically in chapter seven. The next chapter, analyses the patterns of SBRs after the demise of 
the one-party state and the introduction of multiparty democracy. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Nascent Concertation and Politically Embedded Cronyism and Collusion: State-Business-
Relations in a Decade of Multiparty Democracy 
“We regard Government as our partners in creating a conducive climate  for business and 
economic growth … we regard ourselves as advisors to Government but, as is normal, 
Government is not compelled to take all our advice.”1 
“It saddens me … [that]… we have not … won any tenders from our Ministers… [yet]…all of us 
hold our positions by virtue of our party affiliation… It may be proper … to issue a directive that will 
encourage all ministries and parastatals to direct all their requirements to us…”2 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses state-business relations in the first decade of multiparty democracy (1994-2004). 
It shows that the transition from a one-party dictatorship to multiparty democracy, and the subsequent 
change of government from the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) to the United Democratic Front (UDF), 
was another critical juncture for the institutional patterns of SBRs. The democratisation wave generated 
expectations for change in the formal political institutional architecture. These expectations crystallised 
in a new democratic constitution that ushered in a different political dynamic that re-structured state-
society relations generally, and particularly SBRs. Throughout the decade, the institutional 
arrangements for SBRs were in a flux so that their analysis is as much about their emergence as it is 
about the character of SBRs during the period. 
Neo-patrimonial state hegemony of the MCP era gave way to a two–dimension pattern of SBRs. I 
describe these dimensions as nascent concertation and politically embedded cronyism and collusion. 
Nascent concertation was a pattern characterised by continued efforts by several state agents and the 
business community to institutionalise public-private dialogue (PPD) for the formulation and monitoring 
of economic policy and development strategies. It was, however, confounded by mistrust and suspicion 
among stakeholders, mainly because of the informality of the evolving institutional arrangements and 
                                                             
1 Jimmy Koreia Mpatsa, president of the Confederation of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry (MCCCI), „Interview 
with the President‟, MCCCI Newsletter, Issue 2, 2000, p.9. 
2 UDF executive member to UDF Governor for southern region, „Strengthening UDF‟, 24 April, 2002 [Private Archives]. 
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uncertainty about the strategic interests of the key stakeholders. By the end of the decade, PPD was 
much better than in the MCP era but remained uninstitutionalised. The phrase „politically embedded 
cronyism and collusion‟ describes a non transparent, collusive dimension in which there were close 
connections between business owners and the dominant political party and most governing politicians 
were eager and willing to intervene in administrative processes with partisan and personal calculus. It 
was characterised by a break-down of discipline and standards within the state machinery as 
bureaucrats were cajoled into political loyalty to the new regime. The result was wanton political graft in 
which state elites and business elements engaged in rent-generating and rent-seeking activities, 
respectively. 
The core argument of this chapter has three strands. Firstly, the new structure of rules governing 
politics and the economy took effect before building appropriate ancillary institutions. This opened up 
opportunities for rampant rent-seeking behaviour. The configuration of political power after the 1994 
general elections compelled state incumbents to succumb to particularistic pressures in SBRs in order 
to build political support. Secondly, the paradox of the simultaneous pursuit of concertation and 
collusion in SBRs was sustained by a culture of chameleon politics that characterised the political elites 
(both those in government and in the opposition) in the transitional decade. It reflected the interaction of 
formal rules and political agency characterised by a rhetorical pursuit of democratic and liberal ideals 
and a simultaneous pursuit of narrow elite interests to maintain political power, in an environment where 
disbursement of patronage became the basis of political legitimacy. The analysis illustrates how 
political and economic interests of key elites shape each other and influence the kinds of institutional 
choices the elites make. The third argument relates to the theoretical concerns of the study. I argue that 
the history of the one-party state in SBRs motivated the ruling politicians in UDF to quickly deregulate 
the business arena. Large scale deregulation enabled them to gain political support from businessmen 
and women of small and medium enterprises. Furthermore, the need to demonstrate that political 
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practice (especially policy making) had changed relative to that of the one party authoritarian state, 
provided the rationale for consultation between the state and various groups in the business 
community. The new pattern was significantly distinct from both the colonial and the post-independence 
eras and illustrates further how the nature of the state, especially the configuration of political power, 
impacts on the evolution of institutions for SBRs. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 provides the contextual background to the emergence 
of nascent concertation and politically embedded cronyism and collusion. Section 6.2 discusses 
political change and the resulting changes in the institutional architecture of SBRs focussing on the 
deconstruction of the institutional arrangements of the one-party state. Section 6.3 traces the evolution 
of concertation. Section 6.4 discusses the emergence and dynamics of politically embedded cronyism 
and collusion. Section 6.5 explains the paradoxical conflation of concertation and collusion in SBRs. 
The conclusion identifies the theoretical points for SBR and institutional theory that the analysis 
suggests. 
6.1. Background to the emergence of nascent concertation and collusive state-business 
relations 
6.1.1. The wave of democratisation 
The third wave of democratisation reached Malawi in the early 1990s3. After three decades of one-party 
rule, whose authoritarianism and repression was unparalleled anywhere on the African continent 
(Venter, 1995), the political system underwent a quick metamorphosis. Some accounts describe the 
transition as mainly a domestic process initiated by religious authorities. They take the reading of a 
Catholic pastoral letter on 8th March 1992 as the starting point. The letter was the first public criticism of 
the MCP regime. It called for social and political reform and argued that it was not disloyal for 
Malawians to ask questions about matters that concerned them. It was particularly strong at criticising 
                                                             
3 Huntington (1991) distinguishes the „third wave‟ from the first that took place at the end of the eighteenth century beginning 
with the French revolution and ending with the American revolution; and from the „second wave‟ that arose in the aftermath 
of the Second World War. The third wave began in 1974 and was triggered by the overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship. 
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social and economic inequalities, corruption, nepotism, gross abuse of human rights, and inadequate 
social services especially in education and health4. Such accounts include the Catholic Institute for 
International Relations (CIIR) (1993), Mchombo (1998), Newell (1995), Nzunda and Ross (1995), 
Article 19 (1993) and Cullen (1994). 
Other accounts emphasise the international dimension especially the role of foreign aid donors. They 
argue that the donors played a crucial role in the timing and relative smoothness of the transition. The 
background to this argument is that in 1992 foreign aid accounted for 31.5 per cent of GNP which was 
about three times the average for sub-Saharan Africa which was pegged at 11.1 per cent (UNDP, 
2000:221-22). At a donors‟ group meeting in May 1992, the Malawi Government requested $800 million 
for Balance Of Payments (BOP). For the first time, the request was subjected to political conditionality 
(Brown, 2004). Consequently, western bilateral donors gradually withdrew their support and 
increasingly pressured for the respect of human rights and a move to pluralism. This pressure incited 
exiled dissidents of the MCP regime to organise more effectively in March 1992 and forced the MCP 
regime to open up to change. Informative accounts in this regard include Brown (2004), Clapham 
(1996), van Donge (1995) and Venter (1995).  
A few months after the pastoral letter, the Public Affairs Committee (PAC), initially comprising of 
religious groups only, was established as a societal initiative to dialogue with the MCP government for 
political change (Brown, 2004:707). The Chamber of Commerce and the Law Society were initially not 
allowed by Dr. Banda to participate in PAC on the basis that their concerns could be channelled to 
relevant ministries of government. They were later accepted and discussions with government 
                                                             
4 Catholic Bishops of Malawi, 1992, „Living our Faith‟, Balaka, Montfort Missionaries, Lent, 1992. 
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proceeded with speed5. It is fair to say that a confluence of factors, both local and international, caused 
the quick and smooth replacement of the MCP regime6. 
While there were many internal and external factors and actors too, that prompted the political change, 
it is worthwhile for this dissertation to highlight   a small but significant part of the transition that relates 
directly to SBRs.  It is about the role of some leaders of the Chamber and the African Businessmen 
Association of Malawi (ABAM). In the early 1990s, Bakili Muluzi, a former Secretary General of the 
MCP was doubling as Chairman of the Transport Committee of ABAM and Deputy Chairman of the 
Chamber. Harry Thomson was the Chamber‟s chairman and also chairman of the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) Regional Business Council. In 1991, at meetings of the SADC 
Regional Business Council in Mozambique and Swaziland, Muluzi broached the idea of starting an 
opposition party to Thomson7. Straddling ABAM and the Chamber helped Muluzi to gauge the mood for 
change in the business community and to mobilise support among both African and expatriate 
businessmen. Consequently, the Chamber was accused, by MCP sympathisers, of turning into a 
political body through the activities of its leaders. MCP staunch supporters consequently resigned8 but 
the leadership of the Chamber, as part of the PAC, continued to push for reforms. Although ABAM 
officially supported the MCP and continued to call on African businessmen to show gratitude to Kamuzu 
for affording them business opportunities, most of its members joined the movement for political 
change. In mid 1992, ABAM‟s chairman was tasked by Kamuzu Banda to assess the popularity of the 
                                                             
5 Interview, Mr. Harry Thomson, Chairman of the Chamber at the time. During this period, there was considerable external 
criticism of the regime by exiled Malawians. There was also high inflation and growing discontent with a policy directive for 
teachers and other civil servants to relocate and teach in their regions of origin. 
6 Additional literature on Malawi‟s transition to democracy include the following: Phiri and Ross (1998), Englund (2002), 
Forster (2000), Ihonvbere (1997), Kaspin (1995), Mitchell (2002) and Ng‟ong‟ola (1996). 
7 Interview, Mr.Harry Thomson, July 2009. 
8 Interviews, Messrs Harry Thomson, Rafiq Hajat and Humphrey Mvula.  
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party and he reported of popular disillusionment with Banda‟s close associates and that change was 
inevitable9. 
In October 1992, a referendum on the future of the one-party state was announced. In June 1993, 
people voted for multiparty democracy. In readiness for the general election in 1994, seven new parties 
were registered including the UDF10 led by Bakili Muluzi as President and Harry Thomson as Secretary 
General and several shadow ministers who were members of the Chamber. Following the general 
election of May 1994, Kamuzu Banda and the MCP gracefully gave in to Bakili Muluzi of  UDF who won 
the presidential election with 47 per cent of the national vote. 
6.1.2. The configuration of political power 
The general election, however, brought to light the salience of regionalism and ethnicity in Malawian 
politics. At the Presidential level, Bakili Muluzi, a Yao from the southern region and UDF candidate 
amassed 75 per cent of votes in the southern region, about 22 per cent in the central region and close 
to 6 per cent of votes in the northern region. Dr Banda, a Chewa from the central region and MCP 
candidate received 70 per cent of votes in the central region, about 19 per cent in the southern region 
and close to 9 per cent of votes in the northern region. Similarly Chakufwa Chihana, a Tumbuka from 
the northern region and AFORD candidate received 85 per cent of votes in the northern region, about 8 
per cent in the central region and managed only 7 per cent of votes in the southern region11. At 
parliamentary level, the trend was similar as shown below: 
  
                                                             
9 Interview,Mr. D.J. Chikhawo, former chairman of ABAM. 
10 The other parties were Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), United Front for Multiparty Democracy(UFMD), Malawi National 
Democratic party(MNDP), Congress for the Second Republic(CSR), Malawi Democratic Party (MDP), and Malawi 
Democratic Union (MDU). 
11 These are rounded figures so they do not necessarily add up to 100%. Furthermore, there was another presidential 
candidate, Kamlepo Kalua who pooled about 0.53 per cent of the total national votes. 
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Table 6.1: Distribution of parliamentary seats by party and region after the 1994 general election 
 AFORD MCP UDF 
NORTH 33 0 0 
CENTRE 312 51 1213 
SOUTH 0 514 73 
TOTAL 36 56 85 
Source: Malawi Electoral Commission, 1994 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Report, Appendix 
XII. 
As observed by Chirwa (1998), on the basis of these results, no party was „national‟ in character and 
none could claim legitimacy in the regions where they lost. With only 48 per cent of parliamentary 
seats, the UDF could not pass even legislation that required a simple majority vote. The party‟s need to 
build broad-based legitimacy and consolidate power impacted on the practice of state-business 
relations. In particular, the political loyalty and reliability of owners of businesses became a prime 
consideration in the allocation of credit, lucrative government contracts and other favours. 
6.1.3. Social and economic background 
The UDF assumed power in 1994 on the policy platform of poverty alleviation and democratic politics. 
In the preceding era, acknowledging openly the prevalence of poverty was a political taboo as poverty 
was supposed to have been a phenomenon of the colonial era (Chinsinga, 2002). In fact, parliamentary 
and other records of the period are full with expressions of gratitude to Kamuzu Banda for his „wise‟, 
„visionary‟ and „dynamic‟ leadership that transformed Malawi „beyond recognition‟. The reality, however, 
was that poverty was widespread, deep and severe. GNI per capita was as low as $160 in 1994, which 
was far below half the sub-Saharan average and about 52 per cent of the population was living below a 
                                                             
12 These seats were in constituencies bordering the northern region and populated by people with ethnic identities as those 
of the northern region. 
13 These seats were in urban constituencies with mixed ethnic groups. 
14 These seats were all in Nsanje district, the district of origin of the MCP presidential running mate. 
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poverty line of $40 per person per year. At the end of 1993, the gini-coefficient was as high as 0.57 and 
was one of the highest in the world. The Human Development Index (HDI) was as low as 0.320 with life 
expectancy at birth pegged at 44 years, which was eight years less than the average for sub-Saharan 
Africa; infant mortality rate was at 134 per 1000 live births, adult illiteracy was estimated at 44 per cent 
in 1995, and only about 37 per cent of the population had access to safe water15. Against this backdrop, 
the UDF government launched the Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) in August 1994. Although the 
PAP was vague on specific strategies, the shift from agriculture to commerce as the desired hub of 
economic growth and development was clearly visible (Chinsinga, 2002; Van Donge, 1995). The 
government projected an outlook of being biased towards the promotion of the business sector16. 
However, the private business sector was very small. In 1994, its output accounted for only 15-20 per 
cent of GDP and the remainder was being generated by the state in its multiple guises (GoM, 1997:1). 
The formal enterprise sector (including government companies and their subsidiaries) was also small, 
with an estimated 1,800 corporations out of an estimated number of commercial enterprises ranging 
from 200,000 to 600,000 (GoM, 1997:3). Furthermore, the distribution of business enterprises 
according to size showed a structural weakness in that it was characterised by a disproportionately 
large number of micro-enterprises, a small number of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and a few 
large enterprises. A 1992 Gemini survey estimated proportions of the different enterprises to be 0.04 
percent for large enterprises, 3.6 per cent for SMEs and 96.36 per cent for micro-enterprises17 (as cited 
in GoM, 1997:4). It was a common diagnosis that the dominating and often oligopolistic  presence of a 
few large firms, with vertically and horizontally integrated portfolios across agricultural production, 
                                                             
15 These figures are from various official documents as cited in Nthara (2003) and IMF (1998). 
16 In an interview for this study, Mr. Aleke Banda, who served as Minister of Finance and later of Agriculture in the UDF 
government said the perception was wrong because the government spent more on agriculture than on commerce and 
introduced the Agricultural Starter-pack Programme.  
17 Compare with Botswana at 4.2 percent, 50.1 per cent and 45.7 percent respectively. 
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manufacturing and distribution, contributed hugely to an uncompetitive economic environment where 
new and small players were unable to find a foothold (GoM, 1997; Harrigan, 2001).  
Besides complicated business licensing and registration system that were characteristic of the one-
party state, a particularly acute constraint to business development was lack of access to capital. A 
survey of 10,698 medium size enterprises showed that in 1994 sources of capital for setting up 
enterprises were distributed as follows: Household savings accounted for 80 percent of businesses; 
loans from relatives for 7.6 per cent; loans from lending institutions for 4.9 per cent; loans from money 
lenders for 2.3 per cent and 4.3 per cent were accounted for by „other‟ sources (National Statistical 
Office, (NSO), 1996)18. Across the three regions of the country, capital problems in the SME sector 
were as depicted below: 
Table 6.2: Distribution of capital problems in SMEs by region, 1994 
 South Centre North 
Percentage of enterprises with 
problems in securing capital 
61.8  72.5 57.6 
Percentage of household savings in 
capital finance for enterprises 
80  86.7 87.3 
Percentage of firms accessing 
business finance from lending 
organisations 
6 5.6 2.7 
Percentage of firms reporting 
government regulations as problem to 
setting up enterprises 
4.1 1.8 4.7 
Source: National Statistical Office (NSO) (1996) Medium Business Economic Survey, 1994 (figures culled 
from various pages). 
The situation captured above led to several initiatives that impacted on SBRs. For instance, 
liberalisation of the economy, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the need to develop small 
and medium enterprises provided the impetus for the beginning of concertation. These dynamics 
                                                             
18 Survey involved enterprises operating from fixed premises and employing from 5-99 employees. 
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transpired in a political environment characterised by experimentation with democratic ethos in policy-
making, less for commitment to democracy than a fig leaf for show-casing political change. On the 
other hand, difficulties in accessing capital for business development, especially in the SME sector, 
turned the state into a resource and an arena for politically embedded collusion between state agents 
and some business elements.  
6.2. Political change and the deconstruction of the one-party state in state-business 
relations 
6.2.1. Political institutional architecture 
A new political institutional architecture was created in a new republican constitution which sought to 
address the excesses of the one-party state and create a new political and economic order that would 
be based on pluralism, limited executive powers and democratic principles. In particular, the powers of 
the presidency were attenuated through the separation of powers between the executive, legislative 
and judicial branches of the state19. Furthermore, a term of five years was imposed for the presidency 
with the incumbent being allowed to run for one more consecutive term20. Certain decisions, including 
any amendments to the constitution, were subjected to the rule of super-majority in which any proposal 
had to recieve up to two-thirds of affirmative parliamentary votes in order to become law21. The nominal 
supremacy of parliament and the MCP convention gave way to constitutional supremacy under which 
the judiciary gained powers to reverse executive and parliamentary decisions so long as they could be 
shown to be unconstitutional22. Unlike the one-party constitution which was drafted by a small 
committee of the MCP in 1965, under the chairmanship of Aleke Banda, the new constitution was a 
product of a National Consultative Committee (NCC). The NCC drew its membership from professional 
bodies, religious groups, traditional leaders and emergent political parties. However, despite professed 
                                                             
19 Sections 7-9 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994. 
20 Section 83 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994. 
21 Chapter XXI of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994. 
22 Section 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994. On judicial review of executive decisions, see Nzunda 
(1998). 
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intentions for a limited government, the concentration of political power in the president continued into 
the democratic era, and in some respects impacted on the evolution of both concertation and collusion 
in state-business relations (see below). 
The new political institutional architecture differed significantly from the colonial and post-colonial eras 
in that business interests were not given a permanent and secure representative role in the governance 
structures of the state. However, like any other societal interests, they were accorded freedom to 
organise and to lobby for their interests. The Chamber‟s slogan as „the voice of the private sector‟ 
became even more pronounced and lobbying government became its primary objective. In addition to 
restructuring state authority, the constitution made the nurturing of a market economy a principle of 
national policy23  and made specific provisions to guarantee business freedom. In particular, sections 
28 and 29 sought to protect rights over property and to entrench freedom of people to do businesses of 
various kinds: 
 28. (1). Every person shall be able to acquire property alone or in association with others. 
(2). No person shall be arbitrarily deprived of property 
29.  Every person shall have the right to freely engage in economic activity, to work 
and to pursue a livelihood anywhere in Malawi. 
These provisions were important for stopping the practices of the one-party state in affecting the 
business environment. Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, section 88 imposed restrictions on the 
direct involvement of presidents and ministers in the management of private business ventures: 
88 (4):  Any business interests held by the President and members of the cabinet shall 
be held on their behalf in a beneficial trust which shall be managed in such a 
manner as to ensure conformity with this section. 
(5):  The President and members of the cabinet shall not use their respective offices 
for personal gain or place themselves in a situation where their material interests 
conflict with the responsibilities and duties of their offices. 
                                                             
23 Section 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994. 
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Compliance with these provisions was problematic throughout the decade as some examples of 
cronyism and collusive activities involving the president and some of his ministers show (see below). 
However, deconstruction of the one-party rule-structure vis-a-vis the business sector went beyond 
changing the constitutional framework and encompassed the realm of development strategies and 
economic policy. 
6.2.2.  Policy shift: doing business in a market economy for poverty reduction  
The Poverty Alleviation Policy Framework had four objectives, including the promotion of employment 
and income opportunities in the informal sector of the economy24. This objective directly related to the 
business sector and, in practice, focussed on SMEs. In terms of programme content, it aimed to create 
alternative non-farm income opportunities in order to reduce poverty. According to the PAP document, 
focus was going to be on improving the policy environment, entrepreneurial and technical skills 
development, access to credit and appropriate technology and marketing. In practice, access to credit 
became a major preoccupation. 
The focus on commerce was given visibility through numerous credit initiatives for SMEs some of which 
were new creations while others were carried over from the MCP period. The most notable ones 
included Development of Malawi Traders Trust (DEMATT), Small Enterprise Development of Malawi 
(SEDOM), Women World Banking (WWB), the Promotion of Micro-Enterprises for rural Women 
(PMERW), Malawi Savings and Credit Cooperative (MUSCCO), Small and Medium Enterprise Fund 
(SMEF), Malawi Mudzi Fund, the Youth Credit Scheme and the National Association of Business 
Women (NABW). Chinsinga (2002) observed that all these schemes were meant to be revolving funds 
but they dried up because of a culture of defaulting on repayments. I suggest below that the culture was 
                                                             
24 The other three objectives were: to increase agricultural productivity among resource-poor farmers; to increase access to 
priority services; and to enhance the capacities of local communities in managing development. 
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enhanced because political considerations were prime criteria in the allocation of loans which recipients 
treated as grants. 
The shift of policy focus from agriculture to commerce was a result of a combination of factors. A 
muted, politically spiced view was that the UDF government focussed on commerce because it was a 
main preoccupation of people in the southern region where it drew its large electoral support, and that 
changes in the agricultural sector were meant to punish people in the central region who were 
predominantly smallholder farmers, and as a region voted overwhelmingly for the MCP25. This 
argument, rooted in the politics of regionalism that became conspicuous from the results of the general 
election in 1994, may be supported by some statistical data. For instance, a 1992 study estimated that 
there were 570,000 SMEs in the country of which 54 per cent were in the south, 31 per cent in the 
centre and 15 per cent in the north26. However, UDF leaders explained (during field interviews) that 
policy emphasis shifted from agriculture because of conditionalities imposed by international donors, 
especially removal of subsidies on agricultural inputs. Commerce appeared to offer an alternative that 
quickly appealed to the UDF leaders as most of them had backgrounds in commerce27. 
A related policy shift was in the extent of regulating economic activities. Upon the assumption of 
political power, the UDF used the discourse on poverty and economic rights to define its permissive 
orientation towards the business sector (Englund, 2002). Its ideological outlook fitted well with the 
principles of economic liberalisation that were being championed by the international community. Thus, 
the Special Crops Act was amended to allow smallholder farmers to grow any cash crops; the 
Agricultural Produce and Livestock Act was repealed to liberalise production, pricing and marketing of 
all agricultural products; restrictions on seed and fertilisers were removed and private traders were 
                                                             
25 Interview, Mr. D.J. Chikhawo, former Chairman of ABAM and MCP Member of Parliament. 
26 Mzumara, G., „Experts Draft Way Forward for SMEs‟, Daily Times, 16 October 1996 p.10. 
27 Interview, Dr.Justin Malewezi, former Vice President and Minister of Privatisation in the UDF government; Mr. Aleke 
Banda, former Minister of Finance and Agriculture in the UDF government. 
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allowed to buy and sell smallholder crops including tobacco, in competition with ADMARC28. Trade in 
consumer goods and services was fully liberalised, leading to massive street vending in the cities and 
urban centres and, in the process, created a new political constituency within the business sector, i.e. 
street vendors (Jimu, 2005). 
But the euphoria of economic liberalisation was short-lived. The Chamber of Commerce soon observed 
that trade liberalisation led to the flooding of the market with counterfeit goods that threatened to 
replace trade in genuine goods. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry made similar observations29. 
The Chamber further observed that high level liberalisation had brought about hardships in the 
business community, leading to lay-offs and company closures30. The problem appeared to have 
acquired significant magnitude in the tobacco sector, the mainstay of the economy. As early as 1996, 
the Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) demanded a policy reversal and specifically asked for the 
termination of Intermediate Tobacco Buyers (ITB) licenses “with immediate effect” for doing disservice 
to the industry31. It was later argued that lack of civic education on the liberalisation of the tobacco 
sector, brought in players that did not know the rules of the game and contributed significantly to low 
tobacco prices at the auction floors32. Even some UDF politicians, privately voiced concerns with trade 
liberalisation although in public they bragged about their party having brought about freedom to do any 
business anywhere without hindrance. For example, in expressing this concern to the President a UDF 
executive member complained about an influx of Lebanese traders: 
Most local industries are suffering from a flood of cheap goods in the local market. [For example], 
Encor has virtually stopped production of enamel ware. I have noticed that even my shoe clinic 
has had a drop of 40% in sales because of the availability of cheap second hand shoes. It is a 
common view that these people (Lebanese traders) are sharks who have no love for our country. 
They come here to extract whatever wealth that they can acquire and, when we have bled 
                                                             
28  Banda, Aleke., Minister of Finance, Budget Statement 24th March,1997. 
29 MCCCI Newsletter, Issue 2, 2000 p.5. 
30 Otomani, W., „MCCCI offers free economic advice to government‟, Daily Times, 3 September, 1997, p.11. 
31 Chide, R., „TAMA demands end to buyers‟ licences‟, Daily Times, 1 July, 1996, p.2. 
32 Kamlomo, G., „Quality Leaf will fetch good prices –Industry‟, Daily Times, 27 April, 2000, pp.1-3. 
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enough, they leave for richer pickings elsewhere. They do not invest in land, buildings or any 
fixed assets...33. 
 
However, an aspect of economic liberalisation that quickly assumed a political dimension was price 
deregulation, especially of basic consumer goods. Four months after the UDF came to power, there was 
widespread disenchantment with the government for failing to control prices. Junior civil servants 
planned a demonstration to force the government to establish a Price Control Commission to check 
increasing commodity prices34. The opposition party, AFORD, was particularly scathing in accusing 
President Muluzi and his minister of commerce, Harry Thomson, for doing nothing about sugar prices35. 
Thus, while economic liberalisation initially generated euphoria as a symbol of political change, its 
wholesale adoption in a context that lacked appropriate institutions, stung a big segment of the business 
community. The poor majority became nostalgic of the previous era in so far as price control was 
concerned. 
In 1996, the UDF government began to succumb to growing political pressure on the need to control 
prices. At the Eighth Malawi International Trade Fair, President Muluzi took a cue from the MCP 
intimidatory tactics and threatened to revoke trading licences for those that would continue over-pricing 
their merchandise36. Five months later, the government suspended the operation of commuter 
minibuses by non-Malawians including Asians, on the basis that the business had to be left to local or 
indigenous Malawians37. However, unlike the MCP government, the UDF did not have the machinery, 
ideological or otherwise, for checking the „malpractice‟ and the international policy environment was not 
sympathetic to any measures along those lines. The inflationary trend, however, continued in the wake 
of massive currency devaluations under the auspices of the IMF (Harrigan, 2001). On 23 rd September 
                                                             
33 From UDF executive member to State President Bakili Muluzi, „Various Concerns‟, 6th July, 1997, P.1 [Private Archives] 
34 Matiya, C., „Strike in government‟, Daily Times, 28 September, 1994, p.1. 
35 „Price hikes: people react‟, Daily Times, 5 October, 1994, p.1; Nyekanyeka, R., „Sugar scarcity: president blamed‟, Daily 
Times, 15 November, 1994, p.1. 
36 Tembo,C., „Government threatens to revoke licenses‟, Daily Times, 6 June, 1996, p.1. 
37 „No Minibuses for foreigners‟, Daily Times, 5 November, 1996, p.1. 
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1998, with a second general election nine months away, the President made a surprise visit to Portland 
Cement Company, a subsidiary of the MDC for which he was the responsible Minister38. He cajoled 
managers to lower the prices of cement and threatened unspecified action if they defied: 
Although this is a liberalised economy I cannot allow companies to be charging prices any how 
because of the devaluation of the kwacha. And if you are not going to do something about this, I 
will command the government to take drastic measures against you39. 
In the same year, the government enacted the Competition and Fair Trading Act, at the insistence of the 
United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)40. The law sought to encourage competition in the economy by 
prohibiting anti-competitive trade practices, regulating and monitoring monopolies and concentrations of 
economic power, and protecting consumer welfare among others. This legislation had the potential of 
assuring the masses that the government was going to control prices. However, the law remained 
unimplemented until 2005 because the government did not create the commission that was supposed 
to execute the law. The official reason was that the government did not have resources to establish the 
commission41. A muted view was that the legislation was forced on the government by the international 
bodies. There was no local demand for it, not even from the business community itself. Thus, having 
rolled back the legacy of the MCP in running a highly controlled economy, the UDF began to intervene 
in the economy in a manner that was politically rational for regime survival. The varied reactions to 
economic liberalisation by the government show the centrality of politics in state-economy relations. It 
further illustrates that where capitalism is relatively underdeveloped, business regulation by the state is 
not necessarily antagonistic to people‟s welfare and freedom. Neither is free play of market forces 
inherently germane to the interests of all businesses all the time. 
                                                             
38 This was a continuation of the practice in the MCP era in which the President exercised ministerial powers over the 
corporation. 
39 Chapalapata,M., „Muluzi Fails to scare Portland‟, Daily Times, 24 September, 1998,p.1. 
40 Personal correspondence with Mr. Collins Magalasi, former Commissioner for the Malawi Competition and Fair Trading 
Commission. 
41 Ibid. 
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6.2.3.  Divestiture of state-owned enterprises. 
The need to develop the private sector rapidly, especially in non agricultural activities, required an 
overhaul of the ownership structure in the formal business sector in order to expose it to the discipline 
of market competition. Thus, in April 1996, the Public Enterprises (Privatisation) Act, sponsored by the 
World Bank and IMF, was enacted to provide legal authority and procedures for dismantling the 
hegemony of the state in the corporate sector. In August 1997, cabinet approved a divestiture 
sequence plan involving one hundred public enterprises of which 18 were held by ADMARC, 19 by the 
MDC. 
The chamber of commerce had an early policy input into the programme. In particular, it advised 
government that the privatisation process had to give preferences to Malawian citizens regardless of 
racial descent42. The suggestion was accepted by the government which introduced six mechanisms 
for ensuring that Malawian nationals participated in public enterprises that were up for divestiture. They 
included the following: National Investment Limited (NITL) which acquired shares for warehousing and 
subsequent exclusive sale  to Malawians; public offers of shares; a special revolving fund to enable 
indigenous Malawians,  to participate in public enterprises that were being listed on the Malawi Stock 
Exchange (MSE); another fund for concessionary loans to Malawians who acquired significant equity 
stakes in privatised enterprises; a provision in the Privatisation Act which allowed the Privatisation 
Commission to offer a public enterprise at a discount rate if the purchaser was a citizen of Malawi; and 
a provision for deferred payment terms to indigenous Malawians43. By 1999, 36 public enterprises had 
been privatised44 and by 2004 the figure had reached 62. Thus, the change in policy from creating state 
companies to selling them off, yielded institutional changes on both sides of SBRs and entailed a 
                                                             
42 Minutes of the Chamber, 5 December 1995 held in the Chamber House conference room [Private Archives].The meaning 
of this resolution was that it included Malawians of Asian and European descent. 
43 http://www.privatisationmalawi.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32&Itemid=103 accessed on 21 June, 
2010. 
44 http://www.fdi.net/documents/WorldBank/databases/plink/soceco/2malawi.htm accessed on 22 June, 2010. 
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change in the distribution of economic power. While the state concentrated both economic and political 
power during the MCP era, the state during the UDF period was giving up its economic power by 
withdrawing from direct management of profit-making enterprises. This dynamic had the potential to 
make the state dependent on private enterprise and therefore to create even more incentives for 
concertation. But this was not necessarily the case partly because both the state and the private sector 
were organisationally weak (see below) and also because the government gained control over Press 
and maintained leverage in the economy. 
6.2.4.  Dispossessing the MCP of economic power 
Although the MCP lost political power, it retained economic power through its ownership of Press. In 
1994, the corporation was responsible for 40 per cent of the economy and had a turnover equal to 17 
per cent of GDP (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995). With about 49 subsidiary companies, in different 
sectors of the economy (see table below), Press was by far the single largest private sector entity. To 
have such a huge company controlled by a small group of opposition politicians in a fragile economy did 
not auger well with UDF politicians.  
Table 6.3: Operating divisions and number of enterprises of Press in 1993 
Operating Division Number of enterprises 
Agriculture and agro-processing 15 
Brewing and distilling 4 
Banking and Insurance 3 
Construction and secondary manufacturing 10 
General Trading and Distribution 9 
Services 5 
Oil and distribution 3 
Source: Kaunda (1998) footnote No. 25. 
The UDF‟s drive to consolidate power led the government to weaken the MCP further by dispossessing 
it of the corporation. Press had been registered as a Trust in 1982 in order to access a bailout loan from 
the World Bank guaranteed by the Government (van Donge, 2002; PCL, 1994). The trust deed gave Dr. 
Banda, as founding trustee, absolute control over Press: 
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During his life [he will] have exclusive right, power, paramount authority of directing, controlling, 
regulating and determining in all aspects all activities, administration, policies, matters and things 
relating to or concerning the Press Trust and the Trust Fund... the action, deals, decisions, 
directions of the Founding Trustee shall be valid, final, conclusive and binding in all respects as if 
they were actions, deeds, decisions, directions and instructions of all the trustees for the time being 
of the Press Trust.45 
 
On 6th November 1995, a Press Trust Reconstruction Bill was circulated to members of Parliament and 
on 7th November, the Minister of Finance, Aleke Banda, asked Parliament to dispense with a 21-day 
notice requirement for bills and to debate the bill. When the motion was passed by simple majority 
owing to a loose parliamentary coalition between the UDF and AFORD, MCP protested and walked out. 
The bill, was nonetheless, debated, passed and signed into law by the President. The new law replaced 
trustees with appointees of the new government46. On 15th November 1995, the MCP sued the 
government, mostly on procedural improprieties. On 1st July 1996, the court ruled that the Press Trust 
Reconstruction Act was unconstitutional “both in terms of the way it passed through the National 
Assembly as well as on the principles which the constitution stands for”47. The ruling was one of the 
earliest in applying the provisions of the new constitution in which government policy decisions would be 
subjected to review and challenge. The government, however, appealed against the ruling and on 31 st 
January 1997, the Supreme Court over turned the ruling48. This ruling had the effect of financially 
crippling the MCP which has since been unable to organise and mobilise enough political support due 
to lack of resources to maintain an extensive network of patronage. 
Besides dispossessing the MCP of Press, the UDF government squeezed out ABAM because of 
its continued political allegiance to the MCP. In August 1995, the minister of commerce, Peter 
Kalilombe, called for the dissolution of the association on the basis that it had no role in a 
                                                             
45 Clause IV of Press Trust Deed, 10 February,1982. 
46 MCP and others – v – Attorney General and Speaker of the National Assembly, High Court Civil Cause No.2074 of 1995. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Attorney General–v–Malawi Congress Party and Others, Civil Appeal No.22 of 1996, MWSC1, 1997. 
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democratic era that called for interaction of all races49. The association, through its interim 
chairman, Mr Harry Jonga, resisted these efforts50. The association did not disband until it was 
squeezed out by depriving it of its main source of revenue. As indicated in the previous chapter, 
ABAM‟s main source of revenue was commissions levied on sugar distribution by its members. 
ABAM‟s sugar quota of up to 1000 metric tonnes per week was arbitrarily withdrawn51. This quota 
had been granted by the MCP government through the Ministry of Trade and Industry. President 
Muluzi‟s company, Ntaja Trading, became the largest sugar distributor. By 1998, the company 
was reportedly making a profit of about MK10 million per week in sugar distribution alone, and 
was singled out in a donor‟s report as the „worst culprit‟ in what was described as „the sleazy 
sugar business in the country‟52. In addition, membership to ABAM was no longer a basis for the 
award of contracts from government. Thus, the association lost its most valuable incentives for 
political reasons and could not retain its membership. It fizzled out. 
The drive to reverse the legacy of the one-party state in the economy and the desire to develop 
political support for the UDF government were two motives that were at the centre of restructuring 
SBRs. The hegemony of the state was weakened by deregulating the business sector, allowing 
more freedom to do business, and restructuring ownership through divestiture of public 
enterprises. To consolidate its economic and political power, the UDF government dispossessed 
the MCP of the largest private corporation in the country and squeezed out its affiliated business 
association. These efforts further illustrate the primacy of political considerations in forming the 
attitude of state elites towards the business sector, or parts of it, that in turn feed into wider 
institutional dynamics of SBRs. 
                                                             
49 Tembo, C., „Dissolve ABA – Kalilombe‟, The Nation, 2 August, 1995. 
50 „Call a meeting –ABA challenges‟, The Nation, 8 August, 1995. 
51 „ABA‟s Lament: Return our Sugar Quota‟, Daily Times, 12 December,1994, p.1. 
52 Banda, M., „Ntaja Trading nets MK10m weekly: The truth about UDF‟s sleazy sugar deals‟, Daily Times,20 April,1998, p.1. 
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6.3. Democracy and the evolution of concertation in state-business relations 
In contrast to the MCP era, the UDF period saw more policy dialogue within the public sector, but more 
importantly for the purpose of this study, with the private sector. To be sure, the case for more 
collaboration began to gather momentum in the early 1990s when the country was in an economic 
crisis and the wind of political change was blowing. The chamber advocated for „smart partnerships‟ on 
the lines of public–private partnerships (PPPs) but the MCP government was not forthcoming53. In 
1994, the chairman of the Chamber made a case for public-private dialogue (PPD) but observed that 
previous efforts with the MCP government had been hampered by government‟s tendency to send 
junior staff to such meetings (Okhai, 1994).The UDF government was quick to show willingness for 
partnership with the private sector in the formulation of policy. This was particularly crucial as most of 
the cabinet ministers did not have much of experience in running a government. Furthermore, policy 
dialogue was a way of showcasing and legitimising democratic change54. The earliest effort was the 
incorporation of business representatives in the Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) at the policy 
level. The PAP organisational framework consisted of a presidential council, a national steering 
committee and eight task forces. The business sector was represented in the presidential council by the 
Chamber and ABAM before the latter fizzled out. However, the provision for business representation in 
the national steering committee was not specific and was often done by a public sector agency – the 
Malawi Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA) (Chingaipe and Leftwich, 2007). 
President Muluzi led in the effort of initiating PPD. As early as 19th January 1995, he convened a 
meeting with business representatives55. The purpose of the meeting was “to discuss ... measures for 
improving the process of consultation between the government and the private sector in order to 
                                                             
53 Gunde, A., „Chamber, Government Meet Monday‟, Daily Times, 11 April,1997,p.1; Manyungwe, A., „Private Sector for 
Smart Partnership‟, Daily Times, 18 April, 1997, p.1. 
54 Interviews, Mr. Harrison Mandindi, Director of Trade; Dr. Justin Malewezi, former Vice President and Minister of 
Privatisation in UDF government. 
55 The meeting was attended by the Chamber, MIPA, National association of Business Women (NABW), National 
Association of Small and Medium Enterprises of Malawi (NASME), Soche Business women, Governor of Reserve Bank 
and several Ministers . 
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improve private sector participation in economic development”56. Besides calling for suggestions for 
improving the business environment, the president appealed to business representatives to be 
responsive to government initiatives and incentives to promote investment and business development. 
This meeting demonstrated the apparent willingness of the UDF government to develop a state-
business coalition for economic development.  
6.3.1.  The politics of institutionalising public-private dialogue (PPD) 
Organisational and institutional pluralism 
Government‟s commitment to the development of a state-business policy and developmental 
partnership began to take an institutional shape one year after the president‟s meeting with the 
business representatives. In December 1995, the Ministry of Commerce and the Chamber agreed on 
monthly meetings, regular briefing sessions and Press Releases by government delegations on return 
from conferences or seminars of interest to the private sector, and the formation of task forces on 
specific issues57. However, the state side of the relationship was affected by organisational pluralism, 
leading to a dispersion of bureaucratic power and authority in decision-making. The Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Finance, the National Economic Council (later, Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development) and the Ministry of Agriculture had their own arrangements with 
various segments of the private sector on a variety of policy issues, mainly because of cross-cutting 
and overlapping ministerial mandates. However, there was a general acceptance that the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry was primarily responsible for state-business relations and was evolving slowly 
into something of a „pilot agency‟ (Johnson, 1982) on the state side. The role of MIPA in structuring 
                                                             
56 Brief report on the meeting between His Excellency the State President and Business Executives, 19th January 1995 at 
Sanjika Palace at 9:30am –JAAJ/TM/BUSIEXE/020295 p.1 [Private Archives]. 
57 Minutes of a consultation meeting between the Chamber and the Minister of Commerce, F. P. Kalilombe, 5th December, 
1995 [Private Archives]. 
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SBRs during this period illustrates the problems of coordination and competition for power when 
government mandate for the private sector is divided among bureaucratic agencies. 
MIPA was created in 1991 to promote investment through and for private sector development. It, 
however, quickly became a mouthpiece of the private sector within the public sector. By 1995, its 
slogan was „bridging the gap between the public and private sectors‟ and it began to coord inate a 
technical committee on industrial policy. The committee comprised representatives of government 
departments, academia and the business sector, particularly NASME58. A public-private dialogue forum 
called a MIPA Forum was created and designed to be held twice a year (in January and July) to “foster 
interaction between public and private sectors”59. Participation to the forum was by invitation only. The 
plurality of organisational actors certainly made policy coordination incoherent and difficult, and created 
more openings for particularistic interests to forge preferential links and collusive relations. 
The business side was equally pluralised. Besides the Chamber which was increasingly recognised as 
a peak business association and „the voice of the private sector‟, there were other sectoral associations 
which interacted with different state departments on a whole range of issues. Nonetheless, by 1997 the 
Chamber acknowledged the increased openness of the government for policy talks, but bemoaned the 
frequency of unfavourable responses from government on some pertinent issues60. Consequently, 
proposals were mooted to establish a „business council‟ that would convene government and business 
representatives at regular intervals. This proposal, however, did not materialise because President 
Muluzi rejected it on the advice of his close associates of Indian origin who saw no need for such a 
council as it would simply duplicate the functions of the Chamber61. A measured critique of the idea was 
relayed to the President in private correspondence by an executive member of the party: 
                                                             
58 MIPA (1995) Monthly Newsletter (January). 
59 Ibid, p.3 
60 Khanje, T., „Government, Private sector Dialogue Vital – Chamber,‟ The Nation, 21 March, 1997, p.8. 
61 Interview, Mr. Humphrey Mvula. 
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I have looked at the proposals of the new Business Council and I have my doubts as to whether it 
would function as envisaged. Such a body would only function if it was kept small, with 
representation from key areas, at the highest levels, and if it was given specific follow up powers 
by an Act of Parliament…The present proposal seems to have far too many members (about 26 
from Government alone) and may become too unwieldy to be really effective. I feel that such a 
body should have its own secretariat and Manager who would be tasked to implement decisions of 
the Council. The staffing should be recruited transparently, on merit basis to avoid suspicion from 
the other side...62  
 
Although the idea of a business council was thwarted, it had some support among government 
bureaucrats who were weary of the pluralised institutional environment in which they dealt with the 
business sector. For instance, when the business community asked the government in 1999 to 
strengthen policy consultation with the private sector, government representatives encouraged the 
private sector to form a national dialogue and/or a business council to enhance consultations and 
collaboration63. Thus, by 1999 despite the government‟s commitment to collaborate with the organised 
private sector, policy dialogue remained uninstitutionalised. However, there were more policy 
discussions, including annual budget consultations, between government in its many forms and the 
business community at macro- and meso- levels. This ad hoc pattern of concertation owed to the need 
of the new government to demonstrate to donors and the electorate, that they were committed to 
democratic reform of the policy-making process by providing room for policy consultation, and also to 
develop and consolidate a business constituency for political support. 
6.3.2. Initial efforts at structuring PPD and animosity between the Chamber and government 
The year 2000 was particularly consequential for the subsequent institutionalisation of concertation in 
SBRs. On the state side, the Minister of Finance (Aleke Banda) initiated a Special Task Force on the 
Economy (STAFE) as an accountability forum. It included a few cabinet ministers, Chief Executive 
                                                             
62UDF executive member to State President Bakili Muluzi, „Various Concerns‟, 6th July, 1997, p.2. 
63 Report on Proceedings of the 1999 MIPA–ECAMA Budget Breakfast held on 31st July, 1999, at Capital Hotel, Lilongwe 
[Private Archives]. 
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Officers of parastatal companies and other private sector representatives. It was a forum where hard 
questions about macroeconomic management and economic infrastructure were asked, pledges of 
action were made and time frames were set. It reported directly to the President and met monthly. 
However, the effectiveness of the forum revolved around its chairperson who was known to be a 
dynamic, visionary and hardworking minister. By 2002, he had fallen out of grace for opposing an 
amendment to the constitution to abolish presidential term limits. He was, consequently, dropped from 
cabinet and STAFE became moribund for lack of leadership (Chingaipe and Leftwich, 2007). 
In the business sector, a new „business forum‟ was constituted to encourage indigenous business 
Malawians to improve their businesses and to make representations to government on policies which 
stifled growth of the indigenous entrepreneur64. In the same year, the Chamber decentralised its 
structures and created regional chambers. A campaign for membership resulted in many SMEs joining 
the regional chambers and tipped the balance of power against „big business‟ in the national Chamber. 
Thus, in 2001 Jimmy Korea Mpatsa, a founding member of the „business forum‟ was elected President 
of the Chamber and revived the idea of a business council65. Up to mid 2002, policy dialogue between 
the government and the business community had been cordial. The President of the Chamber 
attributed this to the fact that President Muluzi and some of his senior Ministers had been members of 
the Chamber themselves: 
Fortunately, the Head of Government and some of his senior colleagues have been in our positions in the 
past and they clearly understand our role. They are never critical and, if anything, have been encouraging 
us to interact more with government...We regard government as our partners in creating a conducive 
climate  for business and economic growth … we regard ourselves as advisors to government but, as is 
normal, government is not compelled to take all our advice 66. 
 
                                                             
64 Phalula, M., „Local entrepreneurs form association‟, Daily Times, 27 January, 2001, p.10. 
65 „MCCCI offers policy recommendation‟, Daily Times, 22 June, 2001, p.4. 
66 Jimmy Mpatsa, „Interview with the President‟ MCCCI Newsletter, Issue 2, 2000:9. 
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However, after 2002 the relationship between the government (especially politicians) and the Chamber 
was characterised by suspicion, mistrust and hostilities. The Chamber criticised the 2002/03 national 
budget with extraordinary vehemence, describing it as „unrealistic and not making sense‟ and a recipe 
for further fiscal slippages and macroeconomic mismanagement67. This was against the backdrop of 
financial recklessness and over expenditures by government orchestrated by the need to consolidate 
political power by supplying patronage networks and a culture of unplanned, populist cash handouts to 
party supporters and local elites at political rallies and other avenues. The ultimate goal was to canvass 
support for the abolition of presidential term limits. Such recklessness had been observed earlier and 
had been a subject of discussion at other high levels in the government machinery: 
I would not be so concerned if the government over-expenditure was used for productive activities. Most 
of the expenditure seems to be caused by abuse, misuse and misappropriation. I realise government 
expenditure is beyond your control but unless people in positions speak out, mismanagement will 
continue68. 
 
By April 2003, the Chamber was “concerned with the poor state of the economy” and called for a 
private sector – friendly budget that would “heal the sector from injuries inflicted by the government‟s 
failure to manage the economy”69. The background to this sharp criticism was that between 2000 and 
2002, fiscal policy became increasingly expansionary. Government deficit rose to 7.1 per cent of GDP 
while the money supply increased by 25.2 per cent in 2002 largely because of excessive government 
domestic borrowing which stood at MK45 billion70. Domestic interest payments rose to 24.7 per cent of 
government revenue and 4.5 per cent of GDP compared to 13.2 per cent and 2.1 per cent in 1998 
respectively. Interest rates were as high as 40 per cent while gross investment fell from 13.9 per cent in 
                                                             
67 Phalula, M., „MCCCI criticises government revenue and expenditure measures‟, Daily Times, 10 July, 2002, p.7. 
68Chairman of National Economic Council (NEC) to Governor of the Reserve Bank, e-mail correspondence, 2 May, 2000 
[Private Archives]. 
69 Phiri, F., „Chamber Challenges Government on 2003/04 Budget‟, Daily Times, 25 April, 2003, p.1. 
70 There are unverified stories that the Reserve Bank printed lots of MK50 notes which the President was dishing out at his 
rallies. The notes were withdrawn from circulation soon after the 2004 general election. 
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2001 to 10.9 percent of GDP by the end of 2002. The overall balance of payments had changed from a 
surplus to a deficit of 5.5 per cent of GDP71. President Muluzi hit back at the Chamber on 24th May 
2003 at the opening of the Malawi International Trade Fair. He accused the leadership of the chamber 
of double standards and meddling in politics at the expense of promoting business development72. 
These unpalatable public exchanges soured relations between government (at the political level) and 
the Chamber until Muluzi left office in May 2004.  
Thus, from 2000 to 2004 there was an increasing divergence between the intentions of government in 
allocating budgetary resources and the expectations of the business community as represented by the 
Chamber. One respondent attributed this state of affairs to the intransigence of the President: 
With Bakili we had no time to discuss because even if you talked to him, the guy was not listening. 
To him, it was like you are blaming him. So when you are blaming him, he didn‟t want to listen. So 
what then did we do? We just shouted at him. Our strategy was to expose him in the papers and 
the radios…They knew that the chamber was important but they also knew that if they listened, 
they would not make money…they were there to make money and they made money. Don‟t think 
they were stupid, they knew what they were doing73. 
 
Despite the souring of relations between the chamber and the ruling politicians, a parallel effort at 
PPD, the National Action Group (NAG), was slowly being institutionalised. 
6.3.3. The rise of National Action Group (NAG): political power and membership diversity in 
peak business associations 
In 2001, „big business‟ in the Chamber was out-voted by SMEs in taking up positions in the council, 
including the presidency of the Chamber. Faced with strategic options between „voice‟ and „exit‟ 
(Hirschman, 1977), representatives of the big companies were inclined to take the latter. Like their 
counterparts in South Africa who founded the South Africa Foundation (SAF) or those in Mexico who 
founded the MHCN, they founded a separate forum, the NAG, for influencing government‟s economic 
                                                             
71 All these figures are taken from GoM (2004:1). 
72 Phiri, F., „Muluzi accuses private sector‟, Daily Times, 26 May, 2003, pp.1-3.  
73 Interview, former president of the Chamber. 
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policy and advocating the provision of economic infrastructure74. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for 
Press led the initiative75. A national workshop on private sector development was jointly convened by 
the Minister of Finance and the CEO for Press. Participants included high-ranking bureaucrats and 
business captains. It prioritised sub-sectors for national focus and recognised the need for a high-level 
dialogue between government and the business community. The NAG evolved into a forum which drew 
membership from Ministers, senior government bureaucrats, business executives and representatives 
of aid agencies. Forums of this kind, especially during periods of transitions have not been uncommon 
in Africa and elsewhere (Hart, 2001), and in some cases they have taken a neo-corporatist model 
(Nyangoro, 1989; Taylor, 2007; Meisenhelder, 1997). For the NAG emphasis was on representatives 
who had ultimate decision making powers in their organisations or departments. 
The NAG was initially given secretariat support by two consulting firms owned and managed by non-
Malawians. In 2002, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) funded the establishment 
of a permanent secretariat for NAG which included the two consulting firms, two officials from two key 
ministries and a part-timer seconded from DFID (Agar and Kaferapanjira, 2006:2). This support enabled 
the NAG to make the transition from a reactive approach to a proactive one. Consequently, in addition 
to the main monthly forum, sectoral forums were also initiated. The lower level forums were designed to 
address specific sectoral issues e.g. textiles and mining, and would refer issues they could not resolve 
to the main forum. 
The NAG‟s specific objectives included improving the business–enabling environment, establishing 
mechanisms for sustained dialogue between government and the business sector, working towards 
changing negative attitudes to policy dialogue and developing a culture of engagement between 
government and business. These objectives, however, rivalled those of the Chamber and it would not 
                                                             
74 Interview, Mr. Harrison Kalua, MCCCI President; personal exchange with Dr. E. Silumbu, former Chief Economist for the 
Chamber. 
75 He had been Governor of the Reserve Bank and later Minister of Finance in the UDF Government. He was reportedly 
removed from cabinet because of his measures for checking public expenditure which his cabinet colleagues did not like. 
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be far-fetched to suggest that the ultimate goal was to make the Chamber redundant. For instance, the 
formation of the NAG was justified by its proponents by negating the Chamber as “a breeding ground 
for politicians who frustrated business interests”76. The Government, through the Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development, blamed the Chamber for weak mechanisms for public-private dialogue. In 
particular, it argued that the Chamber had failed to win the trust and confidence of the private sector to 
act as an effective mouthpiece for the sector. A new „business council‟ was proposed to serve as a 
liaison between the government and the business community (GoM, 2004:10). However, for some, the 
NAG reflected a quest of power and influence by “disgruntled representatives of big business”77. For 
others, “....it was very much an economic club where [business representatives] could share ideas with 
government personnel and through the people from the ministries, they could push things in 
Government”78.  
Despite the scepticism surrounding the NAG, it is acknowledged by both proponents and opponents, 
that the arrangement gave PPD a new impetus and achieved quite a few significant results. For 
instance, it developed the „Malawi Economic Growth Strategy‟ (MEGS) to complement the Malawi 
Poverty Reduction Paper (MPRSP). The MEGS proposed strategies for generating high and 
sustainable broad-based economic growth of at least 6 per cent per annum over the long term. The 
emphasis was on promotion of export-oriented and import-substitution trade (GoM, 2004). The forum 
also secured reforms in tax administration and tax regime. In particular, the powers of the Minister of 
Finance to grant discretionary incentives and extension of payment periods for provisional tax were 
removed. According to Agar and Kaferapanjira (2006) and GoM (2004), the NAG process helped the 
Chamber to revamp and re-orient its governance and lobbying effectiveness, i.e. shifting the focus 
                                                             
76 Interview with staff of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Private Sector Development (Chingaipe and Leftwich, 2007). 
77 Interview, Mr. Harrison Kalua, President of the Chamber. 
78 Interview,Dr. Justin Malewezi,  former Vice President and Minister of Privatisation. 
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more onto „enabling environment‟ activities than on the more survivalist revenue-raising activities79. In 
its short life, the NAG became the focal point for regular dialogue between the government and a 
segment of the business community, but also faced many obstacles and challenges which finally 
brought about its demise. The forum was convened for the last time in April 2006. The following section 
highlights challenges that the forum encountered and illustrates some factors that are at the centre of 
the politics of institutional formation and change. 
6.3.4. The fall of NAG: Institutional informality and political legitimacy of the forum 
Although the NAG represented a sustained effort at PPD, its form was contested by several 
stakeholders. In January 2007, at a meeting involving the government, the Chamber, NAG secretariat 
and some donor representatives, it was agreed to abolish the NAG and start a new PPD initiative 
managed by the Chamber. The main reasons for doing away with the NAG were political in that they 
concerned the distribution and exercise of power within the business and public sectors and between 
them, and a contestation about the legitimacy and mandate of business representatives in the forum. 
To begin with, the NAG was simply „too informal‟. It did not have formal authority over any of the 
stakeholders. Participants could agree to take action and commit their organizations or departments to 
be accountable to the group but there were no legal or quasi legal enforceable sanctions for failure to 
deliver on agreed commitments. The process relied on peer pressure and volition and it was for that 
reason that representation was sought at very high-levels of decision makers. However, lack of 
formality gave it the perception of illegitimacy and gradually senior government officials began to shun 
it.  
Secondly, drawing on democratic principles of representation, the Chamber argued that the NAG did 
not have „mandate‟ from any other businesses to negotiate anything with government and that such 
mandate lay with a properly registered Chamber of Commerce which had a known membership of the 
                                                             
79 I return to the governance structure issues below. 
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private sector. The NAG process was further criticised for not being representative enough in that it was 
relatively small, arguably to allow for open and robust dialogue between those who knew each other. It 
was deemed to be not representative of the diversity of the private sector because of the inclination to 
draw membership exclusively from „big business‟80. For these reasons, one senior bureaucrat 
described the NAG as 
a suspicious arrangement for government. It was a kind of pressure group of business persons and 
semi-politicians. There was too much of blame game...it was a club of top ones ... but private sector 
is not big companies only....the scope [had to] broaden by including sectoral associations...81. 
Thirdly, the NAG was resented for being “too white, too British, too donor-driven, too big-business 
oriented, not delivering quickly enough and so on” (Agar and Kaferapanjira, 2006:5). The fact that the 
NAG was facilitated by a secretariat that was predominantly white (and British) and funded by DFID was 
regarded by some quarters as only a means of creating jobs for white  expatriate consultants.  
The fall of NAG was further precipitated by the perception amongst public sector participants of „state 
and donor capture‟ by private sector players. The belief was that NAG had become a forceful forum not 
so much for accountability but for decisively influencing government and/or donor policy to the benefit of 
the private sector at the expense of the social sectors. Thus, the lack of formal membership and lack of 
a formal mandate deprived the NAG of legitimacy and fuelled the perception within the Chamber and 
Government that it was merely a forum of „busybodies‟ who wanted to wield political influence through 
undemocratic means.  The emphasis on the informality of the NAG and its implications on democratic 
principles of governance suggests that in the public sphere the sustenance of informal institutions 
depends not just on their being „complimentary‟ or „accommodating‟ of the formal institutions (Helmke 
and Levitisky, 2005) but on the dominant interpretation of their effects82. 
                                                             
80 Interviews, Mr. Harrison Kalua, Mr. Hope Chavula and Mrs. Grace Amri. 
81 Interview, Director of Trade, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Private Sector Development. 
82 I return to this issue below and in the concluding chapter. 
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6.3.5. The NAG and constitutional changes in the Chamber 
The disenchantment of „big business‟ with the governance institutional framework of the Chamber, and 
the subsequent founding of the NAG, undermined the legitimacy of the Chamber. Consequently, in 
2002, the constitution of the Chamber was revised to provide for a hierarchical structure of membership 
based on levels of subscription fees and differences in membership benefits as shown in Table 6.4 
below. Certain benefits that are critical to the practice of SBRs were restricted to certain categories of 
membership. These included election to the council of the Chamber, direct participation in PPD and 
eligibility to serve on joint committees with government. Furthermore, voting power was apportioned 
according to membership categories in a manner that ensured the retention of power and influence of 
big business. These changes were designed to win back big businesses into the mainstream activities 
of the Chamber. 
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Table 6.4:  Membership and distribution of power in the Chamber according to membership group. 
Membership 
category 
Fees in MK83 Benefits  that distinguish the category in terms of power84 
Platinum 125,000 
($833.33) 
Eligible for presidency, deputy presidency and membership of 
Chamber‟s council. 
Eligible to represent the Chamber on government committees, 
task forces and international forums. 
Core member of the PPD team on relevant issues at presidential, 
ministerial and parliamentary levels. 
Participate in setting the agenda for PPD. 
Business profiling on the Chamber‟s website. 
Five votes in decision-making. 
Gold 100,000 
($666.68) 
Eligible for presidency, deputy presidency and membership of the 
Chamber‟s council 
Four votes in decision making 
Silver 65,000 
($433.33) 
Eligible for nomination to the Chamber‟s council only. 
Three votes in decision making. 
Copper 35,000 
($233.33) 
Two votes in decision making 
Aluminium 25,000 
($166.68) 
One vote in decision -making 
Bronze 15,000 
($100.00) 
One vote in decision-making 
 
Source: www.mccci.org/categories_benefits.php; Enhancement of Benefits and Call for Renewal of 
MCCCI Membership (undated). 
The institutionalised asymmetry of power among members of the Chamber has implications for SBRs. 
For example, participation in PPD is an exclusive right of members of the platinum group. The 
arrangement runs the risk of becoming elitist because in an environment where access to business 
finance is problematic, not many SMEs easily part with the necessary subscription fees to purchase a 
                                                             
83 Exchange rate in September, 2010: 1USD =MK150. 
84 Each of the groups has several other benefits but here I show only those that reflect the institutionalised asymmetry of 
power within the Chamber. 
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right of direct policy voice in PPD. Furthermore, the distribution of voting power reflects a model of 
representation which essentially recognises the right of all to be represented but holds that not all 
opinions are of equal value (Heywood, 2002:225). The arrangement favours „big businesses‟ in that it 
enables their over-representation through multiple memberships within the same group and across the 
membership groups. For example, until 2009, all tobacco buying companies were members of the 
Tobacco Exporters Association of Malawi (TEAM)85. The Association was a platinum member as were 
a few other companies that were members of the association e.g. Limbe Leaf Tobacco Company and 
Africa Leaf Malawi. Furthermore, some individual companies in the platinum group have their 
subsidiaries in the other membership categories. While the design maximises revenues for the 
Chamber, the scenario illustrates how the institutional arrangement dramatically increases the number 
of votes accruing to one group of stakeholders and potentially skews the balance of power and 
influence. Internally, the Chamber lacks institutional arrangements for systematically eliciting and 
expressing the voices from its membership in the lower categories. In addition, and crucially, the 
membership of the Chamber is a very small fraction of private sector enterprises as a whole. There is 
little evidence to suggest that members in the platinum group who formally represent the private sector 
on government committees and in other decision-making processes, act in the interest of members in 
the lower categories or the wider community of small businesses.  
Concertation throughout the first decade of multiparty democracy was less than benign. While there 
was periodic exchange of information on some issues between the government and the business 
community, there was less policy credibility on the part of government and the relationship was fraught 
with mistrust and suspicion. Nonetheless, efforts at institutionalising concertation can be said to have 
gained traction at the macro- and meso-levels of SBRs but had not yet consolidated by June 2004.The 
                                                             
85 TEAM was disbanded by presidential directive in 2009 amid allegations that it was an association that masked collusive 
relations among tobacco buying companies where tobacco auction prices were predetermined. 
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development of concertation, however, paralleled a pattern of non transparent and collusive SBRs at 
micro-level. The following section unpacks this dimension and illustrates even further the primacy of 
politics and power configurations in shaping the institutional evolution of SBRs.  
6.4. Patterns of politically embedded cronyism and collusion in state-business relations  
The UDF era spawned a version of „booty (or crony) capitalism‟ (Hutchcroft, 2004) in SBRs at firm 
level86. However, cronyism and collusion were not limited to transactions between the public and 
private sectors. To be sure, they were part of a wider pattern of social behaviour whereby state 
resources were diverted from public to private ends87. For SBRs, they entailed a pattern of official 
impropriety and particularism that nested a web of activities that were calculated to ensure the 
advancement of real or pseudo businesses of those who were related to powerful politicians or were 
genuinely or conveniently sympathetic to the UDF. Cronyism and collusion in SBRs took many forms. 
For the purpose of illustration, I identify four forms, namely, public procurement (award of contracts), 
access to credit, enforcement of rule of law, and outright graft. The analysis shows how access to the 
state enabled private accumulation. It suggests that democratisation deepened and broadened the 
politics of the belly (Bayart, 1993) in which the state is reduced to a spoils system and an arena of 
particularistic exchanges. Government ministers, sometimes including the president, were eager and 
willing to intervene in administrative processes to bend the rules or cut corners in order to pursue 
narrow interests. The cases illustrate the significance of the relative autonomy of bureaucratic authority 
in state-business relations. It is not surprising, therefore, that by 2004 Malawi was known for corruption, 
rampant rent-seeking and widespread economic exploitation. According to one survey, 70 per cent of 
                                                             
86 I do not suggest by this that all firms engaged in collusion but the point is that collusive relations happened at firm level 
while efforts of benign collaboration were at meso- and macro- levels. 
87 Not much scholarly work has been done on corruption in Malawi because of the political sensitivity of the issue but the 
following sources provide a good profile: Anders (2002), Tambulasi (2009a), Tambulasi (2009b), Chirambo (2009), 
Millennium Consulting Group (2006), Transparency International (2004), Khembo (2004) and De Maria (2010) and Hall-
Matthews (2007). 
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Malawians believed that corruption had worsened during the reign of Muluzi (Millenium Consulting 
Group, 2006:6). 
6.4.1. Public procurement and the politics of privilege  
A good deal of public procurement was anything but transparent. It was a rent-haven for politically close 
businessmen and women, pseudo-businessmen and women, public sector managers and officers who 
straddled careers in public service and small or medium business enterprises. Awarding of contracts 
was often not based on objective procurement principles as laid down in government procedures. 
There are numerous examples to suggest that procurement was largely influenced by a quest for 
personal rents and political expediency to facilitate the expansion of a patronage network for UDF 
leaders. The emerging pattern of corruption between government and some private sector elements 
was noted by the Chamber as early as 1995. It was observed that “tendering procedures in government 
were opaque leading to more underhand deals”88. There are many cases of corruption in public 
procurement but here I highlight a few that show public-private interaction89: 
The Field York case 
 In 1994, the Minister of Education was involved in corrupt procurement of learning materials from a 
UK-based company called Field York International Ltd. He was personally involved in arranging the 
transaction, including payment, and bulldozed his senior civil servants to comply with instructions that 
were unprocedural and unlawful. An official of Field York International further offered the Minister of 
Finance a bribe of £25,000 if he authorised payment90. The initial value of the transaction was £1.93 
million but was later reduced to £900,000 as indicated on pro-forma invoices that were not itemised. A 
competitor supplier would cost only 25 per cent of the amount quoted by Field York. Although there was 
                                                             
88 Minutes of the Chamber, 5 December 1995 at 10 am. 
89 More cases can be found in reports of the Anti-corruption Bureau, reports of the Auditor-General and Court documents. 
90 Tembo,C., „Field York scandal- more disclosures‟, Daily Times, 29 March, 1996, p1. 
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no formal contract with the company, materials were delivered by a chartered plane and the company 
engaged the President in arranging payment. £300,000 was paid91. 
The Petroleum case 
Between January and December 1997, the General Manager of the Petroleum Control Commission 
(PCC) and the Minister of Energy and Mining, corruptly awarded a fuel supply contract to Europetrol 
Ltd. The General Manager personally negotiated fuel prices with the supplier and further sidelined 
Malawian transporters in favour of TZ hauliers from Tanzania which was managed by Europetrol 
Ltd.The supplier paid the General Manager huge sums of money as gratification. Between 1997 and 
2000, $216,507.60 was paid in small amounts. Another $25,000 was paid between October 1997 and 
July 1998, and another $1.5 million was credited to his bank account in Channel Islands, UK92. 
Ministry of Health (pharmaceutical) case 
Y.B. Enterprises which belonged to a UDF politician and the president‟s „home boy‟, was awarded a 
contract to supply pharmaceuticals despite being unregistered with the Pharmacy, Medicines and 
Poisons Board (PMPB). The government‟s contracting unit initially rejected the bid but President Muluzi 
directed that six items on tender No.031/2001/02/01 should be awarded to Y.B Enterprises. The 
President argued that the directive aimed at promoting local businessmen. The deal cost government 
an extra $228,78093.However, this was not an isolated case. The Public Accounts Committee of the 
National Assembly observed that for the period 1997-2001, controlling officers in government procured 
goods and services from suppliers who were not on a pre-qualified list approved by government94.  
 
                                                             
91 The State – v –Sam Mpasu, Criminal Case No.17 of 2005, Lilongwe Chief Magistrate‟s Court. 
92 ACB Annual Report, 2001/2002 pp.7-8. 
93 ACB Annual Report, 2001/2002 p.14. 
94 Report of the Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly following examination of treasury minutes of the 
Government of Malawi for the years 1997-2001, June ,2005, p.8. 
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The UNIPRO Africa case 
 Government awarded a MK13 million computer software contract to a ghost company – UNIPRO 
Africa Ltd. The company belonged to a widow of a Minister of Justice who had defected from his party 
(AFORD) during a period of upheaval in political allegiances following the 1994 general election. The 
company was registered about a week after the tender notice while the contract was supposed to be 
given to a company that had operated in Malawi in Information Technology (IT) business for not less 
than 3 years95. 
The Ministry of Education (construction) case 
Contractors (genuine and pseudo) connived with public officers and claimed over MK187 million from 
the government for works not carried out. For example, Jeff wa Jeffrey who was known to be an 
associate of the Minister of Education had „rents‟ valued at MK80, 355,230.89. Contracts under Mr. F.B 
Bvungani had a total „rent‟ value of MK4, 438,431.90 while those under Mr and Mrs Kathumba had a 
value of MK24, 075,23396. Many more received payment proportionately more than the amount of work 
they had done before abandoning projects. The scam involved not just politicians and senior civil 
servants but also very junior staff. For instance, accounts assistants, clerical officers and copy typists in 
the ministry were awarded contracts to rehabilitate secondary schools even when they had no building 
companies97. The case also shows a common pattern of overcharging the government to maximise 
rents. For example, six pit latrines whose correct value was MK120,000 cost the government 
MK1,878,000. Although only four latrines were completed, the contractor was given a completion 
                                                             
95Banda, M.,„Tender Board in MK13 million scam‟, Daily Times, 16 February,1998, p.1. 
 
96Report of the Public Accounts Committee to National Assembly following examination of treasury minutes of the 
Government of Malawi for the years 1997-2001, June 2005, p12. 
97 Moya, L., „Education Headquarters in Shady Deals‟, Daily Times, 4 February, 1997, p.1. 
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certificate for all six to facilitate receipt of money from ministry98. However, this type of collusion was not 
limited to the Ministry of Education. A similar scam transpired in the Ministry of Lands, Housing, 
Physical Planning and Surveys where public officers colluded with private contractors to defraud 
government by claiming large sums of money for work not done or partly done99. In some cases it 
included multiple payments for the same work100. 
These cases illustrate what was a common pattern in state-business transactions in public 
procurement. Politicians engaged in creating rents for personal enrichment and to consolidate power by 
rewarding cronies. This was because after 1994, politics became a rich man‟s game and political 
legitimacy became dependent on the amount of largesse that individual politicians could disburse. The 
UDF believed in social democracy which for many of its members  meant distribution of alms, including 
cash handouts, to the poor101.Thus, money had to be found somewhere for these purposes. This 
pressure made corrupt transactions all the more attractive. This is particularly illustrated in the Ministry 
of Education scam. The Permanent Secretary disclosed that political pressure was the main reason for 
the manner in which contracts were handled: 
This was even worse when we were approaching the presidential and parliamentary elections 
because a lot of UDF politicians came to get contracts in order for them to raise money for their 
political campaign. The Minister of Education ... would give verbal directives to have certain political 
influential persons paid102. 
Besides the pressure to finance political activities, corruption was a strategy for getting rich quickly. A 
senior bureaucrat observed that during Muluzi‟s reign, “there was a scramble for wealth among the top 
brass ... there was too much self–interest...so you see people getting rich under UDF administration 
                                                             
98Report of the Public Accounts Committee to National Assembly Following Examination of Treasury Minutes on the 
Government of Malawi for the years 1997-2007, June 2005, p12. 
99 ACB Annual Report, 2000/2001. 
100 „CARER Abhors Corruption‟, Daily Times, 11 December,1996, p.3. 
101 Interview, Mr. Humphrey Mvula, UDF Director of Research. 
102 Kamlomo, G and Nyoni, S., „Safuli spills the beans,‟ Daily Times, 26 September, 2000, pp 1-3. 
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because they were politically connected”103. Thus collusive SBRs thrived partly for purposes of raising 
campaign finance. This was particularly the case because up to the year 2002 UDF had no party 
accounts of any sort104. The president used to finance all political meetings in his personal capacity and 
nobody knew where he was getting the money105. One main reason is that political financing is an 
unregulated activity in Malawi. Politicians can mobilise resources from anywhere and there is no 
requirement of disclosure as is the case in other countries. Thus, collusive SBRs became a strategy for 
raising money for political activities. The strategy was somewhat sanctioned by the president himself 
when in 1999 he convened a meeting of ninety-three Malawian businessmen of Asian origin. He 
assured them of government support if they would rally behind his political party in the 1999 elections. 
He pledged that they would be granted government contracts, he would ease temporary permits for 
their foreign employees and there would be cessation of government harassment over their 
businesses. Some businessmen pledged financial support to the campaign while others donated cash 
in envelopes106. 
However, in February 2001, the Executive Committee of the UDF resolved to create a structure for 
generating funds for the party through legitimate commercial activity. They set up a company, Manja 
Holdings Ltd, with three subsidiaries107. By 2002, they had generated only MK500, 000 in profits 
because ministers were uncooperative as indicated by the executive member of the party who was in 
charge of the company: 
It saddens me to report that despite our good intentions and efforts, we have not yet won any 
tenders from our ministries. The list of applications is long … but the point ... is in line with your 
statement that all of us hold our positions by virtue of our party affiliation. Thus, we must all support 
                                                             
103 Interview, Director of Trade, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Private Sector Development, July 2009. 
104UDF executive member to UDF Governor of the southern region, „Strengthening UDF‟, 24 April, 2002, pp.3-4 [Private 
Archives]. 
105 Interviews with Dr. Justin Malewezi, former Vice President and Minister of Privatisation in UDF Government and Mr. 
Harry Thomson, former UDF executive member and cabinet minister; July 2009. 
106Tembo, C and Mtumodzi C.,„Muluzi Fetes Asians‟, Daily Times, 21 October, 1998, pp.1-2. 
107 EPA Engineering & Project Management Services Ltd for civil engineering; 2.EPA International Ltd for supply of goods 
and services; 3. Prima Fuels Ltd for importation and distribution of fuels and lubricants. 
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the party by every means at our disposal. I have noted a marked lack of support from our ministers 
for our tender bids and it may be proper for your office to issue a directive that will encourage all 
ministries and parastatal [organisations] to direct all their enquiries for their requirements to us for a 
quotation, and, if we are competitive, then we should get preference in the award of any order108. 
In another instance, a UDF executive member reported of suffering „great distress‟ because his bid to 
supply 8 million exercise books for the free primary education did not win the contract despite being the 
cheapest. When he learned that the contract had been awarded to a foreign firm, he asked President 
Muluzi “to delve into the matter”109. These cases suggest the existence of an implicit rule that 
government contracts had to be awarded to businesses or individuals that sympathised with the regime. 
They further suggest that the informal rule was well understood and could be enforced at the highest 
level by the exercise of formal executive authority. 
It is clear from the examples above that collusion in SBRs was politically embedded. The importance of 
political allegiance in awarding business contracts by government is further demonstrated in the 
marginalisation of businesses of those who were seen to be politically unreliable or sympathetic to the 
opposition parties. For instance, in the Field York case (above), the accused minister argued that he 
could not deal with Dzuka Publishing Company in the supply of learning materials because the company 
was run by people who were staunch supporters of the MCP. He feared that they would sabotage the 
government‟s programme of free primary education. Although bureaucrats from the ministry provided 
testimony that allayed fears of sabotage, the political considerations in awarding contracts were clear110. 
Similarly, a UDF activist informed the Minister of Presidential Affairs in 2002 that a business firm called 
Mike Trading belonged to a nephew of a powerful politician who had been dropped from cabinet for 
                                                             
108UDF executive member to UDF Governor of southern region, „Strengthening UDF‟, 24 April 2002 pp.3-4 [Private 
Archives]. 
109 UDF executive member to state President Bakili muluzi, „Various Concerns‟, 6th July, 1997, p.2 [Private Archives]. 
110 The State – v – Sam Mpasu, Criminal Case No.17 of 2005, Lilongwe Chief Magistrate‟s Court. 
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opposing the extension of presidential terms for President Muluzi. The activist appealed to the minister 
to ensure that the firm no longer got contracts from the government111. 
Public procurement entailed a politics of privilege in which those who were higher in the echelons of the 
party and government had opportunities to boost their businesses or those of their associates. There 
was an erosion of discipline which was not only left unabated by the leadership but was discreetly 
encouraged by it. The President was called in by his cronies to intervene in ways that often undermined 
the rule of law in so far as state-business transactions were concerned. The state simply reduced to a 
spoils system because of lack of disciplined leadership as one former senior minister observed: 
Muluzi, a nice man but I think too populist, not a strong person, not a strong disciplinarian ... discipline in 
the public service just collapsed... there was a lot of thieving and all sorts of things only because the 
enforcement of discipline was not there...It was a misunderstanding of democracy. People thought they 
were free to do whatever they wanted to do...112  
The pattern of indiscipline had been observed earlier by many commentators and observers of 
Malawian politics. For example, by the end of the first presidential term, many of Malawi‟s middle class 
regarded Muluzi as a weak national leader who was keen to appease his ill-disciplined, corrupt 
cabinet113. Similarly, when the Danish government suspended its development aid to Malawi it cited a 
„a weak administration since 1995‟ that had allowed corruption to flourish114  
6.4.2. Graft and plunder: the politics of the belly in public enterprises  
The lack of discipline, however, was not limited to rent-creating and profit-sharing corruption in SBRs. In 
other cases, especially in the parastatal business sector, practices bordered on sheer graft and plunder 
along the lines that Bayart (1993) characterised as „politics of the belly‟. This was because 
appointments to the boards and some management positions of these companies were made as 
                                                             
111 Anonymous author to Minister for Presidential Affairs, „Re: Mike Trading‟, 4 March 2002 (MNA Presidential Affairs Box 
50724). 
112 Interview, Mr. Aleke Banda, former cabinet minister in UDF government. 
113 „Muluzi‟s future hangs in balance‟ in Africa Analysis: Malawi May 1999:4. 
114 Tenthani, Raphael., „Malawi Corruption halts Danish aid‟ 31 January 2002 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Africa/1794730.stm -accessed 20th July 2010). 
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rewards for political allegiance and were given to those who would carry out „instructions from above‟ to 
siphon resources and channel them to political activities or other private ends. There are many cases 
that would fit in this category but here I highlight only three to show the main patterns that political graft 
and plunder took: 
Portland Cement Company 
A subsidiary wholly owned by the MDC gave away 500 bags of cement to a Minister of Energy and 
Mining, after his familiarisation tour to the company. In presenting the „gift‟, the General Manager was 
clear on the purpose of the gesture: “We want to thank you for visiting us with a small gift, just a token – 
it‟s a lorry filled with 500 bags of cement”115. 
The Shire Bus Lines case 
Monday Trading, a firm that supplied spare parts to Shire Bus Lines, belonged to the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of the company who was an executive member of the ruling party. His firm was being 
paid between MK8 to MK9 million per month regardless of whether supplies were made or not. 
Furthermore, the firm was not registered for surtax but was charging Shire Bus Lines surtax and not 
remitting the same to the Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA). Another company, QAC belonged to the 
CEO‟s elder brother and was also on a similar scheme with the parastatal company116.  
The Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi (ESCOM) case 
 A UDF Member of Parliament was paid MK40 million by the company for goods and services he never 
supplied or undersupplied. Similarly, the Deputy CEO and Director of finance paid MK45 million to Shire 
Bus Lines in 2004, without knowledge of the CEO, on the grounds of settling debts117. However, there 
were no records of such debts and it is suspected that the money was released through the dubious 
supply contracts at Shire Bus Lines and used for campaign in the 2004 general election. 
                                                             
115 Ngala, H.,„Portland gives Minister 500 bags of cement‟, Daily Times, 2 January, 1996 p.2. 
116 ACB Annual Report 2003/2004 p.10. By the end of fieldwork, there was little movement on the case. Proceedings had 
been stayed in the magistrate court because files and documents of the case at the court registry went missing! 
117ACB Annual Report, 2004/2005 p.15. 
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These cases illustrate the different ways through which access to the state was used to boost personal 
incomes through genuine or pseudo-businesses and to fund political activities of the ruling party. But 
collusion and corruption in SBRs also took other forms which essentially undermined the rule of law by 
selective application of the rules. For example, Nuka wholesalers Ltd used to buy export sugar from 
Illovo Sugar Company but sold it locally thereby evading surtax. The owner used to bribe custom 
officers at border posts to falsify records to show that the sugar was being exported. The Director of 
Public Prosecutions refused to grant consent to prosecute despite repeated requests by the Anti-
Corruption Bureau (ACB)118. According to a former senior minister in the UDF government, prosecution 
could not proceed because the president‟s company would be implicated. In another case, another of 
the president‟s companies (Atupele Properties) was offered a ghost plot by the Blantyre City Assembly 
for the construction of an office park. The Minister of Lands directed that the car park for the office be 
built on a road reserve for a highway. Furthermore, the president compelled the Malawi Revenue 
Authority (MRA) to occupy the office block and to pay rentals for five years in advance before 
construction of the building was completed119. Similarly, a UDF Member of Parliament directly asked 
the president to order the Ministry of Education to resuscitate a contract his company had with the 
ministry under tender No.4421-CTB 4421/9. The contract had been suspended by the ACB as part of 
investigating the construction scam in the ministry. The Member of Parliament observed that his 
company had been cleared and he was experiencing serious financial problems to service his 
constituency. In response, the president directed the Minister of Presidential Affairs to liaise with the 
Minister of Education to find a way of helping the Member of Parliament120. This selective and slipshod 
enforcement of rules meant that so long as one was in good books with the people at the top of the 
political hierarchy, it was easy to get away with illegalities and corruption. As observed by the World 
                                                             
118 ACB Annual Report for 2003/04 p.13. 
119 ACB Report for 2003/04 p.11. 
120Member of Parliament for Thyolo south constituency to State President (1st February 2001) (MNA, Presidential Affairs 
BOX 50725). 
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Bank country team, there were weak government systems and controls that allowed for institutionalised 
corruption and especially customs evasion121. 
6.4.3. Access to credit facilities: bad loans to good friends 
The leverage of the state in credit organisations for SMEs further deepened politically-embedded 
cronyism and collusion in SBRs. Politicians of the ruling party or their associates took out „business‟ 
loans especially from SEDOM, DEMATT and the MDC and never paid back. This was particularly the 
case because board members and managers were appointed by the president from among party 
supporters and there was an implicit understanding to provide loans to applicants associated with the 
party. For example, SEDOM provided a loan of MK240, 000 to a young brother of a Minister of Lands 
and Valuation when the applicant owed the organisation a previous loan that was not being serviced. 
Another UDF Member of Parliament was named as having given a kickback of MK10,000 to a manager 
within SEDOM for facilitating his loan122. More ministers and senior UDF officials were named in an 
„arrears‟ report as having taken loans from SEDOM  without security and they too were not making any 
repayments at all123. Similarly, between 1995 and 1998, DEMATT disbursed a total of MK33 million 
without proper documentation to enable recovery of the loans124. It was alleged that the president 
contributed to the mess by instructing the organisation to give loans to people on political grounds125. 
But the culture of defaulting on payments was not limited to politicians only. Chirwa et al (1996) found 
that defaulting in microcredit schemes was rampant because politicians misrepresented the loans as 
gifts or grants during campaigns so much that there was little willingness among ordinary recipients to 
pay back the money. 
                                                             
121 Kamlomo, G, „TEAM blames corruption on government weaknesses‟, Daily Times, 14 April, 2000, p.3. 
122 „SEDOM to be probed‟, Daily Times, 3 July, 1997,p.1. 
123 „Ministers, Members of Parliament on SEDOM blacklist‟, Daily Times, 6 August, 1997, p.1. 
124 Maeresa,A, „DEMATT dishes out MK33m with no proper documentation‟, Daily Times, 19 January, 1998,p.2. 
125 Ibid. 
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In very basic terms “SEDOM and DEMATT collapsed because people just took loans because they had 
positions in the party and never paid back”126. The MDC was not spared from political pressures to 
provide investment funds to people who were connected to top politicians. As one o fficer observed,“... 
there was often political pressure on officers within the corporation to prepare project papers and board 
papers for approval even when the projects were not viable”127. By 2004, MDC had a huge debt 
consisting of MK1.07 billion to DBSA (Development Bank of South Africa), MK 471 million to Reserve 
Bank of Malawi/European International Bank (EIB) and MK 157million to EIB128. A considerable 
proportion of this was due to bad loans. At a meeting of the MDC board the chairman informed 
members that “a memo had been deployed to the president on political loans and he was awaiting 
response”129. Suffice to note here that the MDC was subsequently liquidated. 
President Muluzi‟s propensity to intervene in credit matters of his cronies may have encouraged bad 
loans not only from micro-credit firms but also from high street banks. For example, a private school 
owned by an activist of the ruling party had an overdraft of MK522,234 and a loan of MK1, 116,956 
which were not being serviced. When the bank threatened legal action, the proprietor informed the 
bank that the guarantor of the loan, President Muluzi, had undertaken to communicate with the bank on 
the matter130. In another case, a UDF Member of Parliament asked the president to intervene in a loan 
case in which the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) had gone to court because he was not servicing the 
loan. He specifically asked the president to order the RBM to slow down on the recovery of the loan131. 
                                                             
126 Interview,Dr. Justin Malewezi, Former Vice President and Minister of Privatisation in the UDF government. 
127MDC Internal Memorandum, Ref.TIM GEN, 12 October, 1998 (From Project Officer to Management) (MNA, MDC Box 
No.5). 
128MDC Ltd Corporate Strategic Plan 2005-9 (MNA, MDC Box No. 1). 
129 MDC Minutes of the 185th Meeting of the Board of Directors held on 30th January, 2004. 
130 Managing Director (Soche Progressive Institute of Education) to Credit Service Manager, National Bank of Malawi (MNA 
Presidential Affairs, Box No.50724). 
131 From Member of Parliament for Thyolo South Constituency, to His Excellency State President (1st February 2001) (MNA, 
Presidential Affairs BOX 50725). 
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Access to credit based on political relations took many forms. There are reports of unpublicised 
business funding schemes managed by the Ministry of Finance, from which some ministers and senior 
bureaucrats took loans that were never meant to be paid back132. For example, a report by the Auditor 
General revealed that between 1999 and 2002, government introduced a fund to offer soft loans to 
small scale entrepreneurs. Only four people applied for loans under this fund: A cabinet minister, a UDF 
Member of Parliament, a personal physician for the president and a representative of the UDF on the 
Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC). Except for the MEC commissioner who never got the loan, the 
other three got MK3 million, MK2 million and MK5 million, respectively. No contracts were signed133. 
This scheme was basically a pseudo micro-business fund. It did not reflect any state-business 
interaction but outright graft under the pretext of promoting businesses.  
Throughout the first decade of multiparty democracy, collusive SBRs reflected the adage that “ a goat 
eats where it is tethered” (Bayart,1993) which is the essence of the „politics of the belly‟ where state 
elites (i.e. ruling politicians and bureaucrats) engaged in personal accumulation of wealth and power 
using the state. Unlike in South Korea where collusive SBRs are said to have been responsible for 
rapid growth and expanding investment (Kang, 2002), in Malawi they were certainly responsible for 
slowing down the economy. Between 1994 and 1998 private sector investment went down by 70 per 
cent from 17 per cent to 5.2 per cent of GDP134 while the share of industry/manufacturing fell from 21 to 
18 per cent (Nthara, 2003:113) and plummeted further to 12 percent by 2004 (Chinsinga, 2002; UNDP, 
2006).The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) showed that Malawi had 
failed to attract new foreign direct investment (FDI). For instance, FDI (equity) was pegged at $25 
                                                             
132 Interview,Mr. Geof Chikuta, former Chief Investigator of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, July,2009. 
133 Chipofya, D., „UDF allies in MK10m loan scandal‟, The Daily Times, 9 December, 2008. 
134 Gunde, A., „Private sector registers decline‟, Daily Times, 22 May 1998 p.3. 
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million in 1994 but had fallen to $3.3 million by 2001135. This was attributed, among other factors to 
state-business corruption and poor economic planning136.  
While the MCP regime was obviously a predatory oligarchy in so far as its relations with private capital 
and society in general were concerned, the UDF era was a „plundering democracy‟ and a big part of its 
ruling elite constituted an „exploiting oligarchy‟ (Khembo, 2004). Political and economic spaces were 
manipulated to enhance the dominance of the ruling party and its entrepreneurial clientele. During this 
decade, businesses especially SMEs were born, flourished or failed not so much in the market place as 
would have been expected in a liberalising economy, as in the administrative offices of the government 
and the party. The illicit exchange of money and favours between state and business elements and 
political graft was common knowledge. A former cabinet minister in UDF government insinuated that in 
reality UDF stood for Ukafuna Dilu Fulumira137 rather than „United Democratic Front‟. Political loyalty 
overrode prudent economic criteria in public procurement and in granting access to state-controlled 
credit facilities. Bureaucrats were not independent from political interference and many joined in the 
plunder in order to save their jobs in one of the most patrimonial bureaucracies. Politicians in the ruling 
party appeared to be competing among themselves in extracting rents from the state for purposes of 
augmenting their personal economic and political bases. Politically-embedded cronyism and collusion 
in SBRs affected the operations of genuine businessmen. Thus, in mid 2003, the Chamber accused the 
government of throwing away moral business principles by favouring a few people in business, and 
vehemently criticised the culture of handouts, including hard cash, to political supporters138. 
The simultaneous development of concertation and politically-embedded cronyism and collusion in 
SBRs presents something of a paradox. Conventional theories of SBRs suggest that a pattern of 
concertation naturally presents incentives that militate against the development of collusive relations 
                                                             
135 www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/wid_cip_mw_en.pdf (accessed 10 July 2010). 
136 Namwaza,G., „Malawi lowly ranked in investment‟, Daily Times, 8 October,2004, p.1. 
137 Literally meaning: If you want a (corrupt) deal, be quick! 
138 Musukwa, H., „MCCCI Calls for Business Morality‟, Daily Times, 18 July 2003 p.2. 
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(Schneider and Maxifield, 1997; Taylor, 2007; Haggard, Maxfield and Schneider, 1997). The 
institutional pattern of SBRs presented above takes exception to this conventional wisdom. The 
following section attempts a political explanation of the simultaneous development of the two seemingly 
contradictory institutional patterns.  
6.4.4. Chameleon politics139: explaining the awkward embrace of concertation and collusion 
The duality of concertation and collusion arose mainly from the tension between interests of the UDF 
leadership. In one dimension, they sought to project an outlook that they were advancing a democratic 
agenda. The result was the apparent willingness to engage with the business sector in policy dialogue. 
This was aimed at winning the confidence of the international donor community and was consistent with 
the new expectations about democratic politics. In the other, they wanted to build their own economic 
power and retain political power for longer than the new democratic rules of the political game required. 
Electoral politics, based on regionalism and ethnicity, did not guarantee their continued grip on power. 
The simultaneous pursuit of these two interests resulted in „chameleon politics‟ as a dominant strategy 
for maximising their political and economic interests. 
Chameleon politics is used here as shorthand for a kind of politics characterised by flippancy and 
inconsistency in the principles adhered to by political leaders (Dzimbiri, 1998). It demonstrates a lack of 
credibility of the political elites and undermines the democratic notion of a government or state founded 
on the sustained trust of the people. It is further characterised by shifting allegiances among political 
elites, very much on the rationale that in politics there are no permanent enemies or friends. 
Thus,“heroes of yesterday may be villains of today” depending on the dynamic of political friendship or 
animosity (Englund, 2002:17-18). In the culture of chameleon politics, the ruling political elites are 
concerned more with „appearances‟ than the substance of the ideals they profess.  
                                                             
139 The use of this phrase is not new in the analysis of Malawian politics. It was first used by Mapanje (1981) to describe 
state-society relations in the period of the one party state and has been used by others including Dzimbiri (1998) and 
Englund (2002) to describe Malawian politics since 1994. Anders (2006) has used it to describe the behaviour of Malawian 
civil servants. 
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The UDF government initiated concertation in formal SBRs to project the rhetoric of democratic policy-
making processes based on consultations with non-state actors. In doing this they sought to 
demonstrate a departure from the practices of the one-party state where economic policy making was a  
preserve of a few people if not the president alone: 
... having come from a one party state, we did everything to make sure that we were democratic... 
that we did not go back to the one party state... but unfortunately after the 1999 general election, 
things were no longer the same...140 
 
The first five years were very democratic. It was a euphoria period of change. We wanted to do 
certain things which the MCP had not done. We had to be seen to be getting rid of the one party 
remnant. But the second five years were different – they were characterised by kitchen 
cabinets...141 
Thus policy consultation, especially on the national budget with the Chamber and other private sector 
stakeholders, was meant not only to develop a broad ownership of the policies but also to deepen the 
democratic legitimacy of the UDF government. After 1999, however, there was less of collective cabinet 
responsibility. The President developed selfish interests to remain in power and factions within the 
cabinet developed. There were increasingly fewer cabinet meetings and the president committed 
himself less to running government and more to political machinations to extend presidential term 
limits142. Decision making within the government became even more decentralised143. Patrimonial 
strategies, especially cash and material handouts were intensified. However, at technical level and 
ministerial level, concertation began to institutionalise under the NAG to maintain the „appearance‟ of 
democratic and collaborative policy dialogue. Furthermore, the NAG appeared to have been fully 
accepted between 2003 and 2004 at the expense of the Chamber. During this period President Muluzi 
accepted parliamentary defeat to extend term limits and appointed his anointed successor as Minister of 
                                                             
140 Interview, Mr. Harry Thomson, UDF executive member and cabinet minister. 
141 Interview, Dr. Justin Malewezi, Vice President and Minister of Privatisation in UDF government. 
142 Monthly cabinet meetings were abandoned because the president was too busy. He later allowed  his deputy to preside 
over cabinet meetings but the authority was revoked after just one meeting. At that first meeting, one minister asked for 
information about allegations of corrupt government deals to procure vehicles and award of contracts for a scheme to 
develop national identity cards. Two ministers who were involved in these deals and were part of the president‟s „inner 
circle‟ reported the matter to the president who reacted by directing that only he would preside over cabinet meetings. 
143 Interview, Mr. Aleke Banda, Dr. Justin Malewezi and Mr. Harry Thomson. 
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Economic Planning and Development. The new minister used the NAG to court „big business‟ and 
collaborated with it in developing the business-friendly MEGS. Thus, the NAG enhanced the 
appearances of democratic consultations while building a business base for the minister‟s political 
support for the presidency. 
However, multiparty politics gave way to a culture of „handouts‟ as a new basis of legitimacy for political 
elites. This was justified as a direct way of alleviating poverty and as being consistent with the principles 
of social democracy that was the ideological plank of the UDF. Political legitimacy for the party 
depended on an extensive and expensive party machinery that organised and controlled its 
constituency. It required numerous side payments and encouraged the development of „big men‟ in 
politics. Furthermore, before 1999, the distribution of parliamentary seats compelled the UDF to „buy‟ 
opposition politicians in order to attain a threshold of parliamentary votes. After 1999, the strategy 
continued and got worse. It extended to politicians outside parliament and traditional chiefs in order to 
canvass popular support for constitutional changes (Chingaipe,2009). As observed by VonDoepp 
(2005:181), UDF functionaries and candidates bought coffins for funerals, provided donations to 
churches, schools and hospitals and provided cash handouts to groups that patronised their meetings. 
These strategies were primarily responsible for collusion between genuine and pseudo businesses, 
especially SMEs, and state departments. Politically–embedded cronyism and collusion was a strategy 
of siphoning away resources from the state for personal enrichment and for building and consolidating 
patronage networks in order to maintain power. Furthermore, political elites also extracted resources 
from the business community in the form of „security fees‟ for maintaining business contracts144. Thus, 
both concertation and collusion were driven by politics and were products of activities of politicians that 
were caught between satisfying the expectations of the democratic rules of politics while pursuing their 
                                                             
144 Interview, Dr. Justin Malewezi, Vice President and Minister of Privatisation in UDF government. 
 243 
 
 
selfish, non democratic political and economic interests using strategies that contradicted the formal 
framework of rules.  
Conclusion 
The analysis above has shown that in the first decade of multiparty democracy the preconditions for 
coherent SBRs in both the public and private sectors were weak, and that formal relations tended to be 
ad-hoc, issue driven and disjointed. In comparison to the one party era, the democratic period saw 
more policy consultation between the government and the private sector, albeit in a context of 
pluralised institutional environment and ambivalent strategic objectives of governing politicians. In 
winding up the chapter, I return to the main concerns of this research i.e. how political processes and 
power configurations within the democratic framework shaped the institutional patterns of SBRs and 
what the analysis suggests for institutional and SBR theories.  
The primacy of politics 
Just as in the colonial and post-colonial eras, the economic and political interests of the ruling political 
elites were prime in shaping the institutional arrangements of SBRs between 1994 and 2004. However, 
unlike the colonial and post-colonial state elites who demonstrated unity of purpose in their strategic 
objectives, the political elites in the democratic era were ambivalent. The need to project a democratic 
outlook in policy processes led to strategies that enabled apparent concertation between the 
government and the business community. However, unlike in the colonial era, concertation remained 
nascent primarily because of lack of agreement on the mode of business representation for public-
private policy dialogue145. But the UDF politicians wanted to hold on to power in a manner that was not 
consistent with the democratic rules of politics adopted in 1993.This led to a culture of chameleon 
politics that sustained efforts at formal concertation while engendering collusive SBRs. However, the 
extensiveness of collusion reflected the continuing centrality of the state in SBRs due to the resources it 
                                                             
145 It must be recalled here that during the colonial era the European business community had direct representation in the 
Legislative Council (based on the 1907 Order in Council) and later had direct representation in the Executive Council (see 
Chapter 4). 
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commands and as the largest consumer. The examples given above show that state-business 
transactions were avenues of upward mobility and a source of wealth for entry and survival into the 
private sector. The main criterion for eligibility to share in the spoils of the state was political allegiance 
to the UDF as a party and especially to the top leadership146. 
Thus, politics was the driving force in changing SBR institutions of the one party period and in the 
formation and maintenance of new institutional patterns. The institutional variations in SBRs across the 
three periods suggest that different politics entail different institutional arrangements for SBRs and the 
strategic objectives of the political and business elites of each period are critical in explaining the 
processes of institutional evolution. The analysis illustrates the proposition that economic and political 
interests of key elites can exert a powerful influence on the kinds of choices they make with respect to 
institutional arrangements (Boone, 1998). 
The institutional architecture of the state and elite configurations 
The political institutional architecture of the multiparty democratic state resulted in the dispersal of the 
power of decision-making in government. Unlike in the MCP era where all major state-business 
transactions revolved around the dictates of Kamuzu Banda, ministers and bureaucrats in the UDF 
government had wide latitude for decision-making including the concluding of multi-million dollar 
contracts with private companies. The state became less coherent than during the MCP period and 
presented numerous points of interface for non transparent SBRs that were collusive as exemplified by 
different scams presented above.  Furthermore, the new political institutional architecture introduced 
political competition and the uncertainty of a continued grip on power. The creation and sharing of rents 
by governing politicians and bureaucratic elites became a strategy for mobilising resources that were 
disbursed as patronage in order to gain political support and legitimacy. This strategy enhanced 
collusive SBRs in which the political allegiance of business owners became important eligibility criterion 
                                                             
146 Government contracts, access to credit, quotas for sugar distribution, posts to diplomatic missions and membership on 
parastatal boards were all awarded to UDF sympathisers regardless of their region of origin or ethnic identity. 
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for extracting resources from the state for private ends. Furthermore, unlike in one-party period when 
business associations were part of the national governance structures, they were not directly co-opted 
into state structures during the first decade of multiparty democracy despite the active involvement of 
the leadership of the Chamber in the politics of change in the early 1990s147.  
Lack of political co-optation presented incentives for business associations, especially the Chamber, to 
develop independent political and technical capacity to raise policy issues and engage with the 
government when opportunities for dialogue occurred. A comparison of the political capacity of 
business associations the three periods, suggests that the independence of business associations from 
direct political control enhances the development of constructive private-public policy dialogue. 
Cooptation of business associations into the party structure during the MCP period stifled critical policy 
voice because of excessive party discipline. The case of ABAM further suggests that co-opted business 
associations tend to be used as instruments for politicians to pursue other agendas. Once there is a 
shift in political power, the political usefulness of co-opted associations wanes and are likely to become 
irrelevant for their members and will finally disintegrate. Thus, the Chamber has survived since the early 
1890s because it kept its autonomy from the colonial state and developed its political capacity to 
withstand threats which enabled it survive the one party state. 
Economic and political dependence of the state and the autonomy of the state vis-a-vis the 
business community 
I have shown in chapter 4 that concertation developed in colonial SBRs mainly because the state 
depended on the business sector for its revenues and political legitimacy. I have further shown that the 
one-party state depended less on the private business sector because it generated enough revenue 
from the many business enterprises that it managed. In any case, it was an unlimited state so much 
that it could use force and other forms of predation to extract any resources from private businesses if it 
                                                             
147 It must be recalled here that ABAM was an umbrella body of all African business associations and was itself a member of 
the MCP with a right to send delegates to the party convention. Furthermore, expatriate business interests were given 
parliamentary representation as a „loyal opposition (see Chapter 5). 
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needed them. The private business sector was too insignificant a threat for the legitimacy of the regime 
because it could not mobilise independently. There was, therefore, not much room for policy dialogue 
between the state and the business sector and the result was state hegemony in SBRs. The analysis in 
this chapter shows that the UDF government depended on the business community both financially and 
politically. Policy emphasis was on SMEs as agents of economic growth and poverty reduction but 
implementation was badly affected by politics as the policy focus appeared more to rationalise collusion 
and rent-seeking than to encourage investment and growth. Thus, the state generated rents that 
accrued to politicians through pseudo-businesses or informal, collusive relations between government 
departments and agencies and selected businesses.  
The state became embedded in social and political relations with elements of the business sector but 
lacked the autonomy and discipline that is associated with „effective states‟ (Fukuyama, 2005; Ghani 
and Lockart, 2008; Unsworth, 2005). In short, the state under the UDF regime best resembled Myrdal‟s 
„soft state‟ which was characterised by a general lack of social discipline, deficiencies in legislation, in 
law observance and enforcement, and directives handed down to officials at various levels to aid 
collusive SBRs (Myrdal, 1970: 229).  
Organisation of the state and the business sector and the institutionalisation of PPD 
Unlike the colonial and the one party period, the public sector in the first decade of multiparty 
democracy, was characterised by bureaucratic pluralism and a divided mandate for PPD with the 
business sector. This dispersion of mandate partly encouraged factions in the business community as it 
guaranteed access to the state. For example, the NAG enjoyed reasonably good relations with 
ministries of Finance and Economic planning and Development while by law and tradition the chamber 
related better with the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry. Other sectoral associations interfaced 
more with MIPA and other ministries on policy issues but the chamber increasingly got the recognition 
of being the umbrella body of the private sector. Thus, the decentralised pattern of policy-making in 
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government contributed to the pluralised institutional environment for SBRs which affected coherence 
of policy and opened up the system to collusive behaviours.  
In terms of business organisation, the analysis illustrates the importance of the two logics of 
associational objectives identified by Schmitter and Streeck (1999). For the „logic of membership‟ the 
association must offer sufficient incentives to their members to extract from them adequate resources 
for its survival and growth. For the „logic of influence‟, associations must exercise adequate influence 
over public authorities (ibid: 19). The analysis has shown that the rules of membership within the 
chamber before 2001/02 saw large firms withholding their active participation and founding a separate 
forum for PPD. This affected the Chamber on both logics and led to institutional changes within the 
Chamber which have had profound effects in institutionalising PPD after 2004. The analysis suggests 
that business associations for effective PPD must develop political capacity to intermediate among 
members and to engage the state. In particular, it is important to keep „big businesses‟ from defecting 
as they did when they were outvoted by a majority of small firms. The development of the necessary 
political capacity may require the introduction of some form of proportional voting but the current 
formula based on the level of subscription fees raises difficult questions about the notion of 
representation in PPD. 
Insights for institutional theory 
The analysis in this chapter provides at least three insights for institutional theory. The first relates to 
the nature of „critical junctures‟ in effecting change in existing institutions. It reinforces an assertion 
made in the previous chapters that the definitive element of „critical junctures‟ ought to be expectations 
for change rather than effects of change. It was the need to fulfil the new popular expectations about 
political practices of democratic states that led to the emergence of policy dialogue between the state 
and the business community. However, the practice of PPD was less than anticipated and a reversal to 
a status of non-dialogue was a real possibility. Furthermore, despite constitutional rules, introduced as 
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part of the transition process, to stop ruling politicians from active involvement with their businesses, 
the practice continued nonetheless. Thus, the criticality of the transition period lay in people‟s 
expectations for change which were codified in law. The effects of these changes, however, were 
dismal. 
The second insight is about how historical experiences of actors shape institutional continuity and 
discontinuity. The history of the one party state informed the restructuring of SBRs in the era of 
multiparty democracy. Efforts at deconstructing the institutional edifice of the one-party state (e.g. the 
repeal of forfeiture laws, guarantees of freedom to engage in lawful economic activities, apparent 
willingness to engage in policy dialogue) illustrates not only the primacy of politics but also the 
importance of the historical context in shaping institutional evolution. Not only did history provide a 
basis for discarding some institutions, it also generated expectations of what subsequent rules should 
be. Thus, both institutional formation and change are inextricably embedded in history which shapes 
ideas and aspirations of actors. 
The third insight relates to how actors exploit their positions of power to determine what the actual rules 
governing any activity will be. Although the new constitutional rules required the president and cabinet 
ministers to disengage from active involvement with their businesses, they did not spell out a system for 
effecting this requirement. This omission effectively created a space which was not governed by any 
rules. It provided state elites with room for manoeuvre and they exploited the omission by engineering 
collusive SBRs with their firms or those of their cronies. Similarly, the Competition and Fair Trading Act 
which had potential to minimise collusive SBRs was simply ignored and remained unoperationalised. 
The requirement of the Anti-corruption bureau to seek consent from the Director of Public Prosecutions 
in order to prosecute corruption cases effectively shielded collusive SBRs from the justice system148. 
                                                             
148 The Director, who was under the control of the President, used to withhold his consent and he had final say on whether a 
case would be prosecuted or not. See also Transparency International (2004). 
 249 
 
 
These pieces of legislation were not enforced mainly because they were at odds with the interests and 
political realities of those who had lawful mandate to establish the institutions and organisations for 
enforcing them. These instances suggest that enforcement characteristics of formal rules are critical to 
the effective maintenance of institutions and that it is the interaction between formal institutions and 
actors that determine what the actual rules will be.  
This chapter is the last of three empirical chapters. In the next chapter I show what the analysis 
contributes to the understanding of the politics of Malawian SBRs and also its implications for SBR and 
institutional theories. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion: State-Business Relations and the Politics of Institutional Formation, Maintenance 
and Change 
 
“Aside from the difference between despotic and libertarian governments, the greatest 
distinction between one government and another is in the degree to which market replaces 
government or government replaces market ... Hence, certain questions about the 
governmental-market relation are at the core of both political science and economics, no 
less for planned systems than for market systems”1  
Introduction 
This final chapter spells out the wider implications of the empirical analysis of state-business relations 
(SBRs) in Malawi. The overarching argument is that politics were central in shaping the formation and 
maintenance of SBR institutions in each period and in changing the institutions from one period to 
another. The activities of cooperation, negotiation, conflict, bargaining, domination and subjugation, 
first, between the state and the business community, secondly within the state between bureaucratic 
agencies, and thirdly, within the business community between business associations divided along 
racial and sectoral lines, shaped the attitudes of the various state and business elites as well  as the 
structure, political and economic orientations of the state and business communities. At a macro-level, 
a particularly important variable from one period to another, was the distribution and exercise of power 
between the state and the organised business community.  
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 7.1 deals with the implications for the understanding 
of the shifting patterns of state-society relations in Malawi, with particular reference to SBRs. Section 
7.2 considers implications for wider SBR theory, while section 7.3 highlights the implications for 
institutional theory in political science. Section 7.4 identifies some issues for further research.  
                                                             
1Lindblom (1977:ix). 
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7.1. Implications for the understanding of state-business relations in Malawi 
This section identifies the main variables that shaped Malawian SBRs across the three periods. These 
include the structure, authority and political orientations of the state; the structure, power and ideology 
of the business sector; and the dependence of the state on the business sector for revenues and 
political support.  
7.1.1. The structure, authority and political orientations of the state 
The way in which the authority of the state was exercised determined whether the business sector had 
policy voice and space. Under the first constitutional order of 1889, the authority of the „state‟ was 
vested in a rudimentary administration in which the commissioner had virtually unlimited discretion. 
Commissioner Johnston used the discretion to enhance a particularistic relationship with the imperialist 
corporation, the British South Africa Company (BSAC), while marginalising the rest of the business 
community as part of the efforts to introduce company rule over the country. Thus, this early period was 
characterised by acrimony between the barely existing state and the mostly unorganised business 
community. SBRs remained unstructured and uninstitutionalised until 1907 when the rudimentary 
administration began to evolve into a modern state. The creation of the Legislative Council (LEGCO) 
and the Executive council (EXCO) under the 1907 constitutional order diminished the discretion of the 
Governor as he had to share decision-making powers with the councils. By requiring the representation 
of European settlers in the LEGCO, the constitutional framework made the political legitimacy of the 
colonial state dependent more on European commercial and agricultural interests than on the 
Governor‟s loyalty to the British government. Furthermore, the division of state authority between the 
British government and the colonial government required the latter to ensure that its policies and 
proposals were negotiated first with the business associations. It further imposed specific restraints on 
the freedom of the Governor to formulate and implement policy instantly and provided an appeal 
procedure for the European business associations. This was an incentive for the colonial government to 
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negotiate its policies first with the Chamber and the Nyasaland Convention of Associations (NCA). 
Thus, the structure of the colonial state provided spaces for genuine policy dialogue and collaboration 
but only with the European business community.  
The rules for representation in the LEGCO left out the Asian and African communities until the late 
1940s when changes in the composition of the LEGCO were introduced. The privileged position of the 
European business community in public-private dialogue (PPD) weakened with the introduction of the 
Central African Federation (CAF) and the intensity of nationalist activity. These two factors led to 
significant changes in the structure of the colonial state and in the pattern of its engagement with the 
European business associations. However, despite the collaborative relations, the colonial state, 
especially after 1896, was not the unautonomous handmaiden of European commerce and agriculture. 
It battled with planters over labour policies, with European commercialists over their trading practices 
and the construction industry over standards, land acquisitions and inhumane treatment of African 
workers, and endeavoured to avoid monopolies in business. 
However, the structure, authority and ideological orientations of the state changed significantly upon the 
attainment of political independence by Africans. The Malawi Congress Party (MCP) became the most 
important political organisation in the country. It created a coherent, highly autonomous state that 
concentrated policy-making powers in a patrimonial president, Kamuzu Banda, whose idiosyncrasies 
shaped the institutional forms of state-society relations, including SBRs. Banda transformed the 
Malawian polity into a particularly dense and pervasive form of authoritarianism and achieved total 
control over state, society and economy. He subordinated the business community to the party through 
coercion, expropriation and patronage so much that private enterprises were closely tied to the political 
interests of the state. Unlike the colonial state which tolerated the expression of diverse views among 
its officials (reflected in minutes of the EXCO) and within society, including business associations, the 
MCP‟s political mantra of „unity, loyalty, obedience and discipline‟ was ruthlessly enforced by its 
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patrimonial troops to stifle expression of different policy opinions and to enforce compliance with the 
dictates of the president. Thus, the creation and co-optation of the African Businessmen Association 
(ABAM) into the party deprived it of independent policy voice and made it one of the instruments for 
mobilising support for the regime. Similarly, a European parliamentary opposition, which Banda 
designated as a proxy representative of European commercial and agricultural interests, was not 
allowed enough policy autonomy and was abolished when it began to make its policy positions more 
forcefully. Although the regime preached unity, racial thinking continued to shape its attitudes toward 
the business community. The state‟s need to create a nationalist business class often meant hostile 
attitudes and actions towards the Indian and European business communities as exemplified by 
forfeitures of their assets, deportations and trading restrictions, including the eviction of Indian traders 
from rural areas. 
The democratisation process in the 1990s brought changes in the structure, authority and ideological 
orientations of the state that, in turn, profoundly impacted on the patterns of SBRs. The most important 
institutional changes included the attenuation of presidential powers through the separation of power 
among relatively autonomous branches of government and through the decentralisation of economic 
decision-making among ministers and senior bureaucrats. Constitutional rules proscribed arbitrary 
deprivation of private property and guaranteed business freedom and generally supported the 
emergency of a market economy. Organisationally, the shift was towards greater pluralism within both 
the state and the business sector. The decentralisation of decision-making within the state, and 
overlapping mandates of the various government agencies vis-a-vis the business sector, led to 
bureaucratic pluralism. Emphasis on freedom of association resulted in entrepreneurs mobilising 
themselves into business associations along economic sub-sectors, size of firms and identities such as 
gender. The result was a more pronounced fragmentation of the business sector. 
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Organisational pluralism within the state and the private sector yielded, initially, a pluralised 
environment in which the various business associations engaged in policy dialogue with the various 
government agencies/departments. For example, the Chamber with the Ministry of Trade, Commerce 
and Industry, the National Action Group (NAG) with the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development; the National association of Small and Medium Enterprises (NASME) with the Malawi 
Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA). Organisational pluralism weakened the state, eroded 
bureaucratic discipline in the public sector, and opened up institutional spaces for extensive collusive 
SBRs. Furthermore, competitive multiparty politics yielded a fractured political system in which the state 
became less autonomous from particularistic pressures and disbursed rents extensively in order for the 
ruling party to sustain support. Consequently, the state descended into a domain of wanton political 
graft involving rent-seeking business elements and rent-generating state incumbents. Under the UDF 
government, the abuse of public office paralleled that of Mobutu‟s Zaire where holding any slice of 
public power constituted a veritable exchange instrument (Schneider and Maxifield, 1997; Hutchcroft 
(1994), as exemplified by the many cases of collusion cited in chapter six. 
Paradoxically, this pattern of SBRs emerged despite the creation of watchdog organisations such as 
the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) and an emerging vibrant civil society. Its emergence challenges the 
view that democratisation reduces corruption (Chowdhury, 2004; Goel and Nelson, 2005), and shows 
that they can coexist, especially in political contexts where democracy is only emerging and its 
institutions are still in a flux. 
Across the three periods, the evolving patterns of SBRs were directly shaped by the forms of the state. 
From an imperialist bureaucratic state that sided with European commerce and agriculture2, often 
against Africans and Asians3, the state came to resemble Hobbes‟ „Leviathan‟ in the period of one-party 
                                                             
2 My use of „imperialist bureaucratic state‟ draws on O‟Donnell‟s (1998) „bureaucratic authoritarianism‟. 
3See, for example, Shepperson and Price (1956). 
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rule4. It emphasised its sovereign authority, the obligation of all other social actors to obey it, and took 
pre-eminence in political, social and economic life. In the first decade of multiparty democracy, liberal 
notions for organising political and economic relations in society led to attempts to define a private 
sphere that would be independent of the state, thereby redefining the limits of the state itself. But the 
latter degenerated into a form that resembled Myrdal‟s „soft state‟ that was characterised by lack of 
discipline and low levels of law observance and enforcement. However, as the state evolved from one 
form to another, so too, did the structure, power and ideology of the organised business interests. Their 
interactions with the different forms of the state gave SBRs their varied institutional forms in each 
period. 
7.1.2. The structure, power and ideology of the business sector 
The changing nature of the state resulted in business associations changing from being vigorous 
representatives of business demands in the colonial period, to mere conduits of government policies to 
the business community during the one-party period, and to a weak and fluid combination of these roles 
in the first decade of multiparty democracy. While the public and private sectors were distinct in the 
colonial period, they were largely fused in the one-party period. Attempts to redefine the boundaries 
after 1994 were less successful as the state continued to dominate economic activity and elites 
straddled business and politics in a manner that enabled the use of political power to boost their 
enterprises and their economic power to hold on to political power.  
The evolution of the organisational forms, power and ideology of the business sector, across the three 
periods, was profoundly shaped by political processes of organising and re-organising state-society 
relations. For instance, the colonial society was stratified on racial lines. Business associations were 
similarly fragmented i.e. European, Indian and African. There was hardly any recognition of pan-
business interests across the racial divide and often representations of these business associations to 
                                                             
4 See Held (1983) and Parker (1983) on an anatomy of the leviathan state. 
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the government would seek to work against the interests of the others. For example, in the 1930s the 
European Nyasaland Merchants Association (NMA) called for business licensing regulations that would 
negatively affect their Indian competitors, leading to bitter contestation with the Indian Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). While the NMA had direct audience with the government, the ICC had to make its 
case only in writing because of the racially informed rules of PPD. Similarly, when the government 
decided to introduce a business loan scheme in the late 1920s, the Blantyre Native Association (BNA) 
which occasionally made representations on behalf of African entrepreneurs, petitioned the government 
to exclude Indian traders from the scheme5. Besides racial divisions, the European business community 
was further fragmented along sectoral lines especially between commercialists and planters. 
Despite the sectoral divisions, the European agricultural and commercial interests were able to form the 
Chamber as a peak association in 1895 in order to present concerted resistance to the power and 
authority of Commissioner Johnston that was exercised mostly to benefit the BSAC. After 1896, the 
Chamber became increasingly powerful. It was regularly consulted on policy issues, and later acquired 
direct representation in the LEGCO which enabled its members to introduce proposals for enactment 
into law. The autonomy of the Chamber from the government derived from its members‟ early 
settlement in the country, their roles in the processes of state formation and the belief that the 
possession of capital gave them an automatic entitlement to policy voice, especially in the creation of 
institutions for political and economic governance. Although colonial SBRs were somewhat collusive, 
for example, the state‟s relations with corporations such as the British South Africa Company (BSAC) 
and Zambezi Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), and in taxation policies that benefited 
European merchants and planters while exploiting Africans, and trading policies which marginalised 
Indians and Africans, both the state and the Chamber were generally autonomous of each other and 
there was a shared ideological understanding that the role of the state in the economy was largely 
                                                             
5 BNA petition to Governor, 26 November 1930, MNA S1/1343/30. 
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regulatory. This pattern continued until nationalism began to take root in the late 1940s leading to direct 
representation of Africans and Indians in the LEGCO. Between 1953 and 1963 the interactions of the 
Chamber and the NCA on one hand, and the government on the other, were less intense as 
responsibility for economic and commercial policy was transferred to the federal government in present 
day Zimbabwe. 
Nationalist politics, especially after the attainment of political independence in 1964, tipped the balance 
of political and economic power in favour of the state which took effective charge of the business sector 
and dominated economic activity. Banda‟s populist orientations engendered a somewhat hostile 
attitude towards private enterprise, which was heavily regulated and policed especially in pricing 
consumer goods. Furthermore, the state created a peak business association for an emerging African 
business class and favoured its members with business contracts, credit facilities, training and other 
particularistic policies including restricting commercial activities by non-Africans to urban centres in a 
country that was, and still is, predominantly rural. The creation and co-optation of ABAM into the 
political party prevented it from developing political capacity and independence from the state. The 
Chamber lost the legitimacy it had enjoyed with the colonial state as nationalist state elites saw it as a 
remnant organisation of colonialists. It was further weakened by an exodus of most of its members who 
left the country willingly or by deportation. Its relations with the state only began to improve when it 
Africanised its leadership positions in compliance with a nationalist government policy of Africanisation, 
but was penetrated by the party and was, therefore, unable to develop autonomy from the state. Thus, 
the business sector continued to be fragmented. It was not, therefore, in a position to present pan-
business policy proposals and was whipped into mechanical compliance with the four cornerstones of 
the one-party state.  
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The roles of business associations during this period included transmitting orders, regulations and 
guidelines from the government to the business community and helping to work out how to implement 
them rather than initiate policy. This form of collaboration with the state was essential not only for the 
successful execution of the policies, but also as a survival strategy for the associations because the 
MCP regime was capable of disbanding them even for reasons as flimsy as a mere difference in policy 
opinion.  
The combined influence of democratisation and neo-liberalism enabled the Chamber, after 1994, to 
begin to develop the political capacity necessary for engaging with the state. The provision of civil 
liberties opened up space for the Chamber to develop its autonomy from the state and the ruling party. 
Its membership density increased through the co-optation of sectoral associations and the introduction 
of regional chambers. Thus, the Chamber transformed into an encompassing association that stood for 
pan-business interests. The apparent willingness of the government to consult on policy formulation, 
provided the incentive for the Chamber to develop technical capacity by recruiting professional staff in 
economics and management. Although internal divisions within business associations are known to 
weaken the associations for public-private dialogue (PPD), the division between „big business‟ and 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) was beneficial in that it initiated the  institutionalisation of PPD. 
The formation of the National Action Group (NAG) by big business in protesting the dominance of the 
SMEs in the Chamber, led to structural changes in the Chamber including the introduction of 
membership categories. These changes enabled the Chamber to retain both big business and SMEs, 
thereby sustaining its membership density. This enabled the conversion of the NAG into a formal and 
institutionalised PPD forum within the Chamber. However, the Chamber‟s capacity to demand 
accountability from the state had not fully developed by 2004, partly because the Chamber had not yet 
fully recovered from the legacy of the one-party state and was unsure of how the government would 
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react to its criticisms. This was particularly the case between 2000 and 2004 when the UDF regime 
began to renege on democratic principles.  
As can be seen from chapters four to six, the evolution of SBRs was conditioned by political processes 
that were inspired by dominant political dogmas that were central to structuring state-society relations 
i.e. British imperialism in the colonial period, African nationalism after 1964 and liberal democracy after 
May 1993. Thus, European business associations allied with the colonial state in their pursuit of 
imperialist objectives, at the expense of the Asian and African communities. It is worth emphasising that 
except for Africans, both Europeans and Asians used their business associations for political 
representation in the colonial period. After independence, African nationalism led African state elites to 
marginalise the Chamber that was dominated by Europeans and Asians. Furthermore, non-Africans 
were not allowed party membership, effectively denying them any role in national politics as only 
members of the MCP could participate in elected positions. The racial divisions within the business 
community, reinforced by the state, prevented the formation of pan-business associations in the first 
two periods. 
Racial considerations, however, became less influential in democratic politics even though there have 
been unsustained efforts to form business associations and forums that are exclusive to „indigenous‟ 
Malawians, for example, the Indigenous Business Association of Malawi (IBAM). The shift from 
business associations defined by race was a step in the right direction for the development of a class 
consciousness of the business community. However, competitive multiparty politics fragmented the 
polity and resulted in making political affiliation to the ruling party an effective criterion for business 
contracts from government and access to credit, among other favours. Not only did these practices 
deepen neo-patrimonial tendencies of the emerging democratic state, but also delayed the capacity of 
the business community to recognise itself as a „class‟, and undermined its efforts to develop the 
necessary political capacity to pursue pan-business interests. Popular discourse on democratisation in 
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Malawi suggests that ethnicity and regionalism became the most influential identities that structured 
politics after 1994 (Phiri and Ross, 1998). One would, therefore, expect that these identities were 
equally important in the practice of SBRs, especially the collusive ones. They were not. While ethnicity 
and regionalism affected electoral politics and some appointments into the public service, collusive 
SBRs thrived mainly on political affiliation of individual business owners to the UDF, regardless of 
region of origin or ethnicity.  
The changing patterns of SBRs reflect the changing distribution of power between the state and the 
business sector. To paraphrase Lindblom, it can be said that the degree to which market replaced 
government or vice versa shaped the evolution of structures, power and ideology of both the state and 
business sector. Consequently, the intensity of PPD varied with the form and extent of mutual 
dependence between the state and the business communities, as elaborated below. 
7.1.3. Economic and political dependence between the state and the business sector  
Economic dependency 
Although the business community needed the state for the provision of public goods, the evolution of 
Malawian SBRs suggests that what mattered most for their institutional and organisations patterns was 
the relative dependence of the state on the business sector6. In particular, the nature and extent of the 
state‟s financial dependence on the business sector shaped the attitudes of state elites towards the 
business sector and the rules and structures for PPD. In the early colonial era, the state was unable to 
achieve autonomy from the BSAC as the company was the principal benefactor to the administration of 
the protectorate. Between 1891 and 1896, it provided annual subsidies to the protectorate 
administration ranging from 50 per cent to 89 per cent of total annual administrative costs. The result 
                                                             
6
 This is evidenced by the fact that across the three periods, less so during the one-party state, it was the various organised 
business interests that demanded spaces from the state for policy dialogue. 
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was a deep, collusive relationship between the administration and the company, at the expense of 
relations with the other European commercial and agricultural interests.  
Relations with the wider European business community began to improve when the British government 
blocked BSAC‟s efforts to establish company rule and terminated the company‟s role of benefactor to 
the colonial government. The government then began to depend more on the wider European and 
Indian business communities to finance its recurrent budget. The more it wanted to raise revenue for 
the administration, the more engaging SBRs became. In addition to paying their own taxes and other 
levies, the European agricultural and commercial interests provided the largest share of employment to 
Africans which enabled them to pay their taxes. The pertinence of revenue considerations in shaping 
SBRs was further reflected in protracted disagreements, as discussed in chapter four, between the 
Chamber and the government over the exportation of African labour to South Africa under the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) scheme, the agreement between the government 
and the British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) on the purchase of cotton grown by Africans on 
crown land, and in recurrent demands by planters and commercialists for electoral reforms, including 
increase of the number of seats in the LEGCO to ensure that  their interests, especially in taxation, 
were not overridden by those of the government. 
In contrast, the economic dependence of the MCP regime on the private business sector was minimal. 
This was because the private sector was too small to generate the revenue needed for a nationalist 
development programme so much that the government, and the small elite group that dominated it, 
engaged in large-scale business enterprises. The state used its corporate sector as its developmental 
vanguard and to generate the resources it needed for patronage. The state further provided the largest 
proportion of formal employment in the economy. For example, between 1968 and 1971, employment 
in the business sector increased from 89,113 to 112,674 while in the civil service it increased from 
43,730 to 54,766. However, over 60 per cent of employment in the business sector was provided by 
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public enterprises7. The government‟s extensive productive and regulatory roles in the economy, in 
addition to its authoritarian and repressive political character, endowed the state with too much 
autonomy from other societal actors, including business associations. The fusion of party and 
government meant that government resources were used to facilitate party activities and it was not 
uncommon for civil servants to be seconded to the party headquarters while remaining on the civil 
service pay roll8. Furthermore, the MCP constituted a „hard state‟ (Mhone, 1992) that often behaved like 
Olson‟s „stationary bandit‟ (Olson, 1993). It extracted any resources from the business community and 
the wider peasant society by direct appeals for funding or in the form of forced gifts, party membership 
cards and indirect taxation9. 
In addition, the government received development assistance from overseas and did not have to rely so 
much on domestic revenue to finance development projects. For example, in 1964 external finance was 
56 per cent of total government revenues while tax revenues were only 6.5 per cent. By 1971 when 
Banda was made life president of the country, the proportion of tax revenue had increased to 10.7 per 
cent, external finance reduced to 46 per cent because of reductions in voluntary current transfers, 
capital transfers and interest and loan redemption from abroad. However, government borrowing from 
abroad increased from MK2, 412,000 in 1964 to MK32, 417,000 in 1971, representing an increase of 
1,244 per cent10. The dependence on finance from abroad for development programmes continued and 
was exploited by donors in the 1990s to support calls for political change by suspending disbursement. 
                                                             
7 NSO (1972:42-44). Note that throughout the period of the one-party state public enterprises and other income generating 
statutory bodies were classified as part of the „private sector‟. 
8  Interview, Mr. Aleke Banda, July, 2009. 
9See Mhone (1992) and Harrigan (2001) on how ADMARC was used to indirectly „tax‟ smallholder producers to increase 
government revenues. 
10„Central government receipts of revenue and development accounts‟, NSO (1972) Malawi Statistical Yearbook, p.129. 
Except for percentages of tax revenues, all other statistics in percentages are my calculations. 
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These dynamics illustrate that the state‟s dependence on foreign finance and its dominance in the 
domestic economy presented it with no significant incentive for PPD for policy formulation11. 
Neoliberal public sector reforms aimed to reduce the role of the state in the economy. It opened up 
spaces for private enterprises to contribute more to economic growth and employment, therefore, 
increased the potential economic usefulness of the private sector to the state. The UDF government, 
therefore, often referred to the private sector as „the engine of economic growth‟ – a cliché that 
expressed the government‟s intentions rather than the reality. During the decade (1994-2004), private 
sector investment shrank by 70 per cent, as did the manufacturing sector from 21 percent to 12 per 
cent. Foreign direct investment reduced from $25m to $3.3m by 200112, leading to reductions in 
employment and erratic economic growth. While tax revenues could finance up to 60 per cent of the 
recurrent annual government budget, the UDF government, like its predecessor, depended more on 
external finance for development initiatives. Up to 80 per cent of the annual development budget and 
40 percent of the recurrent budget were financed through external aid (loans and grants) (USAID, 2005; 
AFRODAD, 2007). Thus, there was relatively little financial dependence on the private sector by the 
state 
In terms of political financing, the continued fusion between a ruling party and the government enabled 
the UDF access to government resources by direct expenditures on party activities. Furthermore, the 
party and two other opposition parties, used to receive quarterly funding from the National Assembly 
under section 40 (2) of the Constitution13. More importantly, as a ruling party overseeing the discharge 
of patronage, the UDF was able to mobilise political resources from the business community through 
collusive SBRs as discussed in chapter six. President Muluzi was further able to mobilise resources 
                                                             
11 It is important to emphasise that during the one-party era, there were ad hoc PPD meetings but they were limited to 
discussions about policy implementation. 
12 Figures from Nthara (2003),  and www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/wid_cip_mw_en.pdf (accessed 10 July 2010). 
13 The section provides that a political party that obtains at least 10 per cent of the national vote in parliamentary elections 
and actually wins seats in the Assembly should be given funding to enable it to continue representing its constituency. The 
actual amounts are decided by a proportional formula based on the number of seats that the party wins in the Assembly. 
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from foreign organisations and governments for the party even though the money was deposited into 
his personal account14. Thus, the financial utility of the private sector to the state was obviously higher 
than during the MCP era but was not sufficient to commit the UDF government to a pattern of 
collaborative, rather than collusive, SBRs. The easiness of accessing external funding for development 
and political activities diminished the dependence of the government on the private sector and instead 
increased the dependence of the private sector on the state for favours and rents.  
The changing patterns of the state‟s financial dependence on the business sector reinforces the view, 
often made in studies on the fiscal sociology of the state, that sources of state revenue directly shape 
patterns of state formation and subsequent state-society relations (Moore, 2004;Thies,2007; 
Campbell,1993). Where the state largely depends on the domestic business sector for its revenues, as 
was the case with the colonial state after 1896, the state is inclined to seek collaboration with the 
productive groups of society. 
Political dependency 
Besides the state‟s financial dependence on the business sector, the significance of the business 
sector as a political constituency shaped the attitudes of the state elites towards the sector. The key 
considerations were whether the business community (or a segment of it) was an asset or a liability to 
the survival of the state or the regime. The extent to which the state perceived the business community 
to be a political asset influenced the institutional forms that SBRs took. For instance, Johnston‟s 
rudimentary state had its legitimacy in rules made by the British government to whom he was 
accountable. He was, therefore, not bothered so much by the consternation his collusive relationship 
with the BSAC caused among the rest of the European agricultural and commercial interests. The 
European settlers knew that the legitimacy of Johnston‟s state depended less on them than on the 
                                                             
14 For example, he sourced up to MK1,740,166,712 from governments of Libya, Morocco, Rwanda and Taiwan (Namangale, 
15 September,2010;Nyangulu,12 January,2006). He is also reported to have taken advantage of his religion (Islam) to solicit 
$98m from Kuwait (Chirambo, 1998). 
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Foreign Office. This awareness was reflected in Reverend Hetherwick‟s letter to Reverend Dr. Scott in 
which he observed that change “in the means and methods of [the] administration….[could] only be 
done by [British] government”15. Thus, the wider European business community was neglected by 
Johnston‟s „state‟ because it lacked sufficient political usefulness to his administration. After 1907, 
however, the survival of the emerging colonial state depended on the consent of the European 
community represented by business associations. It is the quest for state legitimacy that compelled 
successive governors to counsel the European planters and commercialists to form the NCA for policy 
dialogue and political representation and the co-option of business representatives into the EXCO. 
However, the introduction of the Central African Federation (CAF) decreased the political dependence 
of the colonial state on the settler community. Furthermore, the CAF led to the intensification of 
nationalist activities. A combination of these factors helped the African community to acquire 
importance for the continued survival of the colonial state. Thus the government became increasingly 
sympathetic to African issues, leading to direct African representation in LEGCO which was the mainl 
forum for formal PPD. 
Despite its low financial usefulness to the state, the non-state business sector was politically important 
to the MCP regime. For instance, the marginalisation of the predominantly „white‟ Chamber in the early 
years of independence, and the creation of ABAM projected the spirit of nationalism which the state 
elites used to consolidate their power. Furthermore, the cooptation of ABAM into the political party 
enabled the regime to monitor and control African entrepreneurs but also turned ABAM into a tool for 
proclaiming the benevolence of the regime for giving them business opportunities. In spite of being 
politically useful to the regime, both the Chamber and ABAM did not have independent policy voice. 
 
                                                             
15  From Rev.Hetherwick to Rev. Dr Scott, 13 June 1892, PRO, FO 6337/211. 
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The political dependence of the UDF government on the business sector was mainly at two levels. 
Firstly, its engagement with the Chamber and the NAG were proclaimed as a sign of its democratic 
credentials. Thus, Muluzi himself initiated policy dialogue with the business community within a few 
months of coming to office. This was initially driven by an apparently genuine need to form a 
developmental coalition between the government and the private sector. These attempts pleased the 
international donor community, especially the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the 
World Bank and IMF, which were keen to see consultative processes in economic policy-making. For 
the electorate, policy consultations showcased the reality of political change from the practices of the 
MCP regime and helped to cultivate support for the new government. Secondly, competitive politics and 
UDF‟s need to broaden its support base put the party in a persistent populist mode. The party‟s 
dependence on SMEs and informal businesses (mostly petty traders including street vendors), 
increased as they were seen to constitute a large voting bloc. The president himself began to describe 
himself as „a chief vendor‟. Dependence on this category of business increased in the second term of 
the government while that on the Chamber decreased as the latter‟s calls for accountability were 
understood as attempts to undermine the government. As a result, the government began to shy away 
from high-level PPD.  
Thus, the evolution of Malawian SBRs has been an integral part of the evolution of state-society 
relations since colonial times. Their shifting institutional and organisational patterns have been products 
of political processes involving the state and the organisations of the business sector. From a 
relationship of constructive contestation based on a balance of power in the colonial period, the pattern 
changed to a patrimonial relationship in which the state enjoyed disproportionate power over the 
business sector in the one-party period, before degenerating into an uncertain partnership 
characterised by institutional flux in the first decade of multiparty democracy. The forms of SBRs were 
never stable and were dependent on the political and economic orientations of the incumbents of state 
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power. The intensity of policy engagement varied with forms of the state, mainly because of variations 
in the extent of the state‟s financial and political dependence on the business community. In the next 
section, I highlight the implications of Malawian SBRs for theories of state-business relations. 
7.2. Implications for theories of state-business relations  
The evolution of Malawian SBRs has a few implications for the theories of SBRs. To put these 
implications in perspective, I begin with an overview of the theories. 
Two sets of theories of SBRs can be distinguished on the basis of how „business‟ is conceptualised. 
The first set conceives business as capital, economic sector and a corporation (Haggard, Maxifield and 
Scheneider, 1997). Theories in this set take a structural view of business influence on the state. The 
private control of physical and financial assets and  capital mobility; factor intensity, asset specificity 
and the degree of industrial concentration in sectors; size of firms, their internal organisation and 
ownership - are all theorised to shape the attitudes of the state and its policies towards the business 
sector (Haggard, Maxfield and Schneider, 1997, Leftwich and Sen, 2010). From the perspective of 
these theories, SBRs are arms-length relations and there is no need for institutionalised channels for 
them. These theories give little analytical attention to the political organisation of business and to the 
institutional arrangements for mediating business interests with the state. Although important for their 
interpretive insights, the theme of this study – the politics of institutional formation, maintenance and 
change – was inspired less by them than the second set of theories. 
The second set conceptualises business as „associations‟ and „networks‟. Business –as-association 
perspectives are concerned with the dynamics and forms of business collective action in expressing 
and negotiating policy preferences with the government. Business-as-network perspectives emphasise 
„embedded‟ and „strategic‟ networks16 of personal relationships between individual business managers 
                                                             
16 According to Haggard, Maxfield and Schneider (1997:54-55), „embedded‟ networks are natural, generalised and pre-
existing, e.g. extended family, regional or ethnic networks. They form a primal social fabric in which all other forms of soc ial, 
 268 
 
 
and owners on the one hand, and bureaucrats and governing politicians on the other, and their 
overlapping roles that blur the public-private divide. Thus, SBRs are defined in this perspective as the 
totality of the interactions between economic and political institutions and organisations17. In this view, 
the goal of SBRs is to enhance economic growth and poverty reduction. Thus, „effective‟ or „good‟ 
SBRs are generally understood as a set of highly institutionalised, responsive and transparent 
interactions between the state and the organised business sector (Schneider and Maxfield,1997; 
MacIntyre,1994; Harris, 2006; te Velde, 2006; Sen and Cali, 2009). Such SBRs, it is argued, have four 
key virtues: information exchange between the government and the business community; reciprocity in 
strategic (investment) actions between the government and the business sector; credibility of 
government policy to minimise uncertainty and risk of investment by private businesses; and trust 
between the government and the business sector (Schneider and Maxfield, 1997; te Velde, 2006, 
Herzberg and Wright, 2006). The theory suggests that these virtues are dependent on the following 
empirical factors:  
 How the state is organised vis-a-vis the business sector. Preference is for a pilot agency, 
centralised decision making, and a competent economic bureaucracy that has a reasonable 
degree of Weberian characteristics. 
 How the business sector is organised vis-a-vis the state. Preference is for a peak, 
encompassing business association that has high technical capacity and ability to intermediate 
member interests. 
 How public private dialogue is conducted. Preference is for a regular, formally institutionalised 
forum. 
 The availability of instruments for avoiding harmful collusive behaviour. Emphasis is on the 
presence of a competition (anti-trust) law. 
 
While there is a general inclination for formally institutionalised SBRs (te Velde, 2010; Pinaud, 2007; 
Leftwich and Sen, 2010), there is empirical evidence showing that the virtues of „effective‟ SBRs are 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
economic and political interactions are embedded. Strategic networks are artificial creations – narrower, instrumental forms 
of cooperation established to achieve some specific goal. 
17
 Given the main concerns of this research of the evolution of Malawian SBRs as spelled out in chapter one, the study fits 
in this category better than in the first. 
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attainable through informal arrangements (Wang, 2000; Moore and Schmidtz, 2008; Tenev et al, 2003; 
Steer and Sen, 2008).  
But how does the Malawi story relate to this theory? I show the theoretical insights following the 
sequence of empirical factors of „effective‟ SBRs as presented above. 
7.2.1. Organisational characteristics of the state  
Of the three institutional configurations discussed in chapters four to six, it is colonial SBRs that most 
approximated „effective‟ SBRs. When the three are compared, they suggest that regardless of the 
character of the political regime i.e. authoritarian or democratic, SBRs characterised by constructive 
contestation of policy require that decision-making authority within the state should neither be too 
concentrated (i.e. in the MCP period) nor too fragmented (i.e. in the UDF period). Subject to the political 
and historical setting, either extreme presents problems that preclude the emergence of „effective‟ 
SBRs. For example, the monopoly of the policy space by president Banda after 1964 stifled transparent 
policy dialogue, while too much uncoordinated decentralisation under President Muluzi after 1994 
fragmented the policy arena and undermined the credibility of government. In practical terms, this 
suggests that reforms aimed at building state capacity for policy formulation and delivery, must seek the 
balance between concentration and deconcentration of decision-making authority within the state. 
However, finding the inflexion point will not be easy or fast. 
The importance of „pilot agencies‟ for effective SBRs is well established in the literature, beginning with 
Johnson‟s (1982) study of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Current 
theories emphasise the presence of an investment agency whose bureaucrats are technically 
competent and insulated from political pressures from politicians and other social groups. However, 
there was no such organisation in colonial Malawi but SBRs were consultative. In the post colonial 
period, although the Ministry of Commerce and Industry enjoyed the nominal recognition as a „lead 
agency‟, in effect there were several bureaucratic agencies involved in SBRs, including the Malawi 
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Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA), Malawi Export Promotion Council (MEPC), and Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development. Clarity of policy was ensured by the centralisation of decision-
making power in the President during the one-party period which ensured what Cammack et al (2010) 
have described as „vertical coordination‟ of policies within the state. Decentralisation of the authority 
under President Muluzi yielded bureaucratic competition and policy coordination failures. Furthermore, 
as modern economies get even more complex, it is reasonable to anticipate even greater 
organisational pluralism within the state due to the need of specialist agencies. This suggests that the 
critical element for effective SBRs is not just the presence of a lead bureaucratic agency but the ability 
of government to coordinate policies from the agencies in order to send coherent, unambiguous 
messages to the business sector and enhance the credibility of government. 
The normative appeal of the Weberian state structures and especially their potential role in fending off 
collusion in SBRs and building state capacity is well established (Evans, 1995; Johson, 1982; Evans 
and Rauch, 1999; Evans, 1997). The sticking issue which has not received enough attention in current 
SBR theory is about how to create such structures in countries like Malawi, which have known mostly 
patrimonial bureaucracies where appointments into the policy-making cadres of the public service are 
an important part of political patronage and technocratic integrity has been systematically undermined 
over time18. The centrality of politics in the evolution of Malawian SBRs suggests that creating such 
structures (hence improving state capacity) is likely to be less of a technicality in administrative reforms 
than a profoundly political process involving strenuous and protracted negotiations and bargaining as 
such reforms have the effect of redistributing power within the public sector.  
                                                             
18 Technocratic integrity exists where technocrats are typically willing and able to provide advice to leading politicians. It 
does not exist where senior officials are systematically either afraid or badly equipped to provide advice (Cammack et al, 
2010:4). 
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7.2.2. Organisational characteristics of the business sector 
Contrary to the theories that emphasise the structural constraints of SBRs on the state, the analysis of 
Malawian SBRs provides evidence that the (indigenous) business sector in developing countries does 
not yet occupy a privileged position. Despite political and economic liberalisation, the state has 
continued to shape the character of capitalism and the position of business in the policy arena. The 
activities of the state in the economy strongly influence the dynamics of collective action in the business 
sector, sometimes intentionally but also in unintended ways. It is suggested in current theory that 
encompassing, peak business associations are crucial to the formation of effective SBRs. The 
argument is that policy preferences and demands of a business association are partly dependent on 
the scope of its membership. Encompassing associations are assumed to be in a position to pursue 
non-particularistic policies that ensure long term economy-wide efficiency (Leftwich and Sen, 2010; te 
Velde, 2006; Bell, 1995). 
The paradox suggested by the Malawian case is that the formation of such encompassing associations 
has been at the behest of the state. For example, the colonial state counselled the Chamber and the 
Nyasaland Planters Association (NPA) to form the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture 
in the 1900s in order for the government to obtain one consolidated view on any policy proposal. When 
planters and commercialists fell apart, again it was the state that brokered the formation of the 
Nyasaland Convention of Associations in the late 1920s. Similarly, when merchants broke away from 
the Chamber and demanded recognition of the Nyasaland Merchants Association by the state, the 
government refused and denied its members access to policy dialogue. Consequently, the merchants 
rejoined the Chamber on the pretext of avoiding being played off by the government. In the one-party 
period, president Banda directed the formation of ABAM and the merger of the Chamber and the ICC. 
But because of the state‟s nationalist concerns the two peak associations operated alongside each 
other. Conversely, initial recognition of the National Action Group (NAG) and the granting of access to 
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policy dialogue to many associations during the UDF era, undermined collective action in the business 
sector until the Chamber began to co-opt sectoral associations and successfully challenged the 
existence of the NAG. These suggest that unless the state is interested in the existence of a peak 
association (either for policy dialogue or other reasons), the business sector is more likely to suffer from 
organisational pluralism and be unable to recognise itself as a class.  
Even if the business sector should be able, on its own, to develop encompassing associations, access 
to policy dialogue is the single most important incentive at the disposal of state elites to shape directly 
or indirectly, how the business sector gets organised vis-a-vis the state. The importance of access to 
the state is further illustrated by the demise of ABAM a few years into the transition to democracy. 
ABAM‟s fate illustrates the importance of the independence of business associations from party politics, 
especially in an evolving environment of multiparty politics. 
SBR theories underscore the need for business associations to develop in-house professional capacity 
to collect and process policy-relevant information. This is all well and good but the Malawi story 
presents a few sobering facts. Colonial business associations had only one permanent staffer i.e. the 
secretary. The executive committees of the associations did all the technical work themselves. During 
the MCP period, both the Chamber and ABAM had lean structures but with a little more technical and 
administrative staff. But this was a period of state directives rather than policy dialogue with non state 
actors. Similarly, nascent concertation in the UDF period owed more to the opening up of the political 
system than to increases in professional staffs in the Chamber whose numbers remained low 
(Chingaipe and Leftwich, 2007). This observation does not negate the importance of professional 
technical capacity to vibrant business associations. Instead, it reinforces an earlier observation, first 
expressed by Leys, that it is more important for the domestic businessmen to be politically competent 
as a class  i.e. being able to recognise the requirements of capital as a whole and seeing to it that the 
requirements are met, than for them to be technically or financially efficient (Leys,1994a:230). This 
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observation is particularly pertinent where racism, nationalism or ethnicity present persistent fault lines 
in the private sectors. In Malawi, these identities have been exploited by state elites for political reasons 
but have had the negative effect of constraining „business‟ from developing a class identity.  Failure to 
transcend the racial and ethnic divides as well as the distinction between foreign and national, 
fragments the business sector and reduces its capacity as a political actor. 
7.2.3. The practice of Public-Private Dialogue (PPD). 
SBR theory deduces the strength of PPD from four main variables: whether there is a PPD forum, the 
format of the forum, the frequency of its meetings and whether the forum is formal or informal (te Velde, 
2006, Cali and Sen, 2009). Measurements of these variables, though problematic sometimes19, provide 
a preliminary impression of the nature of PPD. However, there is evidence that even in situations where 
the measurements are apparently favourable for genuine dialogue, the quality of PPD may be low as 
exemplified by Zimbabwe20. The story of Malawian SBRs suggests that one explanation for the format 
and quality of PPDs is the degree of dependence of the state on the business sector (or part of it) for 
revenues and political support. 
Using basic ordinal scales to measure the degree of the state‟s political and financial dependence on 
the private business sector, Table 7.1 presents some specific propositions about the format and 
intensity of PPD. In theory, both political and financial dependence are measurable on a continuum so 
much that there is an infinite space for their interaction, giving rise to many possible combinations. 
Placing the patterns of any SBRs on this coordinate plane depends on empirical evidence. 
  
                                                             
19 For example, frequency measurements are only indicative as they do not take into account ad hoc meetings or small 
group meetings both of which constitute PPD. 
20 Between 1997 and 2006, Zimbabwe had an institutionalised formal PPD forum, the National Economic Consultative 
Forum (NECF) that met at least four times a year  but the forum was used by the government more to exercise control over 
the business sector than to consult on policy (te Velde,2006). 
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Table 7.1: Dependence of the state on the business sector and the format and intensity of PPD 
 
 
There are two main propositions in Table 7.1. Firstly, if an organised business sector (or sub sector) is 
perceived to be a significant constituency for the government‟s political well-being, the state is more 
likely to seek to engage with its representatives. However, the form of engagement will depend on other 
factors such as the strategic interests of the state elites and their perception about the financial 
importance of the sector or sectors. The business association will either be co-opted into the 
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government structures, for example ABAM, or will remain separate from the state, for example, the 
Chamber in the MCP period. Conversely, if the business sector is perceived to be neither a significant 
asset nor threat to the political survival of the government, its business representatives will be 
marginalised from PPD as was the case with the Indian Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in colonial 
Malawi. Secondly, if the financial dependence of the state on the business sector (or subsector) is 
significant, the more likely it will be for the state to engage with business representatives in policy 
dialogue, as was the case with the Chamber after 1994. Conversely, if a business sector has low 
financial importance to the government, genuine policy dialogue with its representatives may not be 
forthcoming. 
The analysis of SBRs in the period of UDF government further suggests that where both the state and 
business are weak and the institutional framework is fluid, and the propensity to collusion is high, formal 
arrangements for PPD are necessary. The informal ones may be contested away as was the case with 
the NAG. But the mere existence of a formal institutional arrangement is not enough. Its effectiveness 
depends on the specifics of the arrangement and on the interests of state elites. For example, ABAM 
was a delegate to MCP conventions but had no effective policy voice. 
7.2.4 The avoidance of harmful collusive behaviour 
For the avoidance of collusive behaviour, SBR theory emphasises the need for mechanisms that 
enhance transparency of business transactions and policy dialogue. Particular emphasis is on the 
existence and effective implementation of business competition law. While such legislation is important 
to a functioning market economy, the Malawi case suggests that the most important element in fending 
off collusion is the nature of the state and the attitude of its elites and business leaders towards 
transparency, accountability and principles of fair trading. For example, the colonial government did not 
have such a law but business competition was part of a shared economic ideology. Similarly, there was 
no such law during the one-party period but the scope of collusion was narrow because of business 
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policing by the strong state. Such legislation, however, was introduced in 1998 at the insistence of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and other multi-lateral 
organisations. But it existed only in statute books until 2005 because the UDF government reneged on 
its commitment to put in place the infrastructure necessary for implementing the law. Meanwhile, 
collusive SBRs developed into something of a norm.  
Thus, the existence of a competition law, per se, does not reduce harmful collusion, especially in 
situations where elites straddle business and politics. The avoidance of collusive behaviour requires a 
multi-faceted approach that ensures the adherence to standards of transparency and accountability and 
to a separation of the public from the private spheres of life. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that in 
contexts where both the organisation of politics and the economy are in transition, regulations on 
political financing are important for fending off collusion in SBRs. This is particularly important because 
in Malawi and other nascent democracies in Africa, access to state power is the surest and quickest 
route to personal wealth. 
Thus, the measurement of SBRs must go beyond a search for specific organisational structures and 
pieces of legislation. Econometric measurements in this regard (for example, te Velde, 2006; Cali and 
Sen, 2009) give snap-shot views that are not systematically contextualised and do not, therefore, tell us 
how the organisations and institutions were formed and how well they function. This research has 
shown that the organisational and institutional forms of SBRs, and their functioning, are profoundly 
shaped by the distribution and exercise of political and economic power between the state and the 
business sector. Thus, the measurement of SBRs is one area where political science and economics 
provide a useful interdisciplinary approach. 
7.2.5. Implications for African state-business relations 
In this section I highlight how my findings relate to three themes on African SBRs. These are racial and 
ethnic identities, attitudes of state elites towards business and the role of international aid. 
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Racism and ethnicity 
Several analyses have pointed out that in Africa, racial and ethnic identities distinguish between a 
country‟s political and economic elites. See for example, Brautigam (2002) and Handley (2008) for 
Mauritius, Himbara (1994) for Kenya, Taylor (2007) for South Africa and Zimbabwe, Handley (2008) for 
South Africa, Heilbrunn (1997) for Togo and Benin, and Heilman and Lucas (1997) for Nigeria and 
Tanzania. The main argument is that state and business elites use their positions to assert group rights 
and the economic advancement of their ethnic groups. The group that dominates the state has more 
advantages than other groups.  
This characterisation is borne out in the evolution of Malawian SBRs. For example, racial identities i.e. 
European, Indian and African were central in shaping the institutional and organisational forms of SBRs 
in colonial and post-independence periods. Thus, the European colonial state marginalised Indian 
commercialists even when the latter‟s share in national commerce was growing rapidly. Similarly, the 
MCP government was resentful of, and often harassed, the European and Indian businessmen as part 
of efforts to „Africanise‟ the business sector. However, unlike in Nigeria (Lucas, 1994; Heilman and 
Lucas, 1997), there is no evidence of ethnic or regional rivalry within the Malawian African business 
community for the period with which this study has been concerned (1891-2004). My findings further 
show that although multiparty politics in the 1990s fragmented the polity on regional and ethnic lines, 
these factors did not cause visible divisions in the business community and in SBRs. Instead, the most 
noticeable cleavages were based on political affiliation of individual businessmen. This shows that 
ethnic cleavages do not have a determining effect of their own on SBRs. Their effects depend on how 
elites use these identities as part of their political strategies for power. This point is reinforced by the 
fact that ethnically diverse societies such as Mauritius and South Africa (Handley, 2008; Taylor, 2007; 
Brautigam, 2002) where the state and the business sector are dominated by different ethnic or racial 
groups, have been able to forge state-business coalitions that have turned out to be developmental. 
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Attitudes of state elites towards business 
Heilman and Lucas (1997) have alerted us to the fact that states can be „pro-business‟ without being 
„pro-capitalist‟. In their conceptualisation, „pro-business‟ states make business-friendly policies but use 
them mainly to create opportunities for rents, leading to corrupt accumulation of wealth and a weak 
basis for a country‟s long term development. „Pro-capitalist‟ states on the other hand, make business-
friendly policies that enable private accumulation of wealth by ensuring productive investment of capital.  
The Malawi case underscores the importance of this distinction in designing reforms aimed at creating 
development-oriented SBRs. For instance, a wholesale adoption of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s 
made the UDF government appear to be more pro-business than pro-capitalist. Restrictions on doing 
business were relaxed, rent-creating and rent-seeking behaviours among state and most business 
elites became the norm rather than the exception, and productive investment slowed down as shown in 
chapter six. In contrast, the MCP regime often displayed a hostile attitude towards private business but 
it was pro-capitalist in that it encouraged productive investments of rents (see Cammack et al, 2010) 
even though it was a version of capitalism in which the state dominated the economy.  
This has important implications for African SBRs. Firstly, it underscores the importance of careful study 
of the evolution of SBRs, analysing the discrepancy between public platitudes made by state elites and 
what actually they do with the business sector. It is clear that effective, growth-oriented SBRs will not 
come forth on the basis of public platitudes, such as „the private sector is the engine of growth‟, that 
was often spouted by the UDF regime. Secondly, it shows that „effective‟ SBRs cannot be had to order 
and it is not enough for the state to simply adopt pro-business policies. Growth-oriented SBRs require 
reforming both the state and business associations for a collaborative rather than a collusive 
relationship. For the business sector, this means that African businessmen must recognise pan-
business interests and develop a class consciousness that is divorced from simplistic affiliation to a 
ruling party. Peak business associations founded on these principles are better placed to contribute to 
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growth and have potential to initiate reform of corrupt, patrimonial politics that characterise many 
African states.  
African SBRs and international aid 
This study has shown that the extent to which the state depends on the private business sector for 
revenues and political support is central to patterns of SBRs. This proposition implies that external aid 
given to developing countries may have a role in shaping the patterns of SBRs by giving state elites the 
perception that they can get additional money elsewhere without engaging with the business sector to 
work out favourable investment policies that will boost the creation of wealth. Furthermore, the orthodox 
neoliberal framework that guides the making of economic policies in many aid-dependent African 
countries restricts the range of strategies that states and business communities can use to create 
„effective‟ SBRs. There is, therefore, a need for more detailed national studies to explore this 
suggestion further.  
7.3.  Implications for institutional theory in political science 
In this section I identify the key contributions of this study to institutional theory. As mentioned in 
chapter three, there are many versions of institutional theory in political science, including rational 
choice, sociological, discursive, historical and normative institutionalism (Peters, 2005; Schmidt, 2006; 
Hay, 2002). The implications that I identify relate only to historical institutionalism - the approach that I 
have used to understand the politics of the institutional and organisational evolution of Malawian SBRs. 
These implications are on the concept of critical junctures especially its definition and relationship with 
the concept of path dependence, emphasis on the importance of history in explaining institutional 
discontinuities, how power asymmetries affect the pace of institutional change, and how actors interact 
with institutions to cause institutional change. 
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7.3.1.  Reconsidering the concept of critical junctures 
Institutional formation and change is considered mostly as happening during moments or episodes of 
upheaval, for example, periods of transition from one political system to another. Such periods are 
called critical junctures. According to Collier and Collier, a critical juncture is “a period of significant 
change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and 
which is hypothesised to produce distinct legacies” (2002:29). Other scholars, for example, Hogan 
(2005 and 2006), Abbot (1997), and Pierson (2004) define critical junctures in a similar way. Although 
the authors have subtle differences on the criteria for identifying a critical juncture, there is consensus 
on two points. First is that a critical juncture exists if a significant change took place. The second is that 
the change must establish a legacy. In these conceptions, judgments about any moment of change 
being a critical juncture can only be done at a later point in time when the effects of institutional change 
can be ascertained and it can be shown that a legacy was established as a direct result of the change. 
The analysis of Malawian SBRs suggests that changes during such periods affect mainly principles and 
ideational frameworks for organising state-society relations (i.e. macro-level change) but do not 
immediately translate to wholesale institutional transformation in specific institutional domains as is 
suggested by most formulations of critical junctures. For example, the introduction of the 1907 
constitution altered the framework of organising state-society relations by introducing the notion of 
political representation and sharing with the Legislative and Executive councils the power previously 
exercised by the Governor only. Similarly, the introduction of a one-party state constitution in the 1960s 
and especially the MCP‟s ideological mantra of „unity, loyalty, obedience and discipline‟ provided a new 
framework for organising state-society relations as did the democratic constitution in 1994. In specific 
institutional domains, actors negotiated with each other on how to align their relations with the ideals 
that framed macro-level changes. For example, the notion of political representation that was provided 
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in the 1907 constitutional order, led to recurrent political contestation over many years between state 
elites and the European community on how best to give it practical effect. It was not resolved until the 
1950s but agreements at different points from 1909 enabled the institutionalisation of PPD within the 
LEGCO. Similarly, the transition to „democracy‟ between 1993 and 1994 was generally understood to 
imply policy consultations between government and societal actors, especially the business community. 
But as the discussion in chapter six has shown, the specific institutional arrangements for doing this had 
to be negotiated incrementally and a satisfactory settlement had not been reached by 2004. Even the 
institutional edifice of the one-party state was built incrementally through resolutions of the party‟s 
annual convention.  
Thus, institutional formation within each period was an incremental process in which change involved 
introducing modifications to the rules in ways that were compatible with the main ideas for organising 
relations within the polity. This reinforces recent theorising about gradual and endogenous institutional 
change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Greif and Laitin, 2004) within historical institutionalism, that 
represent a departure from earlier concerns with abrupt institutional changes induced by exogenous 
factors. My contention is that macro-level critical junctures affect ideas for organising relations and 
subsequent institutional change in different domains is hardly abrupt but is shaped by the ideational 
framework established at critical junctures. 
Furthermore, I suggest that the emphasis on effects of institutional change as a definitive element for a 
critical juncture is rather misplaced because institutional change may not be a necessary element. This 
may sound counterintuitive but in the light of recent theories of  gradual institutional change involving 
layering, conversion and drift (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), it is illogical to define a critical juncture  in  
terms of a period when an existing institutional set-up broke down, or an off-path change was made. 
Furthermore, at critical junctures, changes to specific institutions may be possible, even plausible, but 
may be rejected outright or may be aborted soon afterwards. For example, in 1994 a constitutional 
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conference agreed to stop the straddling of business and politics by presidents and ministers and 
developed specific constitutional rules for this. However, the UDF government simply ignored the 
provisions and straddling strategies of political elites got entrenched. Such cases of aborted change or 
of cases in which actual institutional change takes a path other than the one envisioned by actors, for 
example, Malawi‟s democratisation process (see Vondoep,2005), would negate some historic moments 
as non critical junctures. As Collier and Collier argue, “if the change does not produce a legacy...then 
one would assert that it was not in fact, a critical juncture” (2002:30). I suggest that rather than the 
effects of the institutions that get created, it is people‟s expectations for real institutional change in a 
particular direction that should be a key definitive element of critical junctures. The expectations may be 
fully or partially fulfilled or may not be fulfilled at all. The importance of emphasising expectations for, 
rather than effects of, change is that it recognises the role of actors in fulfilling the expectations for 
change in the institutional and organisational domains where they are involved as exemplified by the 
evolution of PPD between 1994 and 2004. 
Furthermore, once critical junctures are defined on the basis of people‟s expectations, historical 
institutionalism becomes a more internally consistent approach. A perennial criticism has been that the 
concepts of critical junctures and path dependence, which are the essential building blocks of the 
approach, are inconsistent. The argument has been that the concept of critical junctures has implied 
abrupt institutional discontinuities, often orchestrated by external factors, while path dependence has 
implied institutional continuities and slow, incremental endogenous change, even across periods that 
have been designated as critical junctures (Hogan,2006; Peters et al,2005). By defining critical junctures 
on the basis of expectations for change, the apparent contradiction between the two concepts wanes 
because the proposed definition allows a range of outcomes vis-a-vis institutional reform including „no 
change‟, and is less deterministic about the speed of change. Whether change happens, what form it 
takes and its speed, are all empirical questions as illustrated by the changing institutional and 
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organisational forms of SBRs across the three periods. But where institutional resistance to change is 
significant, and institutions begin to evolve in ways that diverge from people‟s expectations as 
expressed at the critical juncture, and the evolution is clearly shaped by institutional arrangements that 
were in place before the critical juncture, then institutional continuity can be explained by path 
dependence. A typical Malawian example for this phenomenon is the labour tenancy that has continued 
on tobacco estates since colonial times despite attempts by both colonial and post-colonial governments 
to curb the system (Woods, 1993; McCracken, 1983; Pryor and Chipeta, 1990). 
7.3.2.  History and causation in historical institutionalism 
A primary assumption in historical institutionalism is about institutional continuities even across 
moments of upheaval. The persistence of institutions is consequently explained in terms of legacies of 
the past using the concept of path dependence (Pierson, 2000b; Mahoney, 2001; Clemens and Cook, 
1999). The evolution of Malawian SBRs shows clearly that history explains not just institutional 
continuities but also discontinuities, and shapes the content of subsequent reforms. For example, the 
MCP government took on productive roles in the economy and modified the mechanisms for the 
parliamentary representation of European commercialists and planters, in order to correct what they 
perceived to be colonial injustices. Similarly, after 1993 political change saw the dismantling of the 
institutional set-up of the one-party state including repeal of the forfeiture laws and freeing social 
organisations (trade unions and business associations) from a forced membership of the MCP. The 
point here is that history matters not just for institutional continuity but also for change. Actors draw upon 
their historical experience with predecessor institutions (i.e. learning) to decide whether to discard, 
retain or modify the existing institutions. This aspect of how „history matters‟ in causing institutional 
discontinuities is not emphasised and is less theorised than how it causes institutional continuities. 
Similarly, it is argued that explanation of institutional continuity must necessarily be long and should go 
back to a very early phase of institutional formation (Hall, 1999; Hoff, 2003; Mahoney, 2003). This 
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approach is necessary to establish „path dependence‟ in institutional evolution. The analysis of the 
evolution of Malawian SBRs shows that the experience with colonial institutions was critical in shaping 
institutional change after independence. For example, the political dominance of Europeans in LEGCO 
led to the proscription of non-Africans from elected positions after independence, but the importance of 
representation of European planters in Parliament led to the creation of a „parliamentary opposition‟. 
Similarly, the experience with the institutions of the one-party state was influential in shaping institutional 
change for the democratic era. For example, expropriation of private property by the MCP regime led to 
the abolition of the forfeiture laws and enactment of legal rules to protect private property. The case 
study does not provide evidence, even for a remote suggestion, that colonial institutions influenced the 
formation of institutions for the democratic era. This has an important implication for historical 
institutionalism. It suggests that the chain of causation may not have to go too far in the past and 
researchers ought to establish some terminus in their backward search. It reinforces Riker‟s observation 
that “at best a remote institution may influence its immediate successor, which in turn influences its 
immediate successor, and so on until the present, but it is hard to ascribe causal influence to a remote 
institution at the beginning of such a chain when the influential structure has been modified repeatedly” 
(1995:123).  
7.3.3.  Power, politics and the pace of institutional change 
It is already established that some institutions are slow-moving while others are fast-moving (Clemens 
and Cook, 1999; Roland, 2004) depending on how deeply entrenched in the social fabric the institutions 
are. Formal political institutions, for example, national constitutions and other laws, are generally taken 
to be superficial and therefore fast-moving and the informal ones, for example, cultural or traditional 
rules governing aspects such as marriages, are taken to be deep-rooted and therefore slow-moving.  
The evolution of Malawian SBRs shows that the pace of change may depend less on whether the 
institution is formal or informal, political, economic or cultural, than on the distribution and exercise of 
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power between proponents and opponents of institutional change. For example, during the MCP era, 
once a change was deemed desirable by the political elite, whether in the cultural, political or economic 
sphere, the pace was fast because there was no need for prolonged negotiations with any other societal 
groups and the state deployed ruthless mechanisms to enforce compliance with the change. For 
example, termination of a European parliamentary opposition was immediate as was the change of the 
electoral system in the 1970s both of which aimed at consolidating power for Dr. Banda. In the 
democratic period (1994-2004), institutional change was slow because of protracted negotiations due to 
the balance of power between the state and business associations as exemplified by the process 
leading to the establishment of a formal PPD. This study, therefore, provides evidence for the view that 
economic and political institutions are political settlements between elites. More specifically, where 
power is dispersed among elite clusters, there exist „veto points‟ (Tsebelis, 2002) which slow down 
institutional reforms. This was the case in the colonial and the democratic periods where business 
associations and other societal actors engaged with government to influence the content of reforms and 
the pace of their implementation. Conversely, where political power is centralised, as was the case 
during the MCP era, there are no independent competing centres of power and veto possibilities are 
remote. Institutional reforms are therefore most likely to be fast-paced. 
7.3.4.  Agency and structure –the causes of institutional formation and change 
It is commonly assumed among institutionalists that all social, political and economic behaviour is 
governed by institutions, formal or informal (North, 1990). The analysis of Malawian SBRs shows that 
institutions do not always form a dense, closely-knit set of unambiguous enforceable rules. Rather, there 
are gaps within the rules and between the rules and their interpretation and enforcement. This notion of 
institutional gaps is not necessarily new but it is fairly recent. For example, Dixit (2006), Leftwich and 
Sen (2010), and Mahoney and Thelen, (2010) have shown that there exist „institution-free‟ zones of 
behaviour. Olivier de Sardan (2008) has identified behavioural patterns which contradict both formal and 
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informal rules, suggesting the existence of „institutional space‟ in which actors manoeuvre. My findings 
suggest that these „gaps‟ become avenues for manipulative or calculative actors whose behaviours 
orchestrate subtle but significant institutional change, and in some cases give rise to informal rules that 
may work at cross-purposes with the formal ones. For example, political financing in democratic Malawi 
is an „institution-free‟ area and ruling politicians take advantage of this lack of rules to siphon resources 
from the state for narrow political ends. Similarly, public procurement rules have generally been loose in 
interpretation and enforcement as have been the rules aimed at cracking down on corrupt activities. By 
taking regular advantage of these gaps, the UDF regime gave rise to an informal set of rules which 
sustained collusive SBRs as discussed in chapter six. Ambiguities or discretion in the formal rules 
engendered contests over their meanings and shaped their enforcement. For example, the generality of 
the provision of section 2 of the Forfeiture Act (see chapter 5, section 5.3.2) gave rise to interpretations 
and enforcement mechanisms that essentially expropriated private property and earned the MCP 
regime the label of a predatory state. The analysis, therefore, shows that the interaction between 
agency and established rules is the source of institutional change, and sometimes of informal rules. 
7.4.  Some issues for further research and conclusion 
7.4.1.  Issues for further research 
This dissertation has implied some issues that merit further research. Firstly, the transitions from one 
form of political system to another, for example, from autocracy to democracy, is associated with 
changing capacities of states to discharge their traditional functions and to put in place institutions that 
deliver development. This research has suggested that the capacity of the Malawi state has been 
higher in the autocratic than democratic periods. There is need for more national studies on the 
institutional and organisational evolution of SBRs aimed at generating practical insights on how to build 
state capacity and especially Weberian-like bureaucratic structures in contexts of pervasive patrimonial 
politics. This need is perhaps more urgent in African countries than in the other regions of the 
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developing world, because except for a few studies (e.g. Taylor, 2007; Handley, 2008; Brautigam, 
2002), there is little scholarly work on SBRs and the problems of development are most pressing. 
Secondly, the development paths of Malawi and many other African countries have been explained 
mostly from the perspective of economic policy. However, this study has made allusions to effects of 
the different patterns of SBRs on growth and development. There is need for studies to determine the 
impact of specific SBR configurations on growth, investment and development and the mechanisms 
through which they work. Given the salience of SBRs in the political economy of development, it is 
hoped that such studies may generate a recipe of what institutional and organisational forms of SBRs 
work for or against broader goals of development in different political contexts.  
Thirdly, this study has been concerned with state-business relations at the macro-level. However, it is 
known, and I have shown especially for the colonial period, that states tend to have different attitudes to 
different subsectors of the business community. My hypothesis is that state attitudes towards 
subsectors will vary with the extent to which the state depends on the subsector for financial and 
political support. This implies that there are possibilities of macro-level patterns of SBRs being different 
from those at sectoral levels and that may have implications for state capacity, sectoral policies and  
the nature of coalitions that happen between state elites and producer groups. For example, in Malawi 
one would expect SBRs in the tobacco sector to be different from the macro-patterns that have been 
discussed in this work. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this thesis I have traced the evolution of state-business relations in Malawi from the 1870s up to 
2004, spanning three political periods distinguished on the basis of the nature of the state and the 
political system. I have demonstrated the primacy of politics in the practice of these relations, especially 
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in the formation, maintenance and change of institutions that shaped them. This process dovetailed 
with the formation and consolidation of the institutions and organisations of the state and involved 
negotiations, bargaining, sometimes directives by the government. The key variables that structured 
these relations were the structure, authority and ideological orientations of the state; the structure, 
power and ideology of the business sector; and the dependency of the state on the business sector for 
revenues and political support. The overall argument is that the shifting institutional configurations of 
Malawian SBRs were shaped by variations in the distribution and exercise of power between the 
organisations of the state and those of the business sector i.e. different forms of state-level politics 
entailed different arrangements for state-society and especially state-economy relations, and reflected 
evolving political settlements among elites. Racially inspired colonial politics led to a governance pact 
between the colonial administration and the European business community. Not only did this affect the 
development of African capitalism, it also constrained the development of class consciousness within 
the business community as issues were framed as European, Indian or African rather than pan-
business. Similarly, nationalist politics fragmented business associations on racial lines while the 
politically determined objectives to pursue infrastructural and industrial development saw the state 
crowd out private enterprise which also suffered state predation as the regime sought to entrench its 
power by eliminating any potential alternative centres of power and personalities. While democratic 
multiparty politics led to the end of state predation on private enterprise, it led to bureaucratic pluralism 
within the state and organisational pluralism within the business sector. SBR institutions were in a flux. 
Competitive politics provided incentives for SBR the emergence and maintenance of SBR institutions 
that enabled both policy dialogue and collusion. 
The analysis has generated new insights for historical institutionalism as an approach to political 
analysis. I have suggested that macro-level critical junctures affect mainly ideational frameworks for 
organising relations in society and that subsequent change in different institutional domains seek to 
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conform to the new framework. I have further suggested that the concept of critical junctures may 
acquire more explanatory power if its definitive elements are people‟s expectations for institutional 
change in the periods of upheaval rather than effects of institutional change. I have shown that history 
is useful not just for explaining institutional continuities (or legacies) but also discontinuities, and the 
design of new institutions. I have further contended that historical causal chains do not necessarily 
have to stretch too far into the past for it is the most recent predecessor institutions that shed light on 
existing institutional arrangements.  
Besides the conceptual and methodological insights summarised above, I have further suggested that 
not all human behaviour is governed by institutions, formal or informal. There are always gaps which 
provide room for agency so that the interaction between the existing rules and actors give rise to 
institutional change or give rise to informal rules. 
Finally, I have illustrated that political and economic institutions are products of politics and reflect 
temporal elite settlements. Thus, the road to understanding the formation, maintenance and change of 
institutions, especially of SBRs, has to be a political one. A search for obstacles to broad-based 
economic, social and political development must concentrate on identifying the institutions that serve 
small groups of elites at the expense of broad access to opportunities by the non-elite majority. Reform 
of these institutions, however, will hardly be without controversy and can be expected to be slow. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I: List of key informants 
NAME OF KEY INFORMANT PROFILE OF RESPONDENT DATE  AND PLACE OF INTERVIEW 
1. Mr. Rafiq Hajat Executive Director of Institute for 
Policy Research and Interaction, 
Former businessman, former 
Executive member of UDF, Former 
Vice Chairperson of MCCCI, Civil 
society advocate and pertinent 
observer. 
 16 June 2009, IPI, Blantyre 
2. Mr. Humphrey Mvula Executive member of UDF, 
Businessman, Former CEO for 
Shire Bus Lines (Parastatal) 
30 June 2009, Shire Highlands Hotel, Limbe. 
3. Dr.Mathews Chikaonda CEO of Press Corporation, Former 
Governor of Reserve Bank, Former 
Minister of Finance in UDF 
government, Co-Chairman of NAG, 
Chairman of Business Action 
Against Corruption. 
23 July 2009, Chayamba Building, Blantyre 
4. Mr. Aleke Banda Cabinet Minister in MCP and UDF 
governments, Businessman, former 
Managing Director of Press 
Corporation.  
22 July 2009, A10 Residence, Lilongwe. 
5. Mr.Harry Thomson Former MCCCI president during 
MCP period, Minister in UDF 
government, Businessman. 
20 July, BCA Residence, Limbe. 
6. Mr.Kassam. Okhai Businessman, former MCCCI 
President 1993-1997, former 
Chairman of National Economic 
Council. 
16th June 2009 , Gestetner offices, Blantyre 
7. Rt. Hon. Dr. Justin Malewezi Secretary to President and Cabinet 
in MCP government, Vice President 
and Minister of Privatisation in UDF 
government. 
15th July, 2009, A43, Kuka Lodge 1, 
Lilongwe. 
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8. Mr.Harrison B.Kaluwa President of MCCCI, President of 
Malawi Coffee Association, former 
bureaucrat (Ministry of Agriculture.), 
CEO for Mzuzu Coffee Planters 
Cooperative. 
17th July 2009, Ufulu Gardens, A43, 
Lilongwe. 
9. Mr.Alex Gomani Chief Economist, Millennium 
Challenge Account-Malawi; Long 
Service in Ministry of Finance and 
other ministries at the level of 
Principal Secretary. 
20th July, Millennium Challenge Account, 
Lilongwe. 
10. Mr.Ted Kalebe Former Technocrat in Office of 
President and Cabinet 
(Development Division), Former 
General Manager of Malawi 
Investment and Promotion Agency, 
Politician (MP) and Minister of 
Economic Planning and 
Development after 2004. 
 
16th July, 2009, A47 Residence, Lilongwe. 
 
11. Mr.Mike Mlombwa Businessman, President of 
Indigenous Business Association of 
Malawi. 
17th June, 2009, Plantation House, Blantyre. 
12. Mr. Dye Mawindo Former CEO of Privatisation 
Commission, Former Legal 
Practitioner, Former Company 
Secretary for MDC. 
15th July, 2009, NRC Residence, Lilongwe. 
13. Mr Harrison Mandindi Director of Trade, Ministry of 
Industry, Trade and Private Sector 
Development. 
21st July 2009, Lilongwe.  
14. Mr.Geoffrey Chikuta Former Chief Investigations Officer 
(10 years), Anti Corruption Bureau 
(1998-2008). 
17th July 2009, Millennium Challenge 
Account Offices, Lilongwe. 
15. Mr. Mark Katsonga Phiri Business man, former MCCCI 
president, Politician. 
30th June, 2009, AXA Bus Lines Offices, 
Blantyre. 
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16. Ms. Edna Chamgwera Malawi Chamber of Commerce 
Membership Development Officer, 
20 years of service with the 
Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. 
16th July, 2009, Lilongwe Chamber of 
Commerce Offices. 
 
17. Mr. Hope Chavula 
 
 
18. Mrs. Grace Amri 
Malawi Chamber of Commerce, 
PPD Economist.  
 
Malawi Chamber of Commerce 
PPD Coordinator.  
23rd July, Chamber House, Blantyre. 
19. Mr. D.J. Chikhawo Former National Executive 
Chairman of the African Business 
Association of Malawi (ABAM) and 
former Member of Parliament 
(MCP). 
22 July, 2009, Njewa, Lilongwe. 
20. Mr.Iron Costa Sindo Former member of MARTA and 
ABAM, UDF politician. 
27 July, 2009, UDF Offices, Limbe. 
21. Mr. Felix Mlusu Managing Director of NICO 
Holdings, co-chairperson for the 
PPD forum. 
27 July, Chibisa House, Blantyre. 
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Appendix II: Themes explored in interviews with key informants 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF FIELD WORK 
My field work aims to collect data that will enable the production of analytic narratives of how political processes 
shaped the institutional and organisational evolution of state-business relations in Malawi across three political 
epochs, namely colonial, one party dictatorship and multiparty democracy. Data will be collected and collated to 
achieve the following three broad objectives: 
 To show how the formal private sector emerged (during colonialism) and was organised vis-a-vis the 
state during each of the periods under study and the political imperatives for these forms of organisation. 
 To show how the state/public sector was organized vis a vis the private sector in each period under 
study and the political imperatives for these forms of organisation 
 To show the practice and the formal and informal institutional patterns of SBRs in each period 
 To show the content of SBRs during each period 
Operationally, these objectives will be unpacked into sets of questions and variables that will guide the process 
of data collection as detailed below. 
Structure of economy 
The structure of the economy is important for understanding the nature of business associations and state 
attitudes towards the business sector as a whole or parts of it. 
What were the major sectors of the economy during each of the three periods? Were there dominant 
companies within these sectors? If yes, did their role in the economy shape their influence or power in 
SBRs? How? Why? 
What was the structural power of the business sector i.e. its economic weight in the economy in terms 
of (a) levels of employment disaggregated between formal and informal employment? (b) taxation and 
other forms of state revenue (c) Forex earning capacity (d) contribution to GDP at sectoral level? 
Does the structural power of capital influence the perceptions and attitudes of the state regarding the 
political and economic utilities of the business sector or subsectors? 
How did the structural power of business affect the political capacity of business in SBRs? 
Were business associations seen as legitimate to the state i.e. to what extent was the administration 
and activities of organised business institutionalised and considered legitimate? 
Did the state have reason to regard business as a partner in policy and institutional creation and 
maintenance? Was this the same at macro and sectoral    levels of business organisation? How? 
Why? 
Structure of business associations 
Did business people see themselves as a part of a larger group –capital- i.e. is there any evidence of 
class consciousnesses?  
Business autonomy: Did the business community operate within a well delineated private arena that 
was both normatively and organisationally distinguishable from the interests and pursuits of the state 
and/or ruling party? 
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Did the business community have economic and political interests, identifiable and distinct from other 
groups including the state and was business organised in pursuit of those objectives? 
Were there peak organizations, representing all business? What were they? How did they form? Why 
did they form? 
 Were there distinct sectoral business associations? If yes, were there any formal or informal 
arrangements for them to meet, discuss, interact and cooperate? Were there any informal linkages? If 
yes, what form did they take? 
Were the organizations of business strongly unified at the top or was there considerable 
decentralization of power down to branches or chapters? How does the centralisation or 
decentralisation affect the political capacity of business associations? Is there competition among 
business associations for the attention of the state? Do the business associations cohere as a set of 
political actors? Do they generate and pursue pan-business positions? 
What was the professional capacity of the business associations in terms of research skills and 
negotiating experience? Did they have a professional staff? How many? Was it adequate for their 
purposes? Was the association properly equipped? 
Did the business associations have capacity to respond to policies or initiate policies? What is the 
evidence for this? Did they have the capacity to project policy positions publicly? Why did they have or 
not have the capacity?  
Is there any evidence of a strong regional, ethnic or even religious basis to some business 
organizations? i.e. what „organizational density‟ characterised the business associations? Were they 
divided or unified, and to what extent and why? 
How representative of businesses were the business associations? What are the membership densities 
of the associations relative to the number of firms at macro level for peak associations, at sectoral level 
for sectoral associations? 
How was power distributed within business associations? Did all members share the same rights and 
obligations or were their degrees of membership, influence and benefits? What factors shaped the 
patterns of power distribution within the associations? 
For peak associations, what institutional arrangements existed for managing the diversity of interests 
within its ranks and for resolving real conflicts? Was there a process of internal contestation of policy? If 
yes, what was that process? 
How were the business associations funded? Were they self-financing? Donor supported? State-
funded? Did the mode of funding affect their relations with the state? How? Why? 
Did the state provide „selective incentives‟ to business associations? 
Structure of the state and ideology of the regime 
What kind of state was it? Federal, unitary, presidential, parliamentary or mixture? How did this 
influence the institutional and organisational patterns of SBRs? 
What was the political character of the regime?  A powerful party-state? A dictatorship? Democratic etc 
and how did this shape SBRs? 
What was the economic ideology of the regime? Was it committed (and credibly so) to the promotion of 
the private sector? Or was it cautious about the private sector, promoting a more mixed economy with a 
stronger role for the state?  
Was the private business sector considered trustworthy by state elites 
Were there political ideologies or slogans that provided the rationale for the disposition of the state vis-
a-vis the business sector? What was the practice in relation to these ideologies? 
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How was the state organised for SBRs? i.e. was there a non-joined-up multiplicity of points of access to 
the state for businesses or a single gate-keeping organization within the state structure? Which 
departments, ministries or government agencies were primarily responsible for SBRs, and how did the 
office of Governor and later, President, fit into the picture? Was there an organisational entity that could 
be described as a „pilot agency‟? 
What was the character and capacity of the economic bureaucracy? Appointive or Meritocratic? 
Institutional Architecture of SBRs 
What was the predominant conception of state-society relations; especially SBRs during each period 
(Pluralism? Corporatism? Collaborative governance? etc) 
Were SBRs formally structured by institutions or were they entirely ad hoc or occasional? 
If SBRs were institutionalised, what form did they take and why did they take that form? Were they 
serviced by secretariats? How did the institutions form? (PPD, Corporatist, etc). Were the institutions 
formal, transparent and seen as legitimate? What were they and how did they work?  
 Were SBRs consultative? How regular were they? Was consultation largely token or was there genuine 
discussion? 
What was the balance of power within the SBR institution? Who called the meetings? Who set the 
agendas? Who funded them? what purpose did the PPDs serve? 
Was the business sector dominated by certain subsectors? i.e. did some sectors of the business 
community win a greater share of the „policy voice‟ than others? If so, why? What is the evidence? 
Were patterns of SBRs similar or different between the macro-and sectoral levels? How? Why? 
How did the nature of the state shape the autonomy of the business sector? What were the results of 
this- Did it engender/ enhance neopatrimonialism by the state or did it enhance the state‟s ability to 
pursue broad–based economic/development policy? 
How predictable and credible was the institutional environment in terms of (a) security of property 
rights? ((b) contract enforcement? Pricing and trading policies (both domestic and export trade). 
Were there behind-the-scenes, personalised influences in SBRs? What evidence is there? 
How did social cleavages i.e. factors such as race, class, ethnicity, political partisanship affect or shape 
SBRs?  
Did business success, generally, depend on political fealty to the party in government or the social 
cleavage dominating the state? Did political parties rely on business financing?  
What were the patterns of elite configurations? Was there some form of shared or double membership 
in state and business organisations? If yes, how did this shape SBRs? 
What kind of institutional informalities shaped SBRs? 
Were there informal organisations that had influence on SBRs? How did this work? Is the informality 
linked to, or mediated through, political party relationships? Do these relations reflect state or business 
domination? Predation, collusion or capture? 
What was the relative power of both formal and informal institutional arrangements and the way in which 
they interacted with each other (whether in conflicting, complementary, accomodating or substitutive 
ways). 
 If there were a multiplicity of business interests interacting with the state, what model best describes 
the state: 
Weathervane?:  
a. Was the state a passive vehicle through which inputs from business associations was processed? 
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b. Was the state biased towards or colonised by businesses or business associations? 
c. Can it be said that the government became the „steady appeasement of relatively small groups‟? 
Neutral View 
a. Was the state a by-stander or a referee presiding over existing rules (regulating) 
b. Did the state intervene to shape institutions and policies to tilt incentives towards the unorganised 
or voiceless parties? 
c. What factors motivated the neutrality of the state –need for political stability? Or consolidation of 
political power and legitimacy? 
d. Was the state autonomous? A mediator? Balancer and harmoniser of interests pushed by various 
business associations (and labour unions?). 
Broker Model 
a. Did the state elites pursue their own interests? 
b. If yes, which interests? How did this shape the institutional and organisational patterns of SBRs 
How did the state exert influence on the business sector?  
a. Control of access to business finance? How? 
b. Enforcement of policies, regulations and discipline? How? 
c. Predation? 
d. Selective awards of business contracts? 
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Appendix III Business portfolio of Press, MDC and ADMARC as at 1994. 
1: Press Corporation Limited’s Portfolio as at October 1994  
Subsidiaries 
Name of company Nature of business Press stake (%) 
Bergers Trading Ltd Malawi Retailer clothing 51.0 
 
Carlsberg Malawi Brewery Brewery 51.0 
 
Enterprise Container Ltd Manufacturing plastic products 62.5 
Central Poultry Ltd Poultry farming 100 
 Grain and Milling co. Ltd Milling of grain and production of stock 
feeds 
51.0 
 
Hardware and General Dealers Ltd Dealers in hardware and furniture 
manufacture 
100 
Malawi Distilleries Distiller and importer of beverages 50 
 
Mw Pharmacies Pharmacy chain 100 
Maldeco Fisheries Fishing company 100 
National Insurance Company Ltd Insurance 65.0 
Number One stores (mw) Ltd Clothing retailer 51 
Truworth (Zimbabwe) 
OILCOM  1978 Ltd Fuel and oil distributor 80 
British Petroleum (UK) 20. 
People’s Trading Centre (PTC) Ltd Supermarket chain 60 
Premier Group (South Africa) 
General Farming Company Ltd  100 
Press (Farming) Ltd  100 
Kasikidzi Estates Ltd  100 
Buwa Tobacco Estates  100 
Press Foods Food manufacturer and distributor 100 
Press group Ltd Investment company 100 
Press Properties Ltd Property investment and development  100 
Press trading pty Ltd Procurement agency (South Africa) 51.0 
Boart International (South Africa) 
Press Transport 1975 Ltd. Transporter 100 
Press Bakeries Ltd Property holding company 100 
Press Produce Ltd Property holding 100 
Sales Services Ltd Property holding company 100 
Tyre re-treaders Ltd tyre re-treaders and distributors 60.0 
Swaziland Tyres 
 
Associated companies 
Name of company Activity PCL effective interest Share held by Group 
companies 
Commercial Bank of 
Malawi 
Bankers 40 40 
Ethanol company Ltd Ethanol production 24.4 35.5 
Limbe Leaf Tobacco 
Company 
 Processing tobacco 42 42 
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Mandala Ltd Agriculture/trading 32.1 32.1 
National Bank of Malawi Bankers  38.4  38.4 
New Building Society Building society 15.9 24.5 
Press Hall Steel (holdings) 
ltd 
Steel processing 50 50 
 
Southern Bottlers (SOBO) 
Ltd 
Production of soft drinks 25.4 49.8 
Source PCL (1994:2 and 16). 
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2: ADMARC’s  portfolio as at 1994 
Name of Company Nature of business Percentage interest 
Auction Holdings Ltd (3 
subsidiaries)  
Tobacco trading, suppliers of 
agricultural inputs, equipment, pest 
control, tobacco re-handling 
 
Central Tobacco Properties   
Cold Storage Company 
 
  
Cory Mann George Ltd 
 
  
David Whitehead and Sons 
 
  
Dwangwa Sugar Corporation 
 
  
Finance Corporation Ltd 
 
  
Grain and Milling Ltd 
 
  
Investment and Development Bank 
of Malawi (INDE BANK). 
 
  
Malawi Finance Company Ltd 
 
  
Malawi Tea Factory Company Ltd 
 
  
Manica Freight Services Ltd 
 
  
MITCO 
 
  
National Bank of Malawi 
 
  
National seed Company Ltd 
 
  
Optchem (malawi) Ltd 
 
  
Stagecoach (Malawi) Ltd 
 
  
Sugar Corporation of Malawi 
(SUCOMA) 
 
  
   
Source: Privatisation Commission(1996), „Divestiture Sequence Plan‟ 
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3: MDC’s portfolio at 1992  
Name of Company  Nature of business Percentage interest 
Bata Shoe Company 
 
Manufacturing shoes, boots and 
sandals 
49 
Brick and Tile Company 
 
Manufacturing cement-based wall and 
floor tiles 
40 
Chillington Agrimal Ltd 
 
Manufacturing agricultural implements 40 
Commercial Bank of Malawi 
 
Commercial banking, corporate finance 
and leasing services 
30 
Encor Products Ltd 
 
Manufacturing and selling aluminium, 
enamel and galvanised wares and tea 
chest fittings and wheelbarrows 
23.3 
Investment and development Fund 
(Inde Fund) 
 
Loan and equity finance to Malawian 
owned companies 
29.35 
Leopard Match Company Ltd 
 
 Manufacturing and distributing leopard 
matches 
30 
National Insurance Company 
 
General insurance, life assurance and 
pension services 
20 
Packaging Industries (Malawi) Ltd 
 
Manufacturing of various packaging 
materials 
85 
Pipe Extruders and Plastic products 
Ltd 
 
Manufacturing pvc pipes, plain and 
printed bags and sheets 
 
The Import & Export Malawi Ltd 
 
Wholesale and retailing and marketing 
services 
86 
The Portland Cement Company 
(1974) Ltd 
 
Manufacturing Portland cement 100 
Tourism Development and 
Investment Company of Malawi Ltd 
 
Hotels, tour and travel services, airport 
catering services 
72.25 
Mpico Ltd  
 
Development, ownership and 
management of commercial and 
industrial property 
50 
Gem Mining and buying gem stones for 
export 
100 
Malawi Iron and Steel Corporation Producing castings in ferrous and non-
ferrous metals 
44.5 
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Appendix IV: MSCA Civil Appeal No.12 of 1998 
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